The Logically Perfect Language on Words without Objects

Abstract

Bertrand Russell’s logical atomism holds that the world is made up of a body of structured facts composed of simple objects. A Logically Perfect Language (LPL) is constructed to reflect this hierarchy of facts—every sentence in a LPL corresponds to a fact, and how these sentences are related accurately reflects how their corresponding facts are related. This paper is divided into four parts. I will first explain Russell’s conception and construction of a LPL. Then, I will explain Henry Laycock’s modified account of a singular-general dichotomy; propositions about multiple objects and stuffs need to be taken into account. In the third part, I will focus on the difficulty of integrating propositions about the non-discrete liquid-stuff in an objectual language. In the fourth part, I will examine two problems, namely, the semantics-syntax discrepancy in a LPL and the problem of collective predication. Finally, after characterizing the individuation condition for liquid-stuffs, I will motivate individuating them as discrete portions for the purposes of particular predication. I will develop a new conception of what constitute a single instance of liquid-stuff, and use this new conception to characterize the preliminary works before the construction of a LPL for liquid-stuffs.