Fiscal Federalism and the Future of Canada: Can Section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867 be an Alternate to the Spending Power?

dc.contributor.authorAdam, Marc-Antoine
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-15T19:14:33Z
dc.date.available2024-10-15T19:14:33Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstract25 years after the coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982, we can now appreciate how much the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has profoundly influenced Canada’s constitutional evolution, both as regards the functioning of the State and the development of Canadian identity. Ironically, as the Charter pushed the principles of limitation on sovereignty, judicial review, constitutionalism and the rule of law to a level never seen before in a British parliamentary system, those very same principles were all but abandoned as regards federalism. In other words, while the idea that the Charter should set strict and enforceable limits to all aspects of government action has sunk deep in the Canadian psyche, relativism seems to have nearly completely overcome federalism.2
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1974/33620
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherQueen's University Institute of Intergovernmental Relations
dc.relation.ispartofseriesInstitute of Intergovernmental Relations (Spending Power Series 2007) Working Paper
dc.subjectSpending Power Series 2007
dc.titleFiscal Federalism and the Future of Canada: Can Section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867 be an Alternate to the Spending Power?
dc.typeworking paper

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