Bringing Security and Intelligence into Focus: How to Clarify the Roles of Newly Created Accountability Bodies

Abstract

After unsuccessful attempts to do so in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2014, the current government is making good on a long-standing Liberal commitment to update and modernize the review, oversight, and accountability for ISAs: it has passed Bill C-22: An Act to Establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (2017), and introduced Bill C-59: An Act Respecting Security Matters (2017). Together these two pieces of legislation establish three new accountability bodies: (1) the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) will address the lack of parliamentary involvement in intelligence accountability; (2) the proposed National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) would eliminate silos between expert review bodies and increase the number of ISAs subject to independent review; and (3) the proposed Intelligence Commissioner (IC) would approve certain authorizations for CSE and CSIS, as a form of oversight. Together, Bills C-22 and C-59 have the potential to address existing shortcomings in the accountability system and advance innovation across the federal intelligence and security community. However, just how effective C-22 and C-59 will be in remedying these shortcomings depends on how NSICOP and NSIRA will coordinate with each other and other accountability bodies. To that end, this commentary analyses the existing accountability framework, assesses the changes Bill C-22 and C-59 propose, and explains how NSICOP and NSIRA have the potential not only to compensate for shortcomings, but also to enhance and offer innovations to the Canadian national security and intelligence accountability system.