Spinoza's Causal Axiom: A Defense
| dc.contributor.author | Doppelt, Torin | en |
| dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Miller, Jon | en |
| dc.date | 2010-09-04 13:22:27.876 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-20T15:20:19Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-09-20T15:20:19Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-09-20T15:20:19Z | |
| dc.degree.grantor | Queen's University at Kingston | en |
| dc.description | Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-04 13:22:27.876 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | In the first chapter, I examine the definitions and axioms in Part One of Spinoza's Ethics. From there, I discuss five interpretations of Spinoza's notion of `axiom' in order to strengthen our understanding of the role Spinoza took axioms to play in his work. In the second chapter, I move from the discussion of what an axiom is to a consideration of the precise meaning of the fourth axiom of the first part (1A4). A key move in this chapter is to show that Spinoza does not separate causation and conception. In the third chapter, I defend the truth of 1A4 by showing that it follows from the definitions of Substance and Mode. I argue that in virtue of the conclusions of the previous two chapters, the axiom can be regarded as true for its relevant magnitude (in a way akin to the 'common notions' of Euclid's Elements). | en |
| dc.description.degree | M.A. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1974/6052 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Canadian theses | en |
| dc.subject | Spinoza | en |
| dc.subject | axiom | en |
| dc.subject | cause | en |
| dc.subject | knowledge | en |
| dc.subject | rationalism | en |
| dc.subject | conception | en |
| dc.subject | effect | en |
| dc.subject | substance | en |
| dc.title | Spinoza's Causal Axiom: A Defense | en |
| dc.type | thesis | en |