From Moral Worth to Moral Praise: Doing the Right Thing, For the Right Moral Reasons, In the Right Spirit

Abstract

The literature within moral philosophy about praiseworthiness and moral worth is expansive, with varying philosophers stating varying claims. While it is commonly held that moral praise is merely a symptom of moral worth, I hold differently. The purpose of this thesis is to show that while the moral worth of an act is necessary, it is not sufficient for the praiseworthiness of an agent who performed that action, and thus, the conditions that satisfy moral worth and moral praise are separate from one another. Because of this, we require further information regarding the factors that inform praise that are different from the factors that inform moral worth. By reconstructing, building on, and extrapolating from the contemporary literature about moral worth, I develop an account of moral worth that strictly applies to actions and an account of moral praise that strictly applies to agents. I conclude that there are three factors which determine praiseworthiness that differ from the factors that moral worth is sensitive to, which are doing the right thing, for the right moral reasons, in the right spirit.