I Think, But I Am Not: Examining the Differential Effects of Objective and Subjective Measures of Attitude Extremity on Resistance to Persuasion

Abstract

Attitude extremity has traditionally been viewed as an important determinant of attitude strength and has almost exclusively been measured using an objective assessment approach. However, as is the case with other strength-related determinants of attitudes, an alternative subjective approach is also possible. The present research explores the premise that a subjective measure of extremity captures a fundamentally distinct construct from its objective measurement counterpart and that a subjective measure provides unique useful information in addition to what is provided by an objective measure. This idea was tested across four counterattitudinal persuasion studies. In each study, subjective and objective extremity were found to be only modestly associated, even after correcting for random measurement error, and indicated that a subjective measure of extremity contributed uniquely to persuasion outcomes. Increased subjective extremity was associated with less attitude change whereas greater objective extremity was associated with more attitude change. In Studies Two, Three, and Four, mediational analyses suggested that subjective extremity’s effect of reduced attitude change was a result of a thoughtful mechanism of counterarguing. In Study Four, mediational analyses also suggested that the effects of subjective extremity on counterarguing and subsequent attitude change were not solely a function of related subjective beliefs.