On Why Future Generations Matter

Abstract

This dissertation is comprised of three papers on why the fates of future generations matter. Each can be read on its own. But when read in the order presented, the papers form a single narrative, culminating in a unified view of why it matters that future generations both exist and fare well. The first paper takes up the first issue: why it matters that future generations exist – that human extinction comes about later rather than sooner. It rejects the natural view that postponing our extinction matters if doing so ensures the survival of rational activity. And, in place of that view, it suggests that postponing human extinction matters to the extent humanity – the human way of life – would flourish, if extinction was postponed. The second paper takes up the second issue: why it matters that future generations will fare well, if and when they exist. Specifically, it argues against the view that this matters for reasons of justice, assuming a particular but influential theory of what justice involves. The third paper takes up the same issue: it asks whether the welfare of future generations matters, if not for reasons of justice, then for reasons of beneficence. It answers: not necessarily. The welfare of future generations matters again because the flourishing of humanity matters. And, while beneficence contributes to humanity’s flourishing, our reasons to promote humanity’s flourishing are not reasons of beneficence. They are reasons to promote what’s good for humanity. Hence, the unified view: it matters that future generations both exist and fare well, not necessarily for the good of future generations themselves, but for the sake of the human way of life, given which future generations stand to those now alive not merely as fellow moral agents or patients, but as successors.