AFTER OCTOBER: RUSSIAN LIBERALISM AS A 'WORK IN PROGRESS,' 1919-1945

by

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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of Russian liberal thought, its durability, and its tensions in exile in interwar France. Through analysis of archival documents and contemporary pamphlets, memoranda, and print media, this thesis adds new dimensions to the scholarship on Russia Abroad, Russian liberalism, and exile politics. Russian liberal groups and actors held and established particular myths about their ideal homeland and harnessed critical occasions to elaborate their evolving ideology regarding the health, strength, and 'greatness' of the Russian state while addressing threats they perceived for their realization parallel to the existence of Soviet regime at home. *After October: Russian Liberalism as a 'Work in Progress,' 1919-1945* unpacks the lively political history of this stateless exile community as it sought ways to connect to the homeland and work for the improvement of the state and its people in spite of their spatial and political alienation. Throughout, this thesis emphasizes key concerns for Russian liberals including the territorial unity and security of the state, its level of modernity and civilization vis-à-vis the West, the need to build a liberal democratic federal republic after Bolshevism, and the creation of a free, educated, loyal, and active citizenry capable of contributing to the socio-political commonweal. Numerous tensions emerged in liberal thought and approach, indicating that their liberal visions of the state were very much still a work in progress. Their continued efforts to elaborate on their values in response to developing circumstances at home and abroad show how Russian liberals created and maintained for themselves a sense of purpose and identity throughout the interwar period.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
List of Abbreviations vi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Territory and Russian Political Exiles at Versailles, 1919 31
2.1 Introduction 31
2.2 Casting Russia's New Democratic Hue 39
2.3 Staking Russia's Claims 44
2.4 Planning the New Russian State 54
2.5 Conclusion 78
Chapter 3 Russian Exiles and the Famine in the Homeland 83
3.1 Introduction 83
3.2 Foreign Trade, Recognition, and the Threats Russian Liberals Perceived 90
3.3 The Famine of 1921-22 and the Soviet Call for Aid 96
3.4 Russian Liberal Responses to the Famine 101
3.5 Deathly Images, Deadly Prospects 118
3.6 The British Response 140
3.7 Conclusion 143
Chapter 4 Turning Inward 146
4.1 Introduction 146
4.2 Monarchist Visions and Revisions 154
4.2.1 Two Contenders: Kirill Vladimirovich and Nikolai Nikolaevich 155
4.3 Miliukov on Monarchism 160
4.4 False Liberals and True Republicans 167
4.5 Republican Possibilities 170
4.6 Eurasianism and the Exodus to the East 174
4.7 Miliukov, Eurasianism, and Russia's Path 180
4.8 Utopianism and Exclusivity 186
4.9 Conclusion 190
Chapter 5 Liberal Reassessments and the Second World War 193
5.1 Introduction 193
5.2 Russian Liberals and the Nazi Threat 200

5.3 Evolving Liberal Views on Soviet Responses to the Threat 205
5.4 *Poslednie novosti*, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the Outbreak of War 217
5.5 *Poslednie novosti* and Former Russian Territories 221
5.6 Justice Served: Righting the Wrongs of 1919 228
5.7 The War in France and the War at Home 232
5.8 Conclusion 241
Chapter 6 Conclusion 243
Bibliography 250

List of Abbreviations

ARA	American Relief Administration
RLC	Russian Liberation Committee
RNK	Russian National Committee
ROVS	Russian Armed Forces Union
RPC	Russian Political Conference

Chapter 1

Introduction

Through the course of the Russian Civil War (1918-1921), approximately one million anti-Bolshevik Russians fled their homeland to escape Bolshevism and the Red Army's final victory over the White Armies. Most went to Europe, taking refuge in cities like Prague, Berlin, and Paris. The French capital became the political and cultural centre of this 'first-wave' emigration. There, intellectual elites took up their pens to laud Russia's history and accomplishments, condemn the Bolshevik regime, and remind their fellow exiles that someday they would return home to a Russia liberated from Soviet dictatorship. Many questions occupied émigré thought regarding the ideal home to which they hoped to return. For example, what form of government and structure would it have? What relationship should the government have with the Russian and non-Russian peoples? Would Russia abandon or emulate Western Europe on its renewed path to greatness? What kinds of obligations would citizens have to the state? Where were Russia's proper borders? Russians abroad debated questions such as these throughout the interwar period, a process that animated the community and crystallized opposing political worldviews in the diaspora.

This dissertation explores how some liberal Russian exiles in Paris approached these questions. In general, Russia's liberals were committed to a constitutional democratic Russian federation populated by active, enlightened, and loyal citizens. They envisioned a state that included all of the former Empire's territories, one that was able to protect itself from foreign invasion and exploitation, and one capable of wielding

influence as a great power in Europe. They continued to crave in exile what they sought before October 1917-what Laura Engelstein has called a "civic and cultural modernity," which absolutism had long impeded.[1] Despite new impediments to their goals created by their exile and the existence of the new Soviet government, Russian liberals still believed these ideals could be achieved in Russia through the creation of a rule of law regime to check the government's power and the education and liberal guidance for the untutored population.[2] Relentlessly confident that they would return home someday, liberals encountered many new challenges which both compelled and allowed them to confront developing historical events and evaluate them with liberal treatments. This thesis studies these challenges, the liberals' responses to them, as well as emergent tensions in their approach to these challenges. Exploration of these tensions help demonstrate Russian liberalism was more than alive and well in exile, but remained very much a work in progress.

After many conversations with non-specialists about my project, I was intrigued to learn their common assumption that the Russian emigration was populated solely by right-wing monarchist reactionaries bent on counter-revolution and restoration. Popular culture has even embraced the assumption - most recently in the hit British serial, *Downton Abbey*, in which Russian exiles are presented as threadbare ultra-monarchist princes displaced by revolution and dedicated to restoration and returning home to their estates. Based on what I knew before my own academic career began, I also thought the

[1] Laura Engelstein, *The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 9.
[2] Reginald Zelnick in Irina Paperno, Reginald Zelnik, Thomas Laqueur, Eric Naiman, Anne Nesbet, and Olga Matich, "Symposium," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring 1994): 200. The article is a multi-author review of Engelstein's book.

emigration was wholly monarchist with restorationist goals, because I had learned somewhere along the way that those émigrés who left France after the French Revolution were largely aristocrats seeking restoration of the Bourbon dynasty through war.

All of these presuppositions were shaped by the fact that the diaspora is commonly known as 'The White Emigration,' a designation meant to encapsulate any Russian who left their homeland after the revolution, but one that evokes the White Army specifically, which was led by officers with real or presumed restorationist goals. When I began reading more about the Russian emigration, I learned that monarchists and White Army officers and soldiers constituted the majority of the Russian community in diaspora. It also became clear that they were not the only anti-Bolshevik faction with a post-Bolshevik vision. Yet, the scholarly texts I had read did not illuminate the nature of different political groups' opposition to the home regime nor thoroughly analyse their particular political goals. The émigrés were all just 'anti-Bolshevik' in these presentations. It seemed clear to me that monarchists wanted some kind of restoration of the old regime, but I wanted to know more about what other exiles had in mind.

I embarked on an explorative journey to discover why Russian liberals opposed the Bolshevik regime and what alternatives they sought. I believed that they did not seek restoration of the tsarist autocracy and I had a well-founded hunch that they had a very different vision of Russia's present circumstances and future potential. The work I have produced demonstrates clearly that liberalism, as another contender in the ring of Russian political ideals, did not simply disappear into the proverbial dustbin of history after Russia became a socialist state. On the contrary, this work shows that many Russian liberals, the Constitutional Democrat (Kadet) Pavel Miliukov in particular, went into exile and

continued to think about, articulate, and promote ideas about the form and content of Russia's future liberal state throughout the interwar period. Miliukov, a historian, newspaper editor, and who had served as both a member of the Imperial Dumas and as Foreign Minister for the Provisional Government in 1917, did not simply 'exist' passively abroad. Numerous circumstances and challenges at home and in exile posed threats to liberal ideals he and others perceived, which helped its proponents continue the work of developing the ethos and exploring ways to realise what they still believed to be realistic goals.

I came to this conclusion after a lengthy period of surveying what thoughts, ideas, circumstances, and events occupied liberal discourse. I searched out what they were talking about, who they were talking to, and importantly, how they framed liberal ideals in their discussions. While all manner of contexts elicited liberal responses, several circumstances occupied their thoughts most, and allowed them to elaborate liberal ideas in the process. Historian Daniel Beer has noted that liberalism in the tsarist era endured because it perpetuated itself as a both a reactionary and a progressive phenomenon as individuals responded to and attempted to build upon particular conditions that for them, lent justification to the correctness of their worldview.[3] I believe this is also true of Russian liberalism in exile. In spite of the existence of the Soviet government at home, men like Miliukov responded to perceived threats including territorial dismemberment, famine, monarchist restoration, and imminent war with Nazi Germany to identify specific aspects that imperiled their idealised view of the Russian state. Not only did they root out, isolate, and analyse sources of these threats, but they also applied progressive liberal

[3] Daniel Beer, *Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 1880-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 10.

criticism and alternatives in their approach to these threats and tried to compel their audiences to think and believe in these terms.

Doing so not only allowed them to keep Russian liberalism relevant in spite of its apparent 'homelessness' abroad, but also allowed liberals to maintain their identity and adopt a sense of purpose for their exile. As historian Igor Narskij has recently described them, liberal oppositionists in the tsarist period traditionally "politicized their professional spheres" to achieve the future autonomy of society "by enlightening and educating that society to the level of personality." As self-described stewards of Russian progress and purveyors of Western enlightened thought, liberal exiles continued this missionizing practice of constructing an idealised Russian society while reserving for themselves what Narskij has referred to as "the important role of intermediaries" between that state and society.[4] They politicized historical developments at home and abroad, sought to enlighten Russian exiles about the rightness of their views, and also maintained a sense of their traditional political role as oppositionists and liberal missionaries in spite of their displacement. Exile may have stripped them of citizenship, but their identity as oppositionists and educators remained firmly intact and was even reinvigorated by their new circumstances abroad.

My dissertation departs significantly from earlier studies. The extant scholarship on the Russian emigration is broad, surveying diaspora communities in Paris, Berlin, Kharbin, Prague, and more. Divided in roughly three ways, the literature focuses on the exiles' literary works, the development of their legal status as refugees and international

[4] Igor Narskij, "Intellectuals as Missionaries: The Liberal Opposition in Russia and Their Notion of Culture," *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 6, No. ¾ (Crossing Boundaries: Russian Discourses on Culture, November 2010): 333.

responses to their plight, and biographical histories of émigré communities that describe their social and cultural activities abroad and their apparent mission to preserve their 'Russianness' in exile until they could return home.[5] Collectively, these fields complement each other in situating Russian émigrés in broader international historical, cultural, and political milieus. However, none deal with the different ways Russian émigrés in general and liberals in particular idealised the Russian state and articulated its potential contours and content in order to prepare for the post-Soviet future. Despite its political origins, the political divides that animated the community, and the political outlooks the exiles maintained with regard to their country's present health and future potential, the Russian emigration is treated almost universally as a topic of cultural history.

One of the major Western texts on Russia Abroad is Robert Johnston's *New Mecca, New Babylon: Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920-1940*. This work is a biographical narrative that discusses the mass exodus, resettlement and establishment of Russian social and cultural life in France, the coming of age of the younger generation,

[5] Works on Russian literary critique include Gleb Struve, "The Double Life of Russian Literature, *"Books Abroad,* Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 1954): 389-406; Edward Brown's *Russian Literature since the Revolution* (New York: Collier, 1963); Simon Karlinsky and Alfred Appel Jr., *The Bitter Air of Exile: Russian Writers in the West, 1922-1972* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977; Aleksey Gibson, *Russian Poetry and Criticism in Paris from 1920 to 1940* (The Hague: Leuxenhoff, 1990); Oleg Mikhailov, *Literatura russkogo zarubezh'ia, 1920-1941* (Moscow: Nasledie, 1993); Bronislav Kodzis, *Literaturnye tsentry russkogo zarubezh'ia 1918-1938. Pisateli. Tvorcheskie ob'edineniia. Periodika. Knigorechatanie* (Munich: Otto Sagner, 2002); Leonid Livak., *How It Was Done in Paris: Russian Émigré Literature and French Modernism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003); Olga Demidova, *Metamorfozy v izganii: Literaturnyi byt russkogo zarubezh'ia* (St. Petersburg: Giperion, 2003); Greta Slobin and Katerina Clark, Eds., *Russians Abroad: Literary and Cultural Politics in Diaspora, 1919-1939* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2013). Scholarship on the émigrés as refugees includes Louise W. Holborn, "The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 203* (May 1939); George Ginsburgs, "The Soviet Union and the Problem of Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1917-1956," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 1957): 325-361; L. Ia. Tauber, *Liga Natsiii i iuridicheskii status russkikh bezhentsev* (Belgrade: n.p., 1993); Catherine Gousseff, *L'exil russe: La fabrique du réfugié apatride, 1920-1939* (Paris: CNRS, 2008).

and finally, the émigré community's dissolution during World War Two. *New Mecca*'s task is to demonstrate how émigrés responded to a new life in France, their attempts to "dig in" and avoid displeasure with their unassimilated presence, wait patiently to return home, and in the meantime, "defend with both tongue and pen the values which had fallen to [their] charge since the catastrophe of October 1917."[6] While Johnston tries to give due weight to average Russians, he focuses on intellectuals because it was they who forged a sense of cohesion, consolation, and unity among émigrés and proclaimed a duty to protect Russia's national history. Of their political programs, Johnston points to their overall weakness and disorganization, which he argues made it impossible for émigrés to muster support in France and Europe for the cause of anti-Bolshevism.

Marc Raeff's book, *Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939*, complements Johnston's work in his survey of émigré activities and accomplishments and his placement of this first-wave emigration into broader historical perspective by relating exile to Russia and Europe's past and present. He illustrates cultural life in different regions of the emigration while allowing for glimpses of the whole "country" in exile. Like Johnston, Raeff makes it clear that wherever émigrés found themselves, they made it their mission to build and participate in vibrant and distinctly Russian communities. In his view, the basis of achieving a sense of community and solidarity was "the underlying feeling of belonging by virtue of a common homeland, of a never questioned refusal of the Soviet system, and of a nostalgic dream of returning to Russia." Despite the differences in their social or political heritage, émigrés were united in their sense of common fate, homesickness, and "unwillingness to give up past

[6] Robert Johnston, *New Mecca, New Babylon: Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920-1945* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 3, 5-6, 22, 29, 32.

identit[ies]," be they political, social, professional, or national. Raeff also focuses on efforts to preserve traditions and treat the symptoms of homesickness. Émigrés in all the major centres of Russia Abroad built and attended Orthodox Churches, established Russian schools and youth groups as well as newspapers and publishing houses. Raeff believes cultural cohesion, mutual aid, and Russian education for émigré youth were key to their national and often individual survival in an extensively scattered diaspora.[7]

The most important moment in Raeff's *Russia Abroad* is his argument that émigrés perceived a critical need for cultural preservation in the face of its extinction at home and thus worked to shape "a new, acceptable image of Russia's past." What is crucial here is the idea that émigrés did not want their culture and history to be defined by images of "death, destruction, and vicious dictatorship" in Soviet Russia. As such, it was only natural for the émigrés to turn to the past and recall selectively those trends and manifestations that "represented the perennially valuable aspects of Russia's true identity."[8] This work is critical to understanding the Russian emigration's cultural self-conception and roots. However, neither he nor Johnston approach the emigration with an eye for their political ideals about the future Russia to which they hoped to return.

Russian interest in and scholarship on Russia Abroad has blossomed substantially since the collapse of communism in 1991 culminating in numerous academic conferences, the creation of new and publicly available library and archive

[7] Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939* (New York: Oxford, 1990), vii-vii, 42. Other western scholarly works on Russia Abroad include Robert C. Williams: *Russian Émigrés in Germany, 1881-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Paul Robinson, *The White Russian Army in Exile, 1920-1941* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Catherine Andreyev and Ivan Savický, *Russia Abroad: Prague and the Russian Diaspora, 1918*-1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Hélène Menegaldo, *Russes à Paris, 1919-1939* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 1998); N.A. Struve, *Soixante-dix ans d'émigration russe: 1919-1989* (Paris: Fayard, 1996).
[8] Raeff, *Russia Abroad*, 156-57.

departments that house documents related to émigré history, and far more substantially, examinations and reproductions of works of literature composed by Russians in exile. Within the academic scholarship, there are many general works that focus on the cultural histories in various colonies of Russia Abroad and on the continued development of Russian literature, art, religion, music, film, and dance parallel to developments in the Soviet Union.[9] E. P Chelysheva, for example, looks at the development of émigré literature outside of the Soviet Union, observing that in spite of the different environs and circumstances in which the works were written, common themes still emerged, indicating that two Russian literary traditions had common roots.[10] A. I. Doronchenkov has also judiciously studied exile philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev's developing Christian philosophy of Russian identity, national character, and apparent new destiny under the Third International instead of the Third Rome.[11] Other authors such as Efim I. Pivovar have taken interest in the scholarship of Russian émigré historians including Pavel Miliukov, attracted as they are by the emigration's interpretation of Russian history and the Revolution untainted by a Marxist brush. The chapters in his volume, however, focus on émigré efforts to trace 'what went wrong' up to and during the revolutionary period in a relentless search for the meaning behind the consequences of the First World War, the

[9] See for example E.P. Serapionova, *Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Chekhoslovatskoi respublike, 20-30e gody* (Moscow, In't slavianovedeniia i balkanistiki RAN, 1995); N. Bashmakova and M. Leinonen, *Iz istorii byta russkikh v Finlandii, 1817-1939* (Helsinki: n.p. 1990); S. Kishkina, "*Russkaia emigratsiia v Prage: kul'turnaia zhizn'*, (1920-1930 gody)," *Slavianovedenie*, 1995, No. 4; S. A. Beliaev, L. V. Ponomareva, N. Iu. Stepanov, Eds., *Russkaia emigratsiia v Evrope: 20-e – 30-e gody XX veka* (Moscow: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk: Institut vseobshchei istorii, 1996).
[10] E.P. Chelysheva, "*Kul'turnoe nasledie rossiiskoi emigratsii,"* in E. P. Chelyasheva and D.M. Shakhovskogo, Eds., *Kul'turnoe nasledie rossiiskoi emigratsii, 1917-1940* (Moscow: Nasledie, 1994).
[11] A. I. Doronchenkov, *Emigratsiia "pervoi volny" o natsional'nykh problemakh i sud'be Rossii* (St. Petersburg: D. Bulanin, 2001).

Whites' losses in the Civil War, and the October Revolution.[12] Much of this work has been covered elsewhere as has the chapter on the Kadet Party, which describes the party's origins and activities, but does not analyse the many ways liberal exiles interpreted events at home and abroad in their moment and the impact of these on the continuing development of their ideals.

General Russian works on Russia Abroad also address politics using a narrative approach and discuss the development of 'post-revolutionary' movements such as Change of Signposts, Eurasianism, and Young Russia, each of which had particular affinities with the Soviet regime. These have drawn interest among Russian readers seeking knowledge about alternatives to Bolshevism that developed after 1917 or seeking affinities with movements that occupy contemporary debates regarding Russia's post-Soviet identity. Other works on émigré politics includes A. V. Kiselev's book *Politicheskaia istoriia russkoe emigratsii.* This work is a collection of party documents and programs that covers exile politics ranging from the far right to the far left. No analyses of the various political ideologies or their differences are offered, however, and only brief remarks about each groups' origins are given.[13] Mikhail V. Nazarov's monograph, *Missiia russkoe emigratsii,* seeks to uncover the true 'mission' of Russia Abroad, which in his view involved the defence of traditional values, the revival of Russia, and the attempt to find ways to foster resistance to communism at home. Nazarov's work focuses heavily on counter-revolutionary activities led by White leaders

[12] See E. I. Pivovar, Ed., *Rossiia v izganii: Sud'by rossiiskikh emigrantov za rubezhom* (Moscow: Institut vseobshchei istorii RAN, 1999). See also Vladimir T. Pashuto, *Russkie istoriki-emigranty v Evropu* (Moscow: Nauka, 1992).
[13] A. V. Kiselev, Ed., *Politicheskaia istoriia russkoe emigratsii 1920-1940: Dokumenty i materialy* (Moscow: Vlados, 1999).

from the Civil War period through the Second World War in an effort to explore what activities provoked the Soviet State's suspicion and animosity toward exiles through much of this period. Importantly, Nazarov observes that different political factions including liberals "claimed to be the sole representatives of Russia," but because prominent liberals like Miliukov had withdrawn support for direct counterrevolutionary action in Russia early in their exile, he does not consider liberals as a serious contender for power at home or influence abroad.[14]

The scholarship on Russian liberalism is less voluminous, but no less interesting.[15] The two standard texts in the field are George Fischer's *Russian Liberalism from Gentry to Intelligentsia* and Victor Leontovitsch's *The History of Liberalism in Russia*. Fischer's monograph is a biographical essay tracing the evolution of liberalism from the 'small deeds' of the gentry class in the rural *zemstvos* (post-Emancipation local self-governing units) to a mass party movement that became more radicalised when urban professional groups sought to move beyond reforms from the local to national level. Leontovitsch is less interested in the social and political evolution of liberalism and more concerned with the fundamental concepts and legislative acts that gave ideological character to Russian liberal thought regarding the rule of law and private property rights. Their approaches are different but their overall conclusions are similar insofar as they argue that liberalism ultimately failed in Russia. Fischer argues that the failure of the

[14] Mikhail V. Nazarov, *Missiia russkoe emigratsii* (Stavropol: Ozun, 1992), 25.
[15] Russian language sources about Russian liberalism before 1945 include Aleksandr V. Gogolevskii, *Ocherki isotrii russkogo liberalizma XIX-nachala XX veka* (Saint Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo SPbGU, 1996); Igor' D. Osipov, *Filosofiia russkogo liberalizma XIX-nachalo XX v*. (Saint Petersburg: Izd-vo, 1996); Kirill A. Solov'ev, "'*Takticheskaia filosofiia' kadetov v epokhu pervoi dumy," Izvestiia vysshikh uchebnikh zavedenii*, Vol. 4 (Penza: Penzenskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2009); M. Iu. Sorokina, Ed., *Mysliashie miru rossiiskogo liberalizma: Pavel Miliukov, 1859-1943: Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma*, Moskva, 23-25 sentiabria 2009 g. (Moscow: Dom russkogo zarubezhi'iaim Aleksandra Solzhenitsyna, 2010).

regime to reform itself as liberals developed a more active political program contributed to its inability to take root in Russian society, which he claims in general was more receptive to revolutionary socialist teachings than liberal ones. Leontovitsch, however, argues that liberalism's failure, or rather betrayal, emanated from the left-leaning liberals' approach. Many conservative liberals like Vasilii Maklakov, a lawyer, Kadet, Duma member, and Ambassador to France under the Provisional Government had sought to work within the existing imperial system and wait for gradual reforms to emerge. Notably, Maklakov blamed Miliukov and liberals 'to the left' for the socialist-inspired radicalism that led to opposition to the regime, a split in the Kadet party, and a reduction in their strength. Leontovitsch sympathises with Maklakov, indicating that the left 'betrayed' Russian liberalism precisely because they departed from the very basic liberal method of working toward gradual reform within the law to achieve their goals.[16]

More recent literature has approached Russian liberalism before 1917 from different angles. Laura Engelstein's monograph, *Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia*, surveys cultural-political understandings of sexual conduct and the differences between the sexes that were articulated by liberal professionals in tsarist Russia in their effort to reappropriate and redefine political power embedded in social relations, public institutions, and intellectual authority.[17] The topical theme is sex, but the subjects are the liberal professionals themselves and their aim to institute rule of law and respect for individual rights and autonomy to create a modern political order. The

[16] George Fischer, *Russian Liberalism from Gentry to Intelligentsia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958); Victor Leontovitsch, *The History of Liberalism in Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 2012). Leontovitsch's work was originally published in German in 1957. For more on the differences in approach to liberalism between Maklakov and Miliukov, see Antony Kröner, "The Debate between Miliukov and Maklakov on the Chances for Russian Liberalism," *Revolutionary Russia*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1994): 239-71.

[17] Engelstein, *Sex and the Keys to Happiness*, 9-10.

tsarist government's resistance to the liberals' reform ideas obstructed their efforts, but as Engelstein makes clear, so too did their own debates about and evaluations of the people that reveals their ambivalence about the limits of peasant individuality: were the masses benighted and in need of education to prepare them for civilisation, or were fairness and justice already inherent peasant values that only required liberals to create the conditions in which those values could flourish?[18] Unable to resolve the quandary, liberals "inhabited a partly realised, partly imagined public space in which they exhibited their values in the exercise of their professional skills," but could not overcome the "powerful model of custodial statehood and the ethos of social collectivism" that pervaded the country.[19]

Engelstein has also written a follow-up book on the fate of Russian liberalism in the tsarist era. *Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia's Illiberal Path* is a compilation of seven essays that assess how Russia's cultural identity came to be defined in terms of an anti-liberal consensus across the empire.[20] Overall, her work shows how liberal ideals competed with well-entrenched Slavophilism that emerged in discourses ranging from Orthodoxy's place in modern Russia to questions about whether nationality in Russia was distinctly Russian or as liberals would have it, something more universal. She argues that "in Russia, liberalism ultimately failed" since it was too weak to vie against the Slavophile legacy imbedded in all manner of cultural and political life and

[18] Reginald Zelnik in "Symposium," 200, 202.
[19] Engelstein, *Sex and the Keys to Happiness*, 7.
[20] Laura Engelstein, *Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia's Illiberal Path* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), ix.

competing groups - right-wing conservatives, radical socialists, and the autocracy who collectively rejected core liberal tenets such as the rule of law.[21]

Anton Fedyashin has also surveyed the development of Russian liberalism in his monograph, *Liberals under Autocracy: Modernization and Civil Society in Russia, 1866-1904*. He undertakes this effort though an analysis of the writing of four authors in the 'thick journal' *Vestnik Evropy*, "the flagship of Russian liberalism" in the late tsarist epoch.[22] He argues that this journal became a critical communications network that helped cultivate a nascent public sphere and produce a system of liberal values that stimulated the political culture emergent from the zemstvo. Many of *Vestnik*'s articles were centred on socio-economic analysis from a local, not national, point of view, while it championed civil rights for the peasantry and greater representation in the zemstvo system. Fedyashin's work stands apart from other monographs in his belief that Russian liberalism was not "doomed" and that it had, through *Vestnik*, left its mark by "exposing readers to alternative world views and nurtured civic values by encouraging participation in local self-government." His work ends in 1904, but he does add that liberalism 'changed' after political parties and the Duma were created in 1905, thus "redirecting public attention from grass-roots politics to the imperial stage."[23]

My work departs from scholarship on both Russian liberalism and Russia Abroad and offers a new history of liberalism's continued development in the Russian diaspora. Unlike other scholars of Russian liberalism, I focus squarely on the perseverance of liberal worldviews after 1917. As we have seen, scholarship on Russian liberalism

[21] Engelstein, *Slavophile Empire*, 32.
[22] Anton A. Fedyashin, *Liberals under Autocracy: Modernization and Civil Society in Russia, 1866-1904* (Madison (WI): Wisconsin University Press, 2012), 4.
[23] Fedyashin, *Liberals under Autocracy*, 201-202.

focuses on its growth in Russia prior to the October Revolution and regards the political movement as essentially defunct thereafter whether the cause was a fault of their own or the cultural-political milieu in which they failed to adapt and thrive. My thesis is different because it treats Russian liberalism as *a work in progress*. Russian liberals like Maklakov and Miliukov imported traditional anxieties about Russia's modernity, the low political consciousness of the people, Russia's need for a constitution and a rule of law, and the necessity to rethink the structure of the Russian state and its relationship with Russian and non-Russian peoples alike. They continued to confront these and fresh anxieties in exile as new circumstances and threats made themselves apparent. As circumstances unfolded at home and abroad, their responses provided opportunities to espouse liberal principles, adapted as it were, to specific contexts. Various conditions also compelled them to re-evaluate and retool their position, respond accordingly, and ask others do to the same.

Taking into account Igor Narskij's observations about the differences between Russian liberalism and its Western analogues, this thesis also adds a new dimension to distinguish Russia's brand of liberal ideology and practice. Narskij correctly states that Russian liberalism in the tsarist period was different from that of the West because its course of development occurred in adverse conditions under tsardom, that it had a complex web of unresolved issues that most Western states solved in stages over long period of time, that it had a weak social base, and borrowed heavily from the west and tried to apply these ideas to a society that was not ready.[24] Another critical aspect that distinguished Russian liberalism lies in their anxiety about Russian backwardness

[24] Narskij, *Intellectuals as Missionaries*, 332.

compared to an otherwise self-confident Western Europe. This belief in Russia's backwardness "served as the launching pad and starting point for validating their historic mission," and thus liberals sought reforms to modernise the state to align it more closely to the more progressive West.[25]

I believe each of these factors still continued to distinguish Russian liberalism from its counterparts after 1917. My thesis builds on these to also demonstrate Russian liberalism's continued development in adverse conditions-that is outside of their homeland's borders where distance and time made it increasingly apparent that their ideals would neither reach the people at home nor find practical application by the regime. Still, Russian liberal exiles continued to act as competitors against the Soviet Government from abroad in a contest to claim the legitimate right to represent the general interests of Russian people and to protect the state's existence, integrity, prosperity, and progress.[26] Political competition and opposing ideologies all but disappeared in the Soviet Union, but exile in interwar France I believe helped give new impetus to Russian liberalism and allowed liberals to elaborate their oppositionist stance far more freely than they ever had.

Another aspect that differentiates the Russian brand of liberalism from both its contemporary western analogues and across the revolutionary divide was the liberal exiles' apparent focus on creating a new state with an entirely fresh start rather than improving society through reform within the existing structures. Prior to the February Revolution, liberals, like their western counterparts, sought reforms to move incrementally closer to achieving values such as individual equality, autonomy, and the

[25] Ibid., 337.
[26] Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 5.

rule of law within the existing institutions. The February and then the October Revolutions, however, largely swept away state institutions familiar to the liberals when they sought to gain access to power in the tsarist period, and when they had a brief share in it during the short life of the Provisional Government. In exile, many liberals, Miliukov in particular, seemed emboldened by the idea that incremental reforms were no longer needed to develop the ideal state. Rather, now that all vestiges of the old regime were largely gone, the ideal constitutional state, after a presumed Bolshevik downfall, could be erected immediately, rather than over time. Russia of course was no *tabula rasa*. Its people still required education and guidance in matters of rule of law and constitutionalism as he and other liberals believed. The key, however, rested on the idea of political revolution from the Soviet to a constitutional republic first and thereafter they could work on the transformation of society. Liberals in exile, in the meantime, worked to spread their values among the emigration in order to both convince them of and prepare them for this new, even revolutionary, state-building project.

I also depart from the deeper liberal philosophies, and the legal and economic theorems that populate some of the extant literature on the history of Russian liberalism, though other scholars interested in these aspects would find much in the émigrés' massive paper trail to service such an endeavour. I do not delve deeply into these areas in this thesis because my interest is in how the liberal exiles communicated their goals to non-specialists-foreign audiences and rank-and-file members of Russia Abroad-most of whom may not have cared, or may not have had the time to explore further, Russian liberalism's cavernous theoretical underpinnings. Most of the emigration were non-intellectuals and the majority - soldiers - had little formal education above the primary level. If liberalism

was to 'survive,' the elaboration of its principles had to continue at a more 'popular' level. My work emphasises how liberal activists continued the work many of them and their predecessors undertook in the tsarist era to apply accessible liberal thought to circumstances and events that affected their community in exile in the hope of educating and steering audiences to their particular view. Within their press, pamphlets, and public meetings, liberals tended to avoid deep and difficult theoretical discourse, seeking instead to enliven the community, including youth, with their perspectives regarding the future state and how it could be improved and made stronger. If Russian liberals had 'failed' to connect with the interests of the Russian masses at home before 1917, they worked harder than ever to appeal to the masses in exile using events that touched the whole community as a means to disseminate their principles.

As for the literature on Russia Abroad, this thesis departs from it in its focus on liberal exiles who did far more than serve as passive guardians of 'Russia that was' and instead actively articulate a new vision of the Russian state that had yet to be realised. Other scholars have focused much on the so-called 'mission' of Russians abroad to preserve cultural traditions in exile. Important as this was to the maintenance of Russian culture and history as well as community-building outside of the Soviet Union, historians have omitted another critical mission that occupied the lives of many activists in the emigration: fostering the conditions to create a constitutional, democratic, republican federation. Social scientists argue that diasporas have particular characteristics such as "a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland" and a belief that all members of the diaspora "should be committed to the maintenance or restoration of the

original homeland and to its safety and prosperity."[27] Indeed the extant literature remains squarely focused on missions to preserve past myths and memories, but does not adequately address competing 'visions' for the future or commitments to safeguarding the prosperity and security of the state, visions that emerged from the collective belief in (or at least hope of) return. The literature on Russia Abroad instead treats each 'colony' as discrete groups that were isolated from the homeland and regards Russia itself only as some kind of émigré *lieu de mémoire*. This thesis engages the relationship exiled liberals actively cultivated with the homeland in their present moment, including relations that they channeled typically through antagonism but eventually support for the home regime. It also engages directly with what new *plateaux* liberals believed Russia would achieve in the future.

Another departure this thesis takes from the scholarship on Russia Abroad is in its direct analysis of liberal politics in exile. It would seem that no one as yet has embarked on this 'history of losers.' Liberals did not effect a successful counterrevolution and historians of the Russian Revolution frequently allude to liberal action or inaction up to 1917 that made the Bolshevik coup possible. It seems to me that other scholars believe that the liberals simply lost, and that was that. Consequently, Marc Raeff believes "sterile political factionalism" in the emigration has only "limited and passing interest."[28] Robert Johnston is even more condemning. He observed that "in reviewing the political passions" of the exiles, "their historian is armed with the knowledge of how meaningless

[27] William Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1991): 83-84; Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 2008), 6.
[28] Raeff, *Russia Abroad*, 9.

to Russia and the world were the endless plans and profusion of articles."[29] While each believe cultural life alone animated and distinguished Russia Abroad and a study of politics is thus fruitless, my thesis reconceptualises study of the emigration by accepting politics as a living part of their culture. I do not believe we can so easily disengage political life from culture anywhere including the community studied in this thesis.

Several factors have compelled me to arrive at the opinion that politics matter in the study of Russia Abroad. Firstly, I believe culture and politics can and do intersect because both capture human ways of life and human ways of seeing and manipulating the world that help characterize and inspire communities. I also think we can consider politics a kind of immaterial cultural artefact, much like we might consider rituals, mythology, or philosophy in the same light because they give shape to social organisation. Like their material cousins such as architecture or sculpture, politics can also help cast lasting cultural heritages.

Secondly, the exiles' departure from Russia resulted *from* politics – they opposed the home regime and legitimately feared its persecution and consequently left their homeland. I believe this created a founding moment for the political activists abroad, compelling them to not just confront all that had happened to them and their ideals before and after October, but also driving them to conceptualize their convictions and political identities in an entirely new set of circumstances. Raeff claims that the émigrés arrived in their host countries but "in the most literal sense did not unpack their suitcases; they sat on their trunks" waiting to return home.[30] This assumption of passivity excludes the

[29] Johnston, *New Mecca*, 38.
[30] Raeff, *Russia Abroad*, 4.

very active means by which politicized Russians in exile tried to find the means of return and prepare the community for what could or would follow after Bolshevism.

Lastly, like their literary fellows in the emigration, political Russian exiles left *a lot* of written words that carried meaning and delivered it through many media. Taking into account Clifford Geertz's definition of culture as a transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols and "a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form" where people "communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life," I think Raeff and Johnston discount the importance and influence the massive corpus of political writing had in helping to shape attitudes and world views among readers and ultimately to add a new dimensional form to the 'culture' of Russia Abroad.[31] Liberals certainly imported, perpetuated, and communicated customary anxieties about Russia's ability to modernise, progress, and achieve particular benchmarks other modern states boasted including a constitutional government into their writing. Whether audiences necessarily subscribed to their views even as they subscribed to liberal newspapers, the point is that the communication of liberal and other political values helped animate and characterize culture in Russia Abroad.

This study is based on a wellspring of materials housed at the Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Columbia University and the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University. During the Second World War, many Russian exiles left France for the United States during the occupation, bringing with them their personal and official collections, and the collections of those who stayed behind or who had died. The arguments in this thesis are informed by liberal responses to unfolding events found

[31] Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89.

in memoranda, pamphlets, newsletters, speeches and lectures, diaries, correspondence, and even the odd scribble made upon hotel stationary or a Montparnasse café napkin that were reproduced in more formal settings later. I also rely heavily on press media sources, particularly Miliukov's daily, *Poslednie novosti*, the most widely read newspaper in Russia Abroad with an approximate daily circulation of 36,000. While the wealth of material available would take many lifetimes to work through, the sources I have mobilised assist in illustrating the continued story of Russian liberal thought after October and allow us to understand their responses to historical events as they unfolded in their time.

What emerges in this thesis is an exploration of the liberals' overriding concern for the health, safety, security, and progress of the Russian state. As I mentioned above, I spent a lot of time 'getting a feel for' what preoccupied liberals. I could see the assumption on almost every page they wrote that they would return home to some post-Bolshevik Russia. When events and circumstances arose that threatened the ideal Russia they envisaged, they tended to interpret those events with a liberalised outlook similar to the way *Vestnik Evropy* became a "liberal lens that refracted the major events of the late imperial era."[32] In a way, every new threat to Russia's health and well-being proved to be more kindling for the Russian liberal fire. Authors like Miliukov isolated obstacles to the modernity and progress of the Russian state, educated and enlightened readers about the nature of these obstructions, and found ways to position liberal ideals as viable alternatives to old autocratic and present day Soviet dictatorship. Their endeavours show how liberalism did not concede final victory to the Bolsheviks after the Civil War was

[32] Fedyashin, *Liberalism under Autocracy*, 11.

over, but still found itself "haunted by a sense of permanent crisis" as new problems materialized, but enlivening the ethos at the same time.[33]

The following four chapters describe four distinct threats that liberals believed imperiled the Russian state's integrity, health, safety, and potential for progress. First, there was the threat of dismemberment of Russia's territories at the Paris Peace Conference (1919), as discussed in Chapter Two. Liberal's believed dismemberment would destroy Russia's unity and strength. Consequently, they believed the future federal state required the membership of all the former Empire's national groups. This was essential to both the strength and defence of the state and the state's ability to evolve from an autocratic empire to a federal republic capable of democratic governance and the reasonable accommodation of the national groups' desires. The Russian Political Conference espoused total commitment to democratic principles and the rights of minorities to national self-determination. They also formulated a plan for the new federation that would grant the nationalities wider autonomy. The entire process shows how Russians adopted Wilsonian democratic principles and tried to recast them into a new Russian mould to defend Russia's territory in 1919 and reconfigure Russia's relationship with its non-Russian citizens in the future.

The second threat liberals perceived to the Russian state and its potential erupted from the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921 and the Russian Famine of 1921-1922, topics surveyed in Chapter Three. Liberals, worried that trade with Great Britain would lead to recognition and therefore legitimation of the Soviet Government, used the famine to show how the latter caused the calamity and transformed the once great Russian

[33] Daniel Beer, *Renovating Russia*, 6.

civilisation into a medieval wasteland. Liberals did so to delegitimise the Bolshevik government and call for regime change to a constitutional democracy. Their relentless efforts to convince British readers of the home regime's evils reveal notable liberal ideas about progress, modernity, civilisation, education, and the liberty of the individual.

Another threat to liberalism was the growth and persistence of right-wing monarchist movements and a new movement – Eurasianism. Chapter Four surveys Miliukov's appraisals of what he perceived to be their dangerous and retrograde political utopianism that threatened the emigration with irrational hopes of reviving some form of monarchy in Russia after Bolshevism. Miliukov, who declared himself a republican to differentiate himself from those 'right-leaning' liberals who favored a constitutional monarchy believed that monarchy itself, in whatever form, was detrimental. He thought that a constitutional monarchy could 'revert' to authoritarianism on a whim. This indicates that liberals still hoped to create a rule of law system that protected the people from the leadership's arbitrariness be set in stone. He also wanted to ensure Russia would continue its western orientation on the path to historically necessary progress and not depart towards Eurasianist isolationism and ill-placed demagogy.

The final threat liberals perceived was that of Nazi Germany and its apparent designs on Soviet territory. Chapter Five elaborates on how Miliukov, Maklakov, and others came to actively support the Soviet Union and even declare an end to the revolution when the USSR made significant strides in not only defending its territory, but reclaiming territories that Russia lost at the Paris Peace Conference. What emerges in their writing is a new conception of citizenship that called on Russian exiles to offer loyalty and support to the Soviet State despite its treatment of citizens at home, and ask for no rights

in return because they had begun to believe that the Soviet regime acted 'justly' in the service and defence of the Russian motherland.

The reader may find it interesting to note that the first two chapters rely more heavily on pamphlets and memoranda directed toward foreign readers and policy-makers (though they were still read by Russians) while the latter two chapters rely far more exclusively on Russian language sources and *Poslednie novosti*, directed as they were to Russian speaking audiences. This is because the audience necessarily shifted as circumstances changed over time. Russian liberals spoke to foreign audiences while there still remained tangible hope that Europe might liberate Russia from Bolshevism. However, after the departure of foreign troops during the civil war and the eventual recognition of the Soviet Government by states such as Great Britain, it became clearer that the home regime was there to stay unless a popular democratic revolution at home deposed it. The Allies had made it clear at the Paris Peace Conference that they were not convinced Russia could or would be remade into a democratic federation. There were too many competing interests and a lot of monarchists with restorationist goals. That Russian liberals 'turned inward' to the Russian community in order to infuse it with ideas about liberal democracy, republicanism, and the liberties and duties of citizens indicates their recognition that they still had to work to convince the emigration that liberal democracy was still a viable option. They were convinced Russia Abroad had to be ready to respond when and if the popular masses rose. When this occurred, liberals could channel popular energy at home and abroad and begin construction of the new state.

Perils such as dismemberment, famine, the restoration of despotism, and Russia's subjugation to and colonization by another European power threatened Russia but also

threatened the ideal liberal civil society at home exiles like Miliukov sought. He and other liberals wanted to remake and strengthen the Russian state so that it provided constitutional guarantees for the rights and freedoms of emancipated, politically educated, and engaged citizens, a representative democratic government, respect for the rule of law, and crucially, an avenue to rejoining Western Europe on the path to progress and modern civilization. These desires were old imports that represented several decades of work tsarist era liberals had engaged in to improve and reform political structures and the human condition in Russia. The threats to their ideals that liberals encountered in exile, however, endangered the memory of political achievements already made, foreshadowed Russia's further departure from western-style progress, and imperiled their hopes that their future ideals would be fulfilled. Their worries animated their writing. They informed their readers of these threats and in so doing, constructed a particular vision of the ideal state to which they hoped their audience would adhere – one that was strong, territorially united, progressive, industrious, democratic, Western-oriented, and capable of protecting Russian interests and earning the loyalty of a free, active, and educated public sphere. This is a very different vision of Russia than the 'Russia that was' that Raeff, Johnston, and others believe the emigration sought to preserve in amber or resurrect. Liberal exiles were less interested in preserving traditions and more interested in building on new and traditional anxieties to enable Russia's progress toward something far newer and greater.

Now we come to the driving argument behind my thesis that Russian liberalism after 1917 was a work in progress. *After October: Russian Liberalism in Exile as a 'Work in Progress,' 1919-1945* as a title carries several meanings. Firstly, Russian liberals in

the emigration were wholly committed to the Russian state's ability to progress in a western orientation and ultimately become a stronger 'Great Power' again. Secondly, my hope is that the study of liberalism after 1917 can continue even beyond the presentation given here. I see this thesis as a beginning, but there is always more ground to cover. Here I have treated what circumstances and threats the exiles appeared most concerned about in their public writing but this thesis has not exhausted every means by which liberals used a liberal lens to interpret events of the day for their readers. Thirdly, and most germane to the scholarship presented here, is the fact that numerous tensions emerged from liberal responses to the circumstances I have listed, tensions that were neither addressed nor resolved at the time. While their efforts to apply liberal thought to the threats of territorial dismemberment, Allied recognition, famine, the persistence of right-wing movements, and Nazi Germany certainly helped them breathe renewed life into their ethos, emergent and unresolved contradictions in their thought show that liberalism was not perfected in exile and that it was still very much in the process of development. This is a very different argument than that of scholars who believe liberalism entirely failed or simply fizzled out after 1917. Liberals still had goals to achieve and inner contradictions in their attitudes and worldview to unravel.

Among the tensions that emerge in each of the following chapters, there was the Russian profession of sympathy for national minority aspirations at the Paris Peace Conference, sympathy that conflicted with their failure to negotiate directly with those national groups and their apparent belief that only Russia and the Allies could legitimately decide minorities' fate. The tension that arose between words and action hinted that liberal Russians did not view national minorities as equal partners, let alone equal

citizens, in the new multinational federation they hoped to create. Another tension emerged in the liberals' treatment of the famine. In their anti-Bolshevik propaganda that discussed the decline of Russia's level of civilisation and the state's apparent reversion to medieval barbarism, they did not attempt to provide practical advice for 'on the ground' assistance that millions of starving peasants needed. Their solution for all of Russia's woes was regime change to a liberal democracy, indicating a concern for transformation in Russia at the state level that eclipsed attention to necessary 'small deeds' work at the local level. While many peasants were politically conscious, in the face of starvation and death it is likely they cared more about their immediate survival than they did *at that moment* about the condition of Russia as a civilisation vis-à-vis Western Europe. While many exiles did engage in practical efforts to raise funds to help starving peasants, liberal dedication to anti-Bolshevik propaganda intended to thwart trade and diplomatic relationships with the regime outshone the emigration's work to secure donations abroad and highlighted the alienation of high liberal values from the immediate demands of the population.

Still another tension emerged in Pavel Miliukov's contentions with monarchists and Eurasianists. He was quick to denigrate his opponents as mere utopians but failed to see that his own visions of the state at the time were similarly idealistic and increasingly unattainable. Miliukov's vision for the future republic was one that would be formed and populated by democrats, effectively closing an exclusionary door on anyone who saw merit in monarchy, be it autocratic or constitutional. While he chided opponents for their undemocratic worldviews, he failed to recognise (or admit) that his own approach was highly undemocratic. Democracies allow all citizens of all political stripes to participate

in decisions regarding state affairs. Political competition as well fosters that development of representative state institutions and protective laws by increasing the scope for comparison in selecting rules and policies. Progress is achieved when a variety of options are debated and tested.[34] While many hard right leaning monarchists believed democracy itself was dangerous, it was still problematic that Miliukov believed their goals precluded absolutely their participation in the development and consolidation of the new state.

At least one more tension emerged in liberal writing during the Second World War. As the Soviet Union began to make strides in self-defence against Germany especially after the latter launched its invasion in 1941, liberal writing began to take a favorable view of the Soviet regime. Admitting that the regime had undertaken evil acts against the people at home, its 'just' efforts to protect territory from foreign invasion all but erased its 'unjust' crimes of the past. At the same time, because the USSR invaded and occupied democratic states like Finland, which Russia had lost at the Paris Peace Conference, liberals all but lauded the effort since the USSR righted the wrongs committed upon Russia twenty years prior. That liberals lauded these efforts without regard for the wishes of the people in the occupied territories signifies that they believed justice was a particular Russian necessity, but by no means a universal right.

Finally, Russian liberals also made use of inclusions and exclusions to construct an image of the ideal, progressive, great Russian state. They excluded Bolsheviks because liberals believed Bolsheviks utterly destroyed land and people, hurling the country centuries backward from the level of modernity and progress it had hitherto

[34] Peter Bernholz, Manfred E. Streit, and Roland Vaubel, "Introduction and Overview," in Peter Bernholz, Manfred E. Streit, and Roland Vaubel, Eds., *Political Competition, Innovation, and Growth* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1998), 5-6.

achieved. Miliukov excluded monarchists and Eurasianists since he believed neither were capable of participating in the democratic game and/or sought to position Russia's development on a path away, rather than toward the West. Liberals included the former Empire's national minorities and the territories they occupied in a great new federal scheme since Russia's greatness and security depended on them. Their Russia also included active, enlightened, and loyal citizens, capable of free initiative and thus the productive and defencive capacity needed to strengthen the state. Inclusions and exclusions of course are not without their tensions as we have seen above, but discussion of these and other tensions are necessary because they demonstrate not only the idealised and constructed nature of the new Russia that liberals hoped to build but also indicate that their work was still in the process of development in exile throughout the interwar period.

Chapter 2

Territory and Russian Political Exiles at Versailles, 1919

2.1 Introduction

The 1919 Paris Peace Conference attracted many of Russian exiles from governing and diplomatic circles of the old Empire and the Provisional Government. They came to the peace talks to defend the former Russian Empire's territorial integrity and what they believed to be Russia's interests while the Allies hammered out the Versailles Treaty, delineated new national boundaries, and attempted to create a new international order to secure a lasting peace. The Allies also had to consider whether they should continue military intervention in Russia's Civil War and if they should leave Russia territorially intact or dismember it by recognising the independence of new secessionist states emerging from it. Making peace with the Central Powers was the Allied priority in Paris, but the war in Russia still posed significant threats to the very foundations of the new European order that they attempted to construct in Paris.[1]

This chapter considers the Russian Political Conference's (RPC) activities at the Peace Conference, a critical moment when Russians were compelled to rethink Russia's imperial rule and articulate a very new vision in new circumstances. The peace talks confronted Russian liberals with demanding political challenges including the formidable task of trying to get Russia's voice heard, but also the challenges presented by secessionist movements motivated by years of war and the growth of nationalisms. In order to secure Russia's territorial unity, the RPC was forced to reevaluate the relationship the Russian

[1] John M. Thompson, *Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles* Peace (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1966), 3.

state would have with non-Russian citizens. The RPC's addresses to the Allies and ongoing deliberations, however, suggest that the largely liberal leadership remained deeply committed to an imperial vision of Russia in spite of their attempts to reconfigure the state from an empire to a federation, their adoption of Wilsonian principles, and their outward commitment to rights of self-determination. They paid lip-service to these ideals, but their resolute commitment to territorial unity demonstrate an enduring commitment to a vision of Russia that was quintessentially an imperial space.

Scholarship on the Paris Peace Conference has devoted considerable attention to the so-called 'Russian problem' and its place at Versailles. Historians have written extensively about how the Big Four tackled the problem of securing peace in Europe while civil war still raged in Russia, while national borders remained in flux, and Bolshevism posed threats to the new order that the Allies were then attempting to forge. Russian language sources tend to focus on the Allies 'interventionism' and attempts to negotiate their relationship with the new Soviet regime. Western scholars dig deeper into Allied motivations. For example, John Thompson focuses on Allied attitudes and aims, evaluates their quandary about the costs of military aid and the political consequences of recognising Kolchak. Arno J. Mayer unpacked the many issues that the Allies faced including the problem of 'containing' Bolshevism, an ideology they feared would destabilize the final peace settlements they hoped to make across "liberated and defeated Europe."[2] Together, Russian and western sources illustrate the Allies' many anxieties

[2] Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 4-5; Arno J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 29, 285. Other major works that deal with Russia and the Paris Peace Conference include Andrei Danilovich Skaba, *Parizhskaia mirnaia konferentsiiia i inostrannaia interventsiia v Strane Sovetov: ianvar'-iiun' 1919 goda* (Kiev: *Naukova dumka*, 1971); Keith Neilson, "'That Elusive Entity British Policy in Russia:' The Impact of Russia on British Policy at the Paris Peace Conference," in *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?* Ed. Michael Dockrill and John Fisher (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Charlotte Alston, "'The Suggested Basis

about the Russian problem; and they diligently survey the motives and goals each ally had. Each make clear that the Allies did not come up with a unified plan because their aims and policies were too confused, contradictory, and ultimately clumsy.

This chapter shifts focus to the Russian perspective and how the peace talks provided a challenge for Russians to invent an entirely new vision of a multinational Russian state out of the old Empire, a project to which liberals and non-liberals alike rallied. In responding to this challenge, Russians in Paris at this time were not trying to preserve old Russia in amber; rather, they tried to create something new, if not revolutionary. Prior to 1919, neither the Russian autocratic state nor liberal oppositionists had done very much to justify Russian sovereignty over the territory upon which Russia constructed its empire. The former Empire had the power, language, and sanctity of internationally recognised treaties to accomplish precisely this kind of validation.[3] Secession movements at Versailles, however, compelled the RPC to try to legitimise Russia's grounds for territorial rights over the seceding regions without simply recreating the old imperial hierarchy.

The RPC mobilised several tactics to defend Russia's territory from secession, culminating in a blueprint for a new democratic state that it hoped would win Allied approval. The process revealed much about Russian liberal attachments to territory that informed their vision of ideal statehood. If Russia could no longer be an empire, the RPC still hoped it would be united, great, and strong. Believing that the appearance of political

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for a Russian Federal Republic:' Britain, Anti-Bolshevik Russia and the Border States at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919," *History* 91, 301 (January 2006): 24-44; S. B. Dronov, "*Parizhskaia mirnaia konferentsiia 1919 g. i popytki uregulirovaniia vzaimootnoshenii s sovetskoi rossiei: Frantsuzskii i Amerikanskii podxody*," *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie iavleniia i protsessy*, Vol. 4 (2010): 114-120.

[3] Ronald Grigor Suny, "Nationalities in the Russian Empire," *Russian Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (October 2000): 488.

unanimity was critical to winning Allied support for their goals, RPC members subordinated their individual worldviews to present an image of political consensus on the desired structure and form of the future Russian state: one that was strong, united, liberal, democratic, modern, European, and crucially, one that included the former Empire's nationalities in a voluntary federation. The RPC also adhered to the Wilsonian principles of self-determination and liberal democracy in an effort to demonstrate Russia's evolution away from old imperialism and to reserve the possibility for Russia to determine the contours of its own future statehood. Given that President Woodrow Wilson stated in his famous Fourteen Points his own desire for Russia to enjoy "the independent determination of her own political development and national policy," the RPC believed it could participate in final Allied decisions about Russia's political and territorial fate.[4]

To retain the territories, the RPC also had to justify why Russia should retain them. Unlike the seceding states, Russia could not derive its territorial claims from the primordial collective rights of a cultural 'nation' to a particular territory, derivations that the Allies were then using used to cut new borders for new states in Central and Eastern Europe.[5] Russia acquired its territories through centuries of colonisation, conquest, and annexation, procurements that formal internationally recognised treaties had beforehand legitimised. Lacking national primordial attachments, the RPC opted to appeal to the sanctity and legality of those older treaties to justify Russian claims over its territories. It also appealed to the instrumental role that these territories played in Russia's future

[4] Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 47; "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points," 8 January 1918, *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy*, Yale University. Online, Internet, Available http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_ century/wilson14.asp. Accessed 3 October 2014.
[5] Anna Stilz, "Nations, States, Territory," *Ethics*, Vol. 121, No. 3 (April 2011): 574.

defence and commerce. Vasilii Alekseevich Maklakov, the RPC's creator, was a liberal lawyer, a Constitutional Democrat (Kadet), and a diplomat who was deeply committed to adherence to legal conventions. These commitments played a part in the RPC's deployment of treaties as did his commitment to the rule of law both at home and internationally. The RPC thus worked to protect Russia's sovereignty from forcible violation-that is, the secession by territories without Russia's official participation in the process due to its lack of a recognised government.[6]

These tactics alone were not enough to convince the Allies that Russia should retain its territories. The principle of self-determination had made living people a real part of the peace settlement equations. Unlike earlier treaty-making conferences, nationalisms, not empires, reigned supreme at Versailles and ideas of sovereignty had moved downward from "the divine to the plebian" at precisely the moment when 'nation-making' became hegemonic in European politics. The RPC was compelled to reconceptualise the kind of relationship the new Russian state would have with all of the peoples therein as a result of this new climate.[7] The RPC certainly recognised the Allies' sympathy for nationalist movements. It also perceived a significant threat to Russia's unity in knowing that formerly subjugated peoples had new powerful influence on Allied

[6] For more on liberal views of sovereignty, see Margaret Moore, "Conclusion and Overview," Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore, Eds., *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 317-20.

[7] Mira Bachvarova and Margaret Moore, "A Conceptual and Normative Analysis of Territorial Pluralism," in Karlo Basta, John McGarry, and Richard Simeon, Eds, *Territorial Pluralism: Managing Diffference in Multinational States* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), 54-56; Suny, 488. Former Imperial Russian subjects wanted to secede for many reasons including fear of the spread of Bolshevism; a return to autocracy, Russification, and the arbitrary and uneven administration of tsarist law and services; suspicion of White Army intentions; and in some cases, utter disappointment with the failure of the Provisional Government to adequately resolve the nationality question during its short tenure in 1917.

decision-making that the RPC would have to confront in order to protect Russia's interests.

The RPC's response was a proposal for a liberalised multinational state. It claimed that Russia, free of autocracy and Bolshevism, would administer the law justly and consistently within the former empire's territorial boundaries in a way that the RPC hoped would ensure the broader autonomy that some of the smaller national groups had sought prior to the October Revolution and the equality of all citizens under the law. The RPC hoped new multinational state model would appear to be an advance above the old empire because it was a demonstrable attempt to adapt to modern nationalist challenges. Moreover, whereas the legitimacy of the tsarist regime came solely from the exercise of raw power, the RPC hoped to re-legitimise Russia's sovereignty over the territories by remaking Russia into a state where *all* peoples could coexist in a system that guaranteed everyone's rights to and within territory by delineating the separation of powers and administration of justice.[8]

Their efforts nevertheless revealed profound tensions for Russian liberalism, its inheritances, and its prospects. First, the RPC created a federal plan that included a categorical hierarchy of national groups that would receive greater or lesser levels of autonomy in the new federation based on their perceived level of progress and civilisation. This conflicted directly with the RPC's professions that everyone would be equal in the new state and enjoy the same freedoms. The RPC continued to argue that it had both the right to intervene politically and administrate in these territories indicating

[8] Suny, "Nationalities," 488; Bachvarova and Moore, "Territorial Pluralism," 54-56. See also Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, "The Making and Unmaking of Borders: What Liberalism Has to Say," in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore, eds., *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 231-261.

that it believed that the national groups were not yet progressive enough to achieve total liberty. In delineating preliminary means to administrate differently to diverse territories, it simultaneously resurrected tsarist imperial practices and invoked western liberal justifications for imperial rule. The RPC crafted a blueprint for statehood and responsible governance that remained 'imperial' insofar as the new state project would presumably allow Russian liberals time to elevate minority groups to a higher rational plane through political intervention while indefinitely deferring the realization of their liberty. Such a project was common to empires such as Great Britain whereby liberal rights were supposed to be universal, but systemic political exclusion was deemed necessary for various 'types' of societies the imperial centres deemed backward, undeveloped, or savage.[9] It appears the RPC shared many of the same convictions and practices as the liberal empires, thus it did not recognise any particular disparity in its approach.

Second, the RPC also only made its proposals to the Allies and did not negotiate its plans with the national groups directly. It assumed the national groups would 'naturally' come back to the fold once Bolshevism was defeated and a new state system was created. This exclusion implied the RPC's view that only Russia had the right to determine the future status of the minority groups with the Allies and undercut the spirit of voluntarism the RPC claimed the national groups would employ. Such a practice conflicted with its assurances that the nationalities would be equal players and partners in the future multinational Russian state. Instead, the RPC spoke over, above, and about the minorities in a fashion that marginalised the latter and in ways that maintained precisely the old imperial habits that the RPC otherwise publicly rejected. The RPC was

[9] Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999): 68.

aware of the need to create a liberalised system where everyone would coexist in harmony equally, but it still prioritised Russia's right to self-determination over that of the national minorities, a circumstance that essentially contradicted their professed goal.

For all their efforts, what emerges from the RPC's activities at Versailles is that Russia was by no means a self-evident construct for liberals in 1919, but rather a new state-building project in the making. The RPC's ideal vision included Russia's pre-1914 political boundaries. They conceived of Russia as a vast territory that exceeded lands occupied principally by ethnic Russians. Russia's borders always housed the territories occupied predominantly by the former Empire's non-Russian nationalities. In the eyes of the RPC, regardless of culture and ethnicity, all peoples of the empire belonged within Russia.[10] As O. Iu. Oleinik and V.S. Metelov have remarked elsewhere, Russian exiles conceived of themselves as representatives of a united people from the same fatherland (*otechestvo*). In this construct, the fatherland could not be split because its individual members were a family intimately linked to one another and contributed to the vitality of the entire household.[11] Nevertheless, the new liberal democratic multinational federation that the RPC proposed also conflicted with the principle of self-determination itself and the Allies' approach to peace-making in Europe. The minorities moved toward 'nation,' the Allies tried to form new states based on nationality, but the RPC could not embrace the assumption that history had moved inescapably toward the correspondence of 'one people with one state.'[12] For the RPC, Russia was and always would be the sum of its

[10] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (Boulder (CO): Pluto, 1993, 109.
[11] See O.Iu. Oleinik and V.S. Metelov, "*Emigratsiia i Otechestvo: K analizu tvorcheskogo naslediia intelligentii Rossiiskogo Zarubezh'ia 20-30x godov*" in A.V. Seregin, Ed., *Rossiiskoe zarubezh'e: Istoriia i sovremennost'* (Moscow: *Ministerstvo kul'tury RF*, 1998), 29.
[12] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010): 221.

many peoples, not Russians as one people alone. 'Nation' was too exclusive. Federation, however, was inclusive and the RPC believed it was a middle ground solution offering broad freedom for individual national groups to enjoy greater political and cultural autonomy while allowing Russia to remain great in size, population, and also prestige.

2.2 Casting Russia's New Democratic Hue

The Russian Political Conference (RPC) was comprised largely of diplomats and ministers of the former Provisional Government. The Allies did not give the RPC an official seat at the peace talks because there was no recognised government in Russia at that moment. Still, the RPC lobbied and advised the Allied Powers at Versailles on many issues relating to Russia while trying to form a united front among its own members.[13] Vasilii Maklakov formed and largely steered the RPC from its inception. Shortly before the peace talks began, he gathered anti-Bolshevik Russians of "all the chief tendencies and shades of political thought" to form the organization that would represent Russia's voice in Paris.[14] Among the new RPC's leading four-member *chetverka* were the liberal head of the North Russian government Nikolai Vasil'evich Chaikovskii, Prince Georgii Evgen'evich L'vov, a Kadet and first Premier of the Russian Provisional Government, the tsarist era Foreign Minister Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, a staunch, reactionary monarchist, and Boris Savinkov, a famous Socialist Revolutionary terrorist who had earlier made a career of assassinating tsarist ministers like Sazonov.[15] These four

[13] Sergei Sazonov to The Governments, Embassies, and Missions, 27 March 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f.1; Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 76.
[14] Vasili Maklakov qtd. in Thompson, 68.
[15] Sergei Sazonov to The Governments, Embassies, and Missions; Thompson, 66-78; Nadia Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile: Russian Émigrés in Paris, 1918-1925," (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1979), 30-31, 111; K. D. Nabokov, *The Ordeal of a Diplomat* (London: Duckworth, 1921), 202, 208. A lengthy list of all RPC members is located in a cable from Sazonov to unidentified governments, embassies and missions in

supervised the RPC's activities, signed all memoranda and papers addressed to the peace conference, and occasionally met with the Allies to present their views.[16] Though each held widely disparate political worldviews, they worked cordially and were "united in a general national-democratic platform…the revival of the Russian state and the deliverance of the country from Bolshevik tyranny."[17]

Maklakov hoped the RPC's colourful roster would project Russia's new "democratic hue" and appeal to the Allies' apparent sympathy for a potentially representative Russian government to restore order and stability. He hoped that that the RPC's composition would be sufficient evidence of the anti-Bolshevik Russia's political solidarity and that their democratic decision-making in Paris would convince the Allies and Europe "that their opinion will be the opinion of Russia" when the Bolsheviks were finally overthrown. He also sought to persuade the Allies that Russians were earnestly working together despite the wide disparity in political outlooks among them.[18]

Maklakov orchestrated a delegation that appeared to represent a moderate rather than a reactionary or restorationist position in Paris by stocking it with a majority of liberal Kadets whose politics were firmly entrenched in democratic principles. Sazonov and Savinkov represented the extremes of right and left politics among the Russians at the peace talks, but the RPC's leadership, the *chetverka,* was intended to show the Allies that extreme revolutionary and reactionary politics could be tempered with more

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Paris. See S.D. Sazonov-*Pravitel'stvam, Posol'stvam, i Missiiam*, 27 March 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f.1, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (hereafter RBML).

[16] Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 76.

[17] Boris Bakhmeteff, "*Russkoe politicheskoi soveshchanie v Parizhe*," 28 April 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box. 57 f.1, RBML.

[18] Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 69-76; Maklakov to Fisher; Tongour, 111; Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 41-42. Shain discusses tools and tactics such as the formation of coalition groups that political exiles use to try to win international support for their cause against a home regime.

moderate views in spite of the Civil War at home. Maklakov's goals seem to have worked in the short term. Bakhmeteff noted that the *chetverka* had to demonstrate in Paris a "united expression of national democratic Russia." Individual viewpoints, he went on, were to be subordinated to emphasise the cooperative character of the group while drawing "a clear-cut margin between the irresponsible and often contradictory actions of individual Russians abroad and the delegation that had, for the moment, the exclusive right to represent Russia."[19] Thus, conflicting voices might be heard within the group, but outwardly, the RPC's largely liberal membership was meant to assert to an Allied audience the idea that moderation and democratic opinion would be key pillars upon which the RPC, and later Russia, would function. British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George later remarked, "no one could say that the anti-Bolshevik junta in Paris lacked variety of experience and of opinion."[20] The Allies extended a number of invitations to the Russian delegation to discuss matters such as Kolchak's candidacy for leadership and the RPC's vision for the new Russian state.

The RPC's composition was practical in the advance of Russia's interests at Versailles for several reasons. First, Maklakov wanted to ensure Russia's voice would actually be heard, let alone listened to, at the Paris Peace Conference. Since there was no legally recognized Russian government in 1919, the RPC was comprised of political exiles who were, in fact, far from Russia and its current situation, a set of circumstances that made Russia's political influence in Paris already very weak. The Allies had already denied Russia an official seat because it lacked a recognised government. This situation

[19] Bakhmeteff, "*Russkoe politicheskoi soveshchanie*."
[20] David Lloyd-George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties,* Vol. 1 (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938), 368.

required the RPC's visible political unity to provide some weight and credibility to the Russia's voice at the peace talks.[21] .

Second, Maklakov believed that United States President Woodrow Wilson's ideals were *the* guiding principles at Versailles.[22] Wilson had elaborated his famous Fourteen Points in January 1918, calling for the spread of liberal democracy in Europe as a central pillar to eliminating autocracies and creating the conditions for long-lasting peace.[23] Wilson, who himself celebrated the fall of tsarism in February 1917 had called for the spread of liberal democracy in Europe as a central pillar to eliminating autocracy to create the conditions of long-lasting peace.[24] Democratising the panel of Russian representatives could give the Allies the impression that many Russians, including monarchists, had abandoned the autocratic principle and were working together toward building a democracy and the enduring peace in Russia that Europe desired. At the same time, it would bolster the political credibility and prestige of the RPC and its goals. Once formed the RPC later declared its allegiance to Wilson's programme telling the President that Russians followed his "noble initiative to organise the relations between people on

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[21] Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile," 111; Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 72; Shain, *Frontier*, 41-42. See also James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1995), 270. Both Wilson and Shain discuss the tools and tactics such as coalition that political exiles use to win international support for their cause against a home regime.

[22] Maklakov to President Woodrow Wilson, n.d., Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 16, f.4, Hoover. For a broader exploration of the RPC's interpretation of Wilsonian principles, see André Mandelstam, "*Memoire sur la délimitation des droits de l'état de la nation d'après la doctrine du Président Wilson*" (Paris: *Imprimerie Polyglotte Hugonis*, 1919) in Serge Botkin Papers, Box 3, f. 5, Hoover. Regarding Wilson's influence at Versailles, see also Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy*, 90-116; Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 39-50; Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002), 14-15.

[23] Woodrow Wilson to Sixty-Fifth Congress, Session One, 2 April 1917, *History Matters*, George Mason University, Available http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4943/. Accessed 3 August 2015.

[24] Wilson's 'making the world safe for democracy' mission emerged when he asked Congress to enter the war. For text of the speech see, Woodrow Wilson to Sixty-Fifth Congress. Wilson's formula for liberal democracy was based on the liberal belief that democratic governments do not go to war against one another. See Georg Sørenson, *A Liberal World Order in Crisis: Choosing between Imposition and Restraint* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 44.

new principles, to reduce, if not eliminate, the very possibility of armed conflicts" and that the new Russia would, if given the chance, accomplish these "noble endeavours."[25]

Wilson also adhered to the belief that all peoples, including Russians, possessed inalienable rights to determine their own destinies and that everyone should freely determine their own political status and economic, social and cultural development.[26] Maklakov and the RPC clung to Point Six of Wilson's program, which affirmed his commitment to "stand by Russia" and to help it realize an "opportunity for the independent determination of [its] own development and national policy." Consequently, the RPC believed that Russia too should have a voice in its own affairs and the fate of its territories. Maklakov hoped the committee's composition would convince the Allies Russia was ready and able to do so. He also recognized that it was essential to compromise on the status of the national minorities in order to win the Allies' good favour and achieve the final goal of preserving Russia's territorial integrity.[27]

Boris Bakhmeteff observed that Maklakov hoped a diverse but united RPC could present to the Allies a tangible working example of new Russian democracy in action which could in turn lay the foundations of a liberal, democratic, and also multinational state. Maklakov, Bakhmeteff and others assumed that the RPC's "cooperative character" would convince the Allies that the future Russia would also work justly with the smaller

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[25] Maklakov to Wilson.

[26] Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 41; Russian National and Democratic Coalition of Political Organisations Abroad to Georges Clemenceau, 24 January 1919, in Mikhail de Girs Papers, Box 39, f. 9, Hoover; John P. Humphrey, "Political and Related Rights," in Theodor Meron, Ed., *Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues*, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 193; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 11.

[27] "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points," *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy*, Yale Law School, Available http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ wilson14.asp, 3 August 2015. André Mandelstam, *Mémoire sur la delimitation des Droits de l'Etat de la Nation d'après la doctrine du Président Wilson* (Paris: *Imprimerie Polyglotte Hugonis*, 1919), Serge Botkin Papers, Box 3, f. 5, Hoover. Mandelstam was the former director of the Legal Department of the Russian Provisional Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

national groups in a new federal model so that each of them could achieve more rights and freedoms and higher levels of cultural and local political autonomy. [28] The democratic hue was thus a pragmatic tactic and an opportunity for Russian liberals to demonstrate their willingness to create a democratic constitutional and multinational state model that would satisfy the Allies' apparent desire to build peace using the principle of self-determination. If the RPC could get Allied sanction for its project, Russian liberals could resolve the nationality question and rebuild the Russian state on a new unified model.[29]

2.3 Staking Russia's Claims

The RPC worked tirelessly to prove that the seceding national groups should remain in Russia and be a part of a great new multinational state. Like the RPC, delegates for each of the national minority groups of the former Russian Empire also went to Paris without official status, but with particular goals for independence from Russia in mind.[30] Up to February 1917, national groups such as the Finns, Lithuanians, and Georgians had generally sought democratisation, social reforms, and greater autonomy in the former empire, but not outright separation from it.[31] After the February Revolution, new representative bodies such as the Estonian National Assembly called for a new

[28] Bakhmeteff, "Russian Political Conference."
[29] William R. Copeland, "Relations between the Finnish Resistance Movement and the Russian Liberals, 1899-1904," In Charles Timberlake, Ed., *Essays on Russian Liberalism*. (Columbia (MO): University of Missouri Press, 1972), 113; William Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Russian Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917-1921* (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University press, 1974), 87.
[30] Finland declared its independence in October 1917 followed by Lithuania in December. Latvia and Estonia declared by February 1918, and Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan declared in May 1918. See Alston, 25-26.
[31] Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History* (Harlow (UK): Pearson, 2001), 355-56; Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge & The Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 32; Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the USSR* (New York: Atheneum, 1980), 8, 20.

democratic federation, guarantees for cultural and economic rights, and for greater local autonomy within Russia's borders.[32] Their aims were frustrated by the Provisional Government's continued commitment to the war effort and to preserving the state's territorial integrity.[33] Though the Provisional Government granted civil rights and liberties to all citizens, extended greater autonomy to Finland and Poland, and augmented cultural rights for all national groups, it also continued to defer resolution of the state's post-imperial structure to a still un-elected Constituent Assembly. This caused Russia's national groups to lose hope that they could ever secure genuine guarantees for greater regional control over their local affairs. Consequently, the Finns and other minority groups continued the struggle for greater autonomy while assuming more governmental responsibilities in the territories they claimed.[34]

The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 was the final straw and many nascent national movements became independence movements in earnest.[35] Delegates from Finland, the Baltic States, the Caucasus, Belorussia, Ukraine, and the Don and

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[32] See for example "Resolution of the Estonian National Assembly on the Status of Estonia, 3 July 1917," "Telegrams from the Ukrainian National Rada to Prince L'vov and Kerensky, 6 March 1917," and "Resolution on the National Question of the Congress of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party, 4-5 April 1917," in Paul Browder and Alexander Kerensky, *The Russian Provisional Government 1917: Documents*, Vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), Vol. 1, 370-72, 404. See also Joshua A. Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 213; Pipes, *Formation of the USSR*, 8; Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Russian Revolution*, 142-43.

[33] "A Draft Project for the Articles of the New Fundamental Laws Concerning Autonomy and Federation," October 1917, in Browder and Kerensky, *Provisional Government*, 319; "Provisional Government's Declaration of War Aims," 27 March 1917, in Browder and Kerensky, *Provisional Government*, 1046. "The Russian State is one and indivisible" is the first article of the Russian Fundamental Law of 23 April 1906. Online, Internet, Available http://www.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/fundlaws.html Accessed 3 August 2015. See also Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 355.

[34] Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse*, 246; Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 355; Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Revolution*, 126. For more on Finland's dissatisfaction with the Provisional Government, see Irina Novikova, "The Provisional Government and Finland: Russian Democracy and Finnish Nationalism in Search of Peaceful Coexistence," in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930*, ed. Jane Burbank, Mark Von Hagen, and A. V. Remnev (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2007), 412-13.

[35] Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse*, 235-36.

Kuban Cossacks among others arrived at the Paris Peace Conference. They sought neither more reforms nor greater autonomy, but rather their complete independence from Russia. Their desires had evolved considerably in the midst of revolution and civil war.

Like the RPC, none of these delegations had official status at the Paris Peace Conference because none had an internationally recognised government.[36] The presence and apparently equal status of the national minority groups in Paris posed a substantial threat to the RPC. The *chetverka* feared the Allies would ignore Russia's interests and confer recognition to every would-be successor state.[37] Their frequent memoranda to the Allies reveal many of their anxieties. The RPC believed multiple secessions from Russia would reduce its physical size, numbers, defences, natural resources, and international prestige. It also feared these losses would weaken the state and imperil its chances both to rebuild after years of war and revolution and to re-join Europe as a liberated Great Power and trading partner. Consequently, the RPC set out on "the big and important work of protecting the interests of Russia at the peace talks," that is, the preservation of Russia's territorial integrity, while continually professing its sympathy for the national groups' aspirations.[38] In a manner similar to the national groups, the RPC also appealed to the principle "that every people should freely determine its own political status and freely pursue its economic, social and cultural development." It began to assert Russia's own rights to political self-determination.[39] Russia was no vanquished foe to be carved up or

[36] Pipes, *Formation of the USSR*, 108; Charlotte Alston, "The Suggested Basis for a Russian Federal Republic: Britain, Anti-Bolshevik Russia and the Border States at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919," History, Vol. 91, No. 301 (January 2006), 25.
[37] Pipes, *Formation of the USSR*, 108; Alston, "Suggested Basis," 25.
[38] "The Russian Political Conference in Paris," 28 April 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box. 57 f.1.
[39] John P. Humphrey, "Political and Related Rights," in Theodor Meron, Ed., *Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues*, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 193; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 11.

dictated to by the winners. As such, the RPC continued to remind the Allies that Russia-the *real*, anti-Bolshevik Russia-was an Ally that still had rights to its territory and to the right to determine the course of its own future statehood.[40]

In order to win Allied military support and convince them that the nationalities ought to remain in Russia, cooperation, or at least the appearance thereof, was key. Through the spring of 1919, the group relentlessly argued first for Russia's rights to *its* territories, but then gravitated, for the sake of winning the best possible outcome for Russia, to publicly acknowledging the validity of the minorities' claims to autonomy. This did not mean they conceded outright the independence of these would-be successor states. Rather, they had begun to acknowledge there could be no return to the imperial past and that they would have to reframe what kind of relationship Russians would have with non-Russians in the future Russian state.[41] Within the context of the Paris Peace Conference, the RPC's attempts to block Allied recognition of any seceding group's independence should not be viewed solely as a reactionary attempt to hold on to the old empire 'as it was.' Rather, it ought to be seen as a moment when a Russian group led by liberals began the process of articulating Russia "as it should become." In this vision, Russia would progress from being a backward tsarist empire to becoming a great democratic and multinational state with constitutionally guaranteed rights and protections.[42]

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[40] Russian National and Democratic Coalition of Political Organisations Abroad to Clemenceau, 24 January 1919, in de Girs Papers, Box 39, f. 9, Hoover.

[41] Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile," 186-87.

[42] In his discussion of different states of mind between immigrants, emigrants, and exiles, Orm Øverland, notes that immigrants tend to focus on relating with their new homeland, emigrants focus on the homeland left behind as it was, while exiles tend to see the imagined homeland 'as it should become.' See "Visions of Home: Exiles and Immigrants," in Peter I. Rose, Ed., *The Dispossessed: An Anatomy of Exile* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 8.

Still, the RPC had to confront how to approach these very real secession movements in their moment. The RPC pressed the Allies to refuse *de jure* recognition to the nationalities, particularly those occupying territories in the Russian northwest. In doing so, they attempted to justify why those groups could not become independent states. The process itself revealed much about how the RPC conceived of Russia's attachments to the territories in question as well as the RPC's liberal ideals for the future.

First, the process of justifying Russia's retention of territory illustrated the RPC's liberal commitment to due process and respect for international law. The RPC's effort to prevent Finland's secession is a useful example. The RPC mobilised formal titles to the territory that were based on formerly internationally recognised treaties and called on the Allies to respect their provisions. It also argued that any changes to Russia's borders required Russia's formal permission. Moreover, this permission could come only after the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and the establishment of a recognised government that could make decisions regarding legal changes to Russian territory.[43] In other words, border changes in Russia, as the RPC maintained, could happen only when the state was in a position to give it.

Regarding Finland, the RPC argued that that the legal union was founded on a constitutional act granted in 1809 after Sweden ceded the territory to Russia, a union the RPC maintained was built on the basis of law, mutual acceptance, and "on right, not on actual might."[44] After Great Britain and other Allied states formally recognised Finland's

[43] Maklakov to Wilson; "On the Question of the Nationalities of Russia," 12 June 1919, in Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f.5.

[44] Maklakov to Wilson. For more on Imperial Russia's acquisition of Finland, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 774. The RPC argued more vociferously to retain Finland than it did other territories. Because Finland had enjoyed a special status in the former Empire that allowed it to develop socially, politically, and economically, the Allies were quick to recognise its independence. Nevertheless, the RPC protested when Finland achieved it because if there was

independence in May 1919, the RPC countered that the "legal status of territory [could not] be changed without the consent or knowledge of the State of which such a territory was a part."[45] The RPC argued that because there were treaties that bound Finland to Russia, both parties were required to participate in the negotiation of any formal changes. Consequently, the RPC maintained that Finland could not unilaterally sever ties, nor could they be severed "by a decision emanating from the Allied Powers" without Russia's consent. Doing so would be unjust, and in Maklakov's view, "an infringement of the very principles of international law" because such an act violated Russia's legally established territorial integrity.[46]

Maklakov also reminded Wilson about the latter's programme for world peace, whereby the President had indicated the need for Russia to enjoy unhampered participation in determining its own political development and national policy.[47] Independence and Allied approval, the RPC noted, violated the spirit of this programme and indicated that the Allies treated Russia as if it "has perished, that her lifeless corpse is being divided into pieces without any regard to the future of the country, to her future resurrection."[48] The RPC had banked on the idea that the Allies would honour Wilson's guiding principles toward Russia. To be sure, Wilson's Fourteen Points were guiding

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even a chance of success, the precedent would make it more difficult for other national groups that were less politically and economically developed to succeed in their efforts. See Sanborn, 212. At the same time, if the RPC chose to say nothing, it would appear that Russia would acquiesce to all potential border changes.

[45] RPC to Clemenceau, 8 May 1919, in Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f. 5. For more on Finland's independence movement, see David Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland* (Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[46] Annex to Aide-Memoire, RPC to Clemenceau, 8 May 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f. 5; Maklakov to Wilson.

[47] Wilson, "Fourteen Points;" Maklakov to Wilson.

[48] Annex to Aide-Memoire, RPC to Clemenceau, 8 May 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f. 5; Maklakov to Wilson.

principles for the conduct of the peace talks. The Allies were not, evidently, legally bound to follow them.

The legal treaty connections from the past were crucial to the RPC's argument for Russia's retention of Finland. So too was the idea that a new legal basis for a future union had to be created since it was generally understood by the Finns that Finland had only been legally bound to the sovereign and not the state. From the Finns' perspective, when the tsar was overthrown, Finland was no longer legally tied to Russia. Cognizant of the Finn's position, the RPC responded by guaranteeing new constitutional protections in order to convince the Allies that Finland would enjoy the broadest possible autonomy in the new Russia.[49] The RPC then proceeded to declare that "enlightened Russian thought" sympathised with the Finns against old tsarist iniquities. As such, just as the Provisional Government "with the universal approval of Russia's liberal opinion [had]…fully restituted the legal rights of the Finnish people," the RPC would do the same.[50] The RPC wanted to make clear to the Allies that the new Russia would not engage in the arbitrary application or flagrant disregard of laws as the tsarist regime had. Rather, the union with Finland would be built on new liberal foundations including equal rights and the rule of law guaranteed in a constitution. The recall of the Constituent Assembly and the creation of constitutional rights then were integral to the RPC's liberal vision of the new Russian multinational state based on the rule of law and importantly, respect for it.

Second, the RPC also tried to appeal to the Allies' greater desire to secure a lasting peace in Europe. It did so by arguing that Russia's security and defences depended on

[49] Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile," 188; Novikova, "Provisional Government and Finland," 399.
[50] Draft letter from RPC to Wilson, n.d., Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 16, f. 4. The RPC chose to ignore the apparent mistakes the Provisional Government made toward the Finns. See Novikova, "The Provisional Government and Finland."

Finland's presence in the new state. Heavily destabilized by the Great War, the October Revolution, and the Civil War, the RPC believed Russia was at the moment quite weak and vulnerable to not only Bolshevik machinations, but also to those of Germany. Finland, in the RPC's view, had long held an integral role in Russia's defences. Finnish independence made Russia vulnerable to "possible attack from the Finnish side or on behalf of any power which would succeed in laying its foundation of operations on Finland's soil."[51] Given that Russia was in the midst of a civil war following the Great War and Revolution, the country was vulnerable to attack. The RPC also claimed that Finland conspired with the Germans when it allowed V. I. Lenin passage into Russia, a circumstance that indicated that Finland and Germany could form a "natural alliance" and constitute a future military menace to Russia.[52] If Finland, as the argument went, were to remain a part of Russia, the latter could work to prevent Finland's collusion with Germany, protect itself from German encroachment northward, and ultimately preserve the general peace that the Allies sought. In the meantime, the RPC pledged that Russia could eventually acquiesce to Finland's desires, but only under the condition that Russia's "own interests are duly maintained."[53] Until this occurred, the RPC implored the Allies to "lend [Russia], as they promised…a helping hand" in its reconstitution first.[54]

Just as the RPC worried Finland's secession would compromise the security of Russian territories, it also argued that the creation of newly independent states on Russia's borders would jeopardise Russia's free access to the Baltic Sea and thus endanger

[51] Maklakov to Wilson; Annex to Aide-Memoire, RPC to Clemenceau, 8 May 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f. 5.
[52] Maklakov to Wilson.
[53] RPC to Clemenceau, 8 May 1919, in Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f. 5; Maklakov to Wilson.
[54] Annex to Aide-Memoire, RPC to Clemenceau, 8 May 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f. 5; Draft letter from RPC to Wilson, n.d., Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 16, f. 4.

Russia's future economic interests.[55] Secession, it contended, would be a "very serious strike on the most vital interests of Russia" and create more obstacles to the state's reconstruction, let alone future commercial prospects and normal economic development.[56] The RPC pointed out that twenty percent of Russia's foreign trade had been conducted through ports on the Baltic Sea. Considerable movement of import and exported goods such as primary resources and manufactured items passed through these ports. If these territories seceded, Russia would be blocked from free access to those seaports that were, in fact, Russian property.[57] It also argued that Russia would face enormous deficits in the amount of trade it needed to conduct to rebuild after the war. The RPC believed these ports were integral to Russia's renewal and continued to argue that Russia had a right to take part in decisions that affected its territory and its infrastructure. Finally, the RPC hinted again that the Baltic States "would likely fall under the economic hold of another industrial country." It meant Germany, which had "asserted interests there" before the war and now sought a new market for its own products so that it could rebuild at Russia's expense and Europe's peril.[58] In spite of these protests, the Allies had already conferred their recognition, Finland and the Baltic Provinces became independent states, and the decision appeared to be final.

That the Allies had denied Russia an official seat at the peace talks and recognised these territories demonstrated Russia was really and symbolically demoted from a great

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[55] Annex to Aide-Memoire, RPC to Clemenceau, 8 May 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f. 5.
[56] Michel Batchef, "*Les Provinces Baltiques au point de vue économique*" (Paris: *Imprimerie-Librairie militaire universelle*, 1919), in Serge Botkin Papers, Box 2, f. 18, Hoover. Batchef was a Russian Embassy attaché who wrote the pamphlet under the auspices of the *Commission financière et économique russe*, a standing RPC committee.
[57] Batchef, "Les Provinces Baltiques."
[58] Ibid.

Allied power to a lesser supplicant. The process of defending Russia's rights to these territories revealed the RPC's conception that Russia's future 'greatness' depended its ability to retain territories it had previously conquered, annexed, or absorbed. Historically, Russia's extensive size had been a source of state pride and self-definition.[59] "Colonisation was the foundational fact of our history" according to the influential 19th century liberal Russian historian and Kadet V. O. Kliuchevskii and it was the incorporation and intermingling of different peoples over time that made Russia what it was and what it could be.[60] As such, liberals and the RPC took it for granted that in the process of colonisation, territory and space became important agents in the making of Russia's history and Russians' sense of self as expansion weaved new territories into an intricate tapestry of peoples. At the same time, Russian liberals saw colonisation as a vital force for progress and forward advancement of positive transformation.[61] As Russia grew in size, the space helped determine Russia's growth, development, and historical evolution-it had become a crucial element in Russia's social and cultural processes and the making of Russia's very sense of itself.[62] For the RPC, here is where the value of Russian space rested. It brought together diverse people in the past, and Russians had long understood "great states were composed of a great number of peoples with different

[59] Jane Burbank and Mark von Hagen, "Coming into the Territory: Uncertainty and Empire," in Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, Eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 16.

[60] V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, Vol. 1 (Moscow, n.p. 1956), 31-32. See also Mark Bassin, Christopher Ely, and Melissa K. Stockdale, "Russian Space," in Mark Bassin, Christopher Ely, and Melissa K. Stockdale Eds., *Space, Place, and Power in Modern Russia: Essays in the New Spatial History* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 4. See also J Burbank and von Hagen, "Coming into the Territory,, 15; Willard Sunderland, "An Empire of Peasants: Empire-Building, Interethnic Interaction, and Ethnic Stereotyping in the Rural World of the Russian Empire, 1800-1855," in Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel, Eds., *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 174-76.

[61] Bassin, Ely, and Stockdale, "Russian Space," 4.

[62] Ibid., 7.

ways of being."[63] It also understood that to be a great state capable of playing an influential role in the international arena, it had to be able to continue mobilizing all of the economic, demographic, natural, and military resources that had hitherto helped it achieve great power status before the First World War.[64]

2.4 Planning the New Russian State

Soon after its formation, the RPC put forward a liberal democratic vision of the Russian state that it hoped would forestall Allied recognition of the independence of the seceding national minority groups. This new Russian multinational federation would be constructed "only on the democratic principles of the people's sovereignty and legal order." Russia would enshrine in a constitution the equality of all citizens before the law and equal rights regardless of religion, ethnicity, or class; and the Russian state would encourage private initiative, the raising of capital, and new protections on labour to revive production in the cities and the countryside. As for the division of state power, the multinational federation would rest on the decentralisation of authority, the transfer of regional matters to local authorities, and the security and recognition of the statutory rights of all national groups inhabiting Russia.[65]

In this offer to confer wider autonomy, the RPC again made plain their view that Russia included and would include both the national groups and the territories that they occupied. Russian liberals in the Provisional Government had behaved similarly in 1917. Then, liberals generally expressed some sympathy for the aspirations of national groups

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[63] Jane Burbank and Mark von Hagen, "Coming into the Territory," 16.
[64] Alexander Chubarov, *Russia's Bitter Path to Modernity: A History of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras* (New York: Continuum, 2001), 26; William R. Thompson, "Why Rivalries Matter and What Great Power Rivalries Can Tell Us about World Politics," in William R. Thompson, Ed. *Great Power Rivalries* (University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 3.
[65] Bakhmeteff, "*Russkoe politicheskoi soveshchanie.*"

but there were limits to this sympathy. They could only tolerate the aspirations of the national groups so long as these goals did not threaten the social peace and order, and in the case of borderlands during the First World War, a measure of defence and control at the frontiers.[66] At the Paris Peace Conference, the RPC espoused continued sympathy for the nationalities' aspirations as the Provisional Government had done, but stopped short of supporting outright independence since secession threatened the new Russian social order that the liberals were trying to hammer out while carving out large swathes of territory at the same time. As such, the RPC subordinated the nationalities' aspirations to Russia's and concentrated instead on seeking aid for Russia's armed struggle against Bolshevism and "the big and important work of protecting the [territorial] interests of Russia at the peace talks."[67]

In doing so, the RPC painted a particular portrait on the Russian canvas using a palette of liberal ideals widely favoured in the West including the languages of civil rights and freedoms. The great democracies, like Britain, France, and the United States enjoyed these and Russia, if given the chance, could adopt these too for Russians and non-Russians to enjoy alike. The RPC later declared its commitment to realising in practice stated and widely-known Allied principles in Russia, suggesting that if the Allies' helped pacify the civil war, Russia could "consummate those very foundations of genuine democracy and social justice in the name of which the Peace Conference assembled" and which liberal Russia championed. Furthermore, "wholly partaking in the Allies' sterling

[66] Before the October Revolution, Russian liberals were concerned primarily with ensuring that law would become the only effective basis of government and that social stability required a general recognition of the moral bases of lawful behaviour. Kadet Party leader Pavel Miliukov and others wanted to foster a new kind of state consciousness among all classes and sectors of Russia's population in order to avoid political disintegration and civil war, and a system that would preserve Russia's political integrity if the state behaved responsibly and lawfully. See Rosenberg, *Liberals in Revolution*, 134.
[67] "The Russian Political Conference in Paris," 28 April 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box. 57 f.1.

principles…founded on the peaceful cohabitation of free peoples," the RPC declared Russians were "fully ready to partake in active cooperation with the Allies for the common goal of establishing a firm and just peace."[68]

Importantly, the RPC's embryonic vision of a Russia resplendent with democratic values and institutions came in direct contrast to its assertions of what the future Russia could never be: an absolutist monarchy, a tsarist empire, or a Soviet republic. In the RPC's view, these illegitimate constructs were built on tyranny and the violation of the rights of Russians and non-Russians alike, both of which lead, inevitably, to conflict.[69] The RPC declared that Russia's "national movement [was] devoid of restorative aspirations," and it "flatly rejected" suspicions that the tsarist regime and its imperial structures would be restored when the Bolsheviks were overthrown.[70] As well, the RPC excluded the Bolsheviks from their ideal Russia because the latter were "usurpers" whose criminal acts and "shameful imposition of will on the Russian people" made them unworthy of citizenship.[71] When the Allies tried to organise all Russian factions at Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora in January 1919, the RPC and White Army leaders' refused to treat with the Bolsheviks at all. Their intransigence demonstrated to the Allies that no anti-Bolshevik faction including the RPC would entertain the notion that the Bolsheviks could participate in the peaceful construction of the new state.[72]

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[68] RPC to Clemenceau, 15 April 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box. 57 f.5.

[69] President Wilson had elaborated the idea that tyranny bred conflict as well in the introduction to his Fourteen Points programme for peace. Available http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. Accessed 3 August 2015.

[70] RPC to Clemenceau, 15 April 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f.5.

[71] Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile," 147; RPC to Clemenceau, 15 April 1919, Bakhmeteff Papers, Box. 57 f.5.

[72] RPC to Clemenceau, 24 January 1919, in Mikhail de Girs Papers, Box 42, f.4, Hoover. Text of Wilson's invitation to Prinkipo can be found in Lloyd George, *Truth about the Peace Treaties*, 364-66 and United States Department of State, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919: The Paris Peace Conference*, Vol. III (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919). 676-77 (hereafter *FRUS*).

By mid-February, the Allies abandoned the Prinkipo plan.[73] For their part, the seceding national groups that had also been invited categorically rejected the invitation outright. They had little to gain from what they saw as Prinkipo's end goal: a strong, regenerated Russia.[74] Moreover, the nationalities generally believed negotiating with the Russians might suggest to the Allies their acquiescence to membership in the future Russia when in fact, these groups had come to Paris to legitimise their own respective independence movements. For the RPC, the Prinkipo invitation made them realise that the Allies were also willing to listen to the Bolsheviks and the nationalities' claims on an equal basis with their own.[75] Psychologically, the RPC was forced to confront the reality that Russia was no longer a major player, and would be treated by the Allies like any other 'would-be state' and therefore a lesser power at the peace talks. Because its goal was to remake a strong unified Russian state, this time based on entirely new multinational and democratic state foundations, the RPC had to move quickly to be sure that if the Allies were going to let all voices be heard, theirs would be the loudest. Thus, while the RPC continued to seek military support for the White Armies, its primary task was to convince the Allies that the nationalities, and the territories upon which they lived, were intrinsic parts of the future Russian state and that the Russian state should be kept intact.

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[73] Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile," 146.

[74] Keith Neilson, "'That Elusive Entity British Policy in Russia:' The Impact of Russia on British Policy at the Paris Peace Conference," in Michael Dockrill and John Fisher, Eds., *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 84. The Georgian, Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian responses to the invitation to Prinkipo are found in United States Department of State, *FRUS 1919: Russia* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919) 47-50, 53, 70-7.

[75] The RPC's political position after Prinkipo was greatly weakened. Firstly, Russia did not have an official seat at the peace talks because Russia lacked a de jure government; therefore the Allies treated the group unofficially like any other diplomatic supplicant. The RPC's own status as a group of political exiles may have also played a part-as virtual outsiders, their only real weapons in the war were principles and they in fact controlled neither territory nor people.

To convince the Allies to deny recognition of any national groups' independence, the RPC had to steer a new tack. It again affirmed its allegiance to Wilson's programme by stating that Russians would follow his initiative to organise relations between all national groups using new liberal principles. Claiming no one held "more deeply and sincerely" than Russians the desire to accomplish the President's virtuous tasks, the RPC chose to model its work at Versailles along Wilsonian lines and declared its desire to settle treaties and apply "practical and concrete solutions" to the problems posed by secessionist movements.[76] The RPC believed Russia was entitled to its rights but it realised it was also obligated to respect the rights of other national groups. In order to establish Russia's sincerity toward the Wilsonian ideal, the RPC adopted a conciliatory approach and federation as a middle path.

The Allies invited RPC members to discuss their views on the nationalities. Nikolai Chaikovskii told the Allies that the RPC recognised that forced centralization and maltreatment under tsardom had created "a kind of independence fever" and that the national minorities did not wish to be considered "compulsory members of the Russian State" without a "voice in deciding their fate and their local institutions." He believed greater autonomy for the national groups would ameliorate the nationalities' desire for a greater voice and more autonomy and thought that their desires would be met in the new Russian republic, "and a federal republic at that."[77] Nikolai de Bazily confirmed this opinion in a note to his counterpart in London. He wished to convey to the Allies that the RPC sought to create "a united democratic Russia reunited in a broad system of

[76] Maklakov to Wilson.
[77] Nikolai Chaikovskii, 10 May 1919, in Paul Mantoux, *The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919): From the Delivery of the Peace Terms to the Signing of the Treaty of Versailles*, Vol. 2 (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1992), 27-29.

regional autonomy with local legislation." [78] *Chetverka* member Boris Savinkov also maintained a conciliatory position, one that as British official James Simpson observed, revealed his clear and forward thinking ideas regarding federation.[79] Winston Churchill also reported Savinkov's belief that it was essential to define Russia's future model as "a huge federated Republic" where all would "enjoy the largest autonomy and all local liberties."[80] Savinkov's primary goal in talks with the Allies was to secure more external support for the military effort at home. However, his statements also indicate that he recognized the need for conciliation toward the national groups and that the RPC should make positive assurances regarding their status since it appeared that the outcome of the Civil War and Russia's very survival depended on it.

To his RPC colleagues, Savinkov stated that outright independence for the nationalities was "clearly unacceptable." However, because he believed the Allies would not meet such an unqualified attitude positively, he advised the RPC to recognise the principle of autonomy and to declare that Russia could agree to this principle before waiting for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. The effect, he hoped, would prevent "our minorities [from allying] against us" and also "regain the Allies' sympathy for and confidence in us."[81] The RPC could not tolerate the independence of any national group since this would undermine Russia's territorial unity, but Savinkov's advice illustrates that the RPC was conscious that it needed to find a compromise between Russia's unity and the principles of self-determination. The Wilsonian principle

[78] Nikolai de Bazily to Evgeny Vasili'evich Sablin, 4 November 1919, in Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bazily Papers, Box 50, f.1, Hoover. de Bazily and Sablin were the *Chargés d'Affaires* at the Russian Embassy in Paris and London respectively.
[79] Alston, "Suggested Basis," 39.
[80] Churchill, Winston, "Memorandum: M. Savinkov and Russian Policy," 27 November 1919, National Archives (Kew), War Cabinet (CAB) 24/94/40.
[81] Boris Savinkov, "Memorandum," 23 August 1919, in de Girs Papers, Box 50, f.1, Hoover.

indicated that appeasement was a necessity. So too was the need to ensure the minorities did not rally together cooperatively at Versailles to achieve their independence.

With a compromise in mind, the RPC still had to convince the Allies that their burgeoning plan for the new state was viable and that Russia was in fact sincere. During the peace talks, the British Delegation set out to explore whether the national groups themselves might have an interest in joining the Russian federation that the RPC proposed, indicating that some British officials believed this was a workable solution to which the Russians would commit. The Allies were frustrated by the continuing uncertainty and incoherence of their collective policies toward Russia, and were actively seeking ways to facilitate the settlement of new territorial boundaries and international relations for post-war Europe. Their need to settle on a plan was likely why Chaikovskii's commitment to a Russian federal republic met receptive ears. British delegate Esme Howard observed that the RPC's conciliatory attitude toward federation "will help matters."[82] British officials under the auspices of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office began consulting with the national groups' representatives regarding their terms for entry into a Russian federation such as the one that the RPC envisaged.[83]

In the meantime, the RPC continuously reaffirmed Russia's dedication to constitutionalism, rights, and autonomy, claims that it hoped would persuade the Allies to believe that all national groups would enjoy the broadest possible freedom in the new democratic Russia.[84] The RPC also reiterated that there would be no return to the imperial past when it insisted that all progressive and "enlightened Russian thought" heartily

[82] See Chaikovskii's interview with the Allies in Mantoux, *Deliberations*, 24-29; Esme Howard qtd. in Alston, "Suggested Basis," 42.
[83] Alston, "Suggested Basis," 29.
[84] Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile," 188.

sympathised with the nationalities' desires for greater autonomy and would guarantee their legal rights with "the universal approval of Russia's liberal opinion."[85] Reasserting that Russia had broken with the centralizing tendencies of the former regime, the RPC pledged that Russia's reconstruction could only be built "on the free association of the peoples who make up her entity on the principles of autonomy and of federalism."[86]

Still, the RPC was justifiably worried that the national groups would not welcome a federal scheme. James Simpson, the official tasked with canvassing their opinions, found the national delegates' responses largely negative. In general, the responses revealed significant doubts about Russian sincerity in guaranteeing the rights of national minorities or the principle of self-determination. As Charlotte Alston has shown, the Polish delegation sent a scathing response to the question of whether they would join a Russian federation. It rejected the federal scheme outright because, "the Russians ha[d] not yet attained that White Flower of political life, the art of compromise" and that Poland could "help Russia…to become more liberal [by taking] territory from her." Latvia's response was similar. Its delegation rejected federation, arguing that the Russians had previously been unable to tolerate different histories, mentalities, and religions in the country. Moreover, the Latvian delegation believed federation was one of the highest forms of state structure, and Russians were below the cultural level needed to achieve and maintain it. Latvia also claimed that most Russians opposed the idea of a decentralized Russia in the first place, hence the Russian delegation could not act in good faith.[87]

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[85] Maklakov to Wilson.

[86] RPC to Clemenceau, "Proposal of the Russian Political Conference in Paris to the Peace Conference on the Question of the Nationalities in Russia," 6 March 1919, British Library, Wetherby, West Yorkshire, UK.

[87] According to Alston, the Armenian and Azeri delegates also flatly rejected the idea of federation. Armenia wanted simply to unify its own people with Great Power support. Azerbaijan dismissed the proposal since Azeri language, religion, and ways of life were different that those of the Russians, and they had already begun their own state-building project. There were also some lukewarm responses. Lithuania would consider

The Bessarabian delegation, on the other hand, came to Paris to ask the Allies to stop Romanian attempts to annex their territory and reunite the principality with Russia. It declared that their natural home, the "democratic Russian Republic, was in serious danger" because of war and the secession movements. The only means to save it was "to organise and unite all its people, in conformity with their right to decide freely" their fate in a democratic multinational Russia. Confident this would be realized, the delegation declared its readiness to join a federal democratic Russia, and help their Russian brothers "seal the conquests of the February Revolution."[88] The Bessarabian delegation emboldened the RPC by validating its arguments and demonstrating one national group's belief that their national survival depended on membership in Russia. The RPC deployed an onslaught of documentation establishing legal and historical connections to confirm Russia's "formal right over Bessarabia was indisputable."[89] However, the Allies allowed Romania to annex the territory in order to secure a pledge from the latter to "remain…a

joining a federation if Russia ever became truly democratic and veritably amenable to the concept of federation. Belorussia would join if the federation were based on equality and free agreement. The Georgian delegate thought the proposition was "naïve," but would consider it if a federation were formed with the willing, not forced, cooperation of those nations involved. The Don Cossacks would enter a federation if there were a treaty and that the central power was limited to controlling only finance, military, international, and postal affairs. Ukraine and Bessarabia responded more positively. The Ukrainian delegate maintained that federation with Russia had been a long-standing Ukrainian goal and that it would join if there were guarantees there would be equal participation among all groups and no return to former Russian centralizing patterns. Bessarabia would join the federation as well, since membership, as its delegation maintained, was far preferable to an apparently immanent annexation by Romania. See Alston, "Suggested Basis," 33-37.

[88] Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Moldavian Republic, the 'Sfatul Tzerii,' 2 December 1917, in Paris Peace Conference Document Series, *The Roumanian Occupation of Bessarabia* (Paris: Imprimerie Lahure, 1920), 58-59. The Military Congress of the Moldavians of All Russia declared just hours before the Bolshevik Revolution began on 25 October 1917 that "the sole form of government admissible and possible in Russia is that of a Federative and Democratic Republic." Furthermore, "Bessarabia shall enjoy territorial and political autonomy" and that it should have "a representative of Moldavian national affairs" in the Russian Government. See Resolutions of the First Military Congress of the Moldavians of All Russia, 25 October 1917, in Peace Conference Document Series, *The Roumanian Occupation*, 52-53.

[89]RPC to Clemenceau, 22 March 1919, in Russia *Posol'stvo* (US) Records, Box 22, f.5, Hoover.

rallying point for Europe against Bolshevism" and shore up a *cordon sanitaire* between Soviet Russia and Central Europe.[90]

As for the other national groups, their delegates' incredulity toward the RPC's sincerity undoubtedly emerged from their memory of the imperial past and, more recently, their disappointments in the Russian Provisional Government. As we have seen, after the February Revolution and during the Great War, the Provisional Government did not yield to multiple requests from national minority groups to create a federation of autonomous states, to convene a Constituent Assembly in 1917, or to respect the status of the representative bodies the national groups had created. Like the Estonian National Assembly, the Ukrainian Central Rada called on the State Duma to grant Ukraine its autonomy and create "a free federation of free peoples."[91] The Provisional Government responded that it had no right to organize new administrative systems since this responsibility lay "wholly within the competence of the Constituent Assembly."[92] As for Finland, the Provisional Government granted it a new constitution in March 1917, but dissolved the Sejm in July. It maintained that full powers and rights of the former tsar over the Grand Duchy "could pass only to the Provisional Government" and refused to "abolish the authority of the Russian Government in matters of Finnish legislation and government." The Finns' independence movement gained momentum not simply because the Finns believed "supreme state power on domestic matters" must fall to the Sejm since Finland was no longer bound to Russia by the tsar. The movement grew because

[90] "Council of Ten: Minutes of Meetings, 12 January to 14 February 1919," in *FRUS,* Vol. III, 850-51. See also MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 125-128.
[91] "Telegrams from the Ukrainian National Rada to Prince L'vov and Kerensky, 6 March 1917" and "Resolution of the Estonian National Assembly on the Status of Estonia," 3 July 1917, in Browder and Kerensky, *Russian Provisional Government,* 370, 404.
[92] "Official Communiqué on the Rejection of Ukrainian Demands," 3 June 1917, in ibid., 376.

Finland's protests were met with promises that the Constituent Assembly would decide matters in the indeterminate future coupled with the Provisional Government's authorization of the Governor General to prevent in Finland any "open disregard of Russia's interests or breach of peace and order" and that he could "stop at nothing to restore the same."[93]

For the national minority delegates at the peace conference, the RPC was like the Provisional Government before it – it regularly expressed sympathy for the aspirations of Russia's minorities, but maintained its position that the unity of the state was paramount and final decisions would be made only by the Constituent Assembly. Only little more than a year had passed since the Provisional Government declared that "the Russian state is one and indivisible" in the same breath as it pledged that "regional autonomy shall be introduced in the Russian state" when a Constituent Assembly convened.[94] When the Kuban Cossack Delegation declared to Simpson its belief that it was only the Great Russians who refused to accept the idea of federation, it said so because they believed the precedent had been set recently by an ostensibly representative Russian government and there was little faith that the Russians had evolved in their thinking since.[95]

The RPC's commitment to the future multinational Russian state superceded their outward commitment to the rights of self-determination for minorities. The RPC could go so far as to sympathize with their desires for greater autonomy but not outright

[93] "Manifesto Confirming the Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland and Its Full Implementation," 8 March 1917; "Manifesto of July 18/31 1917 on the Dissolution of the Sejm and the Holding of New Elections," 18 July 1917; "The Address of the Sejm to the Provisional Government Accompanying the Transmission to it of the Law on the Supreme Power," 12 July 1917; "Decision of the Provisional Government Empowering the Governor General to Take Forceful Measures If Necessary to Maintain Order," 5 August 1917, in ibid., 334, 345, 351, 357.
[94] "A Draft Project for the Articles of the New Fundamental Laws Concerning Autonomy and Federation," October 1917, in ibid., 319.
[95] Alston, "Suggested Basis," 36.

secession. However, the RPC continued to argue that groups like the Ukrainians only demonstrated a tendency toward complete independence because they were "obliged to wage regular warfare against Red Armies" in order to keep the Bolsheviks out of their territory and away from their raw materials and crops.[96] The RPC repeatedly pointed out that until the October Revolution, no national group including the Finns, had in fact sought outright secession, but only greater autonomy. As such, the RPC assumed, as Russian liberals had traditionally done, that national groups would be satisfied with guarantees for greater autonomy in local affairs and that these groups would naturally rejoin Russia once peace was restored and the conditions for greater autonomy were created and constitutionally guaranteed.

Furthermore, since liberals tended to view federation as a higher form of state that Russians and non-Russians alike would rally to, and given the RPC's strenuous efforts to block Allied recognition of the national groups' independence, it might be argued that the RPC really needed the national groups to voluntarily return even if they could not go so far as to ask them officially. Voluntary return could have been Russian liberalism's crowning achievement as the state reclaimed 'greatness' again without coercion. As we have seen, the Russians had, over the course of centuries of absorption, conquest, and settlement, come to see territorial expansion as a part of who they were and what Russia was as a great imperial power. In the past, Russia had become great because it overtook many territories as an expanding empire. The RPC's multinational state was a new, superior project and an evolution from tsarist imperialism because multinational states depend on the voluntary entry of national groups to form a federation for their mutual

[96] RPC to Clemenceau, "Proposal of the Russian Political Conference in Paris to the Peace Conference on the Question of the Nationalities in Russia," 6 March 1919, British Library (Wetherby, West Yorkshire, UK).

benefit. Moreover, in the imperial period, the state ruled coercively and arbitrarily. Conversely in the new federation, the RPC argued there would be constitutional rights protecting local autonomy and the nationalities themselves could take a real role in helping to rebuild the Russian state for the common good. [97]

The Allies, nevertheless, became skeptical. First, despite the RPC's intention to subordinate individual political views for a unified purpose at Versailles, Sergei Sazonov's reactionary position indicated that not every RPC member was fully committed to Wilsonian principles. Perhaps most telling was American Ambassador Thomas N. Page's telegram, which reported that while en route to Paris, Sazonov had flatly rejected the idea of Finnish or Baltic independence and declared that "we will fight before we give [them] up."[98] Such pronouncements indicated to the Allies that any work they achieved in bringing peace to Europe could be overturned by a new Russian reactionary war for territory and vengeance.[99] The statement irritated French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau enough to warn the Allies away from listening to Sazonov, "lest it be alleged that the Conference was conspiring to Tsarism."[100] Sazonov's behaviour seemed to confirm their suspicions that the Russians secretly desired restoration of the old centralizing regime. Winston Churchill even suggested that the

[97] Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 11; Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile," 196.
[98] Thomas N. Page qtd. in Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 71.
[99] Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 71; Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile," 117.
[100] George Clemenceau, Council of Ten: Minutes of Meetings 15 February to June 17 1919, in *FRUS: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, Vol. IV (Washington: US Government Printing Department, 1919), 53. Maklakov warned Sazonov to temper his attitudes lest they give "credibility to the allegations that the White movement was unalterably retrograde." Maklakov to Sazonov, 5 December 1918, in Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 11, f.2.

White cause might be aided if Sazonov were replaced with someone "more abreast of modern ideas and capable of inspiring confidence…in the non-Russian peoples."[101]

Second, Sazonov, who served as the representative of both Kolchak and General Anton Denikin in Paris, intimated to Churchill that he sided with General Anton Denikin's desire to rebuild a strong and indivisible Russia. According to Churchill, Sazonov's statements indicated that Russians "wittingly refused to cooperate with the other peoples of the former Empire."[102] Churchill believed Sazonov clung to a policy line "dictated by outworn formulas" and that his desire, like Denikin's, had only been to "reconstitute a Great Russia; that is to say, a centralized Constitutional Monarchy." In so doing, together they "pushed away all the claims [of the nationalities] even those which are most legitimate."[103] In Churchill's view, closer collaboration would have been facilitated if Sazonov were replaced by a diplomatic representative who was "more active, more abreast of modern ideas, and capable of inspiring confidence both by his policy and his political past in the non-Russian peoples."[104]

Though Denikin's proclaimed commitment to restore "a great and indivisible Russia" was well-known, the Allies were more focused on Kolchak's attitude since they were negotiating terms with him regarding recognition for his government.[105] Kolchak

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[101] Churchill, "Memorandum."
[102] Ibid., Alston, "Suggested Basis," 38. Denikin's plans for the future Russian state were laid out in a 5 May 1919 telegram. He sought the abolition of Bolshevism, the restoration of law and order, the reconstitution of the army, the convocation of a national assembly through universal suffrage, guarantees for total civil and religious liberty, and agrarian reforms and labour legislation for the peasants' benefit and workers protection. Regarding the nationalities, Denikin maintained his desire to rebuild "a strong and indivisible Russia" that included a decentralized government, regional autonomy and a "large measure of local self-government." See M. Serafimov to Sazonov, 5 May 1919, FRUS PPC 1919, Vol. 5, 551.
[103] Churchill, "Memorandum"
[104] Ibid.
[105] Peter Kenez, *Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920: The Defeat of the Whites*, Vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 232. Denikin had also submitted himself to Kolchak's authority to help unify the White cause. See Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 269-74.

pledged to the Allies that there would be no restoration of the old regime and that all peoples would enjoy equal rights and protections. He also declared that the nationalities would enjoy autonomy, though its limits and conditions would be negotiated separately.[106] Kolchak, however, smarted at the idea of convoking a Constituent Assembly that included the Bolsheviks and he declared that the final solution of Finland's independence "must belong to the Constituent Assembly."[107] He concluded that Russia would be a democratic state, but reminded the Allies that any modifications to Russia's territorial frontiers still required ratification by "a representative body, which is the natural expression of the people's sovereignty."[108] The remark was cheeky coming from a man seeking Allied recognition but who did not recognise the Allies' authority to make final decisions about Russia's borders.

In the Allies' perspective, exclusion of the Bolsheviks was a dangerous prospect given that the latter demonstrably enjoyed some popular support in Russia, and perhaps even more support than the White leaders themselves.[109] To the Allies, Kolchak's disregard of what appeared to them to be the general will of the Russian people conjured memories of autocratic rule and accordingly raised their misgivings. The Allies ultimately recognized Kolchak's government, but also found his position on autonomy to be too vague and his stance on Finland and the Constituent Assembly objectionable.

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[106] Damien de Martel (French *Chargé d'affaires* at Omsk) to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 1919, in Aleksandr Vasil'evich Kolchak Correspondence with Heads of Government of the Allied and Associated Powers, 1 folder, Hoover.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] David Lloyd-George advocated for Bolshevik presence at Prinkipo though Clemenceau and others objected. Lloyd-George believed the Bolsheviks did have significant popular support, for if the Bolsheviks had not in Lloyd-George's reasoning, the peasants and workers would have overthrown them by the time the Paris Peace Conference convened. See Lloyd-George, *Truth*, 321. See also W. Bruce Lincoln, *Red Victory: A History of the Russian Civil War, 1918-1921* (Cambridge (MA): Da Capo, 1999), 282-84.

David Lloyd-George noted Kolchak's "repugnance" toward the Constituent Assembly, suggesting that the body was "likely too advanced for him."[110] Churchill also observed that Sazonov, Denikin, and Kolchak collectively were "indifferent to, and uninfluenced by, the new ideas of freedom which have changed the face of Europe."[111] This did not reflect well on Sazonov or the RPC, whose other major task at Versailles was to help Kolchak win their recognition.

The Kolchak exchange is crucial to understanding the growing weakness of the RPC's position because on the question of independence or autonomy for the nationalities, the RPC's view was still unquestioningly aligned with that of Kolchak even though they had made assurances that negotiation might be possible at some future time. When it addressed the subject of the Baltic Provinces' bids for independence on 24 May, the RPC declared that because of long historical ties, economic necessity, and their strategic importance, never would Russia "yield her economic and political suzerainty over the Baltic Provinces." However, while the new Russia was "enlivened by the sincere wish to satisfy as far as possible the wishes of these peoples," it was prepared only "to grant the population of these provinces wide autonomy" on the condition that minority (eg. Russian) rights, were duly safeguarded in these regions.[112] The RPC claimed to "follow with sympathy the measures the Allied and Associated Powers were willing to take to meet the momentary needs of the population," but again fought to reserve officially all of Russia's rights regarding final decisions about these provinces.[113] It is

[110] David Lloyd George, 6 June 1919, in Mantoux, *Deliberations*, 334. Thompson also notes that the RPC, like Kolchak and Sazonov, also disavowed the Constituent Assembly of 1917 because it had Bolshevik membership. See Thompson, 303-304.
[111] Winston Churchill, "Memorandum."
[112] RPC to Paris Peace Conference, 24 May 1919, in Russia *Posol'stvo* (US) Records, Box 22, f. 1, (MFILM Reel 22), Hoover.
[113] Ibid.

clear the RPC still thought of and discussed the Baltic region as Russian territory and had no intention of accepting their independence even as they promised the widest possible economic, cultural, and administrative freedoms to these territories in the new Russia.

The RPC represented their particular views of Russia's future in Paris but, as we have seen, they also served as Kolchak's representative body at the Peace Conference. The unity of outlook between Russians in Omsk and Paris may have, on the one hand, given weight to the RPC's position abroad since it could demonstrate to the Allies support for its views on the home front. However, on the other hand, the RPC's similar attitudes and pronouncements about blocking recognition of the nationalities and the need to overthrow and eliminate the Bolshevik voice were likely met with similar Allied skepticism. Though the RPC tried to work to fit its goals and even group structure to convey to the Allies their readiness to build the great liberal-democratic multinational state, relentless protests against the independence of this or that nationality and their unwillingness to consider, listen to, or work with the Bolsheviks demonstrated that the RPC, like Kolchak, would not or could not meet the Allies' expectations in whole. Though the RPC believed it safeguarded Russia's interests and that they would help usher in the new great state, their entreaties revealed their belief that the architecture of the whole Russian building project in reality rested on Allied sanction. Unfortunately, they did not take into account well enough that the project also required the national groups' approval as well.

The RPC, however, was out of touch with the nationalities' evolving claims to self-determination despite its repeated declarations of sympathy for them. The RPC sought to create a federation, believing that it was the middle ground between Russia's

unity and the minorities' aspirations. However, the RPC's unwillingness to negotiate its plans directly with the national groups in Paris indicated that it did not view the national delegations as equals but rather believed that Russia alone had the right to make decisions that could determine the fate of the national groups. In this way, the RPC proceeded in its deliberations regarding territory as if the nationalities therein did not have a right to participate in conversations about their own self-determination, which gave the RPC the "Great Russian" image it tried to eschew.

The suspicions of the national minorities and Allies that Russia would reconstitute old imperial paradigms were not unfounded. Shortly after the Allies recognized Kolchak's government on 12 June, he approved the creation of an RPC subcommittee. Its task was to design the administration of the new federation that would outline Russia's contours and ultimately the fate of the Baltic States and the Caucasian and Transcaspian regions. The RPC undertook the task with Kolchak's sanction and believed it acted as a "superior body representing the national voice." It had also come to realise that a definitive plan "could not be laid aside until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly."[114] Before, the RPC pledged that the Constituent Assembly would be called and that only it could establish the future structure of the Russian state. That was in the ethereal future, and it became clear that they needed a more concrete plan. It was evident that the nationalities and the Allies were not persuaded by promises without tangible evidence these promises would be delivered.

[114] "On the Question of the Nationalities of Russia," 12 June 1919, in Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f.5. Following the exchange of notes between the Allies and Kolchak a week before, the RPC assumed it had greater political authority to act, though the Allies had not extended the RPC the official recognition it had earlier sought.

When the RPC subcommittee began its work, it claimed that the wishes of the various nationalities for more autonomy would inform this planning so as to convince the Allies of Russia's sincerity. Savinkov had offered a blank cheque in his statement to the Allies that the Russians would give the autonomous groups anything they wanted. What he did not say is that the degree of autonomy from the Russian centre each national group would enjoy depended very much on the "differentiation of their types." [115] That the RPC's subcommittee started talking about different degrees of autonomy for different national groups entirely contradicted the RPC's outward profession that the new Russia would be a federation of equal, autonomous national groups.

At the 28 June session, the RPC subcommittee agreed that because "the current political and international atmosphere" was so tumultuous, different provisions had to be made for particular nationalities. Taking for granted that the Allies would not budge on Finland and that it was then fully independent despite earlier RPC protests, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Georgians would be given "the widest possible rights" within the new federation because they had since managed to "interest the Allied Powers in their destiny" the most. The RPC continued to hope that by granting these nationalities "a particularly privileged position" in the new Russia, the Allies would find this promotion satisfactory and deny recognition for their independence. At the same time, the subcommittee advised prompt advertisement of this Russian position lest "the pace of international developments gives [the nationalities] the possibility of strengthening their political position abroad" and consequently winning Allied recognition of their collective

[115] "Deliberations of the 28 June 1919 Session of the Committee to Discuss the Question of Autonomy Granted to the Various Regions of Russia," in Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 57, f.5.

independence.[116] Though the RPC had hitherto complained that these small states would be too weak to go it alone, the behind-closed-doors session revealed a real fear that perhaps these particular nationalities had more political clout than they had anticipated. Moreover, if these groups won their independence, it might be shown that they, in fact, had more political clout in the international forum than Russia itself.

For other national groups including Ukrainians, Siberians, and the Cossacks, the subcommittee remarked that they required sustained linkages to the Russian centre. The subcommittee argued that Russian central administration would still benefit Ukrainians, Siberians, and Cossacks because of "the organic connection [that] these regions [had] to the more primitive (*koronnoi*) peoples in Russia, a tribal unity that is more or less common to all of them, and their lower cultural level."[117] Clearly, the subcommittee carried forward the Provisional Government's earlier assumptions that these regions were too politically immature for independence or even greater autonomy. The comments, however, also reveal that the liberal project of democratic federation would still be one based on notions of superiority and inferiority, relations that had clearly existed in the imperial period, and notions that rather contradicted the RPC's outward pronouncements of a federation based on equality.

As for the peoples in Azerbaijan, Turkestan, and the Caspian littoral, the RPC subcommittee surmised that the populations were too broadly mixed and that there was sufficiently "little cultural progress" in these regions that it "made sense" to bring them under Russia's orderly and paternal guidance. [118] Because these nationalities,

[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.

"dwelt in such low levels of culture and [found] themselves in conditions requiring more effective control of leadership and the administration of the central authorities…It would make sense to attach these groups even more closely to the Russian centres. We can define them as primitive Russians and administer to them in a way that is similar to that of the US government over the so-called American territories."[119]

Whether they were referring to territories like Puerto Rico or to the territories formerly occupied by American Indians in the Continental US, the comment recalls the once commonly accepted idea of 'civilising natives' and turning hunting cultures into farming ones in lands occupied or annexed by the United States. More importantly, however, the RPC's definitions and stratifications of different national groups reflected earlier liberal assumptions about these groups that they inherited from the Russian Empire's intellectuals and policy-makers. In the 19th century, Russian liberals in the broadest sense supported social progress and believed it their mission to spread culture and civilisation in order to lift the benighted smaller nationalities and peasants and develop among them their individual personalities as the foundation for a viable polity.[120] Having compared Russia to the American project of taming the 'wild west,' Russian liberals perceived backwardness among certain populations that necessitated continued intervention and steerage. For them, "the image of Russian backwardness served as the launching pad and starting point for validating their historic mission" just as it had in the tsarist empire. [121]

Consequently, these policy-makers and intellectuals used cultural coding to identify which groups needed civilising and guidance so that these groups could join into an all-

[119] Ibid.
[120] Igor Narskij, "Intellectuals as Missionaries: The Liberal Opposition in Russia and Their Notion of Culture," in *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 62 (2010): 342-43, 350.
[121] Narskij, "Intellectuals as Missionaries," 335-337.

encompassing collective identification with the Russian state.[122] Indeed, the old regime had mobilised liberal statisticians in an effort to create categories and attributes for non-Russian groups when the Empire's first census was undertaken in 1897. These were not subjective, but state-created objective categories of belonging that helped the state determine how people should be ruled, disciplined, and transformed. Attribution also helped the state decide how territories ought to be exploited for economic advantage.[123] The Imperial State and its liberal functionaries marginalised the minorities in the process, disallowing self-identification and treating them as sites upon which the state would act for administrative, economic, and even defencive purposes.

The RPC subcommittee's work revealed a plan to introduce degrees of autonomy and centralization based on the levels of culture and civilisation of this or that national group similar to the practices of the tsarist empire. The practice, however, marginalised the national groups' in the former's refusal to allow these groups to determine their own place in or outside of Russia despite their apparent respect for self-determination. Instead, the RPC sought to create a "formula for the relationships between the central and local authorities that would respect their rights but ensure Russia the ability to implement its national rights and interests."[124] The RPC prioritised Russia's rights to determine *its* political future while subordinating the national desires of minority groups. The Paris Peace Conference was the opportunity for Russians to work with the nationalities to

[122] Narskij, "Intellectuals as Missionaries," 335-337.
[123] Mark Bassin, "Inventing Siberia: Visions of the Russian East in the Early Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 3 (June 1991): 792; Juliette Cadiot, "Searching for Nationality: Statistics and National Categories at the End of the Russian Empire (1897-1917), *Russian Review*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (July 2005): 440-441; Charles Steinwedel, "To Make a Difference: The Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial Russian Politics, 1861-1917," in David L. Hoffman and Yanni Kotsonis, Eds., *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 76, 80.
[124] "Deliberations of the 28 June 1919 Session of the Committee to Discuss the Question of Autonomy Granted to the Various Regions of Russia."

create an equitable multinational state on an equal playing field, but old presumptions to rule in a new liberal mask ultimately undercut the RPC's professed goals.

The RPC subcommittee's hierarchical categorizations nevertheless reveal shared practices with the liberal justifications for empire in the West. As Uday Singh Mehta has illustrated, empires such as Great Britain also judged and categorised their own colonial domains on the basis of a subjective view of progress and deemed it a 'temporarily necessary' to administer to these domains to lift them to a higher stage of rationalisation through education and political reform, at which point they could become 'nations.' In this way, western liberals legitimised empire through the construction of 'normative' markers or bases for political inclusion and adopted a sense of duty to help their domains satisfy these preconditions since liberty could only be enjoyed and properly exercised by progressive societies.[125] The RPC also categorised Russia's domains, made plans to determine the levels of autonomy and progressive intervention by the democratic state each would receive and even declared that some of these territories could "in certain cases and conditions mutually agreed upon between Russia and those peoples [achieve] their independence."[126] Thus, at some point in the future, when the new Russian democratic state recognised that its civilising task was done and particular territories achieved acceptable benchmarks for progressive possibilities, presumably Russia's obligatory role could be achieved and the retention of the territories in the meantime could be theoretically justified. The RPC spoke a language of liberal imperialism that revealed shared convictions with the western empires and a shared tension emergent in the notion

[125] Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire,* 3, 30, 34. 68-70.
[126] RPC to Clemenceau, "Proposal of the Russian Political Conference in Paris to the Peace Conference on the Question of the Nationalities in Russia."

that liberals, in their deep commitment to and pronouncements of equality, political freedom, and representative government at home still worked to curtail such freedoms for 'less advanced' native or minority populations until these populations achieved predetermined civilizational milestones.[127]

Because Russian liberal intellectuals shared broader European liberal goals for the modernisation and administration of territories they deemed less developed culturally, politically, and technologically, the RPC perceived no inconsistencies in its own imposition of cultural hierarchies on the national groups Russia would ideally reunite with in a federal structure. In Paris, the RPC attempted to meet particular standards set out by the Allies in order to achieve their goals in the first place, hence the adoption of Wilsonian principles and a federal plan. So long as the RPC could demonstrate that the new Russia would exercise control over the autonomous regions in a manner analogous to the methods of administration and education practiced by the western democracies in their own domains, the RPC was confident that this hierarchy would be acceptable to the Allies since Britain in particular exercised similar practices in its own domains. Yet, the fact that these deliberations did not become public knowledge might be an indication that the RPC still feared that the national groups, especially the ostensibly 'backward' ones, would not accept it.

One final tension emerged in the RPC's approach. It spoke only to the Allies and did not attempt to negotiate directly and on an equal basis with the national groups they sought to keep in Russia. Its plans carried the assumption that the nationalities would return to Russia voluntarily when the Bolsheviks were defeated. The RPC's failure to

[127] Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, 7; Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 9-11, 160.

discuss terms with the national groups demonstrated its enduring belief that only Russia had the right to decide the fate of the national groups in concert with the Allies. In this pattern, the RPC did not acknowledge the equality of the national groups to Russia at Versailles, suggesting that those groups would be less than equal in the future multinational state. The national groups' delegates recognised this disparity and thus remained sceptical and even suspicious of Russian motives. Imperial inequality would essentially take on a more liberalised form, but the disparities would still remain even as the RPC pronounced again and again its sympathies for self-determination and declared that Russia "definitely abandoned the centralising tendencies of the old regime."[128]

2.5 Conclusion

Circumstances changed and events moved quickly by the end of June 1919, but still, the Allies could not agree on what ought to be done with respect to Russia. With Kolchak's defeat soon after his recognition, the Allies left final decisions about Russia and its borders to the League of Nations and the outcome of the Civil War so that they could focus their energy on making peace with Germany at Versailles.[129] The Allies lacked a clear policy and, similar to the RPC, also seemed to work at cross-purposes. To lend support to the White Army leaders whose attitudes and practices suggested a sustained commitment to the old centralizing credo 'Russia, One and Indivisible' also conflicted with the Allies' apparent pledge to support the national groups' aspirations for independent statehood along Russia's borders. As Keith Neilson points out, "they were

[128] RPC to Clemenceau, n.d., Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 58, f. 8.
[129] Thompson, *Versailles Peace*, 376-381.

damned if they did and damned if they did not" and all the Allies could do was offer limited support to the Whites and to the national groups simultaneously.[130]

Still, the RPC was more consistent in its policy approach than were the Allies. In its work, the RPC held fast to its perceived duty to protect the unity of the state and to secure Russia's chance to solve the nationality problem by creating a multinational federation. The RPC also tried to meet head on the demands that the new Wilsonian principle seemed to pose for Russia at the peace talks. It even declared its delight to be one of the first "to proclaim the principle of the liberty of peoples to self-determination" and greeted enthusiastically the creation of Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia out of the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[131] However, while the RPC applauded the birth of new nations in Eastern Europe, it could not reconcile inner contradictions in its approach to negotiating the future status of national minorities in Russia that ultimately revealed the RPC's apparently simultaneous commitment to democratic principles and the benign domination of minorities.[132] In the spirit of Wilson's Sixth Point, the RPC may have believed that Russia had the right to its own fate, but a consistent adherence to the self-determination principle also required it to recognise the national minorities' equally valid aspirations. Despite its efforts to cut a middle path, the RPC found it quite impossible to convince the Allies, let alone the national minorities, that Russia was sincere in its commitments to the Wilsonian ideal. Its uncompromising commitment to preserving Russia's territory, its assertions that only a future Constituent

[130] Neilson, "Elusive Entity," 93-94.
[131] RPC to Clemenceau May 10th 1919, Bakhmeteff, Box 57 f. 5.
[132] Jay Winter, *Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 2008), 51. Winter discusses the Allies' similar inability to reconcile this quandary between democratic ideals and domination of colonized and racialized populations.

Assembly could decide federal status, and its failure to negotiate with the national delegations themselves ultimately revealed that the RPC primarily sought to defend Russian unity and had not shed traditional centralizing tendencies and attitudes.

As for the national groups, many like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, enjoyed independent statehood at least until they were occupied and re-annexed by the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Of course, Russian liberals continued to maintain that there could be no final recognition of independence without the formal act of a legally constituted Russian government and as such "recognitions by other powers [were not] binding for the Russian people." Other states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia won *de facto* independence in January 1920; however, the Bolsheviks began to reoccupy these areas in April. Kadet leader, Pavel Miliukov, later wrote "Baku was peacefully taken by the Bolsheviks," indicating tacit approval for the Bolshevik's apparent effort to "restore Russia's unity" once again. The Bolsheviks succeeded in retaking most of the secessionist territories by 1921 and began their own methods of organisation and "re-imagining the former Russian empire as a socialist federation of nationalities" after they consolidated the new Soviet state.[133] Though some Russian liberals abroad approved the reclamation of these territories, as we shall see in see in Chapter Three, they still believed the Bolshevik regime was inherently evil and bent on destruction of Russia itself.[134]

This chapter has surveyed a number of tactics the Russian Political Conference mobilised in order to protect Russia's territory at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

[133] Francine Hirsch, "The Soviet Empire as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category of Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Summer 1997): 251.
[134] Miliukov remarked that the Bolsheviks sought advances in Transcaucasia to install communist governments in these borderlands. Paul N. Miliukov, *Russia To-Day and To-morrow* (Westport (CT): Hyperion, 1922), 87. For more detail on how Soviet Russia regained most of the territories, see Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1979), 83-86, Kappeler, *Russian Empire*, 370-73.

Maklakov built the RPC with a roster of members of all political stripes in an attempt to present Russia's adherence to the spirit and practice of democracy. The RPC adopted the principle of Wilsonian self-determination and established its sympathies for the rights of national minorities to the same rights because the post-war political climate demanded it. It also brought forth old legitimising treaties to establish Russian claims to territories and argued that these territories were imperative for not only Russian self-defence but also its economic reconstruction. The RPC also argued that Russia, despite its lack of a recognised government still had legal claims that could not be ignored and that Russia could and would participate in satisfying the minorities' goals when a new state and government were formed.

The RPC's most critical tactic was the development of a new model for the Russian state. It created a plan for a democratic federal republic that would delineate the separation of powers, confer greater autonomy to the national groups, and establish the equality of all Russia's people's in a constitution. The fact that the national groups were trying to secede and that the Allies appeared receptive to their demands compelled the liberal dominated RPC to satisfy those demands by rethinking and retooling Russia's imperial rule. The RPC's efforts did not achieve the results they had sought as the Allies and the national groups themselves remained suspicious that the Russians would only resuscitate old autocratic and imperial norms. The RPC's defence of Russia's rights to these territories, its creation of a differential hierarchy among the national groups, and its refusal to negotiate directly with national minorities in Paris outshone the apparent respect for democracy, equality, and self-determination they paid and suggests that it continued to cast an imperial gaze upon their vision of the new democratic state.

These tensions nonetheless tell us that Russian liberalism was still a work in progress. The RPC approached the national question with a firm belief in Russia's rights to these territories and also a keen recognition that it had to rethink Russia's traditional relationships with all of the former Empire's peoples. The RPC accepted the need to construct a progressive democratic state that clearly delineated a separation of powers and importantly, ensure national groups' greater autonomy and also protection from the Russian centre by means of a constitution. The RPC tried to meet what in fact many of the nationalities had demanded before the October Revolution, and avoided reconstruction of the *status quo ante bellum*. This suggests that the Russian liberals had learned from the Provisional Government's recent mistakes in approaching the national question. Instead of outright refusal to concede to the minorities' aspirations, the RPC proved willing to gradually meet them in a way that would also satisfy Russia's needs. The state-building project they had in mind was by no means perfect, and it was a formidably large one to tinker with on the ground in a short amount of time, in new circumstances, and with clear uncertainty as to the outcomes of the Russian Civil War that was still underway. Throughout the interwar period, Russian liberals continued to construct new visions of the Russian state and develop their approach as new circumstances emerged. Yet, the Paris Peace Conference is remarkable for the profound efforts Russian liberals made to not only protect Russia's territory, but to rethink the relationships between the state and the people therein.

Chapter 3

Russian Exiles and the Famine in the Homeland

3.1 Introduction

Just as the Russian Civil War was winding down and the Bolshevik regime began to consolidate its authority, calamity struck in the Soviet countryside. The Russian famine of 1921-22 was an enormous disaster that killed between five and six million peasants, decimated villages, and devastated the agricultural economy of Russia's heartland. Its scale was massive and its consequences unforeseen. The new Bolshevik government could not bring aid to the countryside without help. It called on foreign states and organisations to provide assistance because it was unable to remedy the situation alone.

Despite its size and scale and the critical place it occupied in the minds and hearts of Russian exiles, there is very little written about the Famine of 1921-1922 in the literature of Russia Abroad. Major studies of the emigration only mention that a famine occurred in the homeland if they mention it at all. Anna Uriadova's book, *Golod 1920-kh gg. v Rossii i russkoe zarubezh'e* is the exception. She does well to illustrate the organisational activities Russian exiles undertook to raise funds and foodstuffs for starving people back home. She also explores debates among émigrés about the question of whether the emigration should help at all since any assistance as many believed could ultimately prop up the regime rather than help the people. Émigrés in the end did help she argues, forming committees to gather resources and working with international aid organisations in the hope that the food and monetary aid would actually reach the people. Other scholarship on the famine also focuses on the massive efforts foreign organizations such as the

American Relief Association and the Save the Children Fund undertook to bring humanitarian relief to starving Russians. Russians abroad do not figure into these stories because the material resources available to them were comparatively miniscule.[1] Scholars such as Markus Wehner and Sergueï Adamets also study the famine, but focus on its causes, consequences, and the Soviet Government's responses. None of the above scholars consider the impact the famine had on Russians abroad and the responses it provoked regarding their attitude toward the Bolsheviks and the fate of their country.

This chapter interrogates what liberal exiles believed the famine 'said' about the Bolshevik regime's perilous leadership and how they deployed the famine and images of it as a tool to convince foreign readers of the Bolsheviks' unfitness to govern and trade. It is through their assessments, critiques, and prescriptions that we can unpack their understanding of how Bolshevism transformed their home from a land brimming with life and prospects to a hopeless no-man's land, giving us a new lens through which we can understand the nature of their anti-Bolshevism. For the liberal exiles, the Bolsheviks had

[1] Works on Russian Famine of 1921-22 include S. Wheatcroft, "Famine and Epidemic Crises in Russia, 1918-1922: The Case of Saratov," *Annales de Demographie Historique* (1983): 329-52; Christopher Williams, "The 1921 Russian Famine: Centre and Periphery Responses," *Revolutionary Russia*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (December 1993): 277-314); Markus Wehner, "*Golod 1921-1922 gg. v Camarskoi gubernii i reaktsiia sovetskogo pravitel'stva*," *Cahiers du monde russe*, Vol. 38, Nos. 1-2 (1997): 223-241; Sergueï Adamets, *Guerre Civile et famine en Russie: Le pouvoir bolchevique et la population face à la catastrophe demographique, 1917-1923* (Paris: *Institut d'etudes slaves*, 2003); V. G. Makarov and V. C. Khristoforov, "*K istorii Vserossiiskogo komiteta pomoshchi golodaiushim*," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 3 (2006): 198-205; Anna Uriadova, *Golod 1920-kh gg. v Rossii i russkoe zarubezh'e* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2010); Viktor *Topolianskii, Vserossiiskii komitet pomoshchi golodaiushchim* (Moscow: *Mezhdunarodny fond 'Demokratiia,'* 2014). Published works on foreign humanitarian efforts include Linda Mahood and Vic Satzewich, "The Save the Children Fund and the Russian Famine of 1921-23: Claims and Counter-Claims about Feeding 'Bolshevik' Children," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2009): 55-83; Bertrand M. Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002); Benjamin M. Weissman, *Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia: 1921-1923* (Stanford (CA): Hoover Institution Press, 1974); H. H. Fischer, The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919-1923: The Operations of the American Relief Administration (London: MacMillan, 1927). Unpublished works include Jennifer A. Polk, "Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917-1924," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012; Charles Milton Edmondson, "Soviet Famine Relief Measures, 1921-1923," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1970.

not only ruined their homeland, but had also dealt a mortal blow to their hopes to create a new Russia in their own ideal image. Their disapproval went far beyond simple critique of Bolshevik policy and was a lot more than the stubborn nitpicking of individuals jealous for power. Rather, in the exiles' view, the famine was not simply the result of drought and bad Bolshevik choices; it was the result of the Bolsheviks' desire to realise their political goals at the total expense and destruction of the Russian state and its people.

Russian liberals therefore worked to use the famine to demonstrate, explicitly and precisely, the many ways in which they believed the Bolsheviks ravaged an otherwise healthy Russia for the regime's own benefit. At the same time, the liberals also used the famine as an opportunity to advance their own democratic ideals and principles regarding the state and people once again. Foreign governments had been quick to recognise officially the comparatively liberal Provisional Government in 1917, and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 had shown them that the Allies were largely amenable to the spread of democratic norms. To the exiles, the famine seemed to be a good, and perhaps last, opportunity to show foreign powers that the Bolsheviks were the wrong government for Russia and to advertise that democracy was still possible in Russia once the home regime collapsed.

This was a matter of some urgency. The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 1921 indicated that Great Britain was ready to trade with, though not quite ready to confer *de jure* recognition on the Soviet Government. This circumstance signaled to the exiles that the time was of the essence for anti-Bolshevik propaganda and the promotion of Russian liberal ideals.[2] In this way, the famine, which began roughly three months after

[2] A. Uriadova, "*P. N. Miliukov i 'Poslednie novosti' o Sovetskoi vneshnei politike*," in M. Iu. Sorokina, Ed., *Mysliashie miru rossiiskogo liberalizma: Pavel Miliukov, 1859-1943: Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo*

the Agreement was signed, became a propaganda tool. Russian liberals abroad challenged the legitimacy and morality of Bolshevik authority at home and offered a means to return Russia back to a healthy path of regeneration and greatness: the demise of Bolshevism and the creation of a responsible and responsive democratic government. If the Allies would not intervene militarily to overthrow Bolshevism, the liberals abroad did what they could with their pens to encourage diplomatic isolation of the home regime. In the process, their writing about the famine reveals the disaster's deeper impact on the Russian liberal exiles' imagination and their overall preoccupation with the health, wellbeing, and future prospects of the Russian state as a modern civilisation. Though liberal exiles organised what food and monetary aid they could abroad, they offered few practical solutions to 'fix' the famine save for the removal of the Bolshevik regime. Because liberals believed the Bolsheviks caused the calamity, the regime's replacement by an elected government that would shepherd Russia toward regeneration, strength, and progress was the only cure for Russia's ills.

This chapter begins with a brief look at the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement and its impact on Russia Abroad. For Russian liberal exiles, this agreement was a major threat because it signified the potential that Great Britain would confer diplomatic recognition on the Soviet Government. This recognition, in turn, would effectively close the door on liberal hopes that they would ever return to Russia and create their new ideal state based on the foundations of a constitutionally bound government. Next, the chapter considers the famine itself, the Soviet call for foreign aid, and the liberal emigration's responses. It appears the Soviet Government tried to lessen the impact of the impending food crisis and

nauchnogo kollokviuma, Moskva, 23-25 sentiabria 2009 g. (Moscow: Dom russkogo zarubezhi'iaim Aleksandra Solzhenitsyna, 2010); 190.

invite foreign trade when it introduced the New Economic Policy, but the disaster at home proved too much for the regime to remediate alone. Russian liberals were quick to pick up on the Bolsheviks' need for assistance in order to emphasise that while the country and people were in crisis, the Soviet Government itself was weak and powerless. These liberals hoped to convince Britain to starve the Bolsheviks out diplomatically. They used the famine and its terrible effects on the Russian people and landscape as a propaganda tool to dissuade British relations with the Soviet government.

A section is dedicated to the liberals' generation of anti-Bolshevik propaganda, which mobilised the famine as 'proof' of the evil and incompetency of the regime. Several core liberal tenets such as the admiration for the rule of law and the liberty of the individual emerged in their attempts to sway British opinion. These preoccupations revealed themselves in the dark and macabre language the liberal exiles mobilised to describe the horror at home. At the same time, other deep-seated fixations appeared. On the surface, the liberals appeared to talk about the real consequences of Bolshevism on people and landscape. Their writing, however, reveals more deep-seated preoccupations with Russia's level of civilisation, modernity, productivity, and 'Great' stateness.

Last, I explore the tensions in liberal thought and action that their preoccupations also revealed. The liberals were quick to use the famine and real peoples' suffering to illustrate how the Bolshevik regime advanced its interests at the expense of the people. They were not, however, troubled by the idea of using the same suffering to advance their own political agenda, even as they remained physically and ideologically estranged from the very people in whose name they claimed to work. In other words, while liberals complained about how Bolshevism plunged Russia back to the dark ages as the famine

seemed to indicate, they tended to lose sight of the fact that starving peasants may have cared less at that moment about Russia's level of modernity or civilization vis-à-vis the West, and far more about getting food, tools, and fertile land. Of course, liberals, as well as other members of Russia Abroad did work to organise food aid and provide practical analysis of grain production or transportation at home, but their complaints about the evils of the regime and its impact on Russian civilisation were far more voluminous and overshadowed these more practical efforts.

This disparity further emphasised the liberals' traditional alienation from the people. During the famine, it was not just distance that separated liberal exiles from the popular masses, it was a matter of those practical priorities. Liberal descriptions of the people's suffering revealed their underlying concerns with the destruction of Russian civilisation and the state's productivity, however the solution they repeatedly offered was regime change to a responsible democratic government. They talked about change at the state level, rather than offer advice on local reforms that could assist and thus serve the people directly. Though many peasants too sought answers for their despair in the political and civil order and some even rebelled, the majority of the starving population was engaged in the act of seeking precisely immediate on the ground assistance.[3] Peasant letters and appeals for help to the American Relief Administration focus on their practical needs. For example, one Vasilii Ivanovich Vavilin from Samara told the ARA,

> "I have neither cow nor horse. My cow is dead on account of the famine and I have no means to buy a cow or a horse because I have had neither flour nor seed grain since 1921. I therefore, humbly beg the ARA to issue me money for the purchase

[3] Aaron B. Retish, *Russia's Peasants in Revolution and Civil War: Citizenship, Identity, and the Creation of the Soviet State, 1914-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 262. After the 1905 Revolution, mass participatory politics emerged in Russia allowing people who had never done so before to begin articulating their views about how the empire ought to be governed. See Charles Steinwedel, "The 1905 Revolution in Ufa: Mass Politics, Elections, and Nationality," *Russian Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (October 2000): 555-56.

> of a horse. I have requested assistance at the *u'ezd* Pomgol, but without any good results. I beg you once more to grant me my request."[4]

Vavilin evidently believed that his regional State aid office, the All-Union Public Committee for Relief of the Starving (Pomgol), could provide him with the immediate practical assistance he required. This suggests that he and other peasants had come to realise that one of the purposes of government offices was to provide help in times of need. The zemstvo system that was created in 1864 in the era of Great Reforms had after all administered medical relief, food supplies, road maintenance, and public welfare in each of the empire's *guberniyas* (provinces). As George Fischer has illustrated, the zemstvo system of 'small deeds' local work and reforms transformed as urban intellectual liberals joined and brought with them a focus on imperial politics at the expense of local concerns. This contributed to the liberals' inability to bond with the people in the tsarist era, and it appears that liberal exile concerns regarding the state during the Famine of 1921-1922 revived a similar disconnection with the people's direct needs. Vavilin did not despair about medievalism and barbarity in his environs as the liberal exiles did. Instead he sought assistance from a local office to acquire a horse so that he could work his land. The liberal exiles were focused on preventing British trade with and recognition of the Soviet regime, thus their responses to the famine focused on the state's condition even as they wrote about and used famished bodies to support their arguments. At the same time, liberals had no desire to offer advice on practical local reforms that the Soviet regime should take since

[4] Vasilii Ivanovich Vavilin to American Relief Administration, 22 November 1922, in American Relief Administration Russia Operational Records, Box 6, f.2., Hoover. The letter is transcribed in English and stamped as 'Received' by the ARA on 22 November 1922. The date it was originally written is not indicated.

these ideas might inadvertently lend assistance to the hated regime even as they could have helped starving people.

In the end, much of the work of famine aid in fact came from the American Relief Administration (ARA). Millions died but many millions more were saved through foreign humanitarian efforts. As well, several foreign governments, including Great Britain, went on to confer diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Government and continue trading with Soviet Russia. Thus, it can be said that liberal exile efforts to use the famine as an anti-Bolshevik tool were unsuccessful because they did not affect meaningful change in the British Government's attitude and policies toward the Bolsheviks. They certainly did raise awareness about the famine, but because foreign governments like Britain had other priorities, such as the need to rebuild their own economies in the years after World War One, liberal anti-Bolshevik propaganda remained unpersuasive.[5] Nevertheless, the work of developing Russian liberalism itself was still underway during the famine. Liberals mobilised traditional concerns such as the rights of the individual during this time, but had yet to strike a balance between their liberal ideals at the state and local levels.

3.2 Foreign Trade, Recognition, and the Threats Russian Liberals Perceived

In the years between the October Revolution and the outbreak of the famine, Russian liberals abroad worried that foreign governments would confer official diplomatic recognition on the Soviet Government. They were opposed to this since trade and recognition would "afford material and moral support to the Bolshevik power" and would make it possible to "prolong the latter's existence."[6] The Bolsheviks' downfall was

[5] Alastair Kocho-Williams, *Russia's International Relations in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 44.
[6] "Resolutions of the Conference of Representatives of Russian Commerce and Industry in Paris," *Russian Life*, January 1922, 157.

necessary in their view because the Bolsheviks were usurpers and their government was thus illegitimate. Liberals also complained that the Bolsheviks only "pretended to be a Russian Government" as they cruelly pursued their own self-interests by exploiting Russian citizens. They argued that recognition of this illegitimate regime threatened to abandon the country and people to the cruel whims of Bolshevik policy and to weaken the state and drive it backward in terms of its level of progress and civilization, a situation that would only make it easier for foreign states to participate in the "economical and financial enslavement of Russia."[7]

Russian liberal exile fears that foreign governments would recognise the Bolsheviks first emerged around the time the Allies asked all Russian factions to meet at Prinkipo during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. More serious concerns arose when the Bolshevik government granted a number of concessions to Great Britain beginning in 1920. Many worried that these concessions "would lead to the recognition of the Bolshevists as the legal power in Russia."[8] These concessions eventually led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement in March 1921.[9] This Agreement was a boon for the Soviet state because it gave the Bolsheviks a degree of legitimacy internationally that the exiles themselves lacked, though full *de jure* recognition from Britain to the Soviet Government did not come until 1924.[10] Aghast at the conclusion of

[7] Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, *Memorandum on the Anglo-Bolshevist Trade Agreement Concluded in London of the 16th of March 1921*, 10 June 1921 (Paris: Imprimerie "Zemgor," 1921), 2-3.
[8] "Responsible Russian Politicians on the Subject of Change of Allied Policy toward Russia (The Paris Resolution)," *New Russia*, Vol. 1, No. 6 (Mar. 11, 1920): 187-88. The politicians in question included Miliukov and members of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Dumas, members of the Provisional Governments, and several members of local governments.
[9] For more on the politics and diplomacy surrounding the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, see Andrew J. Williams, *Trading with the Bolsheviks: The Politics of East-West Trade, 1920-1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).
[10] Kocho-Williams, *Russia's International Relations*, 44.

the Agreement, the Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly led by Pavel Miliukov protested "energetically," declaring its indignation that the Soviet Government had "granted very extended privileges to British capitalists" but deprived Russian citizens of any free initiative or political and economic right.[11]

The Agreement upset the Executive Committee for a number of reasons. First, they believed it would prop up the Bolshevik regime they believed was on the brink of collapse. Liberal and Right Socialist Revolutionary (SR) members of this committee had rallied around Miliukov's so-called 'New Tactic,' penned in late 1920 after Wrangel's final defeat in the Civil War.[12] The New Tactic revolved around the idea that the Bolshevik government was already quite weak, unpopular, and likely to degenerate further over time, making it possible for the now politically conscious masses, steeped in "a new fund of experience" under Bolshevism, to rise up and overthrow their oppressors from within.[13] The trade agreement, however, complicated the 'New Tactic.' Liberals in particular feared that provisions in the Agreement, which allowed for concessions and the import and manufacture of goods in Soviet Russia, might strengthen the regime by supplying it and

[11] *Memorandum on the Anglo-Bolshevist Trade Agreement*, 3-4. The Executive Committee was made up of largely Kadet and Right Socialist Revolutionary (SR) members of the original Constituent Assembly elected in November 1917. Thirty-Two of the 56 members of the Constituent Assembly regrouped in January 1921 after the final defeat of General Pyotr Wrangel's army in the Crimea.

[12] The text of Miliukov's 'New Tactic' speech was reprinted in "*Chto delat' krymskoi katastrofy*," *Poslednie novosti*, 7 July 1921.

[13] Miliukov, "*Chto delat*." For more on the New Tactic see also Jane Burbank, *Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917-1922* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 158-65; Johnston, *New Mecca*, 37; Jane Burbank, *Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917-1922* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 159, 162-64. The tactic was 'new' and also controversial because the focus had shifted from an earlier reliance on formal White Army armed opposition to overthrow Bolshevism to a newfound liberal populism: the desire to cultivate the "naturally anarchistic" destructive force of the popular masses whose patience indicated non-support for the Whites and in whom "the pledge of [Russia's] rebirth" laid when they became impatient enough in turn with Bolshevism and revolted. More right-leaning Kadets including V.D. Nabokov, rejected Miliukov's New Tactic on moral and patriotic grounds and a division of the party occurred. See Dana Dragunoiu, *Vladimir Nabokov and the Poetics of Liberalism* (Evanston (IL): Northwestern University Press, 2011), 26.

the Red Army with food and provisions. The liberals were eager to cultivate the masses and find ways to push them toward revolt against a government that proved itself increasingly unwilling and unable to govern effectively, let alone ensure everyone had food to eat and tools with which to grow grain. Liberals dreaded that any strengthening of the regime by foreign powers would prolong its existence, their exile, and delay the chance to rebuild Russia in the ideal way they imagined.

Miliukov's Kadets in particular believed the Bolsheviks were usurpers of power because they had seized it without "the confidence of the popular masses." Conversely, many liberal exiles had been elected "representatives of the people" in the Imperial Dumas and the short-lived Constituent Assembly, which was indeed "convoked on the basis of universal suffrage."[14] Though the Provisional Government was not a popularly elected government, the Allies had also quickly recognised its legitimacy and authority soon after the February Revolution. Thus liberals believed they had support, if not a mandate, to move Russia toward a democratic future because they had previously been a part of a recognised government the Kadets helped create in 1917 and had been elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1918. As such, liberal exiles believed they had "the right to declare that no diplomatic protocol [would] induce the Russian people to abandon the struggle for the liberation of its country, for its bright future based upon light and democracy."[15]

Miliukov, angered by the trade agreement, added that it limited the future democratic Russian Government's sovereignty and harmed the interests of the Russian

[14] Pavel Miliukov, "The Evolution of New Russia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 100 (March 1922): 6; "Responsible Russian Politicians," *New Russia*, 187-88.
[15] "Responsible Russian Politicians," *New Russia*, 187-88.

people.[16] The trade agreement, however, signified that Britain at least accepted the Bolsheviks' victory in the Civil War and seemed satisfied with Russia's present form of government, imperiling both the liberals' chances of seeing their goals realized and, in their view, Russia's chances of survival. At the same time, the Agreement indicated that the Bolsheviks were acceptable trading partners other countries might engage with. Finally, it suggested British acceptance of the idea that the Bolsheviks were ready to join the international system as partners rather than enemies "bent on the pursuit of world revolution."[17] In a word, the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was a clear signal to the liberal exiles that their cause to build a democratic Russian state was nearly lost.

Trade and recognition posed an additional threat because some liberals believed that foreign powers, especially Great Britain, wished to plunder Russian resources while the country was politically and economically weak. Similar rhetoric had already emerged in 1919 when the former Russian Empire faced dismemberment by the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference. By 1921, liberals feared recognition would "enable the Bolsheviks to develop further their subversive schemes" and give an opportunity for "foreigners to help in completing the process of bleeding Russia," and thus delay "still further the work of restoring the country."[18] The Executive Committee believed Britain was poised now to take up a "considerable part of [Russia's] national income" as "goods belonging to Russians are confiscated and nationalised without any compensation [while] British citizens may claim their damages…caused by Soviet policy and receive full compensation"

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[16] Miliukov, "*Anglo-Russkoe soglashenie*," *Poslednie novosti*, 17 March 1921. The Committee's Memorandum on the Agreement analyzed extensively the nature of the new Anglo-Soviet relationship, concluding that no official recognition had been conferred to the Soviet regime in the terms given in the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement.
[17] Kocho-Williams, *Russia's International Relations,* 44.
[18] "Editorial Notes," *Russian Life*, January 1922, 146.

under the trade agreement. Meanwhile gold and raw materials would "fall into English hands" as the country fell into total economic submission.[19] While *Russian Life* later reminded its English audience that "Russia is not Africa: she has her own intellectual class…who have created rich industries," the liberals were astutely aware that they were still "forced to flee abroad." Without their presence at home, the trade agreement with the Bolsheviks signaled Russia's degeneration from a great state to something like a colony for Europe to exploit.[20] Miliukov and others hoped the people would rise up to overthrow the weak Bolshevik government to help usher in liberal democracy, but feared foreign states would also take advantage of this same weakness.

By late spring 1921, the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement had been signed and the Soviet Government had implemented its New Economic Policy (NEP). However, hunger turned to famine in the Soviet Russian countryside soon after, indicating that the treaty and NEP either did not come soon enough or were ineffective in the face and the extent of the disaster. What is interesting is that when the famine broke out, liberal exiles were less interested in talking about the agreement or NEP, and more engrossed in analyzing the Bolshevik regime, its policy failures, and its weaknesses specifically. As we shall see below, they mobilized much evidence from the famine to try to justify their arguments. Certainly, liberals in exile wanted to pull at foreign heartstrings in order to get direct food aid to the starving Russian masses using this evidence. However, the liberals' primary task under Miliukov's guidance was to illustrate the heartless and corrupt nature of the regime and turn foreign states against it by appealing to foreign citizens' humanity. In turn, they hoped foreigners would call on their own governments to isolate the Bolsheviks, block

[19] *Memorandum on the Anglo-Bolshevist Trade Agreement*, 23.
[20] "Editorial Notes," *Russian Life*, 146.

official recognition of the Soviet government, and cease other activities like direct trade that could potentially give the home regime added strength that would prolong its survival to Russia's detriment.

3.3 The Famine of 1921-22 and the Soviet Call for Aid

Some contemporaries and scholars have traced the long roots of the famine to traditional peasant land hunger and inefficient land use in the Imperial period.[21] More immediate causes include the damaging effects of war and also two years of drought in the countryside. The mass mobilization of roughly 15 million men and two million draft animals to the front during and after 1914 had meant an enormous transfer in labour power and thus a dramatic decrease in already low agricultural production.[22] Peasants grew and stored less food in total in the war years because there were fewer hands and horses working the fields. Military control over one-third of railroad tracks compounded this labour shortage as grain, equipment, and fuel shipments serviced the army over civilian needs at the rear. Tracks and rolling stock damaged by age and warfare were neither repaired nor replaced by the state at sufficient rates.[23] Military needs and poor transport conditions meant goods could not be moved from the factories to the villages, preventing peasants from acquiring the products they needed to repair equipment if not to improve their land holdings. Thus, while famine had been a common occurrence in Russia in the imperial era, World War One elevated the peasants' susceptibility to such calamity because total war

[21] H.H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919*-1923 (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 472; Zhores A. Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 5-10, 18-38; V. F. Zima, *Golod v SSSR 1946-1947 godov: Proiskhozhdenie i posledstviya* (Lewiston (NY): Edwin Mellen, 1999), 5-7.
[22] Retish, *Russia's Peasants*, 57; Medvedev, *Soviet Agriculture*, 18.
[23] Peter Gatrell, *Russia's First World War: A Social and Economic History* (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 28, 95.

mobilization led to severe shortages of labour, transport, and goods in the countryside that could assist in food production.

On top of the Great War came inflation, two revolutions, and finally a civil war. The prices peasants could fetch on the open market for their crops and the availability of goods and supplies that they could purchase with the revenues from produce they sold began to drop during this period. Peasants responded to poor market conditions by growing only as much as their families required until the next harvest. The production of less grain also meant the production of fewer grain seeds that the peasants needed for future sowing.[24] As well, during the Civil War, Red and White Armies alike seized grain to supply their soldiers.[25] The peasants quickly realized that whatever surplus beyond family consumption that they managed to produce would inevitably be taken by Red or White food brigades. "The Bolsheviks know how to take, but not how to give" was one popular peasant complaint, quick as they were to blame the regime in power. By 1920, the peasantry had

[24] The government prices were too low by peasant standards, there were few manufactured goods to buy, and peasant purchasing power decreased as inflation skyrocketed by summer 1917. See George Pavlovsky, *Agricultural Russia on the Eve of Revolution* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968), 322-23; Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1975), 23; Gatrell, *Russia's First World War*, 95; Bertrand M. Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002), 26; Fisher, *Famine*, 500; Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams, *Why Soviet Russia is Starving* (London: Russian Liberation Committee, 1919), 15. For more detailed information on the problem of supply under the Tsarist regime and the Provisional Government as well as under the Bolshevik Government, see Sergueï Adamets, *Guerre Civile et famine en Russie: Le pouvoir bolchevique et la population face à la catastrophe demographique, 1917-1923* (Paris: Institut d'etudes slaves, 2003). Adamets posits that the problem of the short supply of commodities was a greater disinsentive for peasant productivity than requisitions. The Bolshevik Government, in his view, did not confiscate surpluses or clamp down on black and speculative markets as hard as it could have because the regime feared turning peasant opinion away from itself during the Civil War.

[25] See Bruce Lincoln, *Red Victory: A History of the Russian Civil War, 1918-1921* (New York: Da Capo, 1999), 61; Daniel R. Brower, "'The City in Danger:' The Civil War and the Russian Urban Population," in Diane Koenker, William Rosenberg, and Ronald Suny eds., *Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War: Explorations in Social History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 60; Fisher, *Famine*, 487-88; Patenaude, *Big Show*, 20-21 and Jonathan D. Smele, *Civil War in Siberia: The Anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 368, 385-87.

drastically reduced cultivation and depended only on good weather to ensure that the harvest would grow food that would feed their families until the following harvest.[26]

Without surplus food stores to protect themselves from a food shortage crisis, food shortage turned to famine when sown crops failed to produce grain in areas such Ural and Volga River regions after two consecutive droughts in spring 1920 and 1921.[27] No rain effectively meant no grain. With any stored grain consumed or taken by Red and White food brigades, peasants first turned to eating their remaining grain seeds and slaughtered much of the remaining livestock, depleted as their numbers already were from wartime mobilization of cattle and horses.[28] Once all food supplies were exhausted, peasants turned to surrogates. Malnutrition and epidemics soon followed as did acts of child abandonment and cannibalism, reports of which appeared in the Soviet press.[29]

The Soviet government's first official acknowledgement of the famine appeared in the 26 June 1921 issue of *Pravda*, though hints of impending catastrophe are found in earlier issues of *Izvestiia*.[30] In July, the Bolsheviks responded by exempting peasants from the food tax introduced under the New Economic Policy (NEP).[31] It also mobilized railways for relief work, organized direct food aid at public feeding stations, and

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[26] Patenaude, *Big Show*, 26; Fisher, *Famine*, 488-89.
[27] Fisher, *Famine*, 496.
[28] Horse-drawn wagons, for example, were a standard means of military transport throughout European history, and still filled significant gaps and inefficiencies in Russian logistics during WWI with the poor condition of existing Russian rail lines and rolling stock. See Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Origins of the First World War* (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2011), 34; Martin van Creveld, "The Revolution in Logistics," Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2000), 62-63, 67.the
[29] Zima, *Golod v SSSR*, 7; Retish, *Russia's Peasants*, 240-42.
[30] Patenaude, *Big Show*, 27, "*Bor'ba s golodom: Sokrashcenie plana snabzheniia*," *Izvestiia*, 29 May 1921.
[31] See Information Department of the Russian Trade Delegation, *The Famine in Russia: Documents and Statistics Presented to the Brussels Conference on Famine Relief* (London: Information Department of the Russian Trade Delegation, 1921), 5; Edmondson, "Soviet Famine Relief Measures, 1921-1923," 63-64; Nove, *Economic History*, 73-76.

encouraged the exchange of goods and the collection of seeds from luckier provinces.[32] The extent of the food crisis was too great, however, and the Soviet Government's resources were unequal to the task at hand. Short on food, supplies combined with general disorganization and the breakdown of transport limited the efficiency and extent of the Bolshevik government's relief measures. Acute starvation spread further south along the Volga and Russian people fled in search of food elsewhere.[33] The Soviet state urgently needed foreign aid to not only feed starving peasants, but also to regenerate the dried up agricultural economy upon which workers in the cities-the Bolsheviks' primary support base-depended.

With the permission of the Soviet Government, both the esteemed author Maxim Gorky (1868-1936) and Patriarch Tikhon (1865-1925), the highest authority of the Russian Orthodox Church, made the first pleas for international famine aid through League of Nations High Commissioner Fritdjof Nansen and the foreign press in late July 1921. In his letter, Gorky appealed to the common cultural heritage of Europeans and Americans with Russia and asked "All Honest People," to send "prompt aid" to starving Russians. He went on to entreat lovers of Russia's literature and music to "give bread and medicine" in the hope that foreign readers would sympathize and send food aid.[34] Similarly, Patriarch Tikhon recounted in a telegram that at the moment,

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[32] Edmondson, "Soviet Famine," 16, 26, 32. Soviet aid was administered by a committee to help the starving that included non-Bolsheviks but had State oversight. Resolutions and leaflets of the Central Executive Committee and Central Commission to Review Famine are found in Russian Subject Collection, *Vserossiiskii tsentral'nyi ispolnitel'nyi komitet. Tsentral'naia kommissia pomochchi golodaiushchim*, Box 13, f. 14, Hoover Box 13, f.14-15, Hoover.

[33] Fisher, *Famine*, 504; Nove, *Economic History*, 76; Edmondson, "Soviet Famine," 74.

[34] Maxim Gorky, "Appeal," 13 July 1921, in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Harold H. Fisher, *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1957), 73-74. Gorky's appeal appeared in the Paris based Russian émigré newspapers. See "*Kriki o pomoshchi: Obrashchenie Gor'kogo k Gergardtu Gauptmanu*," *Obshchee delo*, 22 July 1919; "*Telegramma M. Gor'kogo*," *Poslednie novosti*, 19 July 1919.

> "[There was] fearful famine in Russia. Greatest part must die of hunger. In those regions, which ordinarily produce most breadstuffs, all grain now annihilated by drought. Epidemics following in wake of famine. Immediate help large scale imperative. Populace deserting fields and houses and running eastward, crying 'Bread!' Send immediately bread and medicines."[35]

Some foreign audiences responded, notably Herbert Hoover, head of the American Relief Administration (ARA). He wrote Gorky on 23 July offering conditional "food, clothing, and medical supplies to a million children in Russia as rapidly as organization can be affected."[36] Nansen organised international relief measures from Geneva by acting as an intermediary between Soviet Russia, European governments, and charitable groups. His goal was to secure aid directly to peasants not only in the form of charity, but also "in the direction of [Russia's] reconstruction and self-help."[37] In this effort, international government assistance was required to bring seed, agricultural and transport supplies, building materials, and fuel to "win Russia back to normal conditions of industrial and agricultural activity."[38]

Calls for aid from Soviet Russia were crucial moments for the outcome of the famine itself, but also in the history of the Russian Civil War. To be sure, foreign relief agencies saved many thousands of lives, though millions also died. The ability for aid

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[35] Like Gorky's appeal, Patriarch Tikhon's telegram was translated and printed in numerous foreign newspapers. See Tikhon, "Russians Plead for Famine Relief," *New York Times*, 19 July 1921; "The Russian Famine: An Appeal by the Primate," *The Times*, 27 July 1921.

[36] See Herbert Hoover to Maxim Gorky, 23 July 1921 in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and H.H. Fisher, *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1957), 74-75. After some negotiations on the conditions in which the ARA would lend aid, Lev Kamenev, Chairman of the Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee accepted Hoover's offer on 31 July. See Fisher, 53.

[37] Fridjof Nansen, qtd. in Aloysius Balawyder, *Canadian-Soviet Relations between the World Wars* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 48. See Jennifer Polk's thesis on the work of other aid organizations-Jennifer Polk, "Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917-24," Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2012.

[38] Nansen, "Report to the League of Nations: Russian Refugees and the Reconstruction of Russia," 22 Feb. 1922, in League of Nations, Report on Russia with Special Reference to the Famine (1922), Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, Vol. 1317, f. 196.

agencies to bring relief did depend on the Bolsheviks' apparent willingness to first concede that a disaster had struck the countryside and then grant permission for these agencies to undertake duties inside their borders. In terms of the Civil War, however, the famine marked a potential turning point. For the Russian liberal exiles, the call for aid provided a potentially fruitful opportunity to hit the Bolshevik Government hard while it appeared at its weakest. Before the Bolshevik regime could consolidate power and win *de facto* and *de jure* recognition as Russia's legitimate government, the call for aid indicated to liberals that the Bolshevik regime was unable to govern and in fact, sought only to bring ruin to Russia, not greatness and strength.

3.4 Russian Liberal Responses to the Famine

Liberals in Russia Abroad responded to Gorky and Tikhon's calls for famine aid in several ways. Of course there was general shock and dismay and the impulse to organise what material relief they could and relay information about conditions in Russia to facilitate relief from foreign organisations. Several Russian exile groups echoed the appeals emergent from Soviet Russia, calling for help on a humanitarian basis. The Russian National Committee (RNK), a Paris-based anti-Bolshevik coalition group that included many liberals such as Miliukov and Vasilii Maklakov, appealed directly to the United States Ambassador to France, Myron Herrick. It asked him to convince the American government to lead the way in food aid. The RNK pledged that Russians at home and abroad would remember this goodwill and repay it with friendly diplomatic and trade relations when a democratic government was created.[39] Appealing to others was necessary

[39] *Memorandum du Comité National Russe á l'Ambassador des États-Unis de l'Amérique du Nord*, 6 August 1921, *Russkii natsional'nyi komitet* Papers, Box 53, f. 2, RBML.

since Russians abroad had little in the way of monetary resources generally; thus many did what they could to help generate food and money to help Russians at home.[40]

Other responses included the production of English-language statistical and analytical surveys that analysed the situation and isolated core problems on the ground. Doing so allowed Russians abroad to offer foreign relief agencies assistance and expert advice on famine conditions and how to prioritize aid work.[41] One group engaged in this work was the Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia. On 22 July 1921, it issued a bulletin demonstrating its profound concern for what was happening at home and its own appeal for international aid.[42] The Executive Committee declared its readiness to organize assistance on behalf of starving Russians and "lend all the energy it possesse[d] in the service of the cause," but admitted it did not have the material resources to facilitate aid itself.[43] Regardless, the Executive Committee noted that assistance "must be organised first of all by Russians who find themselves abroad" since it believed that Russians were more familiar with conditions in Russia than foreigners and would ensure material assistance arrived to the right people.[44]

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[40] Boris Bakhmeteff released 65,000 USD from Russian Embassy funds under his control in Washington. He expressed regrets that he was unable to donate more since funds were "about exhausted on account of the support given to the refugees during the last year. See Boris Bakhmeteff to Herbert Hoover, 27 August 1921, in Boris Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 3 Correspondence, RBML.

[41] See for example *Ispolnitel'naia kommissia soveshchaniia chlenov uchreditel'nogo sobrania*, "*Informatsionnyi biulleten' finansovo-ekonomicheskogo otdela*," n.d., in Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 33, f. 1; Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Russian Constituent Assembly, Bulletins of Russian Economic and Financial Information, 15 June 1921 and *Comité exécutif de la Conférence des membres de la Constituante de Russie, Bulletin d'information économique et financière russe*, 15 August 1921, Russia *Posol'stvo* Records, Box 32, f. 9, Hoover. Regarding the Russian offer of expert assistance to foreign aid organizations see RNK to *Commission internationale de secours à la Russie*, 3 October 1921, *Russkii natsional'nyi komitet* Papers, Box 53, f.2, RBML.

[42] Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, "Bulletin," 22 July 1921, Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, Hoover.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, "*La famine en Russie: L'appel du comité éxécutif*," n.d., Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, Hoover. The appeal was likely issued sometime in late July or early August 1921, before any evidence of real organisation among Russians and foreign governments emerged. Vladimir Burtsev, Chairman of the RNK and editor of

It asked for further assistance from Russians abroad to raise contributions of money and supplies to help rebuild Russia's agricultural sector and allow the peasants to once again feed themselves.

Russians abroad engaged in these activities because they still had lasting concerns for the quality of life for the people they left behind, including friends and family. This circumstance was incredibly painful for many Russian exiles. Many poems that emerged in the émigré press, for example, express feelings of guilt as well as pity for the starving people at home. Such sentiments are not uncommon among exile groups.[45] Raising awareness about the famine was meant to demonstrate that Russia Abroad had not forgotten about Russians at home and cared about their welfare and the wellbeing of their homeland.[46] For Russian liberals, and the concerns they expressed about responsible and responsive leadership, which I discuss below, they believed such work had practical value. Because the "bulk of the educated Russian class" of technical experts and professionals were now in exile, these "patriots" could still devote their skills to serve their "beloved mother country once again sooner or later."[47] Russian liberals wanted to advance the idea

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Obshchee delo, criticized the Executive Committee's appeal. He sardonically remarked that Committee members were "extraordinarily humane people" in their attempt to "demand control" of the relief effort for themselves. More forcefully, he noted that practical conditions to organize work were needed, and because, the scale of the famine was so massive, "relief on a state scale [was] necessary." While Burtsev noted "real help for the Russian people will come only after the overthrow of Soviet power," he also insisted that the existence of the Bolshevik government should not preclude action now. Vladimir Burtsev, "*Pomoshch golodaiushchim*," *Obshchee delo*, 23 July 1921.

[45] Atsuko Matsuoka and John Sorenson, "Ghosts and Shadows: Memory and Resilience among the Eritrean Diaspora," in Vijay Agnew, Ed., *Diaspora, Memory, and Identity: A Search for Home* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 161.

[46] Diaspora communities such as Russia Abroad are characterised in a variety of ways including a belief that they should "collectively be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their homeland and to its safety and prosperity" and continue to relate to the homeland because "their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship." See William Saffran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1991): 83-84. The concept and definitions of diaspora are in fact limitless, however, other common characteristics can be found in Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, 2nd Edition (New York: Routledge, 2008), 17.

[47] "Russians in Exile: Lack of International Help," *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922), 176.

that the many exiles had useful talents and wished to show that they were ready to apply them in the service of the people at the moment and in the future.

These efforts, the liberals hoped, could not only help people at home, but also allowed the emigration to feel connected to life in the homeland while demonstrating how responsible and responsive the liberal emigration could be to the people's needs.[48] Consequently, their efforts to organise aid and share information about conditions had practical political value for themselves. This work could demonstrate to foreigners and eventually, to peasants at home, that liberals had both civic consciousness and moral virtue insofar as they worked with what means and talents they had to organise aid abroad. The Soviet regime possessed only "colossal means of oppression and persecution," *Russian Life* argued, while "intelligent, active elements" were in exile but still working to organise foreign aid with their connections abroad.[49] Liberals were also cognizant that the "wretched starving…regard British and American relief workers as their saviours."[50] If and when the regime collapsed, Russian liberals could thus claim that they too had done their work to help the peasants, save them from Bolshevik tyranny and consequently earn their favour. Political integrity after all, is established through the demonstration of good moral character and good deeds.

Many Russian liberals believed that the disaster presented a unique opportunity to try to hasten the Bolshevik regime's demise while others like Vladimir Burtsev believed émigré assistance would not really help the starving but only help prop up the regime.[51] Despite early declarations that "before the horrors of the famine, all considerations not

[48] Uriadova, *Golod 1920-kh gg*., 161.
[49] "The Sources of Communist Strength," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922), 208.
[50] C. Nabokov, "Soviet Bragging," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922), 197.
[51] Uriadova, *Golod 1920-x gg*., 53.

directly related to the organisation of aid must be ignored," liberal exiles worked in earnest to undermine the strength of the Bolshevik regime. They used the famine at home to demonstrate to foreigners that the regime's policies were arbitrary and violent. In their view, it was not drought but the Bolsheviks themselves that had killed Russian industry and "robbed the agricultural population" to the point where the famine became inevitable.[52] Russian liberals engaged in a sustained propaganda campaign to raise awareness about the famine and its 'true' causes. The purpose was to convince foreign audiences that the Soviet Government was an incompetent, corrupt, and ruthless government bent on destroying people and country alike.

The Russian Liberation Committee (RLC), a liberal organisation, stated simply that "setting aside all questions of politics…is obviously not our domain." In order to "combat the famine and demonstrate a humanitarian attitude" to the people at home, it was critical to articulate the causes of the famine and "find the culprits."[53] Regarding foreign audiences, the RLC found it necessary to demonstrate the cruelty, injustice, and incompetence of the Bolshevik regime. Such qualities, in the RLC's view, made the Bolsheviks a bad trading partner. The RLC maintained the home regime ought to be

[52] Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, "Bulletin," 22 July 1921, Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, Hoover; (no author) "Who is Responsible for the Famine? *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922), 165. For arguments in favour of humanitarian aid over political considerations, see Boris Mirskii, "*Moral' goloda*," *Poslednie novosti*, 29 July 1921. League of Nations High Commissioner Fridjof Nansen also noted that it was useless to try and root out guilt because the focus should be solely on organizing relief. His focus as the League of Nations High Commissioner lay more heavily in understanding the consequences of the famine and how to deal with them. See *Comité internationale de secours à la Russie: Haut Commissariat du Dr. Nansen, "Les conséquences économiques de la famine en Russie*," Geneva, 8 August 1922, in *Russkii natsional'nyi komitet* Papers, Box 53, f.4, RBML. Liberal Russian exiles certainly applauded Nansen's desire to organize "extensive assistance," but were appalled that Nansen "hasten[ed] to exonerate the Bolshevik Government, which, in his opinion, is not responsible for the famine." See "Should the Culprit Be Sought?" *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922), 199.

[53] "Russian Appeal in Geneva," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): iii; "The Authors of the Famine," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): 184.

compelled to wither and "die a natural death" through diplomatic isolation if foreign states were not willing to intervene by military means.[54] As such, Russian liberals used the famine and its victims as propaganda devices to try and foster diplomatic isolation. Thus while some Russians abroad, including liberals, engaged themselves in fundraising work, others worked even harder to raise awareness about the evils of Bolshevism on behalf of starving people at home in order to help them in the longer term by encouraging regime change.

The Russian Liberation Committee, the RNK, and the Executive Committee produced voluminous pamphlets, reports, and bulletins for Russian and foreign, especially British, audiences.[55] Many of these documents contained straightforward statistics and executed scientific data analysis regarding crop yields and freight tonnage. The analytical sections in these documents tended to produce conclusions, which, unsurprisingly, revealed incompetence and malice behind or failure in Bolshevik governance as the cause of the famine. Fuel shortages, for example, arose in the RLC's interpretation because the Bolsheviks would not pay the millions in pre-war roubles or issue "even paper money" owed to the peasants for their wood. Thus the latter "do not wish to work" and thus produce fuel badly needed for industrial production.[56] Their analyses also predicted the regime would remain the sole roadblock to the famine's remediation and the people's salvation.

[54] "Protest of the Russian National Committee," *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922): 160. The RNK protest was in relation to the upcoming Genoa Conference.
[55] For more on the Russian Liberation Committee (RLC), see Charlotte Alston, "Work of the Russian Liberation Committee in London," *Slavonica*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 2008): 6-17. The RLC published many Bulletins and publications that traced the development of food crisis in Russia since autumn 1919. See for example Tyrkova-Williams, *Why Soviet Russia is Starving*, 3; "Famine," *Bulletins of the Russian Liberation Committee*, No. 44, 20 December 1919, 4; "Workers Hunting for Food," *Bulletins*, No. 51, 14 February 1920, 3 in Russia *Posol'stvo* (US) Records, Box 14, f. 15. Tyrkova-Williams was a founding member of the Constitutional Democratic Party and the RLC.
[56] "Economic Notes: The Food Tax-Fuel-Coal-Petroleum-Corn from Siberia-What is the Matter with the Railways?" *Russian Life*, February-March 1922, 223.

Ultimately, the RNK's purpose was to convince readers of the inherent unfitness of the Bolshevik regime to administrate properly in the country, the direct impact this had on people, and also suggest reasons why foreign trade with the Bolsheviks would be a bad gamble. If the Bolsheviks could not compel peasants to produce and industry was at a standstill, there would not be much for Russia to export.

The Executive Committee echoed the RLC's communications. It wrote about the "full decline in agricultural production under the power of the Soviets," a decline that only invited disaster. The Executive Committee cited the scarcity and artificially high prices of available manure, machinery, and tool items that were neither produced in nor imported to Bolshevik Russia. Without these implements, peasants could not grow crops. The Executive Committee also blamed the Bolsheviks for the failure to deliver seeds. The peasants could not plant crops because the distribution of seeds had been "monopolized by the Soviet power, which could and would not distribute them in a satisfactory manner.[57] Finally, it blamed the Bolsheviks' "repeated requisition of grain" for starvation in the countryside. Peasants had no food to exchange for tools and consumer goods even if the latter items were available. As a result, the peasants "reduced their production to the very minimum of their own needs" because the regime left them no choice. There could be no doubt, in the Executive Committee's summarization, that "the decline in agricultural production caused by Soviet policy over the last four years, drove Russia to a dreadful food crisis."[58]

[57] Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, "*La famine en Russie: L'appel du comité éxécutif*," n.d., in Russia Posol'stvo (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, Hoover.
[58] Ibid.

The RNK advanced a similar argument. It blamed the Bolsheviks for the famine because of their "stoppage of Russian industry" on a national level. The decline in industrial capacity under Bolshevism, it argued, resulted in a dearth of agricultural tools and machinery badly needed in the countryside. Combined with state requisitions, the Bolsheviks caused starvation because it could not manage its industrial sector.[59] Liberals believed that the "Soviet system [was] the very negation of the elementary conditions for productive labour." There also remained no doubt among them that the Bolshevik "monopoly" over the distribution of grain, seed, manure, tools and farm implements combined with restrictions on small and large-scale commerce blocked the normal and healthy flow and trade of these sorely-needed items and led consequently to a "dreadful food crisis" and numerous epidemics.[60]

The Executive Committee went on to remind readers that that famine was "the worst [their] generation could remember," and attributed the calamity to the fact that Russia was "in a state of chaos, its authorities were powerless, and the state had fully disintegrated as a result of four years of the Bolshevik regime."[61] Rather than protecting Russia and leading it appropriately to post-war reconstruction as other states in the West had done, Bolshevik decision-making only brought devastation. Petr Struve, a Marxist-turned-liberal political economist and philosopher who also worked with the RLC observed that the regime's policies had led to Russia's "economic destruction," including the total frustration of transport, the destruction of elementary sanitary conditions, and even Russia's "physical

[59] RNK to *Commission internationale de secours a la Russie*, 3 October 1921, *Russkii natsional'nyi komitet* Papers, Box 53, f.2, RBML.
[60] "*La famine en Russie: L'appel du Comité exécutif*."
[61] Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, "Bulletin," 22 July 1921, in Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, Hoover.

and spiritual ruin," which "many times over, surpassed the devastation of the war."[62] With the economy and infrastructure in shambles and the state's inability to establish sources of foreign credit because it had repudiated tsarist debt after the revolution, the liberals presented an image of the Bolshevik regime that was not only untrustworthy, but unable to obtain or deliver grain or basic services and commodities to starving people. Instead, the regime fed the people maxims because that is all the regime actually possessed.

Russian liberal groups also emphasised that they had seen the catastrophe was imminent years before its outbreak when they rallied earlier warnings about an impending food crisis dating back to 1919. Then, Kadet and RLC organizer Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams declared the Bolsheviks were only capable of the "methodical organisation of all aspects of ruin," which had led already to the paralysis of the economic and productive energy of the Russian people and countryside.[63] In 1922, the RLC was thus able to declare that "even before the drought, everyone anticipated a catastrophe."[64] It reasserted that it had long been obvious that "the famine was coming and that it [was] a natural consequence of the very existence of Soviet power" and "four years of its mismanagement."[65] In this way, the liberals seized upon the moment and claimed authoritative knowledge of Russian conditions to inform foreign opinion.

Their assertions were also intended to drive home their belief that the Bolshevik regime also saw it coming; thus, because of the regime's action and inaction, the famine was the result of a particular kind of malice. The RLC attested that Pavel I. Popov, a

[62] Petr Berngardovich Struve, *Golod*' (Sofia: Russkaia mysl': Rossiisko-Bolgarskoe kn-vo, 1921), 3-4.
[63] Tyrkova-Williams, *Why Soviet Russia is Starving*, 22; Charlotte Alston, "Work of the Russian Liberation Committee in London," *Slavonica*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 2008): 6
[64] "Drought or Requisitions," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): 183.
[65] "Who Is Responsible for the Famine?" *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922): 165; "Bursting European Corn-bins for Russia," *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922): 165.

member of the Central Statistical Bureau of the Soviet, knew about worsening conditions in the countryside. Popov had published earlier discussions on the problems associated with grain requisitions for the Soviet state. Instead of averting crisis and responding adequately to Popov's analysis, the liberals claimed the Bolshevik regime *knowingly* "rendered Russia impotent…and reduced the whole country to starvation" through its wrongful and cruel "socialistic experiments."[66]

The RNK also criticized Bolshevik malevolence to British audiences and delegates at the 1922 Hague Conference where British Prime Minister David Lloyd George was in attendance.[67] The RNK stated that the regime's "nationalisation of all aspects of social life" and its inefficient regulation of commodities and transport were intended only to "reduce to absolute submission" anyone that appeared hostile to the regime. Consequently, the Soviet state had successfully "transformed consumers in the cities into famished slaves, for whom any protests were punished by the death penalty."[68] Liberals also reported on the execution of workers and soldiers to convey the extremes that the home regime would take to fight dissent and retain its power. *Russian Life* argued that even as the regime knowingly starved people to death, it also murdered anyone who complained about starving through "systematic terrorism and the ruthless extermination of government enemies."[69] The

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[66] "Drought or Requisitions," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): 184; "Who Is Responsible for the Famine?" *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922): 165; "Bursting European Corn-bins for Russia:" *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922), 165.

[67] The Hague Conference met in June 1922 and was attended by Allied officials and businessmen, as well as M. M. Litvinov, a prominent diplomat and later, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Litvinov attended to seek foreign credits for the Soviet state. The Allied delegates denied the request because the Soviet State refused to return nationalized property to foreign owners. The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement had made provision for both parties to declare that outstanding property claims of either party or nationals would be dealt with in a formal peace treaty, which was undertaken at the Genoa Conference of April-May 1922. See Carole Fink, *The Genoa Conference, 1921-1922* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 281-300.

[68] *Memorandum du Comité National Russe aux membres de la Conférence de la Haye*, 23 June 1922, in Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 32, f. 9, Hoover.

[69] "Glorification of the Tche-ka," *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922): 169

Executive Committee echoed these concerns, noting the Bolsheviks' apparent efforts to "preclude revolt and silence the population" through starvation and execution. It described this practice as the worst type of reaction, worse than even that of even the most reactionary of tsars.[70] Like the *ancien régime*, the Bolsheviks used violence "to extend the last convulsions of the existence of its power," compelled as it was "to perish by the hate of the people." The Bolsheviks, however, distinguished themselves from the Romanov Dynasty as a "truly satanic regime that clutched Russia by the throat," because even if the tsars used violence to dominate the people, they did not purposely starve the people.[71]

In the countryside, the RNK noted, the Bolsheviks practiced forced requisitions where "resistance was met with the destruction of whole villages" through disproportionate reprisals.[72] *Russian Life* showed that nothing demonstrated more clearly the Bolsheviks' contempt for peasant labour and "the people itself" than the armed incursions to the villages of supply that stole grain and seed, burned homes to the barren ground, and murdered starving women "in the name of the communist ideal of nationalisation."[73] In their view, Bolshevik cruelty, scorn, and selfish purposes led to famine, characteristics that sharply pointed to the unjustness and illegitimacy of the regime.

In their critiques and their claims made to foreign aid organisations, the liberals also worried that donated food would not reach the peasants and claimed that the home

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[70] Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, "Bulletin," 22 July 1921, in Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, Hoover.
[71] Struve, *Golod*, 5; *Comité exécutif de la Conférence des membres de la Constituante de Russie, "Pour les victims de la terreur bolchéviste,"* n.d., Boris Bakhmeteff Papers, Box 20 (Correspondence), RBML. Miliukov also told Poslednie novosti readers that the regime "sought out, isolated, and shot" hungry soldiers and workers who had grown unhappy with rations, further evidence, in his view of growing dissent after the March 1921 Kronstadt Rebellion. Miliukov, "*Golod i sovetskaia vlast'*," *Poslednie novosti*, 27 July 1921.
[72] *Memorandum du Comité National Russe aux membres de la Conférence de la Haye*, 23 June 1922, in Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 32, f. 9, Hoover.
[73] "The Communist War against Peasants," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February- March 1922): 182-83.

regime would use it to feed the Red Army, whose loyalty and weapons were needed to prop up the regime.[74] Mobilising evidence from Soviet newspapers, one report in *Russian Life* observed that the Bolsheviks seemed "not only unable to cope with the famine, but even to make proper use of the foodstuffs received from abroad," and as such, no added strength or time should be given to the regime.[75] Struve lamented that the damage done was so bad that "not even the most plentiful charitable aid or energetic state activity [could] remedy all of this now," though of course, the statement did not preclude his desire to see foreign aid save starving Russians.[76] What is important here is that the 'ask' for assistance continued to be framed in ways that indicated that the Bolshevik regime was both helpless and unwilling to help starving Russians and that they could not be trusted to administer food, goods, or money alone. 'Matter-of-fact' reviews of Russian conditions and outright appeals for assistance still pointed a finger at the Bolshevik regime as the presumed source of the calamity and its endurance.

Another approach the exiles deployed was an appeal to the individual's right to free initiative and the methods the Bolsheviks took to besmirch this. The Russian Economic Association in London declared to English businesspeople most explicitly that "the real cause of the Russian famine [was] not the drought," but the direct result of "State interference with the free economic activity of the agricultural population of the country."[77] The RLC concurred, noting that when the regime banned "private initiative" in Russia, misfortune came about. Because the Bolsheviks reduced Russia's capacity to produce food

[74] RNK to *Commission internationale de secours à la Russie*, 3 October 1921, *Russkii natsional'nyi komitet* Papers, Box 53, f.2, RBML; Miliukov, *To-Day*, 232.
[75] "Who Is Responsible for the Famine?" *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922): 162.
[76] Struve, *Golod*, 4.
[77] The Russian Economic Association in London, "Motor Ploughing as a Remedy against the Famine in Russia," (Prague: n.p. 1922) in *Russkii natsional'nyi komitet* Papers, Box 53, f. 1. RBML.

in their failure to supply peasants with supplies and seeds, they had no inducement to work. When the state "obliged peasants to give up their corn," they further lost incentive to grow corn for sale. In short, the regime's "harsh measures" caused the peasants to lose "interest in economic production." Without incentive and with only "orders from above" to work the land, agricultural production bottomed out, making the peasants extremely vulnerable if the weather failed them, which it did.[78] Moreover, when famine had set in, the regime ensured "no public opinion [was] permitted to help organise relief work independently from the Bolshevist authorities," thus forbidding people to cooperate on their own initiative, adapt, and save themselves.[79]

In the liberal exiles' view, these circumstances made the Bolsheviks as a governing body, unjust, ineffective, and irresponsible because the regime forbade any attempt by the peasants to adapt and otherwise demonstrate the kind of effective initiative that could challenge the regime's authority.[80] Consequently, unresponsive and negligent governments like the Bolshevik regime must be opposed, and where possible deposed, in favour of a liberal democratic system. Russia's very existence, in the RNK's view,

> "demanded a transformation of politics instantly: the whole country must reclaim liberty of commerce, the re-establishment of which is impossible without private ownership, a system of credit, and the basic foundations of civil rights, in other words, the establishment of all principles of civilised states in radical contradiction with those of the Communist regime."[81]

From this, we can gather that the liberals like Maklakov opposed the regime because they believed it had created conditions that made it impossible for peasants to

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[78] "Bursting European Corn-Bins for Russia," *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922): p. 166-67.
[79] Pavel Miliukov, *To-Day*, 241.
[80] *Comité exécutif de la Conférence des membres de la Constituante de Russie*, "*La famine en Russie: L'appel du Comité exécutif*," n.d., Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, 4-6, Hoover.
[81] *Memorandum du Comité National Russe aux membres de la Conférence de la Haye*, 23 June 1922, in Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 32, f. 9, Hoover.

produce. The liberals also believed Russians now endured less freedom than they had under the tsarist government. "Economic activity requires a minimum of liberty," the RLC explicated, yet the "existing police conditions" in Soviet Russia made the regeneration of agriculture and industry impossible.[82] Of course, liberty as well could foster the development of an educated public sphere, necessary for the advancement of state and society, and also a bulwark against unjust actions or inaction of the leadership.

Russian liberals also could not ignore the idea that the Soviet regime's authority "did not emanate from the people," a foundational necessity of state in liberal ideology. "Linked to no country and no people," the home regime held power only through violence and starvation measures.[83] Russian liberals sought a constitutional state that protected the rights and liberty of individuals, believing that "the power of the state…must be based on the free will of the people and must not be imposed upon the people by force or by fraud."[84] The famine then became an avenue by which liberals could illustrate the ways in which the Bolsheviks violated the rights and liberties of Russian individuals. As such, the time had come for Russia to enjoy a government that "could inspire the confidence of the popular masses, since the power of the Bolsheviks had been fully discredited."[85] The RLC stated it plainly: "Russia's salvation lies in a complete change of the regime." The RLC believed the fields would again become green after Bolshevism. Moreover, with the creation of a

[82] "Bursting European Corn-bins for Russia," 168.
[83] *Memorandum du Comité National Russe aux membres de la Conférence de la Haye*, 23 June 1922.
[84] "Views of Russian Business Men: Resolutions of the Conference of Representatives of Russian Commerce and Industry in Paris," *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922): 157.
[85] *Bureau d'information du Comité exécutif de la Conférence des membres de la Constituante de Russie*, Bulletin No. 6: *Appel du Comité exécutif de la Conférence des membres de la Constituante de Russie*, 22 July 1921, Russia *Posol'stvo* (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, 1, Hoover.

liberal democratic state, those fields could be also be nurtured to bloom, signalling Russia's regeneration.[86]

In their discussions, these liberal groups also appeared concerned about the capacity of the government to intervene effectively in the lives of individuals in order to bring help when it was in fact needed. Russian liberals had traditionally denigrated state interference in local public organisational activities, advocated for the broader extension of local self-governments, and upheld the principle of rule of law-the only means of ensuring personal freedom and protecting individual rights and the freedom of economic activity from encroachment and interference by others, including the state.[87] In short, Kadets had before 1917 tried to achieve "an escape from governmental authority" by working to "inaugurate in Russia a regime of political freedom."[88] Yet, by 1921, the liberals argued that the famine demonstrated a need for a responsible government that could meet the people's needs. This vision of good government was contrasted against the apparently negative consequences of harmful Bolshevik state intervention in the private lives and trade of the people. Good governments, as the exiles intimated, could and would intervene for compassionate reasons through real material and administrative assistance at the local level. Bad governments, on the other hand, imposed taxes and monopolised foreign trade, which they argued were core aspects of the NEP. [89] Therefore, the only legitimate power for Russia was a

[86] "The Authors of the Famine," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): 184.
[87] Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Revolution,* 15; Marc Raeff, "Some Reflections on Russian Liberalism," *Russian Review*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July 1959): 223.
[88] Raeff, "Reflections," 221; Pavel Miliukov, "Constitutional Government for Russia," Address to the Civic Forum, 14 January 1908 (New York: Civic Forum), 14.
[89] "The Soviet Blockade," *Russian Life*, No. 6, February-March 1922): 204. Literature on Russian liberalism is quiet on the subject of government humanitarian intervention, though other scholars have taken up this apparent tension in liberal thought and practice. See for example William Greaves, "The Intervention Imperative: Contradictions between Liberalism, Democracy, and Humanitarian Intervention," *Innovations: A Journal of Politics*, Vol. 8 (2008-2009): 60-62. In a related vein, for contemporary arguments in favour of humanitarian aid over political considerations, see Boris Mirskii, "*Moral' goloda*," *Poslednie novosti*, 29 July 1921.

constitutional regime that would be "capable of leading Russia onto the path of regeneration" that could guarantee rights "based upon the recognition of private property, the sanctity of treaties, and upon the principles of the freedom of the individual and labour."[90] "Our conviction," the RNK declared stated, "is based on the fact that only such a government that is accepted by the nation is capable of evolution."[91]

In sum, many of the books, journals, pamphlets, and memoranda that Russian liberal groups published tried to evaluate 'scientifically' the situation on the ground in famine-stricken Russia and pin the blame on the Bolshevik regime for the calamity at home. The acts of working to organise, facilitate and inform famine aid certainly gave Russian liberals some comfort knowing that they were working for the benefit starving people at home, thus establishing crucial connections with the homeland in spite of their exile. The liberal campaign against the Bolsheviks through famine analysis also provided an opportunity to advance particular principles about what liberals believed was and was not good governance for Russia in a way that allowed them to juxtapose their 'responsible' view of government against the apparently unjust, negligent, and illegitimate governance of the Bolshevik regime. Their campaign was largely directed at British audiences in the hope that they would recognise that trade and diplomatic recognition with Soviet Russia "would only serve to prolong the Bolshevik regime's existence, thereby retarding the moment of Russia's reconstruction."[92] The RLC in particular, formed during the Civil War in the hope of helping to shape British policy toward Russia and also inform British press coverage. *The Times*, for example carried many stories generated by the RLC, while

[90] "Views of Russian Business Men," 157.
[91] "Protest of the Russian National Committee," *Russian Life*, No. 5 (January 1922), 159.
[92] "France's Policy Towards the Soviets," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): 189

Harold Williams, spouse of Ariadna-Tyrkova Williams and an RLC member, worked for the British daily as a correspondent in Soviet Russia.[93]

Certainly, the liberals shed a lot of ink in the attempt to apply blame for the famine to the Bolsheviks. They did so to elicit English sympathy for the people and the liberals' cause while fostering antipathy toward the home regime. At the same time, it is also critical to note that their 'blamestorming' also served as a direct reply to relief organiser and League of Nations High Commissioner Fridjof Nansen's dual conviction that drought was the primary cause of the famine and that European trade with starving Russia would spark the "revival of prosperity in Europe."[94] I. V. Schklovsky, a liberal satirist commonly known as Dioneo explained quite frankly the liberals' disappointment with Nansen's apparent belief that "establishing guilt is merely an abstract question" and sought to counter this supposition since for Russians at home and abroad, who was guilty was "a question of life and death."[95] Another *Russian Life* article noted that Nansen's failure to acknowledge Bolshevism as a cause of the famine was ultimately insincere; thus in order to stir "feelings of compassion," the liberals were compelled "to tell the British public the whole truth and nothing but the truth."[96]

Because Great Britain had also already established a trade relationship with the home regime, it also appeared to the liberal exiles that Britain disregarded the perils of Bolshevism in favour of trade in order to foster reconstruction at home. Great Britain could hardly benefit from trade in the liberals' view because "in order to trade, one must have

[93] Alston, "Russian Liberation Committee," 7-8.
[94] Charles M. Edmonson, "The Politics of Hunger: The Soviet Response to the Famine, 1921," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (October 1977): 511; Fridjof Nansen, "Memorandum Submitted to the Secretary General of the League of Nations by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Rostad)," 29 March 1922, in League of Nations, Report on Russia, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 1317, f. 196.
[95] Dioneo, "Should the Culprit Be Sought?" *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): 200.
[96] "Dr. Nansen's Appeal," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): 202.

goods." In Russia, "there were none." The "crazy economic policy" known as NEP, as one A. Borman lamented, ensured that "Russian buyers and producers were cut off from foreign markets." The nationalisation of foreign trade and prohibitions on travel had made it impossible for anyone to import goods or export them, he argued. Consequently, the only party that would benefit from trade were the Bolsheviks themselves, not Great Britain, and certainly not the people at home because the regime itself held the "monopoly on trade" and "blockaded" the rest of the population.[97] 'Pinning the blame' for the famine in the many means the liberals found to do so was not only meant to convince readers that the home regime was incompetent and cruel, but also that it was most unable to deliver goods or establish credit to purchase them from Great Britain or other European states hoping to tap new markets in the post-war reconstruction effort.

3.5 Deathly Images, Deadly Prospects

As we have seen, liberal exiles made many observations about the famine, what it indicated about the incompetence and cruelty of the Bolshevik Government, and even what the famine said about the need for regime change to an authority that could not only guarantee freedom of the individual (and their productivity), but also enjoy the popular support and mandate of the masses. However, liberals also had other preoccupations that can be discerned in the more metaphoric and uncharacteristically macabre language they used to describe the impact of the famine on the people and the countryside. They frequently mobilized horrific images that evoke many themes including death, limbo, peril, barrenness, and more. Some liberals of course were motivated by a desire to convince foreign audiences of the Bolshevik regime's inherent wickedness, which they hoped in turn

[97] "The Soviet Blockade," *Russian Life*, No. 6 (February-March 1922): 204.

would compel foreign readers to tell their governments to neither make trade agreements with the Soviet State nor recognise it officially. Yet, whether they wrote to foreign or Russian audiences, the darker language the liberals sometimes employed to describe the famine's impact reveals their deep-seated fixations regarding Russia's progress toward becoming a modern state and civilization and their fears that the Bolshevik government had undone all the progress Russia had hitherto made in its liberal modernizing effort.[98] As such, the famine became a highly cultivable discursive field in which liberal exiles planted their own ideas about the causes of Russia's peril and also their convictions regarding its path to salvation, regeneration, and greatness that rested on the removal of the Bolshevik scourge from Russia and the installation of a constitutional democratic government.

Liberal exiles used many thematic words and statements in their writing that revealed their underlying fears about threats to Russia's present and future good health of the state and its future prospects. Russian liberals had long believed that the economic and political well-being of citizens translated into the well-being of Russia itself.[99] One threat they perceived was expressed through the illustration of death and dying in the countryside. In the previous section, we saw that liberals wrote about death in more impersonal, matter-of-fact ways, using the numbers and distribution of the dead to demonstrate the famine's demographic impact.[100] However, they also described or narrated death by starvation

[98] Many Russian émigrés looked back on the decades before the October Revolution "as a golden age of progress, which had been arbitrarily interrupted (as it seemed) by the First World War…or the Bolsheviks." See Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 16.
[99] William Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Russian Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917-1921* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 14.
[100] Uriadova, *Golod 1920-x gg.*, 36-37.

under Bolshevism, employing unsettling imagery that a reader might discover in the cantos of Dante's *Inferno*.

Miliukov for example, described in rather gruesome detail the emaciated and rotting corpses that lay in Russian streets, along the roadsides, or floated downstream. As Russians died "one by one," he remarked that the number of dead bodies had grown so large that rotting flesh had become a familiar appearance "that no longer frightened anyone" in the villages. Near them were "dead horses lying in ditches…in complete decomposition, full of worms." In these descriptions, he also added another "unvarnished truth."[101] The death of Russian people was "grievous, intolerable, and soul-shattering," but it was also the continuing death and "decay of agriculture after four years of the Bolshevist regime" that was insufferable. Undoubtedly, Miliukov and other liberals found the death of millions of compatriots heartbreaking, but also remained just as concerned with Russia's productive capacity. It occupied their thoughts because Russia's future prospects for recovery, good health, and progress depended on a healthy agricultural base.[102] *Russian Life* stated that agriculture had greatly improved in the 20 years before the October Revolution, but now "after four years of Soviet mismanagement" peasants were forgetting how to use new technologies and were forced "to return to ancient methods of cultivation." The consequence was that Russia was no longer "the granary of the world," but suffered from a "ruined and paralysed agricultural industry" and now relied on foreign food assistance and imports.[103] Soviet farms that had been "prosperous estates" in bygone days

[101] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 240, 243-44, 246.
[102] Ibid., 236, 249.
[103] "Bursting European Corn-Bins," 165, 167. Miliukov noted that in order to check "the moving sand of the Asiatic wilderness" advancing westward, the old regime and zemstvos checked this advance through perfecting modern methods of agronomy. "All these methods have been discontinued since Bolshevist domination," he added and "the normal resources of rural economy have been utterly destroyed." Miliukov, *To-Day*, 234.

were now "wildernesses."[104] Believing that economic resources in the countryside were exhausted, Miliukov stated Russia had reached its limit. "Beyond that," he added, there is only more "death and destruction" in the countryside so long as the regime stayed in power.[105]

Another deathly theme emerged in descriptions of those famine victims who, to liberal observers, appeared not as living people but more like ghosts or people trapped in limbo, avoiding both death and respite. Liberals wanted to remake the Russian people into active citizens, but the images used to describe them indicate anxiety about the sheer lack of hope for the condition of Russia and its people to be active. While the roads amassed more heaps of corpses in Miliukov's description, 'mostly-dead' Russians did not go to their fields, but rather plodded about as if they were a part of a "Caravan of Death left to its way of perdition." All the while, the "bells of the churches tinkle[d], tremulous and uncertain."[106] Miliukov went on to describe those unfortunate victims who gave up their aimless drifting and grass-eating, noting that they "mostly lie down" and then linger long. Thus alongside the decomposing deceased on once bustling, now starving Russian roadsides, tens of thousands of half-dead corpses lay about, caught as they were in some kind of limbo, unable to move, die, hope, and work.[107] *Russian Life* echoed his concerns noting that only after the regime's downfall would the people be "active again" and able to assist in "the establishment of law, order, and economic reconstruction on a healthy basis."[108]

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[104] "Should the Culprit be Sought," 200.
[105] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 230. See also "Bursting European Corn-Bins," 168.
[106] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 240, 242-43, 245-46.
[107] Ibid., 243.
[108] "Views of Russian Business Men," 157.

Miliukov also relayed snippets from a communiqué acquired from an unnamed 'Bolshevist correspondent' at Samara in the heart of the famine region that illustrates the image of the people and Russia's limbo, as well as Bolshevik cruelty. Narrating the horror, Miliukov told his audience that the Bolshevik correspondent was in a first-class train flush with bread, meat, wine, and sweets, while a few feet away "the unbearable stink of foul clothes and half-dead corpses" languished beneath the window, "covered with black dust and clouds of flies." Amidst this "mass of filth, rags, and refuse," Miliukov's Bolshevik observed,

> "A girl is dying just here, under my window. She is about sixteen, a good-looking girl, thin and well-shaped. She lies on her back with closed eyes. Now and then she opens her eyes…and she stares at the sky, with her immovable, deadly gaze….When in the evening I come back, she is always there, as immovable as before. I bring her bread and milk. She does not want it-nay, she cannot eat…but she throws at me an imploring glance, as if she were saying, "Do not touch me. Let me die."[109]

The image Miliukov narrated is explicit and it has interesting implications for the liberal view of the condition of Russia under the Bolshevik regime. As the dying girl in Miliukov's chapter was forced to simply endure the end of life and wait for death, so too did Russia 'linger,' enduring a similarly protracted and hopeless death 'under' Bolshevism. Moreover, the girl did not accept food from the Bolshevik correspondent. "A great nation like Russia cannot be saved by philanthropy," Miliukov held. Instead Russia had to "work out its own salvation," but a deliverance could not be achieved "as long as the State [was] run on false economic principles by people who are not interested in its preservation nor in the fate of its population."[110]

[109] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 247.
[110] Ibid., 261.

Another theme that emerged in liberal writing about the famine was irrationality and the attendant behaviours it provoked among starving Russians victimized by the consequences of Bolshevik insanity and inhumanity. *Russian Life* declared positively that everyone could see that "the madness of the regime was so obvious" because as we saw above, the regime knew Russians were starving "since the reign of communism was established," but cruelly ignored the warnings.[111] But liberals also sought to emphasise the true inhumanity of the regime by illustrating the ways maniacal Bolsheviks "exterminated" flesh and blood Russians and the country itself "faced extinction" because the fanatical regime so zealously tried to consolidate power by eliminating real or suspected nonconformists through starvation.[112] The RLC concurred, believing that the Soviet state consciously drove people to suicide through state-sponsored hunger. Perhaps more horrible still, in the RLC's view, Bolshevik "Communism [drove] people to cannibalism" and similar acts only the insane could undertake.[113] It was not hunger, but the regime and its harmful ideology that led the people to such extremes.

In their view, hunger had driven otherwise logical Russian individuals to extremes of 'immoral,' 'mad,' and 'unthinkable' behaviour because there remained in Russia no rule of law that compelled the state to intervene and protect individuals from each other.[114] Miliukov noted that from starving Russia, there were reports that people sometimes killed other people for scraps of food. Yet, sometimes people killed other people (or themselves)

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[111] "Drought or Requistions," *Russian Life* (Feb-Mar 1922): 183. The Russian writer, V. G. Korolenko had also forewarned Gorky in early 1921. In his letter he noted "a terrible and unprecedented calamity is impending…such perhaps as we have not seen since the days of Czar Alexis." Text of the letter in Russian Liberation Committee, "The Famine Did Not Come as a Surprise to the Soviet Government," *The Famine*, 25 June 1922. *Russkii natsional'nyi komitet* Papers, Box 53, f.1 RBML.
[112] Boris Mirskii, "*Moral' goloda*," *Poslednie novosti*, 29 July 1921.
[113] Communism and Cannibalism," 181.
[114] Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Revolution*, 15.

to be rescued from hunger.[115] The state would not help them, but death did. Russian liberals picked up on such reports, adding their own interpretations and allowing their illustrations to again underscore the immorality and irrationality of the Bolshevik regime itself since its very existence allowed this 'madness' to continue. Liberals, deployed it to foreign, especially British readers in hopes that they would recognise this madness and thus the immorality of the regime. They hoped Britons would realise that if the Bolsheviks fostered this kind of madness, the regime was not worthy of recognition as a legitimate government, nor could it be trusted to oversee and guarantee their obligations under foreign trade agreements. The resolutions of the 1921 Conference of Representatives of Russian Commerce and Industry in Paris were published in *Russian Life* to remind British readers that Bolshevik tyranny "infringed upon all principles governing the life of civilised communities" and thus could not be "recognised as a legitimate power."[116] The use of shocking and horrific language and anecdotes were propaganda tools meant to help British readers understand these points by appealing to their sense of humanitarian and Christian morality. But the point was not simply to shock them. Rather, "the true interests of civilised people demanded that law and order be restored and that these should not be sacrificed to economic temptations at the moment."[117]

Miliukov reported that villagers near Sarapul in the Kama River region had apparently shut themselves inside a church, recited their prayers, and then set it alight. He also noted the prevalence of other forms of collective suicide in Soviet Russia whereby families blocked up their windows and chimneys, set alight a fire in the hearth, clung to

[115] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 243-45.
[116] "Views of Russian Business Men," 157.
[117] "Views of Russian Business Men," 157.

their icons, and waited to die by asphyxiation.[118] Indeed, mass suicides were relatively well-known classical and medieval era methods to escape conquering invaders, but Russia, until the Bolsheviks arrived, had long escaped medievalism. To some observers such extreme actions like collective suicide might appear to be a rational choice under the circumstances the victims endured and the choices they lacked, just as "thousands burnt themselves in their houses or on woodpiles in the 17th Century to save their souls from the life which had become unbearable."[119] By choosing one type of death over another, one can take some final control in an entirely hopeless situation and choose a death that is quicker, less painful, and perhaps even more humane. However, to liberal exiles, long-steeped in "rationalist faith in the power of science and reason to shape and administer the world," they believed and conveyed to foreign audiences that it was 'insane' that Russia's people were driven to such choices in the first place. Family ties and social loyalties were consumed by hunger; thus Miliukov went on to describe mothers, driven to the ends of fear and irrationality, who drowned their children in rank cholera-filled rivers to spare them from the ravages of hunger.[120] *Russian Life* conveyed a report that "in Slavinetz, a peasant women divided the body of her 23-year-old daughter among her surviving children."[121] While one might say these mothers were mad, but it appears that the liberals' purpose was to illustrate that it was madness that mothers found themselves in these situations at all. Given their belief that it was the regime's madness that spread insanity and irrationality around the countryside, liberals also believed it was "unthinkable" that European leaders

[118] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 245-46.
[119] Daniel Beer, *Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 1880-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 2.
[120] Weissman, *Herbert Hoover*, 7; Daniel Beer, *Renovating Russia*, 2; Miliukov, *To-Day*, 246.
[121] "Should the Culprit be Sought," 199.

would "invite the leopard into the enclosure where hungry lambs were huddled on that assumption that the leopard was about to change its spots."[122]

It was not just mothers and peasants driven to such extremes of irrationality in the pages of exiles' pamphlets. Hunger and starvation drove even those deemed the most rational of Russians, the intelligentsia, to "nervous exhaustion and suicide."[123] For contemporary liberal observers, just as it "never dawned upon the Ministers of the old regime that a prominent scientist could be shot without trial on the strength of a spy's report," it was equally unimaginable that they could be driven to insanity and suicide.[124] Indeed, even in the cities, the intelligentsia who remained in Russia suffered under highly restricted, state-directed economic planning.[125] Many died, while those who had the means and opportunity emigrated. The danger Russian liberals in exile perceived in their deaths and departure is that there would be no one 'rational,' such as the educated professional classes, left in Russia to oppose the Bolshevik regime actively, nor competent and skilled enough to steer people and state away from Russia's decline and degradation toward recovery, greatness, and modernity. Liberal exiles believed Russia's progress depended on the intelligentsia, a group to which they themselves also belonged. But they were in exile, while "scores of self-sacrificing workers in the field of science and education" perished at home.[126]

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[122] C. Nabokov, "The Quadrature of the Circle," *Russian Life*, No. 5, 152.
[123] M. Rostovtzev, "Martyrs of Science in Soviet Russia: To the Memory of Perished Friends and Colleagues," *New Russia*, 1 July 1920, p. 275.
[124] Rostovtzev, "Martyrs of Science," p. 275.
[125] Lesley Chamberlain, *Lenin's Private War: The Voyage of the Philosophy Steamer and the Exile of the Intelligentsia* (New York: St. Martin's, 2006), 48.
[126] Igor Narskij, "Intellectuals as Missionaries: the Liberal Opposition in Russia and Their Notion of Culture," *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 62, No. 3-4 (November 2010): 333; Daniel R. Brower, "The Problem of the Russian Intelligentsia," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1967): 639; Rostovtzev, "Martyrs of Science," p. 275.

Liberals like Miliukov also worried that many of the surviving intelligentsia that were still working at home were also no longer trustworthy. Responding in 1920 to an earlier appeal from the Russian Union of Intellectual Workers to foreign governments to cease armed intervention and resume business relations with the Soviet state, Miliukov told English readers to think critically about this "ambiguous and insincere appeal" on the basis that it first emerged in the Soviet press.[127] Since it was "written in the enemy's camp and the enemy is cruel and gives no quarter," the appeal's words could not be reliable, and instead should be considered a thinly "veiled defence of Bolshevism."[128] In his view, the intelligentsia had already largely 'converted' to Bolshevism because they feared, witnessed, or even experienced directly the violence of the regime and in order to survive, these intellectuals essentially did what the regime told them to do. Hunger, it seemed to Miliukov, also drove intellectuals to extremes and treachery and as such, these intellectuals could no longer have Russia's best interests at heart nor could they be trusted to take an actively critical stance toward the prevailing morality and sociopolitical system in Russia.[129] Many members of the intelligentsia did benefit from a "policy of cooperation" with the regime and obtained medicine, milk for babies, jobs, permits and subsidized food rations.[130] Those intellectuals who did or appeared to act against the regime were

[127] Pavel Miliukov, "An Appeal from Russian Intellectuals," *New Russia*, Vol. II, No. 14 (May 6, 1920): 16.
[128] Pavel Miliukov, "An Appeal," 16. About two weeks later, *New Russia* published an update about intellectuals still in Soviet Russia. The short article told readers that those ill-fated members of the intelligentsia were "rapidly dying out" and that all their thoughts were turned "exclusively to the search for food and fuel." Furthermore, the article noted that the whole intelligentsia worked with the Soviet power because "otherwise there would be no way out left but suicide" and that the intellectual class had itself been crushed physically and morally, rendering it powerless in resistance and mute in its organized opinion. The article then proceeded to identify numerous intellectuals and their tragic fates. See "Fate of Russia's Intellectuals," *New Russia*, Vol. II, No. 16 (May 20, 1920): 93-94.
[129] Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939* (New York: Oxford UP, 1990), 197.
[130] Chamberlain, *Lenin's Private War*, 49-51.

summarily arrested and many deported, including members of the independent public organisation the All-Russian Committee to Aid the Starving.[131] Miliukov believed that committee was the last chance for independent action in Russia. He also noted that the population regarded this committee as a new, competent administration, which frightened the Bolsheviks who in turn "put a speedy end to an experiment which proved so dangerous for them."[132] All that remained were intellectuals in Russia Abroad who "show[ed] no inclination to make peace with the Bolsheviks." For liberals, this was all the more necessary since the only trustworthy letters from "teachers and colleagues…in the Bolshevist paradise" appeared to be "obituary columns-a dreary list of those who [had] perished" that included footnotes marked "'died of hunger,' 'shot,' or 'committed suicide.'"[133] As such, it was up to them to trumpet the charge of anti-Bolshevism.

With the Russian intelligentsia either deported, exiled, imprisoned, converted, or dead, Russian liberals also recorded their grave concern that as Russia's natural defence, the intelligentsia, was broken down, the door to the Bolshevik infection of Russia's children would be opened. Offspring are necessary for the survival and evolution of any species, but for Russian liberals, the survival and evolution of the Russian state seemed to

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[131] Ibid., 70; V. G. Makarov, B. C. Khristophorov, "*K istorii Vserossiiskogo komiteta*," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 3 (2006), 200. The All-Russian Committee for Aid for the Starving (Pomgol) was a public committee formed by Soviet decree that could collect funds, initiate public works, and undertake its work without direct oversight. The 'bourgeois' members included former members of the Provisional Government. They elected a non-Communist majority to its presidium. It survived six weeks until the ARA arrived to bring food aid and after the Soviet regime became cognizant that the organisation became a focus for counterrevolutionary hopes from abroad. See Weissman, *Herbert Hoover*, 15-16.

[132] Miliukov, "The Evolution of New Russia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 100 (March 1922): 7.

[133] Miliukov, "An Appeal," 16. When Lenin expelled a number of intellectuals in 1922, they did not meet an entirely welcome emigration abroad. While the late arrivals could speak more authoritatively on real conditions in Russia having seen them for themselves, the early arrivals, especially those in White Russian circles, "jumped to the conclusion that in 1922 Lenin had sent a Trojan Horse to infiltrate and destroy Russia Abroad. They accused the [new arrivals] of being GPU plants." See Chamberlain, *Lenin's Private War*, 179; Rostovtzev, "Martyrs of Science," p. 275.

virtually depend on whether the children were reared in an education steeped in progressive liberal thought. The famine, however, had driven mothers to kill their children, while others were forced to "leave them alone in the streets or before the doors of Soviet institutions." Miliukov reported that "in the streets of Samara, two hundred children have been picked up daily, abandoned by their parents."[134] Before the famine, liberals had already warned that the "Supreme Peril" to Russia's health, progress, and even existence lay in the Bolshevik regime's corruption of school children. When the famine broke out and children found themselves abandoned, they were left exposed to the "moral disease" of Bolshevism since their parents, crazed with hunger or dead, could not protect them from it.[135]

Vladimir D. Nabokov, a prominent Kadet and father of the famous author, reported that under Bolshevism, twelve-year-old boys went to school armed with revolvers and were allowed access to pornography and the "unrestrained freedom of sexual intercourse."[136] Debauchery aside, schoolchildren "no longer studied properly" and knew only of "daily executions without trial or following upon a shameful parody of a trial."[137] Encouraged to live immorally, the only education Nabokov said Russian children took in was "the poisonous gas" of Bolshevik communism, which was nothing short of a "deadly peril with which the future of [Russia was] menaced."[138] Indeed, since the exiles believed the Bolsheviks only took care of their own, as we shall see below, great danger to Russia lay in the fact that as hundreds of thousands of non-Bolshevik children and their parents died, the only ones left to rebuild Russia would be those educated by the Bolsheviks. In this vein,

[134] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 248.
[135] V. D. Nabokov, "The Supreme Peril," *New Russia*, 20 May 1920, 79-80
[136] Nabokov, "The Supreme Peril," 79-80.
[137] Ibid., 82.
[138] Ibid., 81.

all "human life" in Russia would be reduced to a base and "spiteful bestiality."[139] And once the current Bolshevik vanguard died a comfortable, satiated death many years in the future, the new generation of children that vanguard cultivated would be ready and well-suited in similar brutality to take up the mantle of arbitrary power and the project of completing Russia's final destruction.

In Nabokov's view, a cure for the apparent Bolshevik disease had to be found, and quickly. "Imagine the state of mind of a twelve-year-old Communist who goes to school armed with a revolver?" he implored. "How many years will it take to divert his thoughts and feelings into a wholesome path?"[140] The sooner the Bolsheviks were overthrown, the better because "the growing generation in every country should be its best element. That is the essential condition of progress."[141] If the Bolsheviks succeeded in their task of infecting Russia's youth with the disease of moral, spiritual, and even intellectual degradation, this would stand as not only the "greatest danger to the country" and its potential for rejuvenation and progress, but also the greatest sin against it. If the regime killed off or exiled all the intellectuals, let the remaining non-Bolsheviks starve, and succeeded in indoctrinating the surviving youth, Russia as a progressive civilisation would eventually succumb and die entirely. During the famine, *Russian Life* lamented that "at present, Russia, with its epidemics, ruin, lawlessness, and famine" had found itself in "a state of anarchy pure and simple." The journal asked readers to consider what kind of order could be introduced by a government who converted cultured Russia and its children into a "land of savages."[142] The answer for them was that the Bolsheviks were little more than

[139] Mirskii, "*Moral' goloda*."
[140] Nabokov, "Supreme Peril," 83.
[141] Ibid., 83.
[142] "Buyers and Sellers," 188.

parasites that strengthened themselves by weakening Russia while standing as the only "obstacle" to Russia's regeneration. Russia's destruction would finally come with the complete destruction of the young Russian generation through famine and indoctrination. Hence, the cure was the eradication of Bolshevism and the creation of a civilised constitutional regime to save not only Russia's children but ultimately, Russia itself.[143]

Clearly, Nabokov was interested in Russia's future since children would eventually grow to play their future roles in it. Great hope was laid in the idea that Russia's next generation who, with proper nourishment, like an education steeped in good citizenship and the rule of law, could continue to steer Russia forward to greatness and modernity. Yet, with the danger the Bolshevik 'disease' posed to Russia's future generations, exiles like Nabokov could not help but see the threat Bolshevism made toward all of the hard-earned progress earlier generations had hitherto made toward Russia's modernisation. In the exiles' minds, it seemed that Bolshevism was the antithesis of progress, and rather the bearers of prehistoric or medievalist barbarism. This becomes clear in other writings that talk about Russia as if the Bolsheviks had turned back time and thrust the bedevilled country far backward to epochs predating even the concept of civilisation, let alone the ability for anyone to put ideas and ideals about civilisation down with written words.

Russian Life mobilised prehistoric times in its analysis of the famine noting that Russian people under the Bolshevik regime were "more powerless in the struggle for life than men in the Stone Age."[144] At least in those days, paleolithic man could scratch a living off the land and had only to contend with nature and not "concrete and organized attempts to hinder them." Unlike the victims of the Bolshevik regime, "generations of cave-dwellers

[143] "The Soviet Blockade," 204; Nabokov, "Supreme Peril," 83.
[144] "Communism and Cannibalism,"181.

[could] adjust themselves to their surroundings."[145] In this evaluation, even early *Homo sapiens* enjoyed far better circumstances than Russia's famine victims simply because they had the freedom of choice and experimentation. At the same time, early man's ability to experiment and adapt was the key to human evolution and ultimately, progress. The cave-dweller, confronted by objective nature and the elements, adapted because elementary trial and error exercise allowed for innovation and discovery. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, permitted no such leeway, making it impossible for anyone to adjust to circumstances and move forward. The piercing implication here is that the famine was not entirely natural and people were instead victims of a cruel, subjective regime. Nature was and is a blind actor, making its way on its own course irrespective of humanity and morality. Conversely, while the Bolshevik regime also worked for its own purposes irrespective of humanity and morality as the liberal exiles made clear, the Soviet government was anything but natural because it consciously worked against the people by not only killing them or allowing them to die but also by actively thwarting their ability to progress naturally as a society. At the same time, the regime not only stunted Russia's progress, but "reduced it to starvation," "deprived the people of the minimum of liberty" needed for their self-help, and finally "rendered Russia impotent in the struggle against nature."[146]

Russian Life evoked images of prehistoric man but also the Exodus in its treatment of the Bolsheviks as "a plague of locusts."[147] Just as this biblical blight covered the earth, blackened the land and consumed everything until there remained "not any green thing," the Bolsheviks had spread across Russia, taken and consumed everything and "destroyed

[145] Ibid.
[146] "Who is Responsible for the Famine," 164; "Bursting European Corn-Bins," 168.
[147] "Communism and Cannibalism," 181.

all the riches that the people had accumulated for centuries."[148] As well, the Bolsheviks "killed all the productive forces and all the impulses of production."[149] In this reading, the Bolsheviks wiped out everything including people, all that Russia had accomplished, as well as all hope and even desire. The Bolsheviks, in having brought about the famine, were acting not as Russia's responsible government, but Russia's greatest scourge.

While the exiles reached back into the distant past to draw dramatic comparisons with conditions in contemporary Russia, they also mobilised comparisons to more recent times of trouble. Struve noted that "the horror in which Russia finds itself" had plunged the country backward "to the time of Godunov, or the medieval famines, or that great world plague of the 14th century."[150] *Russian Life* echoed this, lamenting how Russians today had lived to see for themselves "the horrors of the famine of 1602."[151] That particular famine reduced the Kingdom of Russia's population by one-third and left the dead to be "piled up along roadsides and gnawed by wild animals."[152] Indeed, Russians abroad recalled that the years 1598-1613 encapsulated the squalid interregnum period known for frequent riots, famine, occupation by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the protracted dynastic struggle between this or that tsar-pretender and usurper until the establishment of the Romanov Dynasty. This was Russia's first Time of Troubles. When famine broke out in 1602, Tsar Boris Godunov opened his own grain surpluses but still could not stop the ravages of the famine that ultimately undermined his authority in this "God-centred, tsar-

[148] Ibid.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Struve, *Golod*, 4. Struve was referring to Tsar Boris Godunov who reigned between 1585 and 1605 as a *de facto* regent and then Tsar of Russia between the Rurik and Romanov Dynasties. The great world plague Struve mentioned is of course the Black Death that decimated the European population in the 1340s.
[151] "Should the Culprit Be Sought?" 199.
[152] Chester S. Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty* (University Park (PA): Pennsylvania State University, 2001), 97.

centred political culture where the tsar was supposed to be the protector of all people."[153] Struve and *Russian Life* recalled this period suggesting that Russia had fallen victim to an even greater calamity as usurpers and pretenders ruled with full bellies rather than behaving as a government should: doing what it could to safeguard land and people. Moreover, while cases of cannibalism occurred in 1602, this monstrous blemish in Russian history "paled" before events in contemporary Russia in their view. "Until 1921," *Russian Life* lamented, "we had thought that the famine of the first 'Troubled Times' would never be repeated."[154] Russia had come a long way since those days of apparently degenerate barbarism and it again seemed unthinkable to 20th century Russian liberals that it could be plunged, once again, into such horror.

Nor was it comprehensible that the peasants had taken to "the ancient Russian recourse in times of utter despair: to flight from their homes."[155] During the 1602 famine, thousands took flight to the south of Russia where famine was rumoured to be less severe contributing to further dislocation in the countryside.[156] Now, in the 20th century, it appeared Russians were on the move again, amassing at train stations and ports looking for food or a way out of the famine zones. Given that hundreds of thousands of Russians, including the keepers of good governance and high culture, had already fled abroad between 1917 and 1920, it appeared Russia was enduring a new kind of Exodus as the peasants virtually disappeared. Russia was imperilled because its people were dying, were fleeing, or had already fled abroad. Once real Russians were entirely eradicated from the

[153] Dunning, *First Civil War*, 98-106.
[154] "Should the Culprit Be Sought?" 199.
[155] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 241.
[156] Other starving peasants sold themselves into slavery in exchange for grain to eat. Dunning, 97-98.

landscape, only the Bolsheviks would remain and Russia itself would die as Bolshevism bled it dry.

While Russian liberals wrote about how Russia had been thrown back into darker ages and troubled times, Miliukov also recalled the more recent Russian famine of 1891-1892. Several interesting things emerge from his discussion of that disaster. These include his seemingly positive treatment of the highly conservative Tsar Aleksandr III and his admission that even under the tsars, Russia moved ever closer to modern Europe. Miliukov claimed that Aleksandr III, famous (or infamous, depending on the view), for having reversed many of the comparatively liberal reforms of his father, the Great Emancipator Tsar Aleksandr II, had himself made significant strides forward when it came to effective leadership in times of crisis. Miliukov, whose pre-revolutionary political career was defined by opposition to the autocracy, stated that unlike the Bolshevik regime, in the last decades of tsardom, "favourable changes were made" in the functions of state administration even though "famines in Russia, like famines in India" continued to be a perennial problem.[157] When disaster broke out in 1891, he claimed that the state organized supplies of bread, medicine, and money more effectively than ever to combat a natural disaster. For Miliukov in 1921, the Imperial state, in spite of its many deficiencies that he long criticised, had learned how to prepare and what to do to help the people when such calamities had occurred.[158] In later speech to the Civic Forum in Washington, Miliukov remarked that,

> "Autocracy proved destructive for Russia's material and moral development in the sense that it proved [to be] and obstacle to the further rising of Russia to a higher level of civilised existence. The destructive action of Bolshevism, however, was direct, not preventative. Bolshevism destroyed that level of Russian material and

[157] Miliukov, "*Golod*," *Poslednie novosti*, 21 July 1921.
[158] Ibid.

> moral civilisation, which had already been attained by centuries of previous development, and it brought Russia back to medieval forms of existence."[159]

As such, Miliukov tried to illustrate how the Bolshevik government was less competent and deliberately crueller than even the most reactionary of tsars had been.[160] Moreover, whereas weather phenomenon and peasant poverty led to famine in 1891, Miliukov stressed the idea that the famine and the failure to organize relief were man-made and politically motivated.[161]

Though the *ancien régime* had a long way to go, in Miliukov's view, the tsar's effective organization made it seem "that once a little more time had passed, the Russian south east would entirely break away from Asia and become a part of Europe."[162] Here, Miliukov associated the state's ability to administer effectively as something particularly modern, progressive, and European. Yet, the Bolsheviks seemed unequal to even an otherwise backward-looking and reactionary tsar. That the Bolsheviks caused the famine was one matter. That the Bolsheviks could not or would not effectively muster assistance to the people only set Russia two steps back whereas even Aleksandr III had moved it forward one step in terms of effective state governance. It was indicative that any strides Russia had made toward modernizing the state were effectively wiped away. "Thanks to

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[159] Pavel Miliukov, "Speech to the Civic Forum," 11 November 1922, Pavel Miliukov Papers, Box 13, f. 2, RBML.

[160] Benjamin Weissman notes that during the 1891 famine, Lenin had scorned the efforts made by the intelligentsia, believing they were evasions of revolutionary duty. See Weissman, *Herbert Hoover*, 8. Lars Lih, however, more recently observed that this belief about Lenin's reaction was a hostile stereotype toward Marxism generated at the time by populists. In the early 1890s, it appears that Lenin was interested in gaining mass support for a democratic, anti-tsarist revolution and believed that the development of Russian capitalism would 'transform' peasants into effective fighters while they were still in the countryside as opposed to the hostile presumption that Marxists wished to use capitalism to drive peasants from their villages into the cities to foster socialist revolution. Regarding the famine of 1891 itself, one émigré memorist also opposed to Lenin recalled that the latter had worked in a relief canteen to help peasants during that crisis. See Lars T. Lih, *Lenin* (London: Reaktion, 2011), 34-39.

[161] Christopher Williams, "The 1921 Famine: Centre and Periphery Responses," *Revolutionary Russia*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (December 2003), 286.

[162] Miliukov, "*Golod*."

the Bolsheviks," Miliukov howled, "Russia ha[d] returned to Asia and its own Middle Ages."[163] For liberal exiles, the Bolsheviks were a destructive power that imperilled Russia indefinitely. The famine was a symptom of this apparent destruction that blocked what liberals believed to be the natural development in Russia of a "liberal civic modernity." Their ideal view of the state included a free, enlightened, and civilised public sphere that was governed by the rule of law and enjoyed political institutions characterized by an emancipated. It also included who could feed themselves, feed the cities, and contribute to the Russia's regeneration and progress.[164]

Russian liberals were heavily preoccupied with the declining condition of people and governance in Russia during the famine, but they also mobilised impassioned discussions of the desiccated Russian landscape. In their perspective, Russia had become an unproductive dead zone under Bolshevism: one that could not support life, and one that rather seemed to invite death. The Executive Committee lamented that whole villages were emptied and "the fields [were] burned deserts. In their descriptions of pastoral scenes, one finds neither peasant, nor animal, nor even grass to feed livestock.[165] *Poslednie novosti* frankly declared that Russia under the Bolsheviks had been transformed into a "wasteland" devoid of productive people and landscape.[166] *Russian Life* noted that famine seemed like the "logical consummation" of the Bolsheviks' revolution since the regime did not possess the skills to harvest crops with scythes but rather "swept away everything as does a guillotine." Consequently Russia, a once "flourishing land, ha[d] been converted to a

[163] Ibid.
[164] Beer, *Renovating Russia*, 2-3, 6.
[165] Executive Committee of the Conference of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Russia, "*La famine en Russie: L'appel du comité éxécutif*," n.d., Russia Posol'stvo (France) Records, Box 33, f.1, Hoover.
[166] K. Kachorovskii, "*Kak pomoch' Rossii*," *Poslednie novosti*, 16 August 1921.

graveyard."[167] Struve echoed these sentiments writing that the Bolsheviks sowed only murder and despair as people were set upon each other in a cruel struggle that bestowed no more than "a harvest of countless hungry deaths."[168] Meanwhile, along the dusty roadsides Miliukov remarked that one commonly found "babies with swollen bellies [and] mothers trying to suckle them with breasts void of milk."[169] The image invoked the sentiment that the Bolsheviks had starved the Russian Motherland (*rodina*) so completely, it could neither nourish nor nurture its children. By implication, Russia needed help, and for Russian liberals abroad, the only cures were the elimination of the Bolshevik government and its replacement with a government that would foster growth in the countryside again.

In an editorial titled "Communism and Cannibalism," written in bold letters on the front cover of the RLC's journal, *Russian Life*, the Committee's view of Russian civilisation emerged. The editorial did not talk in great detail about cannibalism, a common act in many societies to be sure, but also a trope that had been used in the Western tradition to evoke horror among adventure readers and compel them to "buckle down more robustly behind the civilising mission."[170] All the same, the editorial described the RLC's view of Russian "civilisation" that featured,

> "Money, railways, buying and selling of goods, laws protecting the individual-the consumer and the producer-private property, and…a certain minimum of morality indispensable to every member of society-all this constitutes such a solid foundation of human life."[171]

The famine and its consequences for the RLC, however, was a prime example of Russia's civilizational decline. There was much horror, as we have seen, to illustrate Russia's

[167] "Communism and Cannibalism," 182.
[168] Struve, *Golod*, 3.
[169] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 244.
[170] Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iverson, Eds., *Cannibalism and the Colonial World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1.
[171] "Communism and Cannibalism," *Russian Life*, No. 6, 181.

degradation under Bolshevism including ill, mad, dead, or mostly dead people, as well those who were immoral and unfree in a now backward, barren, and unproductive society. "We are losing sight of these conquests of culture achieved in the process of centuries," the editorial added.[172] These conditions, liberals believed, were caused by a mad and immoral regime that wielded an "inhuman attitude" toward the Russian people, "treating them as material over which power is exercised," and menacing Russian civilisation through "the wholesale extermination of millions."[173]

While liberals lamented the decline, they also expressed their fear that such degradation would turn the once great Russian state into a weak and exploitable colony. "If the Bolsheviks stay in power," *Russian Life* stated, "Russia will not be regarded as a State, but a continent on which commissars will act as policemen and guardians to foreign business men."[174] Their descriptions of the famine's consequences at home indicate that their cognizance of a particular decline in Russia's modernity and morality that Europeans had long used to characterize 'lesser' colonial societies and justified western imperial projects. Numerous British liberal thinkers such as J.S. Mill had described backwardness in terms of the temporal deficits, stasis, or barbarism of particular societies filled with people incapable of rationalization and thus requiring intervention or 'help' from a higher, more progressive power. This tutelage, however, tended to be prolonged, disallowing a subject society's independent development.[175] For Russian liberals, Bolshevism had deprived Russia of all of its progressive milestones "accumulated over centuries while it

[172] Ibid., 181.
[173] "Buyers and Sellers," *Russian Life*, No. 6, 187.
[174] Ibid., 188.
[175] Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 82-90, 117.

killed off all of its productive forces, and all impulses for it," milestones that had marked it as a strong and modernising power. The Bolsheviks, in their view, also worked to ensure that the potential for further progress needed to regain and maintain a strong civilizational standing would be stunted.[176] The liberals thus worried that the door was open for a higher power to exploit Russia's present weakness and obvious declension. Foreign businessmen "will see that there is no state power capable of guarding national interests," *Russian Life* feared. What they would find instead was "a Soviet government prepared to make every concession and surrender everything to foreigners for the sake of remaining in power."[177]

3.6 The British Response

In general, liberal Russian efforts to analyse and describe the famine of 1921-1922 were meant to evoke sympathy among foreign readers for Russia's plight under Bolshevism. They hoped this compassion in turn would translate into abhorrence for the Soviet regime and a demand by foreign sympathizers to foreign governments like Great Britain, to refuse to have any kind of relations with it. In doing so, we learn much about the nature of Russian liberal anti-Bolshevism, namely, their belief that the Soviet regime not only held back Russia's progress toward political modernity, but in fact harmed it and encouraged its degradation.

While their efforts may have in a fact helped to inform and convince citizens in other countries to make donations to charitable organisations providing food aid, evidently, the purpose behind anti-Bolshevik propaganda in Great Britain was not achieved. This is

[176] Mehta, 81. Mehta observes that liberals believed political institutions such as representational democracy were dependent on a society's particular historical maturation or level of civilisation. Those which lagged behind the necessary standards or achievements needed for 'maturity' thus did not satisfy in the liberal view, the conditions for representative government.
[177] "Buyers and Sellers," 187.

due to the fact that Lloyd-George's government had different priorities when it had signed the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement. Regardless of the Russian liberal exiles' admonitions, the British Government remained unmoved and had little interest in isolating Soviet Russia economically. Colonel John Ward noted in the House of Commons that many members had understood "if they made a trading agreement with Russia, unemployment [in Britain] would disappear."[178] Lord Robert Cecil wondered if the British Government would soon extend credits to the Soviet state in order for it to purchase machinery needed for crop growing in Russia, a practice that "would create a demand for British manufactures and set the wheels of trade and industry moving…"[179] These kinds of discussions indicate that British parliamentarians were more interested in exploiting a real market for British goods in starving Russia to help eliminate the growth of domestic unemployment after World War One and fuel commerce once more.

Another reason why Russian liberal admonitions fell on deaf ears is that statesmen like David Lloyd-George did not believe 'misgovernance' to be a sufficient reason to avoid trade with any particular state, including Soviet Russia. When questioned in the House of Commons in on 7 June 1920 about the Great Britain's trade negotiations with the Bolsheviks, the Prime Minister asserted that there existed "no precedent for declaring that you cannot trade with a country because you abhor its government."[180] As such, Great

[178] "Parliament: Unemployment," *The Times*, 19 October 1921, 14. Lloyd-George noted several days later that "the Russian Trade Agreement has had substantial results, though not equal to the anticipations formed in some quarters" and that the Government was exploring the issue of Soviet breaches in the Agreement. See "Parliament: The Relief for Unemployment," The Times, 21 October 1921, 14.
[179] "Parliament: The Russian Famine," *The Times*, 9 November 1921, 16.
[180] David Lloyd-George, "Soviet Trade Delegation-Adjournment Motion," 7 June 1920, *House of Commons Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth Series, Vol. 130 (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1920), 167-68.

Britain would proceed to solidify relations with the Bolsheviks. He went on to justify his Government's negotiations by arguing,

> "I am told 'You must not trade with Russia because of the atrocities of the Bolshevik Government.' Have we never traded with countries, which have been guilty of atrocities? What about Turkey? Were not the atrocities in Russia, bad as they were, exceeded in horror, in number, and in persistence by the atrocities perpetuated in Turkey under Abdul Hamid against the Armenians? Violations, wholesale murder, hundreds of thousands of people killed? Did we cease trading for a single hour?"[181]

Certainly, while spoken in a time before human rights violations in one country obliged other states to protest and impose economic sanctions, Lloyd-George went on to say that it was a rather novel doctrine that one must approve of this or that government before trade is initiated. After all, for centuries England had "opened up most of the cannibal trade of the world, whether in the South Seas or in Komassie." Whatever the habits of a particular government, he concluded, "we must take such governments as we find them, and thank God how happy we ourselves are here."[182] That said, British economic interests took priority over British sympathy for Russian liberal attempts to illustrate the catastrophic consequences of Bolshevism as they saw them. Even *The Times* in London appeared sympathetic to the liberal exiles' position, mobilising similar rhetoric against the Bolsheviks as it declared that the famine signalled "grave political complications [in Soviet Russia] which might well give all the statesmen of the Allied countries pause."[183] After all, the "collapse of civilisation and a reversion to primitive

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[181] Ibid., 168-169.

[182] Ibid., 169. Komassie is a city in Kenya, then a colony in the former British East Africa. As for its position regarding Bolshevik responsibility for the famine, the British government noted it "had no reliable data on the subject" soon after calls for aid arrived abroad and but they believed the famine had been caused because crops had partially or completely failed in the Volga region. See "Russia Facing Famine: Failure of the Crops" *The Times*, 22 July, 9. Soon after, *The Times* reported "Brutal bolshevist requisitions undoubtedly played a large part in producing present conditions by causing the peasants to limit cultivation to their own requirements." "Transport Chaos," *The Times*, 8 August, 1921, 8.

[183] "The Russian Famine," *The Times*, 5 August 1921.

conditions" was plainly evident in Soviet Russia.[184] Nevertheless, Lloyd-George's government had an agenda and followed through on it, continuing trade relations with the Bolsheviks until 1927 and conferring official recognition to the Soviet Union in 1924. The ARA and other relief organisations helped save the lives of millions, and despite some of the economic difficulties that emerged during the New Economic Policy, Soviet agriculture recovered once the grain started to grow again and peasants were able to sell surpluses privately on the market before the state finally collectivized agriculture after 1928 to benefit the first of Joseph Stalin's Five Year Plans.

3.7 Conclusion

Through their efforts, many preoccupations emerged in Russian liberal exile writing that demonstrate their concerns for the fate of their country and also their views of an ideal Russia. Russian liberals sought a constitutional regime, a responsible and responsive government, and critically, one that would allow the people to engage in private initiatives necessary for their own survival and the good health of the state. Their propaganda work about the famine also revealed grave concerns about how the Bolshevik regime caused the famine and did all that it could to kill Russia's chances for regeneration. Because liberal exiles believed "Bolsheviks destroyed the State and the productive forces of the country," in their drive to destroy Russian civilisation, their "watchword still remain[ed] non-recognition of the Soviet Government."[185]

The liberal exiles' efforts also revealed several tensions in their thought and action. First, while the liberals were quick to criticise the Bolsheviks for starving Russian

[184] "The Russian Famine," *The Times*, 19 September 1921.
[185] "Protest of the Russian National Committee," 158.

people to advance their political interests, the liberal exiles also used starving victims to advance their political goals-that is, trying to sway British opinion away from trade and recognition while advancing calls for regime change, and pressing claims that Russia ought to be a liberal democracy. Second, in all of their pronouncements about the need to lift Russia back to a higher level of civilisation and modernity through regime change, the liberals ignored the fact that starving peasants at home may have cared less at that moment about their country's level of civilisation or the state's strength and a lot more about practical concerns such as locating food. Russian liberal pamphleteering offered very little in the way of practical advice for immediate on-the-ground assistance. There were no concrete platforms for economic or agrarian reform, and instead they remained heavily focused on Russia's regenerative possibilities under a future democratic government. Peasants, however, were far more focused on their very survival in the present. In short, Russian liberals prioritised anti-Bolshevik propaganda over practical needs of the people.

Lastly, and most importantly, liberal exiles regularly claimed that the Bolsheviks did not enjoy popular support, had no connection to the people, and were therefore by no means a legitimate government. They argued that true leadership and legitimacy could only emanate from those who worked for and on behalf of the people. Many of these liberals had been members of the deposed Provisional Government and elected members of the Constituent Assembly, and thus believed they had the mandate to do this work. However, they were now far from home and the real situation and could have no practical impact on leadership in Russia. At the same time, the liberals traditionally enjoyed comparatively little popular support in Russia. There had been virtually no middle class

in Russia prior to the revolution and the Kadet support base was largely drawn from intellectuals and professionals with vastly different interests than the peasants. Miliukov himself was forced to resign from the Provisional Government in 1917 when he issued a highly unpopular promise to the Allies that Russia would continue with the Great War effort.[186] Thus, Russian liberals, long alienated from the people were also totally and physically separated from them. This significantly undercut their claim to represent and speak for the people at home.

This chapter has explored the liberal exiles' usage of a human tragedy for political purposes. This does not mean that they engaged in their work heartlessly, but rather the liberals tried to use the famine as a means to show the unworthiness of the current regime and advance the idea that Russia's future depended on liberal democracy. Their work revealed much about their views of what constitutes a legitimate government and their ideals about Russia's long term strength, modernity, and greatness. It also demonstrated particular grievances Russians abroad held toward the Bolshevik regime and Great Britain's desire to trade with it. Though their efforts did not achieve the results the liberals hoped for since Great Britain both traded with and recognised the Soviet Government, their activities helped crystallize Russia Abroad's anti-Bolshevism for years to come while informing foreign and British opinion about conditions in Soviet Russia. They had left Russia bitterly denigrating the Bolsheviks usurpation of power, but the famine provided the liberal emigration with a concrete basis upon which to criticise what the regime did with that power when they attained it.

[186] Andrzej Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 402; Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880-1918* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 253-54.

Chapter 4

Turning Inward

4.1 Introduction

By the mid-1920s, the Allies had withdrawn from military intervention, and several began to recognise and trade with the Soviet government. In spite of the Russian Political Conference and Pavel Miliukov's efforts to influence Allied opinion about the Soviet government during the Paris Peace Conference and the Russian famine, it is clear the Russian exiles could not convince foreign states to engage the Soviet regime militarily or starve them out economically. The exiles were far from home and its people and did not control any territory. Post-war reconstruction also remained an Allied priority while continued military intervention was economically and politically infeasible.[1] Allied incredulity toward the White Army leaders' intentions and the RPC's pronouncements at the PPC indicated that the Allies were unconvinced that a liberal democratic Russian federation was possible and worth further military intervention. Great Britain's desire to secure its trade agreement with Soviet Russia, in spite or perhaps because of the perilous famine in Russia, underscored its desire to proceed with business as usual in order to rebuild after the Great War. While Russian exiles continued to lobby foreign governments on all matter of Russian issues for the remainder of the interwar period, the door had essentially shut on encouraging the Allies to liberate Russia from Bolshevism and foster

[1] Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880-1918* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 283.

the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which Russian liberals expected would create their ideal framework for the new democratic state.

After the Civil War, Russia Abroad's loudest proponent of liberal ideals, Pavel Miliukov, turned away from trying to influence foreign audiences and inward toward trying to sway Russian exile opinion to his view. He also launched several new opposition campaigns. His targets were the emergent monarchist and Eurasianist movements in Russia Abroad. Both presented threats to Miliukov's vision of Russia's necessary progress and Europeanization.

Monarchists sought restoration of tsardom in either autocratic or constitutional forms. Miliukov, as both a liberal politician and historian, objected to the idea of turning back the clock on the gains liberals had made when the monarchy fell in February 1917. He lauded that revolution as a path to total freedom from tsardom. Miliukov believed Russia had and would, like Western European states before it, move toward statehood that enshrined civil liberties, political freedom, representative democracy, and the rule of law. The monarchy, to him, had already posed a significant obstacle, and of course, the Bolshevik regime posed another one. In his interminable confidence that Bolshevism would collapse from within, Miliukov could not entertain ideas that a return to monarchy, in whatever form, would be a correct path for Russia to follow. It was against his political morality, and in his view, the laws of historical progress.

Eurasianism also posed threats to Miliukov's view of Russia's place in the world as a part of Europe. Eurasianists aimed to conceptualize Russian territory as a single political, historical, and cultural unit that was wholly distinct from and even opposed to Europe. Many of its proponents celebrated the October Revolution as a marker of Russia's

departure from the Western model of political and ideological development. As a 'European Russian,' Miliukov's idea of Russia's historical evolution was one that was wholly oriented toward Europe. The process, in his interpretation, began with Peter the Great's reforms in the 18th century, and had continued, with fits and starts depending on the ruler, along a path that led Russia ever closer to fusion with the European West. However, the Eurasianists lauded the Bolshevik efforts to make a "clean sweep of the past" and erase the Romanov imperial period from the annals of Russian history. Eurasianists rejected pre-revolutionary political forms and culture because it had borrowed too much from Europe, causing Russia to lose a true sense of itself, and as such, Eurasianism demanded a radical reconstitution of that culture.[2] Conversely, Miliukov believed Russia's development as a civilisation necessitated its historic and continued borrowing from and interaction with the west.

At the same time, Miliukov found the Eurasianist outlook on the future Russian state troublesome. As historian Marlène Laruelle has pointed out, Eurasianists rejected both monarchy and democracy, and believed the state ought to be a kind of spiritual entity that reflected Eurasian distinctiveness. In this construct, the Eurasianist state would be governed solely by a ruling class united in the power of an organic 'national idea' that would reveal the essence of the people. Rejecting European governing institutions with its attendant party politics and suffrage as a "façade of Western legalism," the Eurasianist government would be absolute, justice would have no autonomy, and there would be no laws to be used against the state because, in their view, laws, morals, and faith would

[2] Marlène Laruelle, *Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 27.

naturally fuse into one, eliminating the need for divisions.[3] Miliukov criticized his opponents for their anti-democratic position that threatened to create another obstacle to the construction of a non-dominating, non-arbitrary constitutional state and the participation of civil society in its governance that Miliukov foresaw in Russia's future.

Miliukov disparaged both monarchism and Eurasianism while attempting to convince his readers that republicanism was the more viable, and historically necessary path for Russia. That he continued with his fight against monarchists and Eurasianists indicates that he saw both groups as dangerous and retrograde. Moreover, it is likely that he feared Russians abroad would latch on to these movements and lose confidence in a popular democratic revolution at home that could, he hoped, usher in the new constitutional regime. Liberalism had political competitors that could appeal to or feed off of Russian exiles' sense of nostalgia for the Russia that was or their growing sense of displacement and denationalisation in Europe. His continued opposition can thus be viewed as an attempt to maintain what he believed should be Russian liberals' key role in the creation of a new Russian state.

Miliukov believed that the course of historical progress indicated that Russia would still become a democratic republic as other European states had done and it was he and his followers that could deliver this historically necessary ideal. As Melissa Stockdale has discussed, he believed there was a certain inescapable lawfulness to the historical process alongside the fact that such laws could be realized in a given milieu, and with the ephemeral and accidental role played by individual human personalities. In the process, human society over generations also shed superstition and became more conscious, enlightened,

[3] Laruelle, *Eurasianism,* 28-30.

and therefore able participate in the development of society's general will. Russia too was subject to these same laws, but as Miliukov saw it, it had done so in a manner distinct from the rest of Europe. Because Russia had been, in his view, at a relatively low level of cultural and economic development, progress had to be initiated from the 'top-down.' In his reasoning, Peter the Great, the ephemeral and accidental personality, began the process by borrowing ideas and technologies from more advanced European cultures, actions that were imposed roughly on the population, but also had the effect of creating a new and increasingly socially conscious intelligentsia to which the state eventually forfeited its progressive role. Society could then struggle against the state as more of the lower classes could become part of the governing process, a struggle he thought ended in the creation of democracy. [4] He believed Russia was still a part of the process, despite the reality of the Bolshevik regime at home. "History has its freaks," he wrote, "we are just passing through one of them."[5] And as Russia passed through this apparent aberration, he continued the work of arguing for the benefits of European ideas and technologies, particularly republicanism and constitutional representative government, in order to help Russia return to its rightful place in the historical process.

There is a common assumption in the literature on Russia Abroad that the exiles failed to unify politically, a circumstance that contributed to the Allies' lack of commitment to the White Army cause during the Russian Civil War. Authors like Raeff and Johnston note that discussing émigré politics is essentially fruitless and sterile since émigré political

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[4] Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov*, 54-55, 59, 73-74, 77. See also Laurie Manchester, "Contradictions at the Heart of Russian Liberalism: Pavel Milukov's Views of Peter the Great and the Role of Personality in History as an Academic, a Politician, and an Émigré," *Russian History*, Vol. 37 (2010): 102-132.

[5] Paul Miliukov, "Eurasianism and Europeanism in Russian History," in Tomas G. Masaryk, *Festschrift Th. G. Masaryk zum 80. Geburtstage: 7 März 1930* (Bonn: Verlag von Friedrich Cohen, 1930), 236.

action had little to no impact on regime change or even reform in the Soviet Union because of their disunity. No one, however, really tries to identify the sources of these disparities. This chapter looks at the disparity between Miliukov's ideals for the future Russia and those envisioned by his political enemies, the monarchists and Eurasianists. The advancement of these competing ideals appeared to give adherents a sense of purpose and mission in exile, just as the preservation of Russian cultural artefacts such as art, music and literature did for many others. Their political differences also underscored the idea that Russians abroad did have competing views, or myths, about the future state and that they also looked back on their country's history in various ways. That Miliukov, and his political competitors abroad, spent so much time advancing competing views reveals a fascinating story of the development of political ideals that flourished outside of the monolithic Soviet system including liberalism. What is more, these political actors, excluded as they were from the Soviet state in exile, spent much time actively trying to isolate and segregate Russians abroad with 'improper' politics that could weaken their vision of the future Soviet state, Miliukov included. Much of the literature on Russia Abroad laments the exiles' inability to unify. However, this misses a crucial point. Émigré politics were indeed fractured, but their points of contention reveal that many political exiles did not wish to unify the emigration at all.

In the case of Miliukov, his behaviour reveals significant tensions in his view of the ideal Russia democratic republic. As we saw in Chapter Three, Miliukov had issued his 'new tactic,' which called for encouraging democratic revolution at home and uniting Russia Abroad behind four key points: republican government, peasant ownership of the

land, a federal multinational state, and an end to arbitrary government and rule from above.[6] In this scheme, what he hoped to achieve most of all was the greatest participation of Russia's people in civil society and the political process of governance and Russia's final convergence with Europe. Nevertheless, when he delivered his new tactic speech in December 1920, he stated that he could only work with those who would subscribe to his point of view, namely the left wing liberals and socialists.[7] What emerged in his continued arguments with political enemies was a vision of a future democracy that would lack political pluralism. He believed democratic Russian society could only include democrats. Miliukov thought Russia, and in particular, those engaged in its statecraft, could only include those who sought the same political goals and ideals as he. Instead of seeking to create a strong state based on diverse political ideas, he seemed to believe the state would be stronger if everyone were a liberal democrat. As such, his critiques and advancements of his own ideals necessarily excluded monarchists, Eurasianists, and also right-leaning liberals who still believed constitutional monarchy was a viable option.

In this vein, Miliukov's outlook on his political opponents hardened into one of disdain. He refused to seek accommodation with his enemies or engage them in good faith dialogue. Instead, he undertook a campaign to denounce them as both extremists and utopians. Yet, one could argue that his steadfast adherence to one singular outlook was in itself extremist. He utterly refused to budge while calling out opponents for refusing to do the same. Miliukov's view that the ends of Russian history could be found only in the liberal democratic republic, and that he unwaveringly maintained this ideal which real

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[6] Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov*, 282; Pavel Miliukov, "*Chto delat' posle krymskoi katastrofy*," *Poslednie novosti*, 7 July 1921.
[7] Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov*, 282.

historical events and circumstances had otherwise thwarted up to that moment, it might also be said that he too was a utopian. This is not necessarily a pejorative. It is an attempt to discuss how Miliukov, like his political enemies, engaged in the distant and endless idealization, if not fantasizing, regarding the construction and restructuration of political institutions at home while challenging those with opposing ideals. His imagined resolutions for all of Russia's past, current, and future woes were intimately wedded to his ideological perspective no less than the monarchists or Eurasianists against whom he fought.[8] Given the longevity and daily circulation of *Poslednie novosti*, it can be said that Miliukov's utopianism helped make Russian politics lively, not sterile in exile. Whether or not readers subscribed to his ideals along with his newspaper, Miliukov helped create an environment where ideals were debated in the diaspora that could help shape the future Russian society while also shaping the society in exile in which they lived.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the goals emergent in two competing monarchist movements, one which pursued a restoration of autocracy, and the other that sought a constitutional monarchy. This will be followed by a discussion of Miliukov's critique of both movements as well as his view of the attitudes of those liberals who still hoped to institute a constitutional monarchy. His critiques compelled him to elaborate more than he had ever been free to before, on the necessity of creating a republic. In doing so, he also self-identified as a republican, moving away from the 'liberal' camp that seemed more interested in working with a reform-minded monarch rather than accepting that the revolution had swept away monarchy and that the opportunity to start anew as a republic was upon them. This would open the door to creating, he hoped, a new civic culture, allow

[8] Frederic Jameson, "The Politics of Utopia," *New Left Review*, Vol. 25 (January-February 2004): 46-47.

the people to participate in governance, and set Russia back on its necessary and correct historical path to progress. Following this, the chapter surveys several aspects of Eurasianism, particularly the movement's outlook on the future Russian state and its past and future relationship with Europe. An examination of Miliukov's critique of Eurasianist ideology follows in light of his understanding of the historical process. It concludes with a summary of emergent tensions in Miliukov's apparent commitment to use undemocratic means to seek democratic ends, a commitment that also reflected his understanding of Russia's historical development.

4.2 Monarchist Visions and Revisions

While Russian monarchism endured during the Civil War, it did not become an active movement in exile until the final withdrawal of the White Armies from Russia. During the Civil War, the White Army leaders and leading monarchists had thought it prudent to adopt a philosophy of 'non-predetermination' regarding Russia's future social and political forms, at least until the Bolsheviks were soundly defeated.[9] None expounded outwardly any plans to restore the tsarist monarchy if counterrevolution were successful. Nevertheless, as we saw in Chapter Two, though White leaders like Aleksandr Kolchak spoke vague words about popular representation, their sincerity was uncertain. As Russian journalist L. V. Arnol'dov observed in 1919, the Omsk government seemed only too glad to satisfy the Allies desires even as it was whispered "When we reach Moscow, we can

[9] Paul Robinson, *The White Russian Army in Exile, 1920-1941* (Oxford (UK): Oxford University Press, 2002), 26. See also Jonathan D. Smele, *Civil War in Siberia: The Anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918-1920* (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2006), 253. Paul Robinson adds non-predetermination was also "a tactical necessity" designed to prevent a split in the army if a clear political position were adopted. See Robinson, *White Russian Army*, 117.

talk to [the Allies] in a different tone."[10] Yet, after the Civil War ended and hope for counterrevolution effectively dried up, exiled monarchists began to seek leadership to satisfy their aspirations since the military effort had failed. Many began to believe that renewed efforts under the banner of a tsar might prove more effective in achieving a successful counterrevolution than a leaderless movement with vague political goals and convictions.[11]

The monarchists, however, were still divided on which 'tsar' to put their weight behind. This is because some monarchists wanted a full restoration of absolutism while others advocated for a constitutional monarchy. Absolutists, also known as Legitimists on the other hand sought to legitimise the 'rightful claim' of Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich (1876-1938), eldest son of the Tsar's uncle, to the throne. Constitutional monarchists supported would be tsar, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (1856-1929), grandson of Nicholas I, and first cousin of Aleksandr III, the last Tsar's father.[12] What follows are brief outlines of each of the Grand Dukes' positions and worldviews. Understanding them is useful to tracing the sources of Miliukov's opposition to monarchism and the development of his republican ideal.

4.2.1 Two Contenders: Kirill Vladimirovich and Nikolai Nikolaevich

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[10] L. V. Arnol'dov qtd. in Smele, *Civil War in Siberia*, 254.
[11] Robinson, *White Russian Army in Exile*, 26.
[12] Kirill Vladimirovich and Nikolai Nikolaevich were the only real Romanov contenders since everyone else was dead or had stepped away from political life. Nikolai II's brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich was murdered in Perm in June 1918. On 16 July 1918, the Imperial family were killed in Ekaterinburg. The same day, five Romanov princes and the Empress Aleksandra's sister were thrown down a mineshaft in Alapaevsk, Siberia. The Bolsheviks conducted the murders because "they understood that the Imperial Family could still act as a rallying point for their opponents" and thus set out to destroy the family's remnants. The Tsar's mother and sisters managed to escape, as well as the Grand Dukes Kirill, Nikolai, and Dmitrii Pavlovich who had no interest in pursuing a claim to the throne and instead ran off to marry an heiress is Florida. See Robinson, *White Russian Army in Exile*, 113-14; Richard Pipes, *Russian Revolution* (London: Vintage, 1991), 745-788.

Grand Duke Kirill, who spent his exile ensconced in Coburg, Germany and seeking foreign support for counterrevolution, declared himself Guardian of the Throne in August 1924 and then on 13 September, he assumed the Imperial Title. While believing that he was the only legitimate heir to the throne, he also thought that autocracy was the necessary form of state Russia would assume once again. Russia, in his view, had only known one autocracy "from the earliest times of her historical existence up to 1917," and he believed it "fully corresponded to the requirements of all the peoples that inhabited Russia."[13]

Kirill energetically rejected any notion of constitutionalism and blamed the intelligentsia, including the liberals, for the dangerous ideas conceived "under their top hats." These ideas, in his view, "deceived" the people with promises of responsible governance but only brought calamity and suffering to Russia in and after February 1917. Of course, he believed the Bolsheviks were evil in their own right, but the "educated classes of professors and social theorists" were worse. [14] He regularly spoke of his resentments toward the intelligentsia as he attempted to rally Russians abroad under a banner of strong tsarist leadership in his person. Kirill argued that personal and social liberty were "mere mirages" in the absence of a sovereign power to guarantee the continuity and stability of the established order. The person of the tsar, in Kirill's interpretation, was the very embodiment of continuity and constancy, virtues which had long made it possible for past tsars to embark on sometimes radical reforms such as the elimination of serfdom that were

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[13] V. Iu. Zhukov, "*Zarubezhnaia Rossiia: Emigratsiia i emigrant*," in V. Iu. Zhukov, Ed., *Russkaia emigratsiia i fashizm: Staty i vespominania* (Saint Petersburg, 2011), 15; H.I.H. Grand Duke Vladimir, "My Father (an Epilogue)," in Grand Duke Cyril of Russia, *My Life in Russia's Service-Then and Now* (London: Selwyn & Blount, 1939), 220-23. Kirill (Cyril) died before finishing his memoir. His son finished the manuscript with an account of Kirill's years in exile.

[14] Robinson, White Russian Army in Exile, 114; H.I.H. Grand Duke Vladimir, "My Father (an Epilogue)," 205, 220. Kirill (Cyril) died before finishing his memoir. His son finished the manuscript with an account of Kirill's years in exile.

deemed "necessary for the salutary progress of the people."[15] Only tsardom and its institutions could guarantee that change, however incremental or radical, would not have an unsettling effect on Russian state and society, and instead lead it steadily "on to the path of progress and prosperity."[16]

Though his counterrevolutionary efforts had failed, Kirill hoped the Bolshevik government would fall all the same. Perhaps the Soviet regime's ignoble fall would occur when the Russian people learned there was a legitimate heir to the throne abroad, knowledge that had the potential to galvanize society in his favour. When the way was clear of Bolsheviks, a restored "stable national government [would] come to power without delay," which could only be "assured by a legitimate monarchy."[17] He denied that restoration would lead to some "archaic form of despotism" which "never in fact existed in Imperial Russia" anyway, but remained "vexed" by suspicions he would rain vengeance and retribution on opponents. Reports that Kirill issued warnings to all Russians who refused to recognise his "indisputable right to the Throne" had come to light, as did fears that those Russians who did not recognise his claim would "never be permitted to return to Russia, on pain of being shot instantly when they cross[ed] the frontier."[18]

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[15] Grand Duke Vladimir, "My Father," 226-227. Vladimir remarked that his father believed if monarchy were not restored after the fall of Bolshevism, another civil war would break out. To prevent this, a stable national government had to be made, which would be assured by a legitimate monarchy. This monarchy would combine continuity of traditional administration with "new demands and spirit of the times." Vladimir added that his father claimed a restored monarchy would be founded on "unity of the nation, the elimination of factious politics and class antagonism, on religious toleration and freedom of conscience, on equal rights for all nationalities of the Empire, on the wide participation of the people in the political and economic administration of the country, and on the heredity of the sovereign power of the Crown-a constant, impartial, and natural arbiter." See pp. 225-26.

[16] Grand Duke Vladimir, "My Father," 226.

[17] Ibid. 220-223. A legitimate monarchy meant a monarchy led by the legitimate heir of the last Tsar. Since all the direct heirs had perished, the legitimate heir was then the closest relation, which appears to have been Kirill over Grand Duke Nikolai.

[18] Ibid., 223-34, 227; "Grand Duke Cyril Threatens His Foes: Exiles Who Refuse to Recognise Him as Czar Cannot Return Home, He Says," *New York Times*, 15 April 1925.

Kirill had another competitor, Grand Duke Nikolai. Nikolai was more popular in Russia Abroad largely because he had a more affable personality and a record of good leadership as Commander-in-Chief of the Russia Army from 1914-1915.[19] Even General Pyotr Wrangel, who had formed the Russian Armed Forces Union (ROVS) from the remnants of the White armies, submitted his forces to Nikolai's authority in late 1923.[20] One reason for Nikolai's comparative popularity in the emigration is that he seemed to want the throne *less* than Kirill did. He also expressed a desire to see the convocation of a Constituent Assembly in Russia, an indication that certainly appealed to liberal exiles with constitutional monarchist sympathies. From his home in Choigny, France, he emphatically dismissed "rumours" about his right to the throne, but he never went so far as to renounce such a claim. "I am no pretender," he said in an interview, "nor am I an émigré in the old French interpretation of the term." Rather, he claimed to be a "mere citizen and a soldier, anxious to return home in order to aid his fellow-citizens and his country."[21]

Nikolai did not want to prejudge the future but believed Russia could be a constitutional monarchy and stated that he would become tsar if his role were "freely chosen by the people themselves." Russia could only find peace when the Bolsheviks were

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[19] Robinson, *White Russian Army in Exile*, 115. Robinson's monograph makes clear that any student of Russia Abroad should keep in mind that the emigration was mostly a military emigration, that is, most of the people who were in exile were in fact soldiers and the largest organisations were military ones. If Nikolai were more popular among émigrés, it is because he had significant support within the ranks of the military. See p. v.

[20] Robinson, *White Russian Army in Exile*, 120. Grand Duke Nikolai assumed the title of Supreme Commander of the army in exile on 16 November 1924. See Robinson, 125.

[21] "Nicolas Predicts Soviet Downfall," *New York Times*, 11 October 1925; Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exile in the Age of the Nation-State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 65. Princess Julia Grant Cantacuzène Spiransky was the eldest grandchild of United States President Ulysses S. Grant and spouse of Nicholas II's Chief of Staff, Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Cantacuzène. The Princess was a renowned biographer of the Revolution and regular correspondent for the *New York Times* regarding news of Russians abroad, particularly the dignitaries and nobles. Nikolai remained generally silent about his views of the Russian future, but it is perhaps because of Cantacuzène's good name and professional reputation that he granted her an interview. Robinson, *White Russian Army in Exile*, 119.

overthrown and a vehicle was established "by which the will of the people could be heard and which would guarantee the transference of that will into action."[22] Nikolai believed Kirill was not up to the task because his self-interest "seriously injur[ed] the Russian cause, which [was] simply to free the majority from their minority oppressors."[23]

Nikolai had the potential to unify the monarchist emigration and perhaps draw in more liberals but failed in the end.[24] He was still prone to vacillation despite his reputation for strong and effective leadership in the military field. Nikolai N. L'vov, a 'liberal to the right,' noted that even in the matters of simple administration, the Grand Duke appeared "like a powerless child who cannot walk and is afraid of every step in case he falls."[25] He still had the respect of the military, but not the entire monarchist emigration. This was because he preferred to stay out of politics, refused to make public statements on where he stood on key issues, and gave no sense of direction to those who followed him.[26] He died in 1929 leaving only Kirill as a contender.

By then, any reconciliation between the two monarchist factions was no longer possible. The time had long passed to organise an effective monarchist movement both inside and outside of the Soviet Union. Monarchist infighting eroded support and multiplied the contempt for the movement among Russians abroad and the international

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[22] Shain, 66; "The Russian Future as Nicholas Sees It," *New York Times*, 31 May 1925; Mikhail V. Nazarov, *Missiia russkoe emigratsii* (Stavropol: Ozun, 1992), 25-26.
[23] "The Russian Future as Nicholas Sees It," *New York Times*, 31 May 1925.
[24] Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich had been chosen to lead the monarchist movement at the Second Monarchist Congress, 16-23 November 1922. See "*K rukovodstvu russkikh monarkhistov*" (Paris: Tipografiia indzenera Konorova, 1922), in Aleksandr Kazem-Bek Papers, Box 10, f. 1, RBML.
[25] Nikolai N. L'vov to General Pyotr Wrangel, 1925 in Vrangel' Collection, 1919-1929, Box 150, f. 1, Hoover; Robinson, 129. L'vov was a zemstvo man and former Kadet in the first Duma, 1906 who sought to organise landowning Kadets, industrialists, bankers and others in order to "boldly defend our interests, because by defending property, we defend statehood…" N. N. L'vov qtd. in Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Russian Revolution*, 210. Liberals 'to the left,' were more likely to align with the Right Socialist Revolutionary platform of redistributing land to the peasants.
[26] Robinson, *White Russian Army in Exile*, 128-29.

community because no coherent agenda emerged from one contender while the other seemed to be the embodiment of autocratic prerogative.[27] What is most illuminating is that the failure of the monarchist movement to unite speaks to the problems exile groups have in maintaining and reinvigorating pre-exile structures abroad. This failure evoked reminders of the same problems the last Tsar experienced when these structures were still intact at home.[28] Tsarism in effect was demonstrably defunct. It is likely for this reason that monarchist movements to install either tsar enjoyed little popular support among the emigration even though most emigres, 'in some form or another,' were monarchists.[29]

4.3 Miliukov on Monarchism

Though the February Revolution had swept away tsardom, Miliukov was acutely aware that many Russian exiles still harboured hopes for a restoration of the monarchy in either absolutist or constitutional forms. Miliukov enthusiastically opposed both. At the same time, he promoted his own vision of an ideal republican Russia as the historically necessary and correct choice. In general, Miliukov's arguments against monarchism focused on its apparent untrustworthiness, incompetence, and hindrance of Russia's progress and the people's free participation in politics. These characteristics were anathema

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[27] Shain, 69-70; Robinson, *White Russian Army in Exile*, 26.

[28] Zhukov, "*Zarubezhnaia Rossiia*," 16; Shain, 62. Shain notes exile failures to unite behind cohesive leadership often allows otherwise reasonable arguments about strategy and tactical issues to devolve into "personalised and ad hominem attacks among exiled aspirants for power."

[29] Robinson draws this from his conclusion that although most literature on Russia Abroad focuses on intellectuals and artists, "the great majority of Russian emigres" were in fact soldiers. "Russia Abroad was a society of military men, and the largest organisations within it were military ones." The military leadership, in general, took the non-predetermination approach, but Robinson is alluding to the rank and file soldiers who, it is presumed, could be called upon to fight for and reinstall this or that would-be tsar to the Russian throne. See v, 26. Shain also notes that the majority of exiles supported restoration of the monarchy, perhaps indicated by the high influence of and attendance rates in the Orthodox Church abroad. See also Bolesław Szcześniak, Ed., *The Russian Revolution and Religion, 1917-1925* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1959), 12.

to the modern, democratic state Miliukov envisioned. He believed Russia should become a republic and build a government that was responsible, representative, effective, efficient, progressive, and at last, participatory.

But why did he go to such lengths? After all, it was the Bolsheviks, not the Romanovs, who occupied the seat of power at home and remained clear enemies of the entire Russian emigration. He made the effort first because of the fact that there were two living heirs to the Romanov dynasty in exile, contenders that could rally significant loyalty from Russians abroad.[30] The overwhelming majority of the emigration was made up of soldiers, officers, and civilian staff that were or had once been loyal to the crown. Roughly 150,000 of them had evacuated the Crimea with Wrangel in 1920 and were now under Grand Duke Nikolai's leadership.[31] That Kirill and Nikolai *existed* in exile meant that there was always a possibility of tsarist restoration and a 'legitimate' claim to power in Russia, regardless of the means by which the Bolshevik regime fell, if ever. They did have the symbolic power to rally people to them and to breathe new life into the dynasty Miliukov and others effectively helped to destroy in February 1917. The existence of both contenders, and the support of thousands of military personnel under them thus threatened to draw Russian exiles to the monarchist camp and establish another government in exile that could effectively take the reins of power if and when they should return home. Such a prospect would defeat the chances of building a republican state.

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[30] Philip Mansel and Torsten Riotte, "Monarchical Exile," in Philip Mansel and Torsten Riotte, Eds., *Monarchy and Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 5.

[31] Robert H. Johnston, *New Mecca, New Babylon: Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920-1945* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 9.

Second, Miliukov seemed incensed that "Mr. Lenin spoke of Monarchy as the only alternative to Bolshevism."[32] Kirill and monarchists in his camp certainly felt the same as Lenin. Miliukov continued to argue for the republican ideal because he did believe it was a viable alternative. He could not accept the notion, suggested by Anton V. Kartashev at a Kadet committee meeting in Paris that they had become "superfluous men."[33] The revolution was still underway in Miliukov's interpretation; the Bolshevik seizure of power was only a temporary setback. The liberal opposition still had a place and a purpose, and an active "presence in life."[34] The monarchy had already been swept away; the only obstacle to creating "a democratic, federal republic with a strong legislative body and an executive authority directly responsible to the national representatives," was the Bolshevik regime.[35] Miliukov believed he had to use his knowledge and vision for the new Russia in useful and practical ways, including the encouragement and support for nascent democratic movements at home while trying to win support for this vision abroad. At the same time, given that he had spent much of his life working in opposition of the tsarist state, it is possible that he was simply unable to abandon his talents for a more passive existence in exile. He had a particular vision, and his view of the historical process included a recognition of the importance of human agency in steering Russia's development. Despite the reality that he was far from home and its current situation, he still believed he was in a position to do so.

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[32] Pavel Miliukov, *Russia To-Day and To-Morrow* (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 275.
[33] Rosenberg, *Liberals in the Russian Revolution*, 445.
[34] David Patterson, *Exile: The Sense of Alienation in Modern Russian* Letters (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1995), 2.
[35] Pavel N. Miliukov, *Tri platformy: Respulikansko-demokraticheskikh ob'edinenii, 1922-1924 gg* (Paris: *Imprimerie d'art Voltaire*, 1925), 15.

To lay the groundwork for the republic Miliukov rested his hopes on, he had to contend with the monarchists. Regarding Kirill, Miliukov criticised the Grand Duke's declarations of monarchical supremacy and attempts to impose his will on Russia, no matter the people's wishes at home or abroad. Miliukov objected to any form of government that would impose its will from above, having spent years opposing arbitrary expressions and applications of authority prior to 1917. Miliukov would only concede to a government of the people's choice if it were chosen "under the conditions of really free elections" and if the opportunity for further political struggle and deliberation could "be carried on by parliamentary methods."[36] Kirill and his followers "ignore[d] all the past, with its long process of historical growth, and [did] not know the present."[37] Popular support for the February Revolution indicated to Miliukov that the people wanted democracy, not a return to the autocratic, politically oppressive past. Moreover, Kirill's apparent desire to concentrate authority in his person threatened Miliukov's hopes to enlighten the lower classes, inculcate them with civic virtues, and see them participate in the governing process, including serving as a check on precisely the kind of power Kirill sought to wield.

As for Nikolai, Miliukov recognised that he appeared to be trapped in a quagmire of "vacillations," having pledged to lead some sort of movement as monarch, but not lead "a purely monarchist movement."[38] Nikolai's failure to explicitly clarify his position was highly dangerous, as the White Army leaders' earlier 'vagueness' on issues including the peasant desire for land and the elimination of class inequality and rule from above proved

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[36] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 271.
[37] Miliukov, *To-Day*, 277.
[38] Miliukov, "*Plany monarkhistov*," *PN*, 2 June 1923.

to be their undoing.[39] Miliukov believed that Nikolai would only intensify the uncertainty and distrust the Whites had provoked among the people. If anything, Nikolai's failure to explicate his positions indicated to Miliukov that the former wished to leave the door open to revert to an autocratic form of rule should he ever be installed as Tsar. Miliukov believed Nikolai had ulterior motives and as such declared that "the goal of democratic republicans [was] to stop this monarchist deception."[40]

His suspicions may not have been unfounded. Nikolai not only led the ROVS, but also the Russian Monarchist Association, a group formed by N. E. Markov, an extreme right-wing Black Hundredist conservative. Nikolai's new "deputy fanatic" had earlier headed the ultra-nationalist Union of Russian People (*Soiuz russkogo naroda*) in the State Duma. Markov's platform had been upholding the autocratic principle, which he considered to be "firm leadership above factions, the interests of the whole nation given impartial expression by one man" and a "restoration of the communion between [the] ruler and [the] ruled."[41] Crucially, Nikolai among other members of Nicholas II's entourage, had "unquestioningly welcomed" Markov's movement and gave it active public

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[39] Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov*, 281-82.
[40] Miliukov, *Respublika i monarkhiia* (II), *PN*, 1 March 1923.
[41] Miliukov, "*Novaia taktika monarkhistov*," *PN*, 28 January 1923; Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 205, 224. Nikolai E. Markov believed the health of the state depended on that of the Tsar. Markov (sometimes called Markov II), was the leader of the Union of Russian People, an anti-Semitic, loyalist, Black Hundredist political organisation formed as a nationalist counter to liberal and socialist parties after 1905 and shore up the strength of the autocracy. In exile, Markov noted that the overthrow and the renunciation of "the Sovereign Emperor Nikolai Aleksandrovich from the Throne of Russian Autocrats put an end to Russia's life as a great state." See N. E. Markov, *Otrechennye dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii, 1917 goda* (Kharbin: *Izdatel'stvo 'Nash put'*, 1938), 5. Markov's small book denounces and indicts socialists and liberals who played roles in weakening the tsar and taking power after the tsar abdicated, paving the way to the October Revolution. The book is available in Nikolai E. Markov Papers, Slavic and East European Collection-SEEC 1086 gb., RBML. Aleksandr A Bashmakov, an ethnographer and member of Kirill's "state council" also wrote extensively on the merits of tsarist autocracy. See for example "*Tsarskii Monarkhism*," "*Katikhizis russkogo monarkhista*," and "*La verité du tzarisme*," in Aleksandr A. and Maria Bashmakov Papers, Boxes 7 and 9, RBML.

encouragement, blessings, and even financial assistance from 1905-1917.[42] Nikolai's earlier support for a Black Hundredist group could not have been lost on Miliukov before or after the revolutions.

Given his distrust in Nikolai's ability to make decisions for himself, Miliukov likely feared Markov's proximity and direct influence, sway that might convince Nikolai to abandon even vague liberal ideas for more reactionary ones if he ever took the throne. To Miliukov, Nikolai was more dangerous than the staunchly reactionary Kirill. The latter did not try to hide his reactionary views. The former, on the other hand, had "emissaries" who drummed up support among Russians abroad, but had to "hide in every possible way" the fact that they were monarchists with "false platforms that poorly cloaked their otherwise insane desires."[43] In Miliukov's reasoning, Nikolai was less inept and far more Machiavellian in character. Nikolai equivocated on his views of the future Russia only because he wanted to avoid committing publicly to restorationist goals he secretly aimed for but knew to be unpopular among Russian people. Consequently, Miliukov intended to expose this "silent conspiracy against the people" and demonstrate to Russia Abroad the true essence of Russian monarchism.[44]

Ultimately, Miliukov did not believe Russia could or should return to monarchy in whatever form it took since it would, inevitably, lead to the concentration of power in the tsar's hands. "Everyone knows," Miliukov contended, "that in countries with an old political life, parties that have called themselves liberal one step at a time turned

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[42] Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 205, 224.
[43] Miliukov, "*Novaia taktika monarkhistov*," *PN*, 28 January 1923; Miliukov, "*Respublika i monarkhiia, II*" *PN*, 1 March 1923; P.N. Miliukov, *Tri platformy: Respulikansko-demokraticheskikh ob'edinenii (1922-1924 gg)*, Paris: Imprimerie d'art Voltaire, 1925), 17-18.
[44] Miliukov, *Respublika i monarkhiia* (II).

conservative or even reactionary." In this analysis, Nikolai was the proverbial wolf in sheep's clothing. There was no way Nikolai would "take concessions in earnest without imperiling [his] very existence." After all, Miliukov contended, Nicholas II had continued after 1905 to try to restore his position of sole "mastery over the land" and eliminate "those delusional constitutional restrictions." Consequently, the monarchy was an unthinkable "threat to Russia," since both Kirill and Nikolai would likely bring back the "old bureaucracy and old political environment." If that were to happen, liberal efforts would have been all for nothing, and Russia's progress toward constitutional government would be blocked entirely.[45]

Clearly Miliukov envisioned a future Russia without monarchism. It appears that he also envisioned one without monarchists. In his assessment of monarchist 'deceptions' and attempts to organise abroad, he concluded that Nikolai's Russian Monarchist Association could "only expand now among people who have themselves already been excluded from the future Russia."[46] The future Russia, in his interpretation, was of course a republic, and monarchists, in their commitment to old outworn traditions, had already excluded themselves from participation in creating the new state. Miliukov noted that he did "not pretend to represent…Russian reactionaries and monarchists," too focused as they were on restoring dangerous institutions of the past, when the way was now clear to erect

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[45] Miliukov, "Speech to the Civic Forum," 11 November 1922, Pavel Miliukov Papers, Box 13, f. 2, RBML; P.N. Miliukov, *Tri platformy: Respulikansko-demokraticheskikh ob'edinenii (1922-1924 gg)*, Paris: Imprimerie d'art Voltaire, 1925), 18-19; Miliukov, "*Proval monarkhistov*," *Poslednie novosti*, 12 July 1923.
[46] Miliukov, "*Proval monarkhistov*," *PN*, 12 July 1923. It appears members of the ROVS, supported by right wing emigres seeking to proclaim Nikolai Nikolaevich the "national leader" and wage a military intervention had tried to cultivate support among members of the new conservative government in Britain. Britain, at the time, was displeased with Soviet attitudes toward labour movement activities in Great Britain, indicating to some right-leaning émigrés, that intervention in Soviet Russia was possible. See Serguei Glebov, "Congresses of Russia Abroad" in the 1920s and the Politics of Émigré Nationalism: A Liberal Survival," *Ab Imperio*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2000): 167.

a republic.[47] In the meantime, Miliukov set out "to try and save the acquisitions of the February Revolution from all attempts to destroy things whether they come from the partisans of an uncompromising utopia or the restorators of the ancient regime."[48]

4.4 False Liberals and True Republicans

As Miliukov worked to denounce the monarchists, so too did he work to separate himself from those liberals who had or continued to support the idea of creating a constitutional monarchy in Russia. Among these liberals were Kadets like Vladimir Nabokov who had taken over leadership of the Kadet Party following the fissure that occurred after Miliukov issued his new tactic.[49] In 1921, Nabokov, Petr Struve, Anton V. Kartashev and other 'liberals on the right' attended the First National Congress formed by Vladimir Burtsev, formerly a Socialist Revolutionary who later cooperated with the Whites. The Congress (which Miliukov boycotted), formalized resolutions favouring the introduction of a constitutional monarchy in Russia with guarantees of full civil rights to all citizens, the reestablishment of private property and free enterprise, and acknowledgement that the land taken by the peasants after 1917 now belonged to them alone.[50]

While the Congress's goals were well-aligned with Miliukov's own ideals including his desire for guaranteed civil rights and the recognition that peasants should own

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[47] Miliukov, "Speech to the Civic Forum," Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, D.C., 11 November 1922, Pavel Miliukov Papers, Box 13, f. 2, RBML.
[48] Miliukov, "Speech to the Civic Forum," 11 November 1922, Pavel Miliukov Papers, Box 13, f. 2, RBML.
[49] Discussion of Miliukov's New Tactic among the Kadets can be seen in "*Protokol' zasedanie Parizhskogo Komiteta Partii narodnoi svobodi*," 16 December 1920, in Konstitutsionno-Demokraticheskaia partiia, Box 3, f. 2, Hoover. V. A. Maklakov, Vinaver, among others were in attendance.
[50] Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Right*, 341-43.

the land, the crucial difference rested on the institution of 'monarchy' itself. On this issue, Miliukov drew a line in the sand between his camp and other 'rightist' liberals. He argued that his liberal opponents were not real liberals at all since authentic liberals had always striven for a Russia free of monarchy. Liberal Kadets in the tsarist era had only 'supported' constitutional monarchy when conditions like the threat of imprisonment or censure by the tsarist government or the necessity for political unity in wartime required it. Now that the monarchy was actually gone, *real* liberals should work to foster democratic revolution at home against the Bolsheviks and help create the institutions in Russia needed to uphold a constitutional republican government. "Liberalism should become republicanism," he declared, because only republicans were worthy of the name 'liberal.' Republicans opposed constitutional monarchy, and in particular, Nikolai, whereas those who supported Nikolai were "not liberals in the true meaning of the word."[51]

Miliukov also noted that some right-leaning Kadets paid lip service to creating an English King-like tsar who hoped to create a constitutional monarchy "in the English example."[52] These liberals were "cruelly mistaken," deluding themselves, and lying to Russians abroad. Convinced Nikolai would backslide to autocracy, Miliukov was certain he would not take on merely ceremonial functions, submit executive authority to the Duma, or act in any way according to the conventions and traditions of the British monarchy. Moreover, because autocracy had for centuries "been deeply rooted in the "subconscious passive submission" of the Russian masses, the right-liberals' hopes that a constitutional monarchy would work was "too theoretical for Russia." Russian society lacked the

[51] Miliukov, "*Liberalizma, monarkhiia*," *PN*, 24 May 1924.
[52] Miliukov, *Tri platformy*, 19; Miliukov, "*Respublika i monarkhiia*, (II)."

"experience, social structure and political traditions and suitable candidates found in more advanced countries" to prevent the constitutionally bound tsar from overreaching and seizing absolute authority again.[53] There was no choice for Russia but to start anew as "a great democracy…a federated republic" where republicans could rebuild a new state, educate the people, and lead them into active citizenship.[54] In the meantime, just as Miliukov sought to expose what he perceived to be monarchist restoration, he also wanted to lift the so-called "democratic masks" from his former liberal allies since their support of constitutional monarchy could threaten to taint the republican name in the eyes of Russia's people and thus "threaten to ruin the whole business of saving Russia."[55] Republicans had "the courage to break ranks with this otherwise monochromatic émigré milieu," he surmised, and the thrust of their message could now be stronger because their group was purged of all those not committed to total liberty from monarchism.[56]

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[53] Miliukov, "The Evolution of New Russia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 100 (March 1922): 7; Miliukov, *Respublika i monarkhiia* (II). Interestingly, a similar critique of the 'abstract' and 'theoretical' was launched by Vasilii Maklakov, a right-leaning liberal against his own party, the Kadets. He noted the Kadets were "devoted to shibboleths of abstract theory that took no account of Russian life at the time." They assumed that the country could shift from autocracy to full-blown liberal democracy with a single document, executed in a single moment in time. See Williams, "A Kadet's Critique," 31-33. For his part, another liberal to the right, Petr Struve, wrote that "arguments between monarchists and republicans about the future form of government [were] pointless and senseless" because Russia's essence and self-conception had to be reclaimed first. All the same, he believed restoration of the monarchy was a mirage and simply impossible. One could not simply rebuild "a magnificent palace that after having taken centuries to be built, found itself swept away by a historical tempest." He believed a national renaissance was the only thing now possible to breathe new life into Russia. See Petr Struve, *"Dvenik politika: Ni sotsialism, ni restavratsiia, a osvobozhdenie i vozrozhdenie,"* Undated newspaper clipping in Petr Struve Papers, Box 16, f. 5, Hoover.

[54] Miliukov, "The Evolution of New Russia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 100 (March 1922): 7.

[55] Miliukov, *Tri platformy*, 17.

[56] Miliukov, "*Resp.-Demokraticheskaia ideia*," *Poslednie Novosti*, 7 June 1925.

4.5 Republican Possibilities

Miliukov's opposition to monarchism and his distrust of constitutional monarchy stemmed not just from his end goals for constitutional government, but also from his republican commitment to creating the very conditions to nurture and defend liberty in Russia. In the republican theory, as laid out by political theorist Philip Pettit, liberty or freedom means that one is not exposed to the arbitrary influence of another.[57] This goes beyond the execution of individual rational autonomy or democratic self-government, but rather the condition of non-domination, a 'negative' conception of liberty that involves the absence of obstacles that significantly diminish a person's possibilities.[58] For Miliukov, the problem with Russian monarchy, in whatever form it came, was that Russia's people would continue to be exposed to the subjection of and subordination of another, namely the new tsar and his government. The people would then always be vulnerable and could not ever truly be free to pursue their goals since they would always be subject to the authority of that tsar, however disposed he might be at any given time to allow the people a full measure of non-interference, to change his mind and policies, just as the tsars of the *ancien régime* had done. [59]

As such, Miliukov's conception of republican liberty was one of total non-domination whereby he not only vilified arbitrary forms of power and interference in the

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[57] Philip Pettit, "Discourse Theory and Republican Freedom," in Christian Nadeau and Daniel Weinstock, Eds. *Republicanism: History, Theory, and Practice* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 78.
[58] Charles Larmore, "Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom," in Nadeau and Weinstock, Republicanism, 97-98. For a full treatment of negative and positive concepts of liberty, see Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
[59] Charles Larmore, "Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom," in Nadeau and Weinstock, Republicanism, 97-98, 107. For a full treatment of negative and positive concepts of liberty, see Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

lives of the people, but he also demonised the people's exposure to the possibility of such interference, a circumstance that constitutional monarchy in his view would allow. If anything, the right wing liberals had been mistaken in his view insofar as they assumed there was nothing inherently oppressive about allowing a constitutional monarchy to reign so long as it did not exercise dominating power arbitrarily. Russia had not yet achieved the kind of civic culture that allowed such a construct to succeed as it had in other European states, and as such, it simply could not work at home.[60]

Arbitrary interference and the eternal possibility thereof on the part of the tsarist monarchy were the kernels of Miliukov's opposition and why he sought to differentiate himself from liberals to the right who supported constitutional monarchy. Past tsars had already proven themselves incapable of earnest adherence to reforms contrary to the people's needs and desires.[61] If anything, tsarist "autocracy [had] proved destructive for the development of Russia, material and moral," and as such, it became Russia's biggest "obstacle to the further rise of Russia to a higher level of civilised existence."[62] Now that the monarchy had essentially been swept away by the February Revolution, Russia was free of these burdens of the past. It could be remade entirely on the basis of present needs, and rapidly at that.[63] Miliukov had pledged his hopes on a democratic revolution at home, believing it was possible because there had been an "increase in education and interest in free political systems" and a desire to participate in deciding solutions to agrarian problems among the people since 1905. The February Revolution, moreover, had been an expression

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[60] Larmore, "Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom," 107.
[61] Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 166.
[62] Miliukov, "Speech to the Civic Forum," 11 November 1922, Pavel Miliukov Papers, Box 13, f. 2, RBML.
[63] Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia*, 31, 77-78.

of that general will. [64] Miliukov remained self-assured that the people wanted a republic and hoped that the masses would "choose a republic if there is no force or deception" since he believed "the majority [was] in fact democratic and with the democrats."[65] Meanwhile, republican exiles had to continue identifying monarchist and right-liberal deceptions - "dangers that threaten[ed] the masses"- while searching out "possibilities for change" at home. They had to try to find ways to foster the idea at home and abroad that if the people "want to keep and guard what they received from the [February] Revolution, the republican democratic model is the only possible form for them to choose."[66]

Miliukov also understood that once the republic was created, institutions had to be built and the people had to be instructed so that rational participation in political culture could become an everyday fact of life. This was not simply about creating a society with universal suffrage, it was a matter of training people into the concepts of rule of law and civil society, the essential bases to uphold a Russian republic. In this, citizens would learn to respect laws as they existed, not simply obey them out of fear of censure or punishment. Miliukov believed the people could and should be taught to take an active part in political life so that they too could express their true will and crucially, recognize and then prevent the law from becoming an instrument of particular (i.e.: monarchist) interests. As another political theorist Charles Larmore points out, "these traits…are far from spontaneous" among populations and required fostering in order to cultivate the civic virtue upon which a republican society without domination absolutely depends.[67] When the Bolshevik regime

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[64] Miliukov, *Respublika i monarkhiia* (II).
[65] Miliukov, *Respublika i monarkhiia* (II).
[66] Ibid., Miliukov, *Tri platformy*, 17.
[67] Larmore, "Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Freedom," 103.

fell, Miliukov maintained "elements of new power, the nucleuses of new organisations are to be formed everywhere in the country." These would eventually develop into regional and national organizations that would "come into a compact on the basis of equality, freedom and unity." When this occurred, true freedom would be realised because the people would participate in civil society and political life, pursue their individual and collective interests, and serve as a check on authority through representative government. At this point, Miliukov believed that the Russian state could finally then be "be healed…of her constitutional weakness."[68]

At the same time, where Miliukov seemed concerned about Russia's potential to backslide if tsardom were restored, he also perceived opportunities for republicanism emergent from Russia's 'low level' of socio-political development. Consider for example his statement to the Civic Forum in 1922:

> "Imagine that the Bolshevist regime played havoc for a few days in the midst of New York City, an extremely complex social organism of modern times. Then compare this with some similar occurrence somewhere in newly colonised districts of Manitoba: you will feel the difference and you will understand my assumption, that it is by far easier for a country like Russia to recover, and that it can be done in a much shorter space of time than it would by the case of a more developed social structure."[69]

Russia, in Miliukov's view was not dynamic enough before the 1917. New York City was a living symbol of all the grand possibilities in the progressive American Republic and served as a focal point of esteem and hope for millions in and outside of the United States. Russia had no such focal point and fortunately, in Miliukov's view, lacked a truly national tradition. When Russia had begun its late-coming process of state-building, it had

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[68] Miliukov, "Speech to the Civic Forum," 11 November 1922, Pavel Miliukov Papers, Box 13, f. 2, RBML.
[69] Miliukov, "Speech to the Civic Forum."

done so from the top down, linking the country together only through the autocracy, its institutions, and bureaucracies. With their removal from Russia, there was little connecting Russian people of the present to the past.[70] Moreover, as Miliukov had articulated in his New Tactic, he believed the people themselves rejected traditional state authority and wanted to start fresh and unfettered.[71] With neither the shackles of monarchy nor a national tradition to hold them back, again the state could be transformed "from a 'colossus on feet of clay, an empire of the Eastern style" into a "living compound of national and regional units" connected on the basis of equality, freedom, and federal unity.[72]

4.6 Eurasianism and the Exodus to the East

Miliukov's republicanism faced other challenges besides the Soviet Government and the monarchists. He also had to contend with the so-called post-revolutionary movement known as Eurasianism.[73] Eurasianism posed challenges precisely because it conflicted with Miliukov's vision of a modern European Russia, which he believed had developed and would develop along western lines in a process that began with Peter the Great. While the Eurasianist historico-philosophical canon is huge and well covered elsewhere, in a nutshell, Miliukov criticized Eurasianists because they lauded the October Revolution as the Russian people's successful attempt to throw off an alien western culture, which had been saddled upon them since the time Tsar Peter set out to Europeanise Russia.

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[70] Stockdale, 77-78.
[71] Rosenberg, 447.
[72] Miliukov, "The Evolution of New Russia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 100 (March 1922): 8.
[73] Other post-Revolutionary movements included *Smena Vekh*, or Change of Signposts and Mladorossy, or Young Russia. Published works include: Robert C. Williams, "Changing Landmarks" in Russian Berlin, 1922-1924, Slavic Review, Vol. 27, No. 4 (December 1968): 581-593; Hilde Hardeman, *Coming to Terms with the Soviet Regime: The "Changing Signposts" Movement among Russian Émigrés in the 1920s* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994);

At the same time, they wished to erect an ideologically based government that would rule without the participation of the people, but ostensibly in their interests and spiritual will.[74]

Eurasianism began as an intellectual and socio-political current in the early 1920s in Sofia and spread to other centres of Russia Abroad including Prague, Berlin, and Paris. Its young, educated members including N. S. Trubetskoi (1890-1938), P. N. Savitskii (1895-1968), G. V. Florovsky (1893-1979), and N. N. Alekseev (1879-1964), among others, published copious volumes that synthesized philosophy, science, economics, ethno-linguistics, arts, literature, theology, and geography. They created a movement, or rather, a historiosophy that posited Russia as a historically unique "integral geographical world" that lay between Europe and Asia, but in fact belonged to neither.[75] On the whole, Eurasianists believed Russia was an entirely "autonomous cultural-historical complex" that had developed organically in a long process of homogenization of the many peoples

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[74] Elena Chinyaeva, *Russians outside Russia: The Émigré Community in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001), 198. Other major texts on Russian Eurasianism include Mark Bassin, "Classical Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Identity," Dartmouth University Collective Research Centre (CRN Russia), April 2001, Online, Internet, Available: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~crn/russia_papers.htm, Accessed 22 April 2015; Marlène Laruelle, *L'ideologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l'empire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999); V. G. Makarov, "Pax Rossica: The History of the Eurasianist Movement and the Fate of the Eurasianists," *Russian Social Science Review*, Vol 49, No. 6 (November-December 2008): 49-72; Slawomir Mazurek and Guy R. Torr, "Russian Eurasianism: Historiosophy and Ideology," *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 54 No. 1-2, Polish Studies on Russian Thought (March 2002): 105-123; Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "The Emergence of Eurasianism," *California Slavonic Studies*, Vol. 1 (1967): 39-72; Dmitry V. Schlapentokh, "Eurasianism Past and Present," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1997): 129-151.

[75] Sławomir Mazurek and Guy R. Torr, "Russian Eurasianism: Historiography and Ideology," *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 54, No. 1-2, Polish Studies on Russian Thought (March 2002): 108; P. N. Savitskii, "*Geograficheskii obzor Rossii-Evrazii," Rossiia: Osovbi geograficheskii mir* (Prague: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927), 27. Among the most important Eurasianist publications are Trubetskoi's monograph *Evropa i cheloveschestvo* (Sofia, 1921), the collection *Iskhod k Vostoku. Predchuvstviia I svershennia* (Sofia, 1921), as well as several journals including *Evraziiskii vremennik* (1923-1927), *Evraziiskii khroniki* (1925-1937).

inhabiting the vast Eurasian space into a single anthropological entity from a common historical heritage ranging from shared folk cultures to the legacy of Genghis Khan.[76]

Claiming philosophical antecedents in 19th century Slavophilism, the Eurasianist movement strongly opposed the so-called presumption of Romano-Germanic European culture's pre-eminence and the assumption by Europeans and many Russians that its values were both universal and higher than that of others. Along with the conventions of Western epistemological imperialism also came the imposition of European values on other civilisations, which in turn adopted technological and intellectual achievements of Romano-Germanic culture to benefit, in one way or another, their own cultures. This process, in the Eurasianist interpretation, alienated those civilizations from their own traditional modes while recruiting them as unconscious partners in the expansion of European cultural domination. At the same time, the Eurasianists believed the process created an artificial table of political, economic, and cultural backwardness populated by those civilizations that were compelled to 'attempt' Europeanization, but forever condemned to remain backward "since they are subject to the strength of the dialectics and paradoxes of the process of Europeanization itself.[77]

With regard to Russia, the Eurasianists argued that ethnic and cultural complexity of Russia-Eurasia had emerged from the organic contributions made by eastern peoples, particularly the Mongols, to Russian history[78] In doing so, the Eurasianists reminded Russians that "to understand Russia's past one had to pay proper attention to its [Eastern]

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[76] Mark Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 1991): 15.
[77] Mazurek, 108-109.
[78] Riasanovsky, "Emergence," 51.

steppe heritage, and to not forget that for many centuries before Peter the Great threw open his window on the west, Russia, happily had faced Asia rather than Europe."[79] It was now time to look toward the East again, "to break with the dead ideas of the past for the living idea of the future, to develop a new outlook, and a new type of person."[80]

As for the West, the apparent birthplace of dead ideas, the Eurasianists believed elements of European civilisation had been mechanically imposed on Russia since Peter's time (1672-1725) and this process had entirely deformed Russia's proper identity and authentic spiritual nature. As a consequence of Russia's long, unnatural liaison with the West, many harmful alien ideas including liberalism, democracy, secularism, and capitalism took root. So too did atheistic Bolshevik-Marxist ideology and its war on Eastern Orthodoxy, Eurasia's very "essence."[81] Consequently, Eurasianists maintained that since Russia-Eurasia was necessarily culturally distinct from others and that this culture was irreducible to the West, Europeanization itself was neither an endpoint nor a mode of development that other civilizations could or should reproduce. After all, having drunk in the spirit of Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*, the Eurasianists were convinced Europe was "threatened by collapse" insofar as "textbook democratic clichés" appeared to be all that held it up and above everyone else.[82]

The Eurasianists' antipathy towards the West helps explain their qualified affinity for the October Revolution and the Bolshevik regime. Though Eurasianists' rejected

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[79] Raeff, *Russia Abroad*, 167.
[80] B. P. Nikitin, "*My i vostok* (II)," *Evraziia*, 1 December 1928.
[81] Johnston, 91; Raeff, 167; Andreyev and Savický, 138.
[82] Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 26; Marlène Laruelle, "Les idéologies de la "*Troisième voie" dans les années 1920: Le mouvement eurasiste russe*," *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire*, No. 70 (April-June 2001): 34; "*O smysle revoliutsiia*," *Evraziia*, 24 November 1928; M.G. Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl' russkoi emigratsii, 20-30-e gg. XX veka* (Moscow: IRI RAN, 2009), 165.

Marxist ideology, they still lauded the Bolshevik coup as exceptionally national. To them, it was a healthy 'clean sweep' performed by a group driven unconsciously by the will of the masses who long opposed the domination of a westernized governing class, the intelligentsia, which had forced upon Russia a 'Petersburg' culture that was entirely alien and incomprehensible to the people.[83] The Eurasianists thus regarded the October Revolution itself as a beneficial departure from the western mode of thought and development and the self-immolation of the imperial, Europeanised past. The political, ideological, and economic structures created by the Soviet regime, and Joseph Stalin's evident turn to 'socialism in one country' signalled to Eurasianists that the Bolsheviks had effectively allowed Russia to sever its links to Europe and isolate itself from it.[84] The political, economic, and ideological innovations Eurasianists perceived in Soviet state structure also reinforced their belief in the "regime's 'legitimate' and lasting character" as well as the idea that that Stalin was some kind of mystic "demigod" and other similarly exultant views. As we shall soon see, such views drew much condemnation from critics among the emigration.[85]

All the same, Eurasianists believed Bolshevism was merely a passing moment in history because it did not conform to the nature and will of the popular masses as they believed Eurasianism could. The Eurasianists maintained that the Eurasianist idea would

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[83] Mazurek, 114; Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism*, 27-28; Catherine Andreyev and Ivan Savický, *Russia Abroad: Prague and the Russian Diaspora, 1918-1938* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 136, 138.
[84] Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism*, 28; Mazurek, 114.
[85] Andreyev and Savický, 136, 138; Mazurek, 114; Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, "Eurasianism: Past and Present," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1997): 133, 139. See also Savitskii, "*Povorot k vostoku*," *Iskhod k vostoku*, 2.

replace the Soviet government and eventually guide all the peoples of Russia-Eurasia.[86] This new state would be both ideocratic and demotic. These characteristics meant first that the state would be governed by the Eurasianist idea that corresponded to the national character, and that the governing stratum would be selected to rule on the basis of devotion to this idea and the ability to prevent interference in political, economic, and cultural life by any factor not subordinate to this idea. Secondly, the demotic state where government was absolute, cohesive, organised and strictly disciplined and where law, morals, and faith were fused organically would exercise this power in the name of satisfying the popular masses' natural desires.[87]

The Eurasianists unsurprisingly rejected parliamentary, democratic state constructs, as well as principles including universal suffrage. The latter, in the Eurasianist view, was merely a mechanical game played by political parties that upheld the dangerous illusion that public opinion really existed.[88] Moreover, the Eurasianists argued that western state institutions were too abstract, were not organic to Russian-Eurasian society, left the individual too isolated, and divided classes into hostile camps. Instead, Eurasianists called for a state that harnessed the nation's true spirituality and morality and unified people. This "ideocratic state," according to Trubetskoi, would have "its own system of firm convictions, a ruling idea, and by virtue of this, the state itself must organize and control all aspects of life." Such a state would be a huge advance above the West, since Europe

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[86] Riasanovsky, "The Emergence of Eurasianism," *California Slavic Studies,* Vol. 1 (1967): 53; Mazurek, 116.
[87] Riasanovsky, "Emergence," 51; Andreyev and Savický, 138; V. G. Makarov, "Pax Rossica: The History of the Eurasianist Movement and the Fate of the Eurasianists," *Russian Social Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 6 (November-December 2008): 58; Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, "Eurasianism: Past and Present*," Communist and Post-Communist Studies,* Vol. 30, No. 2 (1997): 131; Laruelle, *L'ideologie eurasiste russe*, 128-130.
[88] Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism,* 28-29.

appeared mired in a lack of clear conviction because different political parties advocated different political truths and the educated elite were alienated from the rest of the population, forcing each state into stagnation.[89] Conversely, in the new Eurasianist state, a single ruling idea would allow the state to grow while unifying the Russian educated classes and popular masses who had once been at odds with each other because of competing ideologies and western influence.[90]

4.7 Miliukov, Eurasianism, and Russia's Path

Eurasianism drew criticism from varying camps in Russia Abroad, especially because of its embrace of the October Revolution and Soviet institutions. Miliukov was one of the movement's loudest detractors. His disapproval rested largely on the Eurasianists plans for the future Russian state structure and their denunciation of Russia's past and future Europeanisation. Ever the 'Russian European,' Miliukov's conception of Russia was one built on the idea that Russia lacked an enduring organic national tradition and that the state had long made it a habit of adopting, retooling, and discarding European institutions and ideas, which led it ever closer to constitutional government.[91] In his view, Russia's past and future were wholly linked to and built upon Europe and its institutions. Eurasianism, however, threatened to steer those Russians abroad who were disenchanted with life in exile away from a belief in the possibility that Russia could one day achieve a constitutional government and re-join Europe as a great state. Having abandoned the idea

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[89] Laruelle, *L'ideologie eurasiste russe*, 127-28; Sławomir Mazurek and Guy R. Torr, "Russian Eurasianism: Historiosophy and Ideology," Studies in East European Thought, Vol. 54, No. 1-2 (March 2002): 116.
[90] Elena Chinayaeva, *Russians outside of Russia: The Émigré Community in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001), 198.
[91] Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov*, 78, 275.

that armed intervention would topple the Bolsheviks, Miliukov had placed his hopes on Russians abroad and their ability to foster the growth of an anti-Bolshevik democratic movement at home. However, just as monarchism threatened to turn back the clock on liberal achievements, Eurasianism threatened to convince Russians abroad to turn their backs on Europe and a desire for Russia's Europeanisation, of which democracy and constitutionalism were hallmarks.

Regarding the Eurasianist view of Russia's future governance, Miliukov frequently alluded to the movement's seemingly treacherous commitment to dictatorship, a form of rule Miliukov clearly believed all Russians abroad should oppose on principle. He often made comparisons between the would-be Eurasianist 'ruling class' and both Soviet and Italian fascist regimes, constructs that imposed rule by the few over the liberty and free will of many. Because this new ruling class would be created "by selection" based on members' suitable commitment to and embodiment of the Eurasianist ideology, Miliukov argued that this type of government would be as "monopolistic as the Communist Party" while forming a fascist-style dictatorship that was less European and more "specific to the East."[92] At the same time, the Eurasianists' effort to fight "for the right of autocracy" seemed to defy what Miliukov believed to be Russia's longstanding need and effort to liquidate dictatorship entirely in favour of representative government. The Eurasianists' intention to retain the "vital elements" of the old tsarist ruling elite while replacing Soviet atheism and materialism with religion implied that the movement's creators intended not to create any kind of new state structure at all, but rather replace one despotic ideology for

[92] "*Miliukov v Prage: Ot nashego korrespondenta*," *PN*, 21 January 1927; V. P., "Evraziistvo: Doklad P. N. Miliukova," PN, 8 February 1927.

another. "The newly organised party will rule alone…with the exclusion of all others," Miliukov maintained, likening the Eurasianist state to both the *ancien* and Soviet regimes. Even if they claimed a desire to "consciously realise the unconscious will of the whole," ultimately, they "develop their own schemes and carry through their own will," not unlike Lenin, Mussolini, or the tsars.[93]

Miliukov desired a constitutional representative government and believed this was still possible for Russia. The Eurasianists, much like the monarchists, were trying to sell, in his view, a vision of Russia that did little but try to justify old and current iniquities of autocratic rule. The Eurasianist vision of ideocracy conflicted with Miliukov's long-standing view of the history of progress and Russia's place in it. In short, he believed in what Stockdale describes as "human society's conscious direction of its destiny." In this republican scheme, social development and the creation of a truly civil society in Russia rested on the idea that elites arrived at a common goal, transmitted culture to the lower classes over generations, and continued to do so until they became enlightened or 'conscious.' When civil society achieved full consciousness and understood the 'norms' originally established by the elites, it could participate actively in steering the course of state and society and finally bridge the gap between ideals and their final achievement.[94] The Eurasianist desire to essentially replace monolithic Bolshevik communism with a ruling class of Orthodox nationalists indicated to him that the latter would only continue to rule in their own interest in spite of their claim to express the people's will. Such a

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[93] Miliukov, "*Evrazitsii za Stalina*," *PN*, 14 May 1927; Paul Miliukov, "Eurasianism and Europeanism in Russian History," in Tomas G. Masaryk, *Festschrift Th. G. Masaryk zum 80. Geburtstage: 7 März 1930* (Bonn: Verlag von Friedrich Cohen, 1930), 233-34.
[94] Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov*, 56, 59; Philip Petitt, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 243-44.

construct, however, would prevent civil society from developing as it should because society would remain both unconscious and non-participatory.

Miliukov also disdained what he perceived to be Eurasianist celebrations of "dangerous demagogy." This so-called demagogy was played out in the Eurasianists' appeal to "young disillusioned people who were confused and in search of something new."[95] Miliukov believed the Eurasianists took advantage of the 'Russian Catastrophe' of October 1917 and composed their doctrine in this atmosphere to appeal to the sense of loss, denationalisation, and displacement Russian émigré youth began to experience when they came of age in the 1920s and early 1930s.[96] At first glance, the movement was "attractive," Miliukov admitted, especially to an impressionable young group which sought a firmer sense of from where they had come, to where they might go, and to whom they should blame for their dislocation and uncertainty about their identity, roots, and purpose.[97] Nevertheless, Eurasianism's true danger, in Miliukov's interpretation is that it risked steering Russian youth abroad away from a proper western liberal education they ought to imbibe while abroad. Learning 'freedom' was needed, ultimately, since it was youth who would inherit the future Russia and steer its course toward a westernised culture, state, and civilisation. Consequently, Miliukov surmised that "democrats had no choice but to correct the demagogy of Eurasianists" and their attack "of the new against the old" generation. At the same time, democrats abroad must teach the younger generation that the liberal republic

[95] "Miliukov v *Prage: Ot nashego korrespondenta*," *PN*, 21 January 1927. Miliukov was on a lecture tour in Prague, one of the centres of Eurasianism. The article is a transcription of his 11 January 1927 lecture, "*Politicheskaia programma evraziitsev*," (The Political Program of the Eurasianists).
[96] Robert Johnston, *New Mecca*, 83-99.
[97] Miliukov, "Eurasianism and Europeanism," 225.

was a more viable ideal and a natural, logical stage in Russia's long march of historical progress.[98]

As noted above, the Eurasianists thought Russians should look to the East to understand Russia's unique culture and its own evolutionary path apart from Europe. Miliukov, very much in the Westernizer tradition, protested this Eurasianist heresy. He asserted that Russian "civilisation is European," and that its development resulted from the movement of culture "from West to East, from the forest to the steppe" over the course of centuries, a civilising mission that overcame "barbarians and nomads" with the benefits of European life and technologies.[99] Moreover, Russian civilisation was European in his view because the educated classes had, since Peter the Great's time, undertaken "democratic strivings" including the fight against serfdom, autocracy, equality, freedom, social privilege, and political oppression, endeavours that he believed were of European import. Consequently, Russia had moved "far closer to East-European culture than to the steppe nomad culture in the East" and ought to be considered "one of the last European countries, not one of the first Asian ones."[100]

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[98] V. P., "*Evraziistvo: Doklad P. N. Miliukova*," *PN*, 8 February 1927. Hans Rogger, "Was There a Russian Fascism? The Union of Russian People," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1964): 414. Stanley G. Payne notes that fascist organisations exalted youth more than any other groups and played into generational conflict. This was made possible by the ability to identify members of the European left with the older prewar generation that had brought about turmoil in 1914 and economic depression in the interwar period. Fascism also attempts to recreate the concept of the nation with youth as its very life force. In this way, Eurasianism could appeal to youth the way liberal republicanism might appeal to 'the people.' Both offered something 'new' and something that had the potential to give youth and people a sense of self-worth in the service of the state. See Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 7, 13.

[99] V. P., "*Evraziistvo: Doklad P. N. Miliukova*," *PN*, 8 February 1927; Miliukov, "Eurasianism and Europeanism," 235.

[100] N. P. V. "*Evraziistvo: Preniia o Doklad P. N. Miliukova*," *PN*, 14 February 1927; Miliukov, "Eurasianism and Europeanism," 235-36; Vandalkovksaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl'*, 178.

The course of Russian history, as Miliukov understood it, meant that Russia, free of Bolshevism, had to get back on the path to real progress, a process that could only be done as "part of the European family."[101] "Has not the whole history of Russia after Peter not proved conclusively that Russia is not Asia, but a part of Europe?" he asked.[102] The Eurasianists, however, believed in the merits of Russia's 'splendid isolation' from Europe, which, in Miliukov's view, could only hinder Russia's gradual and necessary convergence with the West. The Eurasianist views on the influence of the East on Russia troubled Miliukov for the simple reason that the idea was almost entirely foreign to his education and outlook.[103] For him, Russia had never been nor should be isolated from the western world. Nor did it develop "uniformly," or independently from the West. Since the early 18th century, educated Russians had largely identified themselves, their culture, and their politics with the West and worked, in ways available to them, to realise their worldview.[104] Even in the 1920s, Miliukov believed Russia was still in the general world process of changing from a monarchy to a 'people's sovereignty,' despite the current obstacle made by the Soviet Government.[105]

Miliukov believed that Republic was a "necessary and inevitable stage" in the history, completeness, and triumph of progress.[106] The great nations of the European West "had worked up to those maximum forms of democracy," and they provided models that Russia ought to follow, even if imperfectly. British political thought, Miliukov maintained,

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[101] N. P. V. "*Evraziistvo*."
[102] Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl'*, 178.
[103] Riasanovsky, "Emergence," 52.
[104] Ibid., 62; Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl'*, 165.
[105] Miliukov, "*Evraziiskaia teoriia i praktika*," *PN*, 3 December 1927, Miliukov, qtd. in Vandalkovskaia, 178.
[106] Miliukov, "*Respublika i monarkhiia*," *PN* 28 February 1923.

had particularly strong influence among liberals and social reformers in Russia in the last half-century, even if Russia could not adopt a constitutional monarchy. It was rather the British liberal "mental outlook" that Russian intellectuals adopted that was key to Russia's past and future growth.[107] He also reminded readers that the democratic republic had once seemed "incompatible with the spirit and history of the German people, and today it has been made a fact." In his mind, if the republic were possible in formerly Imperial Germany, so too was it possible for Russia. As well, "even the last of the backward countries in Europe, Turkey…changed its own century of tradition" and became a republic. China also became a republic and "even assumed the role of protecting justice and…the organised protection of its passive masses."[108] Western political thought, Miliukov believed, spread from West to East and it was necessary that Russia take this path too. He did not want Russia to fall behind other civilisations nor fail to protect itself from real or potential enemies.[109] Believing that "Russia fell deep in October 1917, but it did not fall from a very high level," Miliukov wanted to ensure that the "primitive habits of life…not yet forgotten in Russia" would eventually be replaced by the development of a western oriented democratic tradition and civic morality when the home regime finally fell.[110]

4.8 Utopianism and Exclusivity

One interesting tension that emerges from Miliukov's critiques of Eurasianism, and monarchism for that matter, is his habit of referring to each opposing system of thought as

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[107] Pavel Miliukov, "The Influence of English Political Thought in Russia," *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 5 (1926): 267.
[108] P.N. Miliukov, *Tri platformy: Respulikansko-demokraticheskikh ob'edinenii (1922-1924 gg)*, Paris: Imprimerie d'art Voltaire, 1925), 17-18.
[109] Miliukov, "*Respublika i monarkhiia*," *PN* 28 February 1923; *Evraziistvo*, *PN*, 8 February 1927.
[110] Miliukov, "Speech to the Civic Forum," 11 November 1922; Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov*, 72

utopianism while eschewing the possibility that his idealization of liberalism/republicanism in Russia might have also been considered in the same light by contemporaries and observers. For example, in one of his many indictments of Eurasianism, he observed that the "whole construction [was] obviously theoretical, artificial, and utopian."[111] Likewise, of Grand Duke Nikolai, Miliukov claimed that this 'liberal monarch' could not be trusted for reasons noted above, as well as the would-be tsar's apparent desire to "build political programs on hypotheses that have an explicitly utopian character."[112] Miliukov mobilised the term 'utopia' as a pejorative, one that was meant to paint his political enemies with brushstrokes of unrealistic fantasy and myth-making. Certainly, his understanding of the historical process led him to believe alternative paths were impossible. However, his use of the term as an invective also revealed the hard-line, extreme, and even reactionary stand he took in defence of his own ideals and the means by which he tried to convince readers of the folly in his opponents' respective world-views.

To be sure, utopianism is commonly associated with fantasizing the non-real. Political scientists also understand it as a distinctive political phenomenon born out of discontent with present circumstances while giving birth to articulations for a better way of life and being. Utopians necessarily challenge the status quo and "criticise their own worlds from an estranged imaginary and/or critical distance." At the same time they can "*educate* desire" and serve as points of inspiration and catalysts for change.[113] Miliukov

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[111] Miliukov, "Eurasianism and Europeanism," 234.
[112] Miliukov, "*Respublika i monarkhiia, II*" *PN*, 1 March 1923; P.N. Miliukov, *Tri platformy: Respulikansko-demokraticheskikh ob'edinenii (1922-1924 gg)*, Paris: *Imprimerie d'art Voltaire*, 1925), 17-18.
[113] Lucy Sargisson, "A Democracy of All Nature: Taking a Utopian Approach," *Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2013): 125. Emphasis is hers. See also Ruth Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia* (Hemel Hempstead (UK): Philip Allen, 1990).

can be considered a utopian insofar as he continued to critique the status quo at home from exile while also challenging the views of opponents who meant to deviate from the new status quo he sought to create in the unforeseen future. His incredibly detailed critiques were also meant to educate his readers, to get them thinking, and he hoped, get them behind his particular vision of the new Russian state. For their part, some Eurasianists thought that Miliukov should depart from making accusations against them and instead realise "liberal-democratic ideals also reveal their own unreality and impossibility (a quality attributed to utopianism)." For their part, the Eurasianists were all too happy to accept the title 'utopian' since it was connected with "a desire to be great and great is always born from the impossible."[114]

Miliukov's views were also utopian insofar as the reality, the status quo of his situation is that he was in exile. He was far from home, the consolidation of Soviet power at home made clear that there would be little chance of triumphant counter-revolutionary return, and he continued to work for (or dream of) a better Russia in his ideal image. His continued effort to fight opposing views including monarchism and Eurasianism in exile nevertheless shed new light on traditional definitions of what characteristics might be found in a diaspora. As we saw in the Introduction to this thesis, William Safran states that diasporas typically "retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland, - its physical location, history, and achievements" and a collective commitment to the "maintenance or restoration of their original homeland."[115] Robin Cohen builds on

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[114] "*Tekushchee: Bystuplenie P. N. Miliukova protiv evraziistva*," in *Evraziiskaia khronika*, Vypusk VII, (1927): 32. Author is unattributed.
[115] William Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," in *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1991): 83-84.

Safran's latter point by adding that diasporas can also collectively aspire to *create* an "imagined homeland."[116] Earlier works on Russia Abroad do corroborate these ideas as scholars such as Raeff and Johnston discuss the collective mission of Russians abroad to preserve their culture in amber until they returned home. Miliukov's ideals and debates with his opponents abroad indicate that Russia Abroad was an exile community with more than one memory, vision, or myth about their original and their imagined homeland. Russia Abroad did have a 'collective mission' insofar as they shared a common belief that Russia's future statehood was yet to be determined. Yet, different groups and individuals in Russia Abroad held widely disparate views of what the Russian state had been, what it would be, and importantly, who could take part in the (re)creation of that state when and if they returned.

Another tension emergent in Miliukov's views is his belief that the future Russian state would consist of only those who adhered to democratic principles. He regularly excluded his political competitors from his vision, claiming that because they sought autocratic forms of governance or sought to isolate Russia from its rightful European pathway to modernity, they had no rights to participate in the new state's creation. Miliukov wanted to build a democratic state, but it is difficult to imagine how this could be done if only democrats participated. He seemed to believe the state would be greater and stronger if the cacophony of competing political voices were limited to a like-minded few. What is most striking is that in his regular complaints about the Soviet regime's efforts to eliminate real or imagined political opponents, Miliukov developed similar thinking parallel to the Soviet practice of consolidating power at home through the

[116] Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction, Second Edition* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 6.

elimination of political competition, a practice the regime believed would help achieve the realisation of the communist utopia. Miliukov neither identified nor addressed this apparent contradiction in his views. However, the story of political competition and exclusivity in Russia Abroad illustrates a fascinating picture of a community that did not simply fail to unify, but did everything it could to obstruct unity.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has teased out the nature of political competition among Russian exiles. While their activities had no tangible impact on stimulating a popular anti-Bolshevik revolution at home, lively political debate gave shape to the community and a purposeful role for the actors to play. Competing groups had opposing visions of what their ideal Russian state would look like if and when the Bolshevik regime fell, even after it became clearer that the home regime was there to stay. Here I have laid out the contours of contending monarchist movements and assessed the motivations behind Miliukov's hostility to them as well as his antagonism toward those right-leaning liberals who believed a constitutional monarchy was a correct path for Russia to take. Miliukov also opposed Eurasianist views of Russia's past and future as something distinct from the west. These contests allowed Miliukov to elaborate on the need for a western-oriented republic and continue calling on Russians abroad to find ways to foster a democratic revolution at home in order to realise these lofty goals. In the meantime, several tensions for Russian liberalism emerged in his elaborations. Miliukov did not admit that his own views were as utopian as his opponents and he believed Russian democracy demanded that only democrats participate in the creation of a strong new Russian state. As we shall see in the following chapter, Miliukov found other ways to exclude right-wing Russians from the

present community and future state. All the while, he continued to wave the liberal/republican banner to try and win followers and ensure the ideals and philosophies behind it did not evaporate in exile.

Miliukov made it a point to be the loudest proponent of liberal ideas among Russian exiles using his newspaper, *Poslednie novosti*, the most widely read daily in the emigration. He imported into exile many of his old anxieties regarding autocracy and Russia's 'correct' historical path. He also imported the idea that great personalities, Peter the Great in particular, had a major role to play in Russia's proper historical development. Miliukov, the first historian to write a scholarly analysis of the Russian Revolution, was conscious of his own role as a historical actor. Like Peter, it appears that he too sought to steer Russia in a European direction and bring the West's institutions home.[117] Miliukov's relentless pursuit of these goals indicate that he still believed he had a critical part to play in the state's evolution.

Yet, the tensions emergent in his thought and approach also reveal that his whole conception of liberal democracy was still very much a work in progress. Of course, he continued to argue that Russia would have its constitution, the rule of law, civil liberties, and other facets that characterize liberal democratic states, but he had not yet found a way to accommodate Russians with competing right-wing visions of the state in his own construction. His presumptions that the majority of the population were in fact democratic dismissed the idea that if given the chance, a newly enfranchised society could still vote for and elect representatives that did not conform to Miliukov's view of the ideal democratic leader. At the same time, he did not seem to recognise that a voting

[117] Manchester, "Contradictions at the Heart of Russian Liberalism," 121, 126.

public in the constitutional state he sought could still change policy and the leadership through the electoral process if the majority disagreed with the work of a particular government in office. In doing so, he disregarded the role of the masses could take in steering Russia's progress and historical development.[118] It does not appear that Miliukov worked these problems out while in exile, nor does it appear that he even wanted to make such an attempt. He had a particular vision and disregarded as false, suspicious, or misguided the competing visions monarchists and Eurasianists held. If anything, his old animosities crystallised in exile thus preventing the fruitful development of democratic norms abroad that he hoped to bring home to the new republic someday.

[118] Ibid. 129.

Chapter 5

Liberal Reassessments and the Second World War

5.1 Introduction

Conflicts among émigrés continued to smoulder through the 1920s regarding the ideal form of the future state, but new sources of political division emerged in the 1930s. New crossroads were laid when it became increasingly clear to Russian exiles that Nazi Germany posed a real military threat to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As events such as Adolf Hitler's seizure of power, Germany's departure from the League of Nations, its refutation of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler's declarations of rearmament, and German expansionism in Eastern Europe unfolded, some far-right leaning Russian exiles began to hope Hitler might become Russia's liberator. Others like Pavel Miliukov and Vasilii Maklakov on the left perceived an imminent threat in Nazi Germany's true intentions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and began to re-evaluate their opposition toward the Kremlin. They later offered qualified and then full support to the Soviet government as *the* defender of Russia and its territorial interests. This newfound support was a remarkable shift in their attitude toward the regime after 20 years of opposition to it.

Debates in Russia Abroad about the proper form of government in Russia were superceded in the 1930s by a more pressing concern: whether the emigration should support Nazi Germany as the power most capable of destroying the Soviet regime, or whether they should support Stalin, the exiles' long-time enemy, as Russia's best defender. At the very heart of the debate were questions about what constituted the emigration's duty and role toward protecting the Soviet Union from external aggression.

Imbedded in these questions were formulations of what constituted 'true' Russian obligations to the homeland in spite or because of its current regime. Should the emigration support the Nazis as a means to liberate Russia from Bolshevik clutches or should they work to support the Soviet Union's fight against fascism? Every first-wave Russian émigré doubtlessly considered the question. Those who chose to side with the Nazis were known at the time as defeatists. Those who sided with the Soviet Union were defencists. Vladimir Lenin had used these terms during the First World War. Believing the German Kaiser was less dangerous than the tsar, he had called on socialists to support Russia's defeat in the hopes of initiating a civil war and ushering in a workers' victory in the class struggle. Defencism was a Leninist pejorative denoting excessive patriotism and the abandonment of socialist principles in favour of national defence.[1] In exile, Russian liberals adopted the name to denote their loyalty to the state.

Whereas the extant scholarship focuses strongly on the activities of right-wing émigré movements up to and during the Second World War, this chapter focuses specifically on liberal defencism.[2] Pavel Miliukov and other contributors to *Poslednie*

[1] See Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2011), 382; O. Iu. Oleinik, *Intelligentsiia, emigratsiia, otechestvo: Problema patriotisma v Tvorchestvom nasledii predstavitelei rossiiskogo zarubezh'ia 20-30 godov XX Veka* (Ivanovo: Ivanovskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 1997), 132.

[2] The major works dealing with the Russian emigration and their activities up to and during the Second World War include Michael Kellogg, *The Russian Roots of Nazism: White Émigrés and the Making of National Socialism, 1917-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stephen D. Shenfield, *Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001); Marina Gorboff: *La Russie fantôme: L'émigration russe de 1920 à 1950* (Lausanne: *Èditions L'Age d'Homme,* 1995); Catherine Andreyev, *Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Émigré Theories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John J. Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); E. Oberlander, "The All-Russian Fascist Party," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1966): 158-173. These works discuss defencist arguments to a degree though the best account of defencist émigré activities in France up to and during World War Two can be found in Robert Johnson, *New Mecca, New Babylon: Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920-1945* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 157-182.

novosti wrote at length about the growing Nazi threat, what dangers they identified in it for their homeland, and what role, duties, and obligations they believed exiles owed to the Soviet Union. In exploring these perceptions, this chapter discusses evolving liberal exile attitudes toward the home regime and the primacy they placed on the state and 'its' territory. When it became evident that Hitler's Germany posed a real military threat to the Soviet Union, liberals like Miliukov began to offer qualified support for the Soviet state by emphasizing its defencive and evolutionary qualities after two decades of chiding the regime's backward, even medieval character and attempting to undermine its legitimacy abroad. When the Soviet Union itself began to occupy former Russian Imperial territories after World War Two broke out, liberal writers treated these manoeuvres as defencive and just. They argued that the Soviet Union essentially created a necessary *cordon sanitaire* between itself and potential German aggression to protect its own territorial integrity with the added benefit that it tried to reclaim territory that had been unjustly lost after the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In their view, these actions made the state stronger, capable of self-defence, and ultimately good.

Miliukov and others stated that they still opposed the Soviet state's ideology and practices. At the same time, they argued that Russian exiles must cease anti-Soviet propaganda in order to support the USSR's defence against Hitler. Many liberals had come to believe that the USSR's defencive foreign policy and reclamation of territory during the war indicated that it had evolved to finally serve the national interest. Liberals acted out of a belief that it was the exiles' duty to support the strengthening of the Soviet State, strengthening that they cast in territorial terms. They had also begun to recognise that there was popular support for the regime at home. In the process, they began to act

as loyal citizens who lent their allegiance to a state that they believed acted justly and protected the people, despite the fact that they themselves were stateless exiles. Moreover, the justice that these liberal exiles had in mind had little to do with the state's allocation of distributive or social justice in the Soviet Union. Rather, their brand of justice emerged from their growing belief that the Soviet regime acted rightly when it took necessary, though provocative, steps to defend its territory and reclaim former Imperial Russian territories.

The Soviet regime was not the constitutional state the liberal exiles wanted or envisioned as an ideal, but to them, it had proven itself strong and capable of evolution and modernisation. Recognising this, liberals effectively ended their struggle against the Soviet Government even declaring that it was the legitimate government and defender of Russian interests. In doing so, liberals prioritised immediate loyalty to the state over their longer term goal of securing a democratic constitution, the rule of law, or personal freedoms for the people at home. In what political scientist Robert Rotberg calls the "hierarchy of political good," the liberals' elaborations on Soviet defencive manoeuvres reveal their belief that the state's primary function was to provide the "political good of security," that is, to prevent foreign invasion, the loss of territory, or to eliminate threats and attacks on the national order and social structure. Meanwhile in this hierarchy, the delivery of other political goods such as an enforceable rule of law, a judicial system, or the security of property could become possible only once security was sustained.[3] As we have seen, liberals like Miliukov had earlier prioritised the political liberty of people and

[3] Robert Rotberg, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 3.

development of civil society as the foundation of a strong liberal Russian state. With the threat and eventual outbreak of war, these 'political goods' were subordinated for the greater and more immediate good of defence despite the fact that the Soviet Union failed to deliver other political goods that defined a strong liberal state. This did not mean that they forgot about their larger goals for a democratic Russia. But they did stop talking about them. Moreover, the liberals seemed willing to sacrifice these goods when it came to non-Russian peoples.

It is also noteworthy that Miliukov and others also prioritized the strength of the Soviet state over the rights, freedoms, and wishes of the people whose states were invaded, occupied, or annexed by the Soviet Union. This is particularly telling in the case of Finland, which was a democratic republic at the time of the Winter War (1939-1940). When the Soviet Union invaded Finland, *Poslednie novosti* largely applauded the maneuver because contributors were interested in the reclamation of sovereignty over former Russian territory. It might be said that their reactions reveal that their view of democracy was a political goal for Russia as opposed to a universal value to be enjoyed by all peoples including the Finns. Finland was not invaded by another democracy housing the institutions that Miliukov and other liberals most valued or that the Finns could presumably enjoy. In fact, democratic states typically do not engage in aggressive behaviour with other democratic states due to "conventions of mutual respect."[4]

So did liberal exiles then give the Soviet state a free hand in democratic Finland (let alone the Baltics and Poland) in their evaluations? This chapter illustrates that yes, in

[4] Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983): 213.

spite of the ideology and practices of the home regime, Miliukov and other liberals believed the Soviet Union acted justly in its attempt to remediate the perceived injustice of territorial loss in 1919. These liberals identified no contradiction in the idea that justice would be served at the cost of Finnish democracy, right to self-determination, and territorial integrity since their primary interest was the Soviet state's strength. The fact that the Finns defended their territory through warfare indicates they did not consent to or welcome the Soviet invasion and had no desire to return to the Russian fold. Regardless of the Finn's wishes, what Russian liberals found most critical was that the Soviet Union had in fact become the best defender of Russian territorial interests and this effort was worth supporting. It also became clear that they privileged the continued existence and security of the Russian state over the individual rights of citizens, including citizens of other countries.[5] Of course, as exiles, Russian liberals abroad were not citizens themselves in the legal sense of the word. Their sense of obligation and duty, however, indicate that they did identify as moral citizens of Russia in the past, present, and future. Despite their long-time opposition to the home regime, its reclamation of formerly territory served their interests too and they believed that the state was working to protect its own territory and the people therein.

In their approval of Soviet aggression in northern Europe, liberal Russian exiles could not lay claim to liberal imperialist justifications for the USSR's forcible intrusion on the basis of 'civilising' the Finns and other states without contradicting their belief system entirely. After all, these states had democratic governments and institutions. Thus,

[5] Allen Buchanan, "The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say," in Buchanan and Moore, *States, Nations, and Borders*, 245.

the liberals did not and could not claim that the Soviet system of government was manifestly superior to that of the Finns as a basis for justification.[6] They could and did, however, claim that since countries like Finland were too weak politically and militarily to protect themselves, the USSR had to step in to protect them and itself at the same time from German aggression. The Russian Political Conference had made similar warnings in 1919. Russian liberals during World War II deployed these old arguments but also refashioned an older justification for western liberal imperialism that tied imperial legitimacy with a project of progressive improvement and civilisation in the colonies. [7] Russian liberals did not claim that Finns (or Poles, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians for that matter) were lesser or backward cultural groups in need of Soviet civilizational development. Yet, because their ideal view of Russia was still conceived in terms of its pre-1914 boundaries, they did not recognise the modernising developments these states had made since they gained independence in 1919, particularly in areas of defence. Because they were 'weak' in the face of German aggression, the Soviet Union could occupy and effectively provide a necessary helping hand.

What follows first is an analysis of liberal attitudes toward Nazi Germany during the 1930s and the impact on their outlook on the Soviet Union. I illustrate how exiled liberals came to view the Soviet Union in a more positive light in response to Soviet foreign policy initiatives designed to protect the country from the German threat. In their responses, Miliukov among others also tried to downplay the activities of Russian fascists

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[6] David Miller, "Liberalism and Boundaries: A Response to Allen Buchanan," in Buchanan and Moore, *States, Nations, and Borders*, 265-66.

[7] Karuna Mantena, "The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism," in Duncan Bell, Ed., *Victorian Visions of a Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 114, 117, 120. See also Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

and Nazi sympathizers. The hopes that the extreme right wing members of Russia Abroad put in Nazism to liberate Russia from Soviet clutches conflicted with the liberals' belief that defence of the Soviet Union's territory was superseded the need to defeat its government. Next, this chapter looks at the shift from liberal approval of the Soviet Union's defencive maneuvers to more active support for its efforts to reclaim territory Russia lost in 1919. Liberals began to speak in terms of the 'justness' of Soviet maneuvers, not only to defend itself from German machinations, but to right the wrongs done to their homeland at the Paris Peace Conference. Finally, this chapter examines exile reactions to the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941. Because the regime could muster popular support at home at its most trying time, some liberals declared that their fight with the Soviet Government had necessarily come to an end. In the meantime, they adopted for themselves a new kind of active citizenship, one that offered loyalty to the state, but did not demand rights for the people in return.

5.2 Russian Liberals and the Nazi Threat

Even prior to the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, Russia Abroad began to question Hitler's motives toward the Soviet Union. After all, Hitler appeared to enjoy immense popularity in Germany and the potential that he could win the election was evident.[8] When he did take power, the question of whether Hitler's Germany posed any kind of military threat to the Soviet Union emerged in full force amidst Russians abroad. This was not a result of simple conspiracy theory or paranoia. Hitler's stance on Soviet Russia was already well-known to the Russian exiles when he published *Mein Kampf* in

[8] See for example William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945* (Brattleboro (VT): Echo Point, 2014).

1925, what many readers and statesmen alike considered to be a provocative manifesto outlining his overall aim to unite German blood into a common united Greater Germanic Reich under one leader (*Ein völk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer*).[9] Regarding his views on Russia, what stood out for Russian émigrés were Hitler's goals regarding German *lebensraum* (living space). Hitler wrote:

> "If land was desired in Europe [for Germany], it could be obtained by and large only at the expense of Russia, and this means that the new Reich must again set itself…to obtain by the German sword sod for the German plow and daily bread for the nation."[10]

Such a statement provoked apprehension among many Russian liberals because they considered it a direct threat to Soviet territory and the Russian homeland therein. That Hitler continued to make references to his 'mission' to achieve national salvation through acquiring living space in the East in his public speeches and broadcasts only helped solidify growing Russian exile fears.[11]

Nicolas de Bazily, a liberal, former *chargé d'affaires* for the Russian Embassy in Paris, and close friend of Maklakov, later confirmed the potential threat when he interviewed Hitler, Herman Hesse, and Alfred Rosenberg in January 1932. Hitler discussed the "iniquitous" and "oppressive" terms of the Versailles Treaty on Germany,

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[9] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Ralph Manheim, Trans. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 1.
[10] Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 140. It should be noted that several White Russian émigrés directly influenced Hitler's thought before he wrote *Mein Kampf*. Émigrés including Fedor Vinberg and Alfred Rosenberg helped "indoctrinate" Hitler with their version of synthesised "*völkisch*-redemptive views of German spiritual and racial superiority with conspirational-apocalyptic White émigré conceptions of international Jewry as a malevolent force…" Vinberg edited *Prizyv* (The Call), a monarchist exile newspaper with none other than Shabelskii-Bork and Taboritskii, Nabokov's assassins. Hitler, under the tutelage of his mentor, Dietrich Eckart, paid close attention to the newspaper and developed warm relations with Rosenberg. Rosenberg was one of the first members to join the German Workers' Party, the predecessor to the NSDAP, and Hitler remarked that Rosenberg was "the only man whose ideas he would listen to." See Kellogg, 64, 69, 71-73.
[11] Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 157-58.

which created conditions that could invite Bolshevism into the Reich.[12] Hitler went on to say that he believed "the main world problem was the battle against the Bolshevik danger and the necessity of liberating Russia from the tyranny of the Bolshevik regime." Moreover, Germany's relationship with the USSR under the Rapallo Treaty would prove useful to Germany but the purpose is…*to destroy Carthage*." [13] The well-known idiom referenced Cato the Elder's position that Rome must reject any kind of treaty with Carthage and instead eliminate it through total annihilation before the latter rebuilt military strength.[14] de Bazily shared this account with Phillipe Berthelot, the Secretary to the French Foreign Minister though it is likely he also shared details of his conversation with friends such as Maklakov. The interview is nevertheless instructive insofar as it shows how one Russian liberal attempted to discover Hitler's motives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The conversation seemed to confirm for him that Hitler wanted to stamp out Bolshevism before it became a threat to Germany. Hitler's comment about 'liberating Russia' from the Bolshevik yoke certainly hinted at the possibility that Germany might someday invade.[15]

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[12] Nicolas de Bazily, "*Entrevue de Nicolas de Basily avec Adolf Hitler, à Munich, avant son arrivée au pouvoir, 1932*," n.d. Nicolas de Bazily Papers, Box 22, Hoover. Rosenberg, a Baltic German from Reval was heavily influential in the creation of Nazi ideology regarding Lebensraum, racial theory, and the justifications for the persecution of Jews.

[13] de Bazily, "*Entrevue*." Emphasis is de Bazily's.

[14] *Delenda est Carthago* ('Carthage must be destroyed') was famously uttered by Cato the Elder (234-149 BCE), a Roman Senator toward the end of the Punic Wars (264-146 BCE). Cato frequently used the phrase in his many speeches about the need to reject any kind of peace treaty and instead eliminate through total victory the Carthaginian threat to Rome. The latter had twice beaten Carthage only to see it rapidly rebuild military strength and take the field against Carthage again. Charles E. Little, "The Authenticity and Form of Cato's Saying '*Carthago Delenda Est*," Classical Journal, Vol. 29 (1934): 429-435).

[15] The document is undated, though we can surmise it was written during or before 1925 when Berthelot left office.

When Hitler did seize power in 1933, Miliukov expressed his doubts about the "anti-communist paladin" almost immediately.[16] At first, Miliukov's mistrust arose from contradictory NSDAP statements he observed regarding war in Europe. He noted that the Nazis claimed a desire to maintain good relations with Europe and that "Germans do not want a war right now." Meanwhile, "powerful German groups are now declaring that war is unavoidable and that Germany's chances of winning were big."[17] Miliukov was evidently confident that Hitler was no 'friend of peace,' and instead sought war with Europe in order to win back all Germany had lost in the Great War.[18] To bolster his claims, Miliukov went on to discuss German assertions that it would only abstain from military build-up provided that the Great Powers disarm. He maintained that this tactic was only a ruse to allow Germany a free hand in arming itself since "it already started to do so long ago" and that it wanted to continue doing so without "international control getting in the way."[19] Reading pronouncements from Berlin accurately in hindsight, Miliukov warned his readers that "Europe was now on high alert" and that Hitler's true motives "should not fool anyone" including Russians abroad.[20] When Germany subsequently renounced the Versailles Treaty in March 1935 to "restore German sovereignty," it only confirmed for Miliukov that the Reich was replying to accusations

[16] Johnston, *New Mecca*, 117.
[17] Miliukov, "*Vneshniaia politika Germanii*," *PN*, 13 April 1933.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Miliukov, "*Programma Gitlera*," *PN*, 24 March 1933; Miliukov, "*Manevr Gitlera*," *PN*, 17 October 1933.
[20] Miliukov, "*Manevr Gitlera*;" Miliukov, "*Germaniia, SSSR, i Liga Natsii*," *PN*, 12 September 1934.

of aggression "by doing precisely the crimes of which they are accused," including massive military aggrandisement.[21]

While Miliukov watched German diplomatic advancements in Europe, his newspaper became devoted to showing readers what Germany's true attitude toward the Soviet Union was – threatening. In March 1933, *Poslednie novosti* printed a short article which stated that Rosenberg, the Nazi ideologue, had met in Locarno with Italian fascists and discussed German hopes to create a federal state consisting of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine SSR. These projects "hardly disturbed" the Soviet Union, the report added. It suggested that Germany should learn from the "pitiable fiasco" that emerged from an earlier German-led invasion in Ukraine and warned that Germany should "think well about the consequences of a similar intervention." [22] Thus soon after Hitler's seizure of power, *Poslednie novosti* located a threat to Soviet territorial integrity and ensured readers could see that the Soviet Union was both aware of the threat and that it was ready for possible German aggression. Several months later, Miliukov also told readers that Germany had withdrawn its specialists and technicians from Soviet military factories while the USSR responded by suspending orders for German goods. Relations appeared to be "deteriorating a lot" and the Rapallo Treaty seemed doomed.[23] Hitler's anti-communism and the zeal his regime took in persecuting socialists in the Reich again

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[21] Adolf Hitler qtd. in Edward H. Carr, *German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), 116. Miliukov, "*Anulirovanie versal'skogo dogovora*," *PN*, 17 March 1935.

[22] "*Gitler i bol'sheviki*," *PN*, 14 March 1933. With regard to Ukraine, the article is referring to Central Power incursions in Ukraine during the Ukrainian War of Independence (1917-1921), a conflict that ended with a final victory of the Soviet Government and the incorporation of the territory into the new USSR.

[23] Miliukov, "*Vneshniaia politika III reikha: Germaniia i SSSR*," *PN*, 12 July 1933. See also Miliukov, "*Germaniia, Italiia, i SSSR*," *PN*, 25 June 1934.

appeared to be a contributing factor despite the Fuhrer's claims that he intended to retain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, just as he had pledged to the rest of Europe.[24]

5.3 Evolving Liberal Views on Soviet Responses to the Threat

By January 1934, Miliukov also told readers that the Soviet Union was now 'on the lookout' for encirclement by the Reich and Japan, the latter of which had just "woken up to World History" and wanted to join Germany in an attempt to "change the unstable status quo set after the war."[25] Thus, just as Europe remained on 'high alert,' so too did the Soviet Union. Miliukov went on to say that "Soviet diplomacy [was] trying to coordinate all possible actions," and indicated it would be unwise for Western Europe to ignore this.[26] Miliukov evidently began to believe that the Soviet Union might become the centre of a "continental war" against both Germany and Japan. His admonition about Europe hints at an emergent favourable opinion regarding the Soviet response to evolving circumstances by reaching out to the West in order to forge protective and mutually beneficial alliances. [27]

One *Poslednie novosti* contributor, A. Matveev, observed that the Soviet Union had begun to take additional steps. In order to solidify more positive relationships with Europe, Matveev reported that the Soviet Union was refusing to assist communist rebels in capitalist countries because the state "worried about the security of its territory due to the danger posed" by both Germany and Japan. Consequently, it sought "unexpected

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[24] "*Gitler i Stalin: Druzhestvennyia otnosheniia prodolzhaiutsia*," *PN*, 20 Mar 1933.
[25] Miliukov, "*SSSR, Germaniia, i Iaponiia*," *PN*, 6 January 1934.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

allies who also felt the danger." [28] Matveev worried, however, that the USSR could not sufficiently defend the security of its territory because it had "destroyed its own base, the peasants and intelligentsia." External security, in his view, depended on "internal conditions of the state," and consequently, Russian exiles must lobby foreign states and ask them to sign treaties with the Soviet Union that could benefit the people who could in turn help the state prepare to defend its territory. All the same, Matveev stated that he did not believe the state could change on its own for the better, "but history says that under foreign threats, even evil regimes must evolve" and he otherwise looked favourably on Soviet efforts to solidify alliances.[29] Incidentally, France signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union two days after Matveev's article emerged. It took several months more to establish an adequate system of credit insurance for French firms to cover the value of Soviet orders for French export goods. Overall, the trade agreement did not prove profitable and it appears that the Soviet Union made orders for heavy industry equipment as opposed to consumer goods that might benefit Soviet citizens directly. The real importance of this trade, however, is that it assisted in developing a *rapprochement* between France and the USSR and led to the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance in May 1935.[30]

Miliukov did not respond to Matveev directly, but did appear to agree with his reservations about internal conditions in the Soviet Union. When the USSR negotiated its accession to the League of Nations in September 1934, Miliukov offered qualified

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[28] A. Matveev, "*Otkrytoe pis'mo P. N. Miliukovu*," *PN*, 9 January 1934.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Michael Jabara Carley, "Five Kopecks for Five Kopecks: Franco-Soviet Trade Negotiations, 1928-1939," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1992): 42-43, 47.

opposition. He believed that the USSR could not "adequately pass the qualifying examination" for admission to the League because of the nature of the regime's rule.[31] He was incensed that other states, by admitting the USSR, legitimised and imposed on Soviet citizens "a single social regime that remains irreconcilable with the freedom of the autonomous peoples that the League is called upon to protect."[32] However, while Miliukov acknowledged displeasure over the USSR's admission without foreign regard for the quality of life for the people therein, he admitted that despite "the internal foreignness of the Soviet dictatorship...Russia now ha[d] the opportunity to make use of its indisputable right as a Great Power as part of this international organisation of peace."[33] It had entered a compact with other states in which members worked to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of other member states and pledged to take action when necessary if war or the threat of war affected any member.[34] In this way, not only could the Soviet Union better ensure the safety of its territory, it could now act in concert with states in the preservation of peace in Europe. It is here where Miliukov began to clearly prioritise Soviet foreign policy gains before the distress he perceived among Russian people at home.[35]

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[31] Miliukov, "*Liga Natsii i SSSR*," *PN*, 8 September 1934. For more reasons why the USSR could not qualify for admission to the League of Nations in Miliukov's view, see Miliukov, "*Liga Natsii, i SSSR*," *PN*, 1 September 1934.
[32] Miliukov, "*Po tret'emu razriadu*," *PN*, 20 September 1934.
[33] Ibid. Miliukov also chided the LON insofar as admission of the Soviets could only debase it further. But perhaps this was predictable in his view since the same organisation had "released Germany from compliance to the spirit of the Pact in its entirety" already. See "*Liga Natsii i SSSR*," 8 September 1934.
[34] "Articles 10 and 11," *The Covenant of the League of Nations*, December 1924, *Avalon Project*, Online, Internet, Available: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp, Accessed 27 May 2015.
[35] Laurie Manchester, "Contradictions at the Heart of Russian Liberalism: Pavel Miliukov's Views of Peter the Great and the Role of Personality in History as an Academic, a Politician, and an Émigré," *Russian History*, Vol. 37 (2010): 130.

Though his tone remained cautious and continued to chide "foggy references" by some League members to "the evolution of the Soviet regime," Miliukov told Russian readers that at least one type of evolution had in fact occurred, though he had seen glimmerings elsewhere.[36] He reported a statement from Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov who had evidently declared in Geneva that the USSR had "not modified its distinctive origins, but it ha[d] ceased to consider the League of Nations as a gathering of the 'sharks of imperialism bent on a campaign against the USSR." Instead, Litvinov professed that the Soviet Union now preferred to enter into an organisation "that protects the world against those who would wish to change by the sword the borders of Europe and Asia."[37]

In Miliukov's interpretation, Litvinov sought greater protection for Soviet territory through League membership, a major foreign policy gain. While Miliukov still acknowledged that the Soviet state acted unjustly toward the people at home in his protest against admission, he now began to intimate that the USSR acted rightly in seeking new foreign relationships. Thus, his opposition to the USSR's admission to the League rested on his longer term liberal principles and goals for the people, but Soviet steps to seek and secure added protection from Germany through League membership and warmer foreign relations overall was an immediate and superior imperative. In the meantime, he added, "if the USSR were admitted…it would mean that the leader of the World Proletariat will enter a 'Capitalist World Organisation' while the World Proletariat may be compelled to

[36] Laurie Manchester notes that Miliukov also recognised other signs of evolution in Stalin's regime including Socialism in One Country, the Great Terror against Old Bolsheviks, a 1935 law that gave peasants the right to farm private plots, and provisions for good schools and courts in the 1936 Constitution. See Manchester, "Contradictions, 131."
[37] Miliukov, "*Po tret'emu razriadu*," *PN*, 20 September 1934.

step aside and be silent."[38] The statement is Miliukov's estimation that the Soviet state appeared to be prepared to cease supporting communist groups in League countries abroad though Miliukov did not expect state means and methods toward the people at home to change. Miliukov had nevertheless begun to truly entertain and share notions that the Soviet system was in fact evolving for the greater interests of the state in the international sphere.

Similar to his reaction to the USSR's admission to the League, Miliukov nodded towards the Soviet Union's "return to old historic ground" when it signed the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance in May 1935, rekindling a traditional Russian military alliance. Even still, while the pact was of "huge historical importance," again Miliukov reminded readers that it would not "make us change our position about domestic policies and Soviet state structure. We are still for the principles of sovereignty of the people and against the Bolshevik autocracy."[39] Nevertheless, because there was "a new threat-the threat of military aggression against Russia," Miliukov intimated that Stalin took a new, and appropriate, policy line. While the Soviet regime's desire to maintain its "autocracy" remained, crucially, "the interests of the state are not always the same as the interests of the government." Those interests, as Miliukov surmised, were not to prosecute a "victorious war with Germany, but rather to avoid the threat from an overwhelming power."[40] Here, Miliukov expressed that the Soviet Government was therefore acting in the state's best interests and safety when it allied with France despite its policies and practices at home. When Miliukov wrote about the famine in 1922, he had asked whether

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[38] Miliukov, "*Vstuplenie SSSR*," *PN*, 16 September 1934.
[39] Miliukov, "*Novyi period*," *PN*, 3 May 1935.
[40] Miliukov, "*Novyi period*."

it was possible for the regime to "evolve." At that time, he noted that if the regime was making concessions in the creation of the New Economic Policy, it was only "in order to remain a Bolshevist power."[41] By 1935, however, Miliukov was ready to admit that because the regime had solidified its power, it was now using it to protect Russian territory.

The pact, it seemed to Miliukov, only showed that the Soviet state was continuing to evolve while his own attitude followed suit. The result of the state's new pact, he observed, was that the USSR paradoxically "turned out to be a protector of the territorial status quo of the Versailles Treaty and bourgeois international law and order" that it had otherwise long repudiated.[42] This was necessary since "Germany's fixation on the present borders of Poland, the Baltic States, and the USSR" was evident.[43] At the same time, not only did the Soviet state take correct action in seeking alliances to protect its territory, but it had finally aligned its policy with "the security of the whole world."[44] To Miliukov, Russia, with the Soviet regime at its head, was a powerful player in Europe once again, a circumstance that seemed to satisfy his longstanding desire for the homeland to re-join Europe again as a Great State.

The Franco-Soviet pact was also an indicator that Russians abroad should "*trust* both the French and Soviet governments-neither wants a war."[45] This was a pivotal statement. Because the Soviet Union now appeared to be acting in the best interests of the state by seeking means to protect its territorial integrity through alliances, Miliukov

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[41] Miliukov, *Russia To-day and To-morrow* (Westport (CT): Hyperion, 1922), 264-65.
[42] Miliukov, "*Novyi period*."
[43] Miliukov, "*Germaniia, SSSR i Liga Natsii*."
[44] Miliukov, "*Novyi period*." See also Miliukov, "*Franko-sovetskoe soglashenie*," *PN*, 1 May 1935 and "*Pakt i protokol*," *PN*, 5 May 1935.
[45] Miliukov, "*Novyi period*." Emphasis is mine.

asked that not only should Russian exiles have faith in the government, but offer it certain obligations in return. He called on the exiles to refrain from active propaganda against the Soviet Union, a charge he had led himself in exile for almost 20 years. He noted that France needed to know about conditions "at the Russian rear" that could in fact weaken the country, however, Russian exiles had to be now careful about what they said in this regard. Threatening countries like Germany and Japan also had every interest in learning about weak points in the Soviet Union that they could exploit. Russia Abroad "could do a little" to teach France about the Soviet Union, but they should not say too much that "could cause real harm to Russia by assisting its enemies."[46] Instead, he cautioned readers that they should remember their "obligations" in France, and to avoid propaganda against their intended ally. As France sought to fortify itself, this relationship could also strengthen the Soviet state against the apparent enemy and as such, active propaganda against the home regime was necessarily "forbidden."[47] In effect, Miliukov had evolved away from his role as a political exile who made a career of trying to undermine the Soviet regime through active propaganda against it. He now asked the emigration to assist and bolster the regime by avoiding this very practice. It was a dramatic reversal that essentially added a new dimension to the liberal Russian mission abroad-instead of exploring ways to weaken the hated home regime, he now wanted to shore it up with émigré backing as a defender of Russian territory.

Miliukov's support for Soviet defencive efforts nonetheless competed with defeatists among the White Emigration, many of whom became fascists and Nazi

[46] Ibid.
[47] Miliukov, "*Franko-Sovet Pakt*," *PN*, 3 May 1933.

sympathizers in exile. Many of these Russians were far right-leaning monarchists who largely lived in Germany, though other Russian fascists had settled in places like Kharbin, Manchuria and Putnam, Connecticut. They formed organisations under the conviction that Hitlerism was a useful means by which to liberate Russia from communism and to usher in a similar state system at home once Stalin's regime was overthrown.[48] As other scholars such as Paul Robinson and John Stephan have noted, Russian fascists and Nazis were particularly attracted to Hitler's 'active' approach to eliminating communists in Germany through decrees, subversion, and terror. Consequently, they believed Hitler's movement could satisfy their moral outrage toward the communists at home through war.[49] "The true merit of fascism," as in the Russian fascist magazine *Klich* noted, "is that it has rendered communists to a position of illegality and it protects Europe from the bloody spectre of communism in Moscow."[50] Klich, the self-described organ of 'national liberation under the banner of national dictatorship,' regularly called on Russians abroad to unify "in the active struggle against communism."[51] Fascist groups believed Hitler was a model leader with a state system Russia ought to emulate. One group called the National Workers' Alliance (NTS) based in Berlin and Belgrade believed that when it came to the Soviet regime's final defeat, the ends justified the means. For them, a Nazi-style

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[48] Paul Robinson, *The White Russian Army in Exile, 1920-1941* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 176-78; E. Oberlander, "The All-Russian Fascist Party," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1966): 165.

[49] Robinson, *White Russian Army*, 188, John J. Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 21, 188. For more on Russian fascism and the contributions many Russians made to Nazi ideology and strategy, see Michael Kellogg, *The Russian Roots of Nazism: White Émigrés and the Making of National Socialism, 1917-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[50] S. D. "*Chto takoe fashizm i pochemu emu soputstvuet pobeda*," *Klich*, No. 1, October 1933, 12, 14. *Klich*, "The Organ of National Liberation under the flag of a National Dictatorship," was published occasionally between 1933 and 1939 in Belgrade, Brussels, and Viipuri, Vyborg, Finland under several editors.

[51] P. N. Bazanov, "*Pervye organizatsii russkikh fashistov*," in Zhukov, *Russkaia emigratsiia*, 28.

dictatorship meant "strong authority and the only means to realize a national revolution and a firmly built structure" in Russia.[52]

Many Russians to the right including fascists and Nazis believed that a defeat of the regime at home would be a victory for Russia. As such, they are known in the literature as 'defeatists' who, paradoxically, inherited a belief that any invader of the USSR ought to be supported in order to foster the destruction of the regime's power from Vladimir Lenin's brand of revolutionary defeatism. Lenin famously advocated this idea during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and the First World War. During the latter conflagration, Lenin called upon other socialists to seek Russia's defeat in the battlefield. He celebrated enemy victories against Russia as the "people's war against absolutism" and expounded the thesis that "for the labouring class and the toiling masses" of Russia, "the lesser evil would be the defeat of the tsarist monarchy and its army…"[53] Similarly, extreme right-wing Russians who supported Hitler believed his victory would be a lesser evil than the Soviet regime. Moreover, its replacement with a new fascist autocracy would be infinitely better than the status quo that could finally set Russia back onto its right path.[54]

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[52] Marina Gorboff: *La Russie fantôme: L'émigration russe de 1920 à 1950* (Lausanne: *Èditions L'Age d'Homme,* 1995), 166-67.

[53] Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 134, 136; Vladimir Lenin qtd. in Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 636.

[54] Shain, 136-37. See also Robert H. Johnson, "The Great Patriotic War and the Russian Exiles in France," *Russian Review*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July 1976): 305-13. See also V. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Revolutionary Social Democracy in the European War," and "The Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War," in V. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21 (Moscow, 1977), 15-19 and 275-76. Grand Duke Kirill, who had given material support to the Nazi Party in the 1920s including funds for the Beer Hall Putsch, would have been, for many fascists, the new pro-German Russian monarch. His official representative in Germany, Vladimir Biskupskii, worked for the German Bureau for Russian Refugees and *Aufbau*, a conspirational organization that brought together *völkisch* Germans together with White émigrés. See Kellogg, 14, 109, 146-49, 248-49.

While Miliukov had shed much ink in the 1920s about his right-wing enemies in the emigration, he was remarkably quiet about the Russian fascists. One practical reason for ignoring them was the need to avoid attracting their French hosts' negative attention. Miliukov did not want to draw attention to any Russian collaborators for the reason that they supported France's long-time foe. Raising the fascists' profile through coverage could have made it difficult for any Russian to find and retain employment or enjoy a meal in a pub free of racial slurs or physical violence lest French citizens presume them to also be collaborators by virtue of their ethnicity.[55]

Though Miliukov did not want to draw negative French attention to the Russian community, another reason Miliukov largely ignored the fascists is that he simply did not view the fascists as members of that community. As we saw in Chapter Three, Miliukov had eliminated right wing monarchists from his vision of the ideal Russian future because he believed they would reintroduce another autocracy at the people's expense. In his apparent refusal to talk about fascists, he in effect excised them rather figuratively from their present community since they hoped Russia would become a fascist dictatorship through a German-led war. Where Russian fascists appeared in *Poslednie novosti*, other contributors mentioned them in matter-of-fact second or third-page news items about events in foreign countries. One author noted that the fascist organisation, the Russian National Liberation Movement (ROND), were no more than "slavish copies" of the

[55] Vasilii Maklakov also worked to downplay the significance of Russian fascism. In a report to French Foreign Minister, George Bonnet, he addressed the question of Russian fascist activities in Europe. He mentioned NTS and noted that the group had "only a few hundred members in Europe" and that their activities "do not go beyond words." Moreover, while they were fascists, they would never be friends with France's enemies because of "defects in their quality" that rendered them too week to affect any difference in international and Russian affairs. See Vasilii Maklakov to Georges Bonnet, 5 May 1939, Vasilii Maklakov Papers, Box 7, f. 12, RBML.

NSDAP. [56] Another called Russian fascists mere "hangers-on" and "fanatics" who had "high hopes for the success of Germany's policies and arms" and spouted the "usual old White Émigré activism." The only thing they managed to do, in the latter author's view, was to break up all Russian "political organisations in Germany" and destroy every cultural and sporting organisation in the process.[57] In effect, *Poslednie novosti*, when it did mention the fascists, treated them as enemies of Russia Abroad who ensured the Russian colony in Germany "faded and lost its Russian spirit" as they worked and hid "behind [their] German masters."[58] Likely, the authors believed Russians at home would not be treated any better. They did not believe the fascists to be real Russians at all given that they thought the fascists engaged in mindless copy-catting of the German Nazis.

Miliukov did not engage the Russian fascists directly, but he did position himself in opposition to them in a way that reveals much about his shifting attitude towards the role of an exile and a 'citizen' of Russia. Miliukov could not agree with the fascists' apparent desire to use Hitler and war to liberate Russia from the communist yoke because he could not abide Nazi invasion and occupation of Soviet territory. Rather, in his discussions about obligations, he in fact deployed a statist view of citizenship that was remarkably different from the rights based concept of citizenship upon which he had long extrapolated.[59] As we have seen, he ceased, and called on others to terminate, political agitation that called for the creation of a rights-based society in a liberated Russia to

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[56] G. V. "*Russkie v Germanii*," *PN*, 1 January 1938. Miliukov did mention ROND at least once, noting they were no more than "an assembly of racists." See Miliukov, "*Hitler i Stalin: Taktika fon Neirata*," *PN*, 13 July 1933.
[57] N. P. V. "*Russkie nakhlebniki Gitlera*," *PN*, 22 August 1939.
[58] G.V. "*Russkie v Germanii*," *PN*, 1 January 1938.
[59] Eric Lohr, "The Ideal Citizen and Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 2006): 175.

replace the Soviet regime. In place of this activism, Miliukov called on others to recognise the duty Russian exiles owed to the state in refraining from this activism because it was right according to moral reason and the utility of the state against a clear foreign threat.[60] Because the Soviet state worked to protect its territory, and by extension, the people therein, it acted justly according to what Miliukov deemed right and fair. Thus, instead of continuing the call for an extension of rights and the establishment of rule of law in an idealised Russia, Miliukov effectively sought to bolster the state through a 'negative acceptance' of the existing government and laws.

The qualified support these liberals gave to the Soviet regime also sheds interesting light on the question of loyalties and obligations political exiles in general may believe they owe their homeland. While most of the emigration in fact left Russia in the wake of the October Revolution and Civil War for fear of political persecution at home, it might be said that they owed the Soviet state nothing since an injustice - their exclusion from home society through real or threatened persecution - was done unto them and they were the injured party. All the same, despite their years of dedication to trying to undermine the home regime though information and propaganda, these liberals could not consider going over to the enemy, as to them, it would be a betrayal, or rather treason. Instead, their loyalty to 'Russia' and its territory sustained their obligation to the state and home regime. At the same time, these exiles made no attempt to reclaim their rights or in fact, to call on the Soviet state to create the constitutional rights they had long hoped for in the Soviet Union in return for their service to the state. Their loyalty to their homeland regardless of the regime fostered their sense of obligation. Instead of declaring they did

[60] Judith N. Shklar, "Obligation, Loyalty, Exile," *Political Theory*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May 1993): 183.

not have to serve the state because of injustices rendered unto them, they chose to serve and act out the role of model citizens. [61]

Defeatists for their part did not ignore Miliukov's newfound support of the USSR as the defender of "Russia's vital interests." One author noted that the home regime was "far more dangerous" than Germany since the former was only interested in Russia's "extinction and weakness," a fact that "Miliukov well [knew]." Miliukov's newfound respect for the regime as well demonstrated to the right that the emigration's leading liberal had become no more than turncoat and a "radical prop for Stalin's patriotism." This prop work included spinning legends about the home regime's evolution and right-wing treason while blaspheming the Army in exile. Miliukov's slander in this interpretation ought to be ignored and émigrés should instead turn their focus toward fostering the imminent demise of Stalin's regime by any means necessary.[62]

5.4 *Poslednie novosti*, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the Outbreak of War

Miliukov's apparent commitment to the importance of Soviet alliances for defencive purposes was evident. Remarkably, he maintained this commitment still when Moscow rekindled warmer relations with Berlin.[63] The signature of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939 concluded Germano-Soviet talks. The Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov signed this non-aggression treaty because it had become increasingly clear to Moscow that Western Europe favoured appeasing German

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[61] Shklar, "Obligation, Loyalty, Exile," 188, 191, 194.
[62] N. D. Iazhevskii, "*Novaia pozitsiia Miliukova i ee nesostoiatel'nost',*" 10 April 1935 *Informatsionnyi biulleten' (R. O. V. S),* No. 222, in Aleksei Archangel'skii Papers, Box 3, Hoover.
[63] A. Uriadova, "*P. N. Miliukov i 'Poslednie novosti' o Sovetskoi vneshnei politike*," in M. Iu. Sorokina, Ed., *Mysliashie miru rossiiskogo liberalizma: Pavel Miliukov, 1859-1943: Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma, Moskva, 23-25 sentiabria 2009 g.* (Moscow: Dom russkogo zarubezhi'iaim Aleksandra Solzhenitsyna, 2010); 194-95.

expansionism to avoid war more than it supported maintaining close relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of collective security.[64] Prior to the pact's signature, *Poslednie novosti* had begun to report on Soviet concerns that the Western allies would leave the USSR to stand alone in the face of the Nazi threat. Two months after Germany violated the 1938 Munich Agreement by occupying Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Miliukov reported that Moscow had expressed grave concerns to France and Great Britain about "what might happen if Germany 'peacefully' occupied Poland and Romania, a manoeuvre that would eliminate the barrier between Germany and the USSR." At the same time, the Soviet Government also addressed the "Baltic Problem." If Britain would not guarantee the region's safety, it would leave "one more way for the Germans to enter Russia in the case of military aggression."[65] Despite the Soviet Government's legitimate concerns about security, Miliukov noted that London was disinclined to make any guarantees about the safety of states in the USSR's western frontier, and by extension, the USSR itself. Consequently, "Moscow…does not trust England," Miliukov surmised, but the Soviet Union still had to find a way to "protect its own borders" all the same.[66]

When Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August 1939, Miliukov reminded readers the next day about Japanese aggression in China and the former's apparent preparations "to fight against Russia." The Nazi-Soviet Pact secured "freedom of action for the USSR in the Far East in the event of an armed conflict with Japan."[67] The Allies would not satisfy Soviet needs for security on its western

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[64] For more on deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and Western Europe in the 1930s see Michael J. Carley, "End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 45, No 2 (1993): 303-41.
[65] Miliukov, "*Peregovory s Moskvoi*," *PN*, 21 May 1939.
[66] Miliukov, "*Zaiavlenie Chemberlina*," *PN*, 25 May 1939.
[67] Miliukov, "*Pervye otkliki*," *PN*, 24 August 1939.

frontiers, thus Miliukov showed how the Soviet state acted first to protect its borders in the east since it could not rely on the Allies to assist in that theatre. Article Two of the Nazi-Soviet Pact states that if one party were to become the object of aggression by a third power, neither signatory would "in no manner lend its support to this third power."[68] As such, the Pact was not a betrayal of the Allies in Miliukov's presentation, but rather an attempt to protect itself by preventing German aggression in the west to assist a potential Japanese invasion from the east. Though Miliukov remained suspicious that Germany could simply ignore this pact and assist the Japanese in an "anti-communist front," the point was to legitimise the Soviet Union's new alliance with Nazi Germany. [69]

Of course, Miliukov was conscious that Paris and London regarded the negotiation of the pact as a "bombshell" and "could hardly imagine that the Soviet government would present such a surprise" at such a crucial moment when war in fact appeared imminent. He reported that tri-lateral talks between the USSR, France, and Great Britain had already broken down, but it is interesting that he focused on the Soviet Union's need to protect the eastern borders when the pact was signed.[70] He did not want to antagonize French opinion of the Russian emigration by taking a passive-aggressive stance toward the Allies failure to agree to Soviet requests to guarantee the safety of different states on its western frontier. Still, the Soviet rapprochement with enemy Germany required some justification, and the safe bet at that moment seemed to be an argument for security in the East. Émigrés in France had become objects of French ire and suspicion to be sure after

[68] "Article II," The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939. *Fordham University Modern History Sourcebook*. Online. Internet. Available: http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1939pact.html. Accessed 4 June 2015.
[69] Miliukov, "*Pervye otkliki*," *PN*, 24 August 1939.
[70] Miliukov, "*Germano-Sovietskaia* '*bomba*,'" *PN*, 23 August 1939.

the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed, but in Miliukov's view, the security of Soviet territory was still of paramount concern.[71] Even if he could not explicitly state that the Allies essentially pushed the Soviet Union to a non-aggression pact with Germany, he could intimate that the USSR acted justly in order to protect territory and people from a two front war.

Miliukov and other liberals had more work in store for them when after Germany invaded Poland and ignited the Second World War, the Soviet Union itself moved into democratic Poland on 17 September without a formal declaration of war. Conscious that the Allies would treat the manoeuvre as an act of Soviet aggression, *Poslednie novosti* treated the action again as purely defencive. "The Soviet Government, by virtue of unfolding events, may be forced to make a number of important decisions," one article stated. This was because "Germany insisted that the USSR answer the question of whether it was with Germany or against it."[72] Germany, in other words, had forced the USSR's hand. The author was of course entirely unaware of the secret protocol attached to the Nazi-Soviet Pact that outlined territorial and political arrangements to be made between the two states in Poland.[73] At the time, however, *Poslednie novosti* spun the manoeuvre as a defensive response to a German ultimatum rather than an act of aggression. The Soviet Union had, after all, already complained to the Allies about a need to create a secure buffer through occupation between Germany and the USSR. Since war had broken out, the need for this buffer was now even more justified.

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[71] Johnston, *New Mecca*, 144.
[72] "*Pozitsiia SSSR*," PN, 17 September 1939. Author is uncredited.
[73] See "Article II-Secret Additional Protocol," The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939.

In its reports, *Poslednie novosti* also noted that Soviet press organs regularly referred to Germany as "aggressors" to shore up the idea that the Soviet state acted defencively. In order to show that the USSR neither wished to antagonise or "provoke conflict with Paris and London," *Poslednie novosti* also claimed Soviet troops would "hardly strike down Polish troops." The Soviet Union was merely reacting to events closer to home when it entered Poland. The USSR's actions were not the result "of any agreement with Germany, but rather to limit German conquests" and to 'protect' remaining Polish territory from Hitler's incursions.[74] Ultimately, *Poslednie novosti* claimed, there was little profit for the Soviet Union in the division of Polish territory other than defence. This was no act of Soviet "pan-Slavism" but a response to Hitler's threats. If anything, Russia's "return to Europe" was good for Poland as *Poslednie novosti* would have it, since the Soviet Union would take on this burden and protect the remainder of Poland from Germany.[75]

5.5 *Poslednie novosti* and Former Russian Territories

Poslednie novosti largely continued its defence of the USSR's actions still further when the state's actions appeared more aggressive than defencive. This practice continued even though Miliukov initially called its invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939 "amoral" since the Soviet Union had not officially declared war and because Finland was a democracy.[76] Still, the act invited particularly telling examples of liberal exile support. *Poslednie novosti* reported that the Soviet Union had begun demanding the

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[74] "*Kuda idet SSSR*," *PN*, 17 September 1939.
[75] "*Gitler i Stalin*," *PN*, 24 September 1939.
[76] M. G. Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl' russkoi emigratsiia, 20-30-e gg. XX v*. (Moscow: *Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN*, 2009), 359.

cession of land from Finland in order to move the USSR's borders further west and provide more breathing space for Leningrad from the Nazi threat. "Neutrality" as outlined in the Nazi-Soviet Pact, was of "merely secondary assistance" to the Soviet Union, but not a guarantee Hitler would not invade. On the eve of the invasion, the newspaper contended that "Soviet demands were quite minimal," given that the USSR had offered land in return and that defence of Leningrad necessitated these requests.[77] The Finns refused and Soviet forces consequently invaded.[78] Not only was it necessary to ensure the safety and security of Peter's capital, the newspaper declared, but "Russia also need[ed] free access for its fleet in the Gulf of Finland."[79] Military priorities for the Soviet state thus justified what may otherwise be called aggression against a democratic state.

The arguments were neatly reminiscent of those made by the RPC at the Paris Peace Conference as we saw in Chapter One. *Poslednie novosti* prioritized Soviet security measures over the wishes of Finland's population similar to the way the RPC argued that Russia should be allowed to retain Finland and other territories to protect its borders and military and economic interests in the Baltic region in spite of their rights to national self-determination. As M. G. Vandalkovskaia points out, Miliukov could not help but be aware of one important contradiction in the USSR's manoeuvres. The paradox Miliukov perceived was that Soviet occupation and outright annexation of territories then belonging to Finland and Poland "broke up the fully developed historical and national shape" that

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[77] "*Nakanune soveto-finskoi voiny*?" *PN*, 29 November 1939. No author attributed; Miliukov, "*Kto zachinshchik*?" *PN*, 19 April 1940.
[78] William R. Trotter, *The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940* (New York: Workman, 2002), 14-16. See also Robert Edwards, *White Death: Russia's War on Finland, 1939-40* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 27-29.
[79] "*Nakanune soveto-finskoi voiny*?" *PN*, 29 November 1939; Georgii Adamov. "*Finliandiia*," *PN*, 12 December 1939.

had grown in these territories while ignoring the national wills therein.[80] At the same time, these territories had been under the control of legitimate and recognised democracies. Now, "like the Muscovite totalitarian state where land belonged to the tsar and citizens were his lackeys, the present one denied personal freedom and property" to local populations, while it installed the "same impenetrable features, strict prohibitions, and strict supervision."[81] Nevertheless, while Miliukov appeared to pay lip service to the problem associated with a communist regime invading democracies like Finland and Poland, he very quickly added that the Winter War at least had created for the USSR "a brand new position in the world" that made it worth "reassessing" the regime.[82] He had begun to reassess it for the better. At the same time, his support for the regime in spite of its aggression toward democratic states indicates that he did not prioritize the rights of people as a universal value. Rather, he prioritized territorial interests of the state as a Russian value that could, as we shall see below, justifiably come at the expense of non-Russians.

Miliukov had acknowledged that former Imperial Russian territories had developed national cultures and thus could not justify Soviet action based on old liberal imperialist lines. Yet he evidently did not believe Finland could protect itself against Germany, and more critically, it could not serve as a traditional barrier between Russian territory and foreign invaders. Instead, Miliukov seemed to legitimise the maneuver by emphasizing the Soviet state's need to create a defencive buffer zone between itself and Germany while offering protection to a weaker state at the same time. *Poslednie novosti*

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[80] Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl'*, 357.
[81] Miliukov, "*Okno v Evropu*," *PN*, 27 November 1939; Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl'*, 359.
[82] Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl'*, 359.

continued to identify the "rigidness" of Soviet policies and acts of "aggression," but stopped short of direct criticism of the USSR's apparent "policy of Sovietization" in Finland because it was perceived as another defencive measure. When the USSR installed a puppet government under Otto V. Kuusinen in Finnish Karelia, *Poslednie novosti* stated that this was merely an attempt to foster a "close friendship" between the USSR and Finland. Such a 'friendship' was needed because it appeared that Germany intended to create a "wide road" to the Atlantic through Sweden and Norway, a circumstance that would bring the Wehrmacht "uncomfortably close to Soviet territory." As such, the Soviet Union fought the Winter War, partially occupied Finnish territory, and created a puppet government, as *Poslednie novosti* intimated to readers, all under the pretense of safeguarding the Soviet Union's territorial security while protecting that of Finland.[83]

Poslednie novosti contributor, Georgii Adamovich supported this view in his remark that if "foreigners were irritated by what they saw as a revival of Peter the Great's imperialistic traditions in the USSR," so be it since "Russians liked Peter." The Soviet occupation of Finland was justifiable since it wanted "to help Finland…it's a beautiful country."[84] Here, *Poslednie novosti*, Miliukov's flagship of Russian liberalism in exile, put forward the idea that Soviet actions were justified because of Finland's use to Soviet territorial defence and also the protection of Finns. Traditional liberal justifications for empire rested on the idea that empires had an obligation to uplift backward regions to a higher plane of civilisation.[85] Liberal exiles, however, appeared secure in the Soviet

[83] P. V., "*Sovetskaia agressiia v Finliandii*," *PN*, 13 December 1939; Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl',* 357, 359.
[84] Georgii Adamovich, "*Finlandiia*," *PN*, 12 December 1939.
[85] Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, 30.

Union's military and technological superiority and reframed this old justification to focus on the paternalistic protection of a weaker state by a stronger power, which in turn also had a legitimate right to protect itself from invasion.[86]

When the League of Nations expelled the USSR for its apparent aggression in Finland on 14 December, Miliukov, with a bit more bravado than he had mobilised earlier when the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty was signed, cited the League's "practical failure" to uphold its "true obligations to protect member countries from attacks." The organisation had failed to protect Austria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia from Germany and the pacifism and "platonic protests" of western democracies had only "nursed the chief aggressor," – Germany. [87] Intimating that the Soviet Union had no longer been able to count on the League to assist in maintaining its security since "one could say that its authority was useless," Miliukov acknowledged that the state had been pushed toward Hitler and then compelled to push into Finland as well as Poland since it had no one but itself upon which to rely for help against Hitler.[88]

In general, liberals like Miliukov had previously argued that the Soviet regime was illegitimate and fundamentally anathema to the best interests of Russia and its people. As we have seen, *Poslednie novosti* warmed to the home regime as the USSR made attempts to seek protective alliances. More active support emerged when the state created a buffer zone at Lake Ladoga, a body of water previously shared by the USSR and Finland. However, not all liberals agreed that the Soviet regime had departed from its original

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[86] Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 11.
[87] "*Posle iskliucheniia SSSR*," *PN*, 21 December 1939. (no author attributed); M. G. Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl,'* 352. See also "*Sovetskii soiuz iskliuchen iz Ligi Natsii*," *PN*, 15 December 1939.
[88] Miliukov, qtd. in M. G. Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl,'* 352.

desire to spread revolution or that its incursions into Finland and Poland were purely defensive. Right-leaning Kadet V. A. Kravtsov stated that no one should consider Soviet actions as "resistance against German expansion" or even a useful military tactic to occupy Germany in the East in order to help the Anglo-French bloc on the western front. Kravtsov believed these ideas were mere fallacies. The Red Army's dismal performance against the Finns revealed "the weakness of the perverse Soviet system," therefore the USSR would be of little assistance to the Allies even if that were the goal in 1940. More importantly, while the Nazi regime was indeed a real danger, no one should forget that the "primary goal of the USSR was the spread of worldwide communism regardless of the treaties and declarations" the regime made to the contrary. The "trivial and stupid comedy of the Kuusinen Government," Kravtsov added, was no more than a staging ground too spread Bolshevism through Scandinavia, while Finland itself was reduced to a mere cog "in the expansion of world communism." Consequently, anyone who believed that the Soviet Union was capable of evolution held "absurd hopes."[89]

Miliukov did not respond to Kravstov directly. He had, of course, spoken of the evil intentions of the Comintern and the home regime's desire to spread world revolution throughout the interwar period. By 1939, however, he expressed his belief that Stalinism was the "end of the revolutionary process since [Soviet] Russia, having begun as a Utopia, had…come back down to earth and accepted new forms." In contrast to Germany, which steered toward its utopian desire for the global domination of one race over all, "the Russian Revolution had moved from the slogan of 'worldwide revolution' to that of 'a life of happiness' in the socialist fatherland." Stalin's 'Socialism in One Country' plan

[89] V.A. Kravtsov, "*Le probleme russe*," January 1940, V.A. Kravtsov Papers, Miscellaneous Files, RBML.

enabled Russia, in Miliukov's view, to connect the "remote past with promises of a long-term future." Even if this entailed the continuation of communism in the near future in the USSR, at the very least, the Soviet state had "connected communism with…Aleksandr Nevskii," known for successful military victories over German (Teutonic) and Swedish invaders and lauded for his apparent 'patriotism' in Sergei Eisenstein's well-known 1938 Soviet propaganda film.[90]

Miliukov also saw positive benefits for the Soviet state when it concluded several Mutual Assistance Treaties with Estonia (28 September 1939), Latvia (5 October), and Lithuania (10 October). These treaties allowed the USSR to establish military and naval bases in these former Russian territories. While the sovereignty of the Baltics was supposed to remain intact, the Soviet Union essentially established "totalitarian style" protectorates in the region, stationing troops in each state. Regardless of the USSR's internal policies toward people in the Baltic States, Miliukov called the creation of this new system "the Cornerstone of Europe," a construction that was "the very same one Peter the Great used to break Moscow away from the Great Wall of China and attach Russia to Europe two centuries ago."[91] The Soviet Union, as he saw it, understood the threat Germany posed and allowed its internal ideology to adapt to present circumstances.[92] "From world fiction -- the fiction of socialism," he wrote, "the USSR passed here into the

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[90] Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl'*, 349. For more on the 1938 film, *Aleksandr Nevskii*, see Richard Taylor, *Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany*, (London: I. B. Taurius, 2006), 85-98. Aleksandr Nevskii (1220-1263 CE) was the Grand Prince of Kiev, Vladimir and Novgorod.

[91] For terms of these treaties regarding Soviet military installations, see "Article III," Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-Pact of Mutual Assistance, 28 September 1939, *League of Nations Treaty Series, Online*, Internet, Available: http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1939/147.html, Accessed 1 June 2014; M. G. Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl',* 358; Miliukov, "*Okno v Evropu*," *PN*, 27 November 1939.

[92] N. Vakar, "*P.N. Miliukov v izgnanii*," *Novyi Zhurnal*, Vol. 6 (1943): 373.

world of European realities. Here, Peter's 'Window on Europe' was opened again, and a fresh breeze blew." Miliukov did not lament the Soviet state's failure to heed the wishes of the Baltic peoples, nor did he call on the state to maintain the institutions that had already fostered civil society in the region. Instead, he acknowledged that "the same impenetrable features and strict prohibitions" that these territories had endured in the Imperial era had appeared again. Regardless of the apparent Soviet imposition, what mattered more to Miliukov was the Soviet effort to secure its territory first through treaty making, and then through occupation to create yet another buffer zone.[93] Several years before Russian sociologist Nikolai Timasheff published his groundbreaking work on the communism's 'Great Retreat,' Miliukov found sufficient evidence to show him the home regime had evolved from "an ideology of world revolution to…realism" and that Stalin's government was working in Russia's best interests as he saw them. As the regime evolved, Miliukov's outlook on the home government had dramatically changed too.[94]

5.6 Justice Served: Righting the Wrongs of 1919

Another factor that influenced Miliukov's more positive attitude toward the Soviet state was the Soviet Union's 'just' effort to reverse territorial decisions made at Versailles in 1919. As we saw in Chapter Two, the RPC under Vasilii Maklakov worked to safeguard Russia's territory from secession movements. The Allies, committed as they

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[93] M. G. Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl',* 347, 358-59; Miliukov, "*Okno v Evropu*," *PN*, 27 November 1939.

[94] Miliukov, "*Kto zachinshchik?"* See Nicholas Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1946). Timasheff's argues that after nearly two decades of decline in Russian politics, economy, and culture that occurred due to the shock of communist practice, Russia had returned to a path of progressive development on the basis of national traditions, patriotism, and war-time feats in the Second World War.

were to the principle of self-determination, ignored the RPC's supplications and granted several national groups, including Finland, their independence. Twenty years later when the Soviet Union invaded Finland, Miliukov told his co-editor, Igor P. Demidov, that "it is a pity to me about the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg Province."[95] Miliukov's statement recalled the right wing monarchist Boris Sazonov's 1919 comment that Russians would fight before giving these territories up as discussed in Chapter Two. Miliukov himself remained embittered that the loss of these territories occurred because "Russia the Ally was too often treated as a defeated country" by the Allies in Paris.[96] In this vein, Russia's territorial integrity had been violated during the Paris Peace Conference and without Russian approval or participation in official negotiations. Miliukov, among many liberals and Russians in exile viewed this occurrence as wholly unjust. Conversely, that Stalin had maneuvered into former imperial territories was a just and necessary means to right an Allied wrong that reduced the state's defencive capacity and size while exposing it to German machinations. In a rather dramatic sign off to one of his last published articles in *Poslednie novosti*, Miliukov claimed that "the real motive behind Stalin's agreement with Hitler to get the consent of Germany to return to Russia all of the territories it had lost in the last war." This was not an admission that Russia helped Germany start the war, since Hitler's plans against Poland and other states "were conceived independently of Soviet support."[97] But it was a firm recognition that Stalin was successfully undertaking a project to prosecute the RPC's failed claims and seek restitution for Russia's losses.

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[95] N. Vakar, "*P.N. Miliukov,"* 375.
[96] Paul Miliukov, *Russia and England* (London: Russian Liberation Committee, 1920), 7.
[97] Miliukov, "*Kto zachinshchik?"*

In effect, Miliukov believed the Soviet regime acted justly when it occupied Finland and the Baltic States. Certainly, the Stalinist state satisfied the Russian exiles' disappointments with Allied decisions at Versailles, decisions which the RPC stated could only foster Russian resentment and conflict in the future. "Russia…was not at Versailles and it has thus not been obliged to comply with the system" outlined by the Allies. The war, as Miliukov now read it, afforded the opportunity for Russia to realize "its special interests…connected to the question of territories of the former Empire on its Western borders." [98] For his part, Maklakov, the RPC's leader and staunch defender of Russian territory in 1919 concurred. Maklakov claimed that the invasion of Finland was "odious," but he went on to state that the Allies "should realize what the loss of these territories meant for Russia," and understand that "Russia still felt the humiliation imposed upon it in 1919," a disgrace "that could not so easily be forgotten." Stalin's manoeuvres, at the very least, "reopened the famous window on Europe pierced by Peter" in Maklakov's view, allowing Russia to re-join the West and to more effectively protect itself from foreign enemies once again.[99] Historian Laurie Manchester observes that Miliukov thought in the same terms. Miliukov saw in Stalin a violent but practical dictator, a new Peter who could lead Russia back to its natural European path of development.[100]

Miliukov and Maklakov conceived of Soviet reclamation of territory as just because the ends appeared proportional to Russia's losses. The Soviet Union at this time engaged in activities that were originally in Russia's sphere of interests and competency

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[98] Miliukov, "*Polozhenie nakanune voiny*," *Novyi zhurnal*, VI (1943): 195.
[99] Vasilii Maklakov, "Note," 6 December 1939, in Maklakov Papers, Box 16, f. 10. This 'note' discussed the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the invasion of Finland.
[100] Manchester, "Contradictions," 132.

while the violence caused by conflict was proportional to the realized good insofar as the state's actions did not appear to exceed what was necessary to achieve particular objectives-righting old wrongs and defending itself. [101] Miliukov and Maklakov believed the USSR acted justly because its corrective measures equated with the severity of the original territorial violations they claimed Russia endured at Versailles. To them, the USSR did not exceed the balance for greater advantage. It merely reclaimed what belonged to Russia and corrected an imbalance "that only served the interests of Germany," just as the RPC had warned would happen in 1919.[102]

Finally, the USSR's actions could be justified in liberal theory as an extension of the individual right to self-defence against violations to one's life or liberty through even violent means. Miliukov certainly argued in these terms. As Margaret Moore and David Rodin have demonstrated, an attack, or threat of attack, by one state on another is at the same time an attack on the rights and lives of people living in the threatened state, thus defencive acts including war are applications "*en masse*, of the familiar right of individuals to protect themselves from unjust lethal attack."[103] Miliukov did voice his fear that Germany would "enslave [Russian] people and transform them into working cattle, as the Reich established a limitless yoke and monopoly" over Soviet territory.[104] Consequently, Soviet efforts to defend its territory and the people therein from a foreign invader hoping to "transform Russia into a mere colony" through the creation of buffer

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[101] Margaret Moore, *A Political Theory of Territory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 226.
[102] Maklakov, "Note," 6 December 1939, in Maklakov Papers, Box 16, f. 10.
[103] Moore, *A Political Theory*, 222; David Rodin, *War and Self-Defence* (Oxford (UK): Clarendon, 2002), 127.
[104] Vandalkovskaia, *Istoricheskaia mysl',* 350; Miliukov, "*Kto zachinshchik?"PN,* 14 February 1940.

zones in the former imperial territories was both pragmatic and just in his interpretation.[105] He continued to believe in these terms until his death in Aix-le-Bains in 1943.

5.7 The War in France and the War at Home

Russians in France endured significant hardships alongside their French hosts during the Second World War. Many experienced still greater anxiety when Nazi Germany reneged on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Primary source documents regarding liberal responses are somewhat limited. This is largely because writing paper and newsprint were simply in short supply. As well, with the occupation of France, many exiles with means migrated, this time to the United States. Those like Maklakov who stayed behind also had a difficult time maintaining correspondence with the emigration to the US under heavy French and Vichy government censorship. *Poslednie novosti* still published almost daily from the beginning of WWII, but the number of pages printed was markedly reduced. The content as well was qualitatively different: matter-of-fact reports from the war front and descriptions of the German Blitzkrieg as it overran Belgian and French territory adorned its pages. Nevertheless, the paper ran up to the day before Paris was declared an open city and occupied by Nazi Germany. By this time, Miliukov, who was quite ill and aged, had moved to Vichy and turned over editorship to Demidov, though the former continued to send submissions periodically.

Maklakov, who had spent most of the interwar period defending the interests of Russian exiles and refugees in France, took up the reins from Miliukov in rallying

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[105] Miliukov, "*Dva diktatora—dve revoliutsiia*," *PN*, 16 January 1940; Miliukov, "*Kto zachinshchik*," 14 February 1940, Vandalkovskaia, 350.

Russians to the Soviet cause and conveying the idea that Russians knew their 'duty' to not only their host country, but also the motherland. [106] When World War Two began, Maklakov frequently reminded French dignitaries about the roughly 10,000 'Russian Patriots' who were serving in the French military and gladly "took up the campaign alongside their French friends by sharing the danger, exhaustion, tragedy, and deprivation." He also stated that many Russian exiles suffered the same fate as Frenchmen while others earned medals, though "all fulfilled [their] duty to the end."[107] Maklakov wanted to demonstrate Russian loyalty to their ally by conveying that the emigration "faithfully paid" France for the generosity it offered to Russian exiles in their time of need, even if the payment came as a "levy of blood."[108] By spreading this message, Maklakov hoped to improve the negative impact the Nazi-Soviet Pact had had on French views of the Russian emigration. French popular and official opinion worsened when the war began. Russians in France were scapegoated for all manner of privations and suffered from racial slurs and employment discrimination.[109] Russians in Maklakov's view, nevertheless knew their duty to France and remained committed to helping their host against a common enemy. His job was to share this message, which he did when he corresponded with various French officials.

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[106] Robert Johnston gives the most elaborative account of Maklakov's activities in *New Mecca*, 165-182.
[107] Maklakov, "*La situation juridique des émigrés russes en France*," n.d., Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 4. See also Maklakov, "*Loi relatif à la situation des étrangers en surnombre dans l'économie nationale et ses conséquences*," n.d., Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 4.
[108] Maklakov, "*La situation juridique des émigrés russes en France*," n.d., Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 4.
[109] Robert Johnston, "The Great Patriotic War and the Russian Exiles in France," Russian Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July 1976): 304; Maklakov to P. Mille, 13 October 1939, Vasilii Maklakov Papers, Box 6, f. 3; Johnston, *New Mecca*, 151, 157. Johnston notes that Russians experienced much ill treatment particularly during times of labour agitation. If they refused to strike, their French workmates retaliated. However, if they chose to strike, Russian émigrés risked outright dismissal with no prospects of being re-hired.

Maklakov as both lawyer and diplomat also worked throughout the interwar period and during the war to inform Russian émigrés of their juridical status in France, including their rights and obligations as exiles and stateless refugees. He understood that the right to live and work in France necessitated particular obligations to the host including military service even if they were not naturalised citizens. Their stateless status meant that Russians in France could not 'demand' formal rights and protections in the same way French *citoyens* could. However, to enjoy the comparative comfort of refuge and employment in France in spite of their situation, Maklakov believed that Russians had to fulfil particular obligations to the state including the conveyance of "total loyalty" and military service alongside day to day observance of general laws and regulations that were common to French citizens and foreigners.[110] This is consonant with his lifetime commitment to the "essence of liberalism," which for him meant "voluntary submission to a legal order, working within the framework of the law, and respect for the rights of others."[111]

Maklakov did not demand from French authorities the extension of rights or exemptions for Russian exiles in return for their safe harbour in France. In the tsarist era, he believed that the liberals' task was to "seek the peaceful transformation of the autocracy into a constitutional monarchy" by working within the system to generate greater reforms. Now, his discussions about the duties Russians undertook to serve France conveyed the liberal notion that voluntary membership in a community necessitates obligations to

[110] Maklakov, "*L'Émigration russe en France et son role*," Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 4.
[111] David A. Davies, "V. A. Maklakov and the Problem of Russia's Westernization," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 1967, 272; V. A. Maklakov, *The First State Duma: Contemporary Reminiscences* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), 243.

fellow members of the community whether or not one identifies with the group (i.e.: as co-nationals or co-religionists). Undertaking particular practices, such as military service against a common enemy as such generates and communicates a special commitment to the French community as a whole.[112] Whether French authorities fully appreciated Maklakov's efforts is difficult to tell. However, when Germany occupied France and the Vichy Government formed in the summer of 1940, the new authorities did perceive the political importance of his work. Maklakov spent several months in La Santé prison in Montparnasse for his efforts and his apparent refusal to cooperate with the new occupying power.[113]

Maklakov, like Miliukov, also lent support to the Soviet regime. When Germany invaded the USSR in June 1941, Maklakov made a profound effort to drum up active Russian support for the USSR. He continued this effort after his release from prison in 1942. Maklakov did not simply forget about the evils he too perceived in the Stalinist regime at home, but the war for him also required a change of attitude. He could not help but notice the leadership qualities of Stalin's government at home or the degree of popular support this leadership garnered.[114] Strong, effective management and control was an enduring quality Maklakov respected most in leaders. When the Great War broke out, he openly supported the government. He withdrew this support only when it proved incapable of orchestrating strong coordinated leadership and demonstrated too much self-

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[112] Anna Stilz, *Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 189-191.
[113] Johnston, "The Great Patriotic War," 307 and *New Mecca*, 165-67; Marina Gorboff, *La Russie fantôme: L'émigration russe de 1920 à 1950*, (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1995), 192.
[114] Johnston, *New Mecca*, 171-72.

interested at the expense of progressive reforms at home and advances at the front.[115] During the Second World War, Maklakov formed the Russian Émigré Action Group and collaborated closely with the Union of Russian Patriots, a pro-Soviet organisation that promoted Russian émigré allegiance to the French Resistance and reconciliation between the 'glorious' Soviet Union and the emigration.[116] Maklakov's Action Group called on Russian exiles to recognize that Soviet power had in fact kept Great Russia alive and resuscitated its patriotism and healthy forces, which, together with the Soviet regime, helped save Russia from German conquest.

To Maklakov and his group, the Soviet government's courage and pragmatism in the face of German invasion had demonstrated that "the Soviet power ha[d] proved to be worthy" in terms of its leadership.[117] Pragmatic leadership in liberal thought necessitates a particular demonstration of courage against interest groups at home and crucially the ability to eschew personal ethical principles in favour of acting for the common good.[118] The Action Group's statements make it clear their belief that the Soviet Union had evolved from a strictly oppressive regime to a state that could in fact foster and mobilise an active patriotic resurgence at home, which inspired greater unity and productivity among Soviet citizens. The regime also reconciled with the Orthodox Church and evoked images of tsarist heroes to mobilize the people, actions that demonstrated a new embrace of Russian

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[115] V. A. Maklakov, "*Tri Vraga*," *Russkie vedomosti*, 18 September 1915, 2; Davies, "V. A. Maklakov," 319-20.
[116] Johnston, *New Mecca*, 171-72; "*Ob'edinenie russkoi dlia sblizheniia s Sovetskoi Rossiei*," 24 March 1945," Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 17.
[117] *Groupe d'action des émigrés russes*, "Memorandum," June 1944, Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 17, Hoover.
[118] Jason A. Scorza, *Strong Liberalism: Habits of Mind for Democratic Citizenship* (Lebanon (NH): Tufts University Press, 2008), 124-25.

tradition apart from socialist utopianism.[119] Consequently, the Action Group called on the emigration to acknowledge first that the Soviet Government was a truly national government and second, that it must "recognize the Soviet government as a Russian Government."[120]

The weight of these statements was not lost on its members. Concluding an entente with the Soviet regime symbolized the true "end of the revolutionary period in Russia" and the emigration's fight with their long-time foe. The benefits of entente and recognition would ultimately serve "the true interests of Russia," hence the need to support rather than fight the regime.[121] In this resignation, Maklakov's group pointed out that émigrés did not have to entirely "disavow its past intransigence toward the Soviet regime," which had been based on "defending the fundamental principles of the state." Disavowal would erase the meaning and mission of exile for émigrés of all political stripes, including liberals. But duty to Russia and its government, despite its regime, required a resignation.

Similarly, the Union of Russian Patriots published an underground newsletter titled *Russkii Patriot/Patriote russe* edited by Dmitrii Odinets. This underground newsletter which gave reports from the Partisans' Front, updates on Red Army achievements, the conditions in the homeland, and occasionally messages from 'Marshal

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[119] *Groupe d'action des émigrés russes, "L'Émigration doit tirer les conclusions nécéssaires des évenements actuels; cela l'amenera à réconsiderer sa position vis-à-vis du pouvoir soviétique et de la révolution de Novembre,"* n.d. Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 17; Johnston, "The Great Patriotic War," 312, David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2002), 43-47.

[120] *Groupe d'action des émigrés russes*, "Memorandum," June 1944, Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 17, Hoover.

[121] *Groupe d'action des émigrés russes*, "*L'emigration doit tirer les conclusions nécéssaires des évenements actuels*," n.d. Maklakov Papers, Box 22, f. 17, Hoover.

Stalin.'[122] The Union of Russian Patriots also used the organ to continually remind French and Russian readers that "the place of Russian émigrés" was "in the ranks of the French Partisans, defenders of democracy and order."[123] Like the Action Group, it also advocated for an entente between the emigration and the Soviet Union and the former's recognition that "the Government of the USSR exists at the moment as the only government defending the national interests of Russia." Even as the Russian people fight behind the regime for the "motherland" at home, so too must "patriotic" Russian exiles do their part by recognising the Soviet government as a legitimate and just regime that protected that motherland, which they loved unreservedly.[124]

Russkii Patriot praised the Soviet Union for this protection of the motherland (*rodina*). "Glory to our free Fatherland, the people's unity is an unfailing bulwark, the Soviet flag is the people's flag," boasted the refrain of one poem, "Stalin has nurtured our allegiance to the people."[125] As O. Iu. Oleinik has shown, patriotism was one of the characteristic qualities of the Russian intelligentsia in exile. He states that the Russian 'fatherland' in their view was a "holistic" phenomenon that "united people who were conscious of themselves as a single entity regardless of their location. Russia could not be dismembered into discrete parts having a separate existence." The fatherland, that is, the Soviet regime, kept the family together, and did its job to protect the motherland.

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[122] See for example "*Message du Marechale Staline*," *Patriote Russe*, No. 10, July 1944; "*Prikaz Marshala Stalina po sluchaiu prazdnika 1-go mai*," *Russkii Patriot*, No. 11, July 1944. The newsletter was printed in both Russian and French languages.
[123] *Russkii Patriot,* No. 10, July 1944. No title for the article listed.
[124] *L'Union des Patriots Russes en France*, *Patriote Russe*, No. 3, May 1944; *Russkii Patriot,* No. 10, July 1944.
[125] "*Gimi SSSR*," *Russkii Patriot,* No. 5, May 1944. The newsletter alternated its printing between French and Russian languages.

Consequently, these Russian exiles came to see themselves as "compatriots of one nation" even if distance separated them from Russia itself.[126]

Before his death, Miliukov too had come to think in similar terms. As we have seen, the interests and security of the state for him was a first order good. After Germany invaded the USSR, he too lauded Soviet defencive efforts, actions that made the regime worth actively supporting. However, unlike Maklakov and his associates, Miliukov believed the regime's massive war efforts served as a form of restorative justice that compensated for its past crimes. "Eight months of splendid defence of national interests" he wrote,

> "has connected Russia with the interests of European democracies, and its defence against a terrible enemy and potential enslaver has thrown new light on the difficult years during which Russia prepared for war. These months have softened the memories of those brutalities that accompanied the Stalinist experiment."[127]

These comments indicate that Miliukov had moved from qualified to unqualified support of the Soviet regime because of the state acted for the sake of security. The Soviet government also appeared to foster a new relationship with the people, one in which they could play an active role for the purpose of defence. He believed that because of the regime's protective exertions, Russians at home and abroad remained "connected to their motherland." The people at home had become "conscious patriots" determined to fight off the enemy in partnership with the state. Defeatists in his view were mistaken in their belief that the people would now "willingly replace a politically oppressive dictatorship

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[126] O. Iu. Oleinik, *Intelligentsiia, emigratsiia, otechestvo*, 9, 37. For a deeper explanation of the concepts of *rodina* and *otechestvo*, see Melissa K. Stockdale, "What is a Fatherland? Changing Notions of Duty, Rights, and Belonging in Russia," in Mark Bassin, Christopher Ely, and Melissa K. Stockdale, *Space, Place, and Power in Modern Russia: Essays in the New Spatial History* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010).

[127] Miliukov, "*Polozhenie nakanune voiny*," *Novyi zhurnal*, VI (1943): 195.

with economic servitude to a foreign conqueror."[128] After all, if the people were in fact hostile to the government, they "would have risen against it at the first sight of German bayonets."[129] Because he believed the Soviet people fought bravely for the motherland under the regime's leadership and in spite of its past sins, the effort had to be applauded and supported in his view. The regime had "evolved and survived the new catastrophe" with an appropriate and just amount of aggression against the Nazi threat. The people also "produced huge amounts for manufacturing and defence industries, and [were] on the right track for producing administrative machinery." Believing the regime and people now worked together to create and maintain a state that was "equal to the enemy in technical knowledge, arms, and professional advancement, Miliukov was "ready to admit that [he was] among the jingoists," ready to embrace the regime. This was a radical departure from his earlier positions against strengthening the regime. At this moment, he believed the state and people required loyalty and Miliukov unreservedly gave it. [130]

In this regard, exiles like Maklakov and even Miliukov reconnected themselves to Russia through the practice of what was they believed was essentially good liberal citizenship. They had ceased their denunciations of the regime, took up the cause of active support, and applauded its victories at the front. As exiles, they could now claim to be insiders who shared the national burden with compatriots at home.[131] Nevertheless, their responses to the Nazi threat and invasion of the Soviet Union reveal the shifting nature of

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[128] Ibid.
[129] Miliukov, qtd. in Oleinik, *Intelligentsiia, emigratsiia, otechestvo*, 144.
[130] Miliukov, "*Polozhenie nakanune voiny*," 195; "*Pravda bolshevisma*," in *Russkii Patriot*, No. 6, June 1944, Oleinik, *Intelligentsia, emigratsiia, otechestvo*, 132, 144. See also Mark Vishniak, *Godu Emigratsii, 1919-1969: Parizh-N'iu-Iork (Bospominaniia)*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970), 192-94; Johnston, *New Mecca*, 127.
[131] Shain, *Frontier*, 132.

their liberal ideals. They no longer sought to weaken the regime, but rather strengthen it through active support. They engaged in behaviour that they believed would be in service to the state and motherland and ceased criticizing the regime for its refusal to grant greater rights and liberties to the people at home. Nor did they demand them in return for this newfound loyalty. In a time of war, the security of the state had primacy, while the exile's broader liberal ideals took second place.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has surveyed Russian liberal responses to the threat and outbreak of war against the Soviet Union. I examined growing concerns regarding Nazi Germany's intentions vis-à-vis Soviet territory that were matched by budding approval among liberals for the USSR's defencive actions. This newfound approval evolved into more active support when World War II began and the Soviet Union invaded and occupied territories that Russia had lost in 1919. When Nazi Germany invaded the USSR in 1941, Russian liberals lauded the latter's defencive efforts and ability to muster active popular support. Each of these developments caused liberals to reevaluate their long-time opposition to the regime. By the end of the war, these liberals declared that the revolution was over and that the Soviet Government was in fact a legitimate one. The regime had acted 'justly,' protecting Russia's territorial interests, a course of action the liberals came to prioritise over the rights and liberties of the people at home and in those states the Soviet Union occupied. These tensions demonstrate the Russian liberals had yet to strike a balance between the territorial interests of the state with an acceptance of the rights of peoples in other independent states, indicating again that liberalism was a work in progress. Russian

liberals did not demand more rights for the people at home (or themselves) in exchange for their loyalties and they all but ceased to argue for their ideals. Yet, they did succeed in adopting for themselves a role in sharing the national burden from abroad, behaving as they believed as ideal citizens.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

After the Second World War, the centre of Russian political and cultural life in exile moved from Paris to New York. There, many exiles continued the long tradition of opposition to the Soviet Government. The periodical *Novyi zhurnal* took up political questions where *Poslednie novosti* had left off. Unlike the Paris newspaper, *Novyi zhurnal'*s editors refused to remain silent about the criminal aspects of Soviet misrule though it heartily embraced Russia's efforts during and after the Second World War. Critically, the work that the emigration to the United States undertook in their columns and lecture tours regarding Soviet affairs pioneered the new discipline of Sovietology.[1] This Cold War era science was used to interpret and anticipate internal Soviet politics in order to inform Western, particularly US foreign policy toward the USSR. Kremlinology, its successor, continues the tradition today by attempting to uncover the nature and motives of President Vladimir Putin's government in the post-Soviet era, by not only informing Western policy toward the Russian Federation but also popular opinion through media analysis.[2]

Of those, like Vasilii Maklakov, who stayed in Paris, many debated the question of whether to accept Soviet citizenship and return 'home' to the Soviet Union under a June

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[1] Robert Johnston, *New Mecca, New Babylon: Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920-1945* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), 170, 182, 185.

[2] See for example Professor Mark Galeotti's blog *In Moscow's Shadows* that focuses on state-level organised crime and security issues. Available https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/. Accessed 15 August 2015. See also Brian Whitmore's blog, "The Power Vertical," through *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty*, which focuses on Russian power struggles inside and outside of the Federation's borders. Available http://www.rferl.org/archive/The_Power_ Vertical/latest/884/884.html. Accessed 15 August 2015.

1946 amnesty given to them by the Soviet Government. Some 6000 returned from to the USSR but most stayed in France. As Miliukov had before his death in 1943, Maklakov and others had come to believe that the Soviet Government acted in the state's best interests. They also identified, as Robert Johnston notes, "a victorious USSR with the best of the purely Russian past" and Stalin as the legitimate heir to Peter the Great. However, they were still quick to perceive the regime's return to old intransigence after the war.[3] Future study of the emigration following the Second World War will greatly add to the history of Russian political culture outside of the Soviet Union in the Cold War period, as well as Russian liberal politics and worldviews abroad by surveying their responses to developments inside the Soviet Union and its foreign relations. Periodicals such as *Novyi zhurnal* (1942-1980) in New York and *Vozrozhdenie* (1949-1974) in Paris are fruitful sources. They serve as an excellent starting point for political debate. For example, the New York group harboured significant disdain for the Paris colony's 'acceptance' of the Revolution and Soviet Government that brought an effective end to the Russian civil war. The latter's reply rested on the idea that the New York group simply did not understand the circumstances emergent from hardships of war in France because they had fled to America.[4] The anti-Soviet 'diehards' it seems were then ensconced in the US, but it is certainly worth exploring whether Russian liberals that stayed on in Paris reverted to their old diehard opposition of the regime based on its treatment of the people, including returning Red Army veterans and prisoners of war, or if they continued to accept

[3] Johnston, *New Mecca*, 179-180.
[4] Ibid.

the regime, however tacit or exuberant, because of its modernisation and defence of the state.

Though Johnston states that "the political dimension of the émigrés life in France is the least compelling part of their historical legacy," and that the political activists' lost causes "lie more thickly covered by desert dust than any other artefact of exile life," this thesis has challenged his contention.[5] Liberal exile analysis and critique of contemporary events and circumstances such as the threat of state dismemberment, the famine's impact on the strength and modernity of that state, the restorationist visions among the emigration's right wing, and the Nazi threat to the state's security both compelled and allowed them to elaborate on alternative visions that challenged the status quo by using a liberal lens through which to view developing historical circumstances. Liberal activism helped shape the life and culture of Russia Abroad. It did so by fostering consideration and debate of ideals about a future Russian state that constituted a significant part of the myth-making rituals regarding the homeland in this diaspora.

Russian liberals continued the effort to actively articulate a new vision of a strong, modern, and just Russian state, one that rested on democracy, federalism, civil rights, a constitution, and the rule of law. Such a state had not yet been realised in Russia, and many liberals dedicated their lives in exile to achieve this goal. This thesis has surveyed a very different mission than the one cultural histories of Russia Abroad have identified, a mission that sought only to capture and protect memories of the Russia that was. Liberal exiles hoped to return to a post-Soviet Russia that was quite dissimilar to the Russia they had fled. They made it their purpose to elaborate on these ideals in public forums in order

[5] Ibid., 185.

to steer the emigration's opinion to their points of view, and also ready them for time when the grand state-building project could begin. Through their work, liberal ideals 'survived' in exile despite the fact that their distance and the existence of the Soviet made the application of these ideals ever more remote.

As we have seen, numerous tensions also emerged in Russian liberal thought and action in the interwar period, indicating that the ethos did not disappear after October 1917 and did far more than survive abroad. Tensions such as the RPC's outward profession of sympathy for self-determination and simultaneous defence of Russia's rights to 'its' territory, anti-Bolshevik propaganda during the famine of 1921-22 that focused more on the state as civilisation and less on meeting the practical needs of starving peasants, the undemocratic exclusion of non-democrats from participation in new state-building, and the applause of 'just' Soviet actions to defend itself at the expense of the rights of peoples in the states the USSR occupied during WWII all indicate that liberalism was very much a work in progress after 1917. Russia liberals did not appear to either publicly confront, unravel, or resolve these tensions in the period under study thus leaving the work incomplete. Indeed, they may not have recognised these tensions in their time. The fact that these tensions emerged, however, does not mean that Russian liberalism was by any means a failure. Rather, it means that liberals had yet to master a balance between the priorities they placed on the strength and modernisation of the state with the rights and welfare of the people at home, in peripheral regions, and among political competitors abroad.

Given the various socio-political issues that we read about today, it is evident that some of the quandaries Russian liberal exiles confronted are continuing to play themselves

out between the state and people in and even outside of the Russian Federation. In June 2015, for example, Moscow introduced a new regional policy deemed by some observers as 'hyper-centralist,' insofar as the centre has given itself greater control over regional tax revenues, the amalgamation of economic zones and resources therein, and the candidature of gubernatorial offices. Thus it appears to observers that Russia is now a 'post-federal' space that uses the word 'Federation' in its name only nominally as it moves closer to impinging on the rights and powers of the state's many regions.[6] In the cases of Russia's wars in Georgia and Ukraine, while there are many geopolitical issues at play here, one of those issues remains heavy dissatisfaction with the location of Russia borders that were cut in 1991, a Russian irredentist desire to reclaim strategic territory populated partially with ethnic Russians for the state, and a simultaneous need to thwart NATO and Eurozone influence close to Russia's political frontiers and economic spheres of interest.[7] Furthermore, there are also concerns about the Putin government's suspicion of western influence along its borders and inside them, and how these concerns are playing out in broader conversations about Russia's post-Soviet identity and place in the world as either a westernizing or increasingly Eurasianist state.[8] Again, these contemporary

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[6] See Vadim Shtepa, "*Postfederalizm: plavanie v pustom basseine*," *Gazeta.ru*. 1 June 2015. Available http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2015/05/28_a_6737745.shtml Accessed 15 August 2015. See also Paul Goble, "Hypercentralization Born of the Chechen War Now Threatens Russia, Beno Says," *Window on Eurasia*, 13 December 2014. Available http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.ca/2014/12/window-on-eurasia-hyper-centralization.html Accessed 15 August 2015. For the structure and jurisdictional authority of the Russian Federation and its constituent republics, see "The Constitution of Russia, Chapter Three: The Federal Structure," *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, 25 December 1993. Available http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles /ConstEng3.shtml Accessed 15 August 2015.

[7] See "Understanding Putin's Plans," *The Economist*, 31 January 2015, Available http://www.economist.com/news /europe/21641278-russian-president-stepping-up-both-war-ukraine-and-his-confrontational-rhetoric Accessed 15 August 2015.

[8] For an analysis on whether Putin's government is pursuing a policy of Eurasianism, see Matthew Schmidt, "Is Putin Pursuing a Eurasianist Foreign Policy?" *Demokratizatsiya*-George Washington University (Winter 2004-05). Available https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya

circumstances are far too intricate and multifaceted to analyse adequately here, but it is clear that Russia has yet to negotiate political, security, and economic relationships with the republics inside of its borders and the former Soviet republics beyond its frontiers in a manner that is satisfactory for all, nor has its national identity been cast in stone.

Finally, it is worth recalling the idea that Russian liberals in exile worked under the assumption that the old regime and its institutions had vanished and thus a new state could be formed, followed by the creation of a democratic civil society. Arguably, this simply has not yet occurred in post-Soviet Russia. Of course, we know that democracy is imperfect everywhere it is practiced, but it is difficult to ignore that the Russia as a democratic federative republic has taken steps at home under Putin that indicate that it is moving closer to authoritarianism rather than toward liberal democracy after the massive failure of reforms in the Boris Yeltsin years. Political scientist Karen Dawisha believes Putin and his "close-knit cabal" sought to create an authoritarian regime within weeks of his first election, while democracy "is a decoration rather than a direction" in Russia.[9] Her book is written with the self-assurance that Western democracy of the British or American brands are *the* yardsticks to measure Russia's current failure to 'progress' toward democracy and is undoubtedly hostile to Putin's government. Nonetheless, elections remain heavily flawed, political pluralism continues to narrow, and the government itself has taken an increasingly hardline against opposition among elites and the general public. Presently, there is no liberal party representation in the State Duma. Nevertheless, opposition to the government continues to grow, opposition that has roots in the liberal

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%20archive/GWASHU_DEMO_13_1/Y35592282447U832/Y35592282447U832.pdf. Accessed 16 August 2015.

[9] Karen Dawisha, *Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 8.

exiles' work before and after they left Russia. Liberal democracy, if that is in fact what Russian people desire, may have a long way to go, but it remains, as it did in Russia Abroad, still a work in progress.

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