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THE
FATAL CONSEQUENCES
OF
Minist^r. Influence:

Or, The Difference between
ROYAL POWER
AND
MINISTERIAL POWER.
Truly Stated.

A
POLITICAL ESSAY,

Occasioned by
The PETITION presented last Session of
Parliament by *Six Noble Peers of Scotland.*

AND
Addressed to the *Noble*, the *Ancient*, and the *Rich*
Families of Great Britain.

WITH
AN APPENDIX, containing Copies of those *Accounts*
of ILLEGAL PRACTICES at the last Election of P---s,
which some N---le and others were ready to have
given, and are still ready to give upon *Oath*, if required.

*Remember, O my Friends, the Laws, the Rights,
The generous Plan of Power deliver'd down,
From Age to Age, by your renown'd Forefathers,
(So dearly bought, the Price of so much Blood!)*
O! let it never perish in your Hands,
But piously transmit it to your Children.
Do thou, Great Liberty, inspire our Souls,
And make our Lives in thy Possession happy,
Or our Deaths glorious in thy just Defence.

CATO.

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P R E F A C E.



HO' many of my Countrymen appeared but little affected with the PETITION presented to the *House of Peers* last Session of Parliament, by SIX NOBLE LORDS of *Scotland*; yet to me it gave the utmost Concern. I was from the Beginning, highly sensible of the Danger with which our *Constitution* was threatned from that Quarter; and therefore, as a *Free-born* Subject of *Great Britain*, I found myself naturally interested in the Event of that Affair. Tho' the rejecting of the *Petition* gave me great Uneasiness, yet while the *Session* continued, I pleased myself with the Hopes, that the Affair would be put into some other Shape, and strictly enquired into, either by that House, or the other; but the *Session* ending, without so much as an Attempt made in either *House* for that Purpose, my Hopes all vanished, and they were succeeded by the most dismal Apprehensions.

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In this troublesome State of Mind, it was natural to seek for Comfort in my own Imagination; and accordingly, from the little Notice that was taken of the Affair, I endeavour'd to perswade myself, that the *Noble Lords Petitioners* were certainly mistaken, and that there was not the least Ground to suspect any such *Practices* as they had complain'd of: To confirm myself in this Opinion, I endeavour'd to get as much into the Secret of that Affair as I could; and tho' all my Endeavours signified little, yet Fortune supplied, what Industry could not attain to; and by *meer Accident*, I got Possession of a great Number of *Papers*, which I am assur'd were copy'd from *Originals*, and were design'd to have been made use of by the Managers in the *House of Lords*, if their Lordships had thought fit to enter into an *Enquiry* into that Affair. But from the Perusal of those Papers, I was soon convinc'd the *Noble Lords Petitioners*, were far from being mistaken; for tho' but few of the *Proofs*, upon which they founded their Complaint, can be supposed to have come to my Hands; yet from these I have, there appears to be too much Reason to suspect, that the most *Treasonable Practices* were made use of *at the last Election of Peers for Scotland*.

It is not proper to publish the Names of the *Witnesses*, or of the *Persons accused*, till they come to be published in a *legal and constitutional* Manner. The *Practices* are what the Publick ought chiefly to regard, and they are Crimes which, in my Opinion, strike

so directly at *His Majesty's* Government, and at our *Happy Constitution*, that after having been complained of in such a solemn Manner, I must think it impossible they should escape being enquired into by *Parliament*, unless we suppose, (which God forbid) *That the Majority of both Houses of Parliament have a greater Regard for the Persons who may probably be accused, than they have for their King or their Country.*

I shall not take it upon me to affirm, that the Persons suspected are really guilty; on the contrary, for the Sake of them, for the Sake of my Country, I wish they may be able to justify themselves in the most ample manner, upon a fair and impartial *Enquiry*: But if they are really guilty, our *Constitution* cannot be preserved, *His Majesty's* Government cannot remain secure, without a strict *Enquiry*, and a *severe Punishment*; and if they are innocent, their Characters as Men of Honour, and as good Subjects, cannot be vindicated without a *fair* and an *open Enquiry*: In the first Case, every Man of Honour in the Nation ought to promote an *Enquiry*; in the last, the Gentlemen accused or suspected, ought to insist upon it; and therefore, as a Friend to my Country, if they are guilty, as a Friend to them if they are innocent, I resolved to use my best Endeavours to promote a *free and impartial Enquiry* into that Affair.

This Resolution gave occasion to the following Essay, and I found it necessary to publish, by way of Appendix, the Copies of some

of those *Testimonies* or *Evidences*, which, it is supposed, some *N---le* and others could give, if required, in relation to the *illegal Practices* made use of at the *Last Election* of the *Sixteen Peers* for *Scotland*; for as my Design was to shew the Necessity of *inquiring* into these *Practices*, I was obliged to give my Reasons for *suspecting* that some such *Practices* were actually made use of; therefore I hope the *N---le* and others, whose private *Memorandums* I have published, will excuse the Liberty I have taken.





INTRODUCTION.



THE first Principles of VIRTUE, HONOUR, or MORALITY, and the *fundamental Maxims* of Society, have been of late so much *misrepresented* by a certain Set of *Political Writers*, that it is become necessary for every Man who writes in Defence of our *Constitution*, to begin with explaining and enforcing those Principles and Maxims, which were never controverted but for the most *wicked Purposes*, and by the most *selfish* and *designing* Men.

VIRTUE, HONOUR, HONESTY, are three Names given to the same Idea. A Man's Duty in this Life is meant by each, with this Difference, That when we consider a Man who performs his Duty as a *Fellow Creature*, or *Fellow Countryman*, we say he is a *Man of Virtue*; when we consider a Man who performs his Duty as a *Gentleman*, or a *Soldier*, (which every Gentleman is supposed to be) we say he is a *Man of Honour*; and when we consider a Man who performs his Duty as a *Neighbour* or *Dealer*, we say he is a *moral* or *honest Man*: But as no Man can perform his Duty as a *Gentleman* or *Soldier*, as no Man can perform his Duty as a *Neighbour* or *Dealer*, without performing his Duty as a *Fellow Creature* or *Fellow Countryman*; therefore whoever is not a *virtuous Man*, whoever is deficient in his Duty to Mankind, or to his Country, can neither be a *Man of Honour*, nor an *Honest Man*.

VIRTUE then, in its most general Sense, consists in an exact Observance of the Laws of Nature, according to that Subordination in which they are placed by the Author of Nature; which Subordination every Man may discover, and must acknowledge.

As I am not now to compile a *Body of Morality*, therefore I shall only take notice, that, according to this Subordination, we are in Duty bound to contribute as much as we can, *1st*, To the Preservation and Happiness of Mankind in general. *2^{dly}*, To the Good of the particular Society to which we belong, so far as is consistent with the Preservation and Happiness of Mankind in general. *3^{dly}*, To the Good of our Family and Friends, so far as is consistent with the Good of our Country, and the Preservation of Mankind. *4^{thly}*, To the Preservation of our own Lives, and the Increase of our future Happiness, so far as is consistent with the Safety of our Family and Friends, the Good of our Country, and the Preservation of Mankind. And lastly, We are in Duty bound

bound to avoid Pain, and pursue our present Happiness or Pleasure, so far as is consistent with the Preservation of our Lives, our own future Happiness, the Safety of our Family or Friends, the Good of our Country, and the Welfare of Mankind.

This Subordination we must, *in Principle at least*, acknowledge. It is in acting according to this Subordination that VIRTUE truly consists. Nay, it is in this that *Religion* chiefly consists; for the principal Part of our *Duty* towards *God* consists in performing our *Duty* towards *Mankind*, according to those Laws which he has prescribed, and which every Man finds deeply imprinted upon his Mind; for if we examine but a little into the several Passions and Affections of Mankind, especially that violent Desire every Man has of acquiring and preserving the Esteem of his Companions, we must conclude, that no Man can enjoy real Happiness, without observing this Subordination, in as perfect a Manner at least, as it is generally observed by the rest of his Countrymen, particularly those with whom he associates. For Confirmation of this, I may appeal to every Man's Experience in Life; for we always find, that as soon as a Man has forfeited his Character, by neglecting to observe this Subordination, in any remarkable Degree, or by committing any notorious and *unfashionable* Violation of it, he deserts the Company of those that have preserved it, and begins to associate with Criminals like himself; and tho' in their Company he may seem easy, yet we may judge *what he feels within*, at every time he meets one of his former Companions, or reflects upon the general Contempt he finds himself exposed to: Such is the Force of this Human Passion for Esteem, that even the most barbarous Crimes, the most sordid Vices, by becoming general and *fashionable*, have often taken a new Name, and have assumed the Character of VIRTUE; our Reason, our Understanding, and our Judgment of Things being as often misled by this Passion as by any other.

As no Man can be really happy without being *virtuous*, or at least without thinking himself *virtuous*: So if every Man had Resolution enough to act according to the strict Rules of VIRTUE, and Impartiality, and Patience enough to examine and discover, upon all occasions, their proper Subordination, every Man would be happy as far as the Common Frailties and Accidents of Life could permit. There would be no such thing as particular Societies: Mankind would be but one general Society, without King or Subject, Lord or Tenant, Master or Servant: Every Man would be just to another: Every Man would assist his Fellow Creature in Distress.

But the Case is otherwise, and has always been so. Most Men pursue vehemently their immediate Desires, their present Pleasures, without any Regard either to their own future Happiness, or to the Preservation or Happiness of Mankind in General: This brings Diseases and Death upon particular Men, and has brought the *Evil of Government* upon the whole Species; for there is no way of restraining these vehement and inconsiderate Pursuers of their present

present Good, but by an Association among the *Virtuous* and more Considerate, for restraining the violent Passions of one another; for Compelling one another to be *Virtuous*, as far as it is possible for Human Laws or Punishments to effectuate, and for their mutual Defence against all manner of Injuries; and as this Union or Association cannot be made effectual for the End intended, without their submitting themselves to the Direction or Command of some one Person, Natural or Political; therefore all those who associate themselves together for this great End, covenant to act with their united Force, according to that Direction they agree on; for as in Mechanism, in order to make different Powers act with a joint Force, they must be made all to act in the same Direction, so in order to make different Men act with a joint Force, they must all agree to act by the same Will or Direction. This Covenant is imply'd in the very Nature of every Society, and that Direction or Will by which they chuse to act, is called their *Government*.

Mankind are, and have for many ages, been too numerous, for its being possible to unite them into one Society, or to subject them to *one Government*; and therefore we find that there have always been, and still are, a great Number of distinct Societies or *Governments* in the World; and every one of these *Governments* again consists of a great Number of particular Families, or Societies; from whence flows that Series and Subordination, with respect to the Principles of VIRTUE, which I have mentioned.

The general Rules of VIRTUE, or the Laws of Nature, ought to be the Foundation of every particular Society, and are always supposed to be so, at least with respect to the Behaviour of the Several Members towards one another; and in all particular Societies, if there happens any Dispute between two of the Members about the Application of these Rules or Laws, there is always some certain Method established for determining that Dispute; to which Determination both Parties are obliged, by the very Nature of the Society, to submit; and moreover, in order to prevent such Disputes as much as possible, and to ascertain the Application of the general Laws of Nature, to every particular Case that may occur, and to explain them in such a manner, as that every Man may easily understand them, every Society either makes a great many Regulations or Orders, which are called the Laws of that Society; or they submit themselves absolutely to the Will and Determination of their Governor or Governors, and to such Laws as he or they shall please to make.

When the Laws are made by the whole Society, they are called the *Established Laws* of that Society; but when the People of the Society submit themselves to the absolute Will and Determination of their Governor or Governors, and to such Regulations as they shall please to make, such Society may have Laws, but they cannot be said to have *Established Laws*; for tho' the Governor may give several Orders and Directions how the Members shall behave towards one another, and likewise may lay down some general Rules
for

for his own Government ; yet as the Observance and Altering of these Regulations or Orders, depend intirely on the will of the Governour, they cannot be said to be the *Established Laws* of the Society ; for no Law or Rule, that depends on the variable Will of another Man, can ever be said to be *established*, with respect to me ; whereas, if it cannot be altered, or broke through, without my Consent, it is with respect to me as much *Established*, as the Nature of the Thing will admit of, or as I can desire it should.

The End of *Government*, therefore, and the chief Business of all Wise and Just Governours, is, to enforce the Observance of the Laws of VIRTUE or Nature, according to the Subordination I have made ; not only by their own Example, but by Rewarding the *Virtuous*, and Punishing the *Vicious* : This is the Business of Governours. But as Governours are liable to the same Follies, and immoderate Pursuits of present Pleasure, that other Men are ; they often subvert the Ends of *Government*, and make use of that Power, with which they are invested, not for the Protection of the People, but for the satisfying of their own unjust and violent Desires ; from whence it often happens, that *the People stand as much in need of being protected against their Protectors*, as they stand in need of Protection against one another ; or even against Foreign Enemies : This is generally the Consequence, when the Governours are invested with too great a Power, too absolute a Command over the People of the Society ; and on the other Hand, if their Power be too small, if their Command over the People of the Society, be too much limited, they are neither able to protect the Society against Insults and Invasions from without ; nor against Factions and Insurrections from within. To avoid both these Extremes, has been the great Care of all prudent and wise Law-givers ; and ought to be the continual Care of every Society. This is the Reason, that there are almost as many different Forms of *Government*, as there are different Societies ; and from hence it is, that, with respect to Subjects, *Governments* may be divided into two Sorts, *to wit*, *FREE-Governments*, and *Slavish Governments* ; the first of which, will, I believe, be admitted to be the best Sort of *Government*, with respect to the Happiness of Mankind in general, as well as the Happiness of that particular Society ; and therefore no Man can lay Claim to VIRTUE or Honour, who, from a mean and selfish View, or for the Satisfaction of any private Desire, shall oppose its being established, or contribute to its being abolished, in that Country where he happens to have an Interest.

In order to make my Readers fully comprehend this Division of Governments, I shall endeavour to establish, what I take to be the only just and true Ideas of LIBERTY and Slavery.

LIBERTY, is a natural Power of doing, or not doing, what ever we have a mind ; so far as is consistent with the Rules of Virtue, and the *established Laws* of the Society to which we belong.

Slavery is a Force put upon Human-Nature, by which a Man is oblig'd to act, or not to act, according to the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of another.

From these Definitions, it must appear, That, tho' a Man of a wicked Disposition be, by Society, brought under the Necessity of acting or not acting, according to the Rules of VIRTUE, and the *established Laws* of the Society, contrary to his own Inclinations; yet that Necessity is no Ineroachment upon his Liberty; he continues a *Free-Man*, notwithstanding the Force that is put upon him; because that Force is not put upon him as a reasonable Man (which is the natural State of Mankind) but as a Man blinded and misled by his Passions.

And it must likewise appear, that when a Man is once brought into the unhappy State of being oblig'd to act, or not to act, according to the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of another; tho' his Master, or Masters, be so indulgent, as not to desire any Thing of him, but what is according to his own Inclination; yet this Indulgence no ways makes him a *Free-Man*; while he continues in such a State, he continues a **Slave**, notwithstanding the seeming *Liberty* he enjoys.

Now, *FREE-Governments*, I call all such, where the Subjects are in a State of *Liberty*, according to the Definition abovementioned: And *Slavish-Governments*, I call all such, where the Subjects are in a State of **Slavery** as above defin'd. But in order to determine what Sorts of *Governments* are *FREE-Governments*, and what Sorts are *Slavish*, I shall examine particularly, the three different Sorts into which *Governments* have been generally distinguished by those who have written upon the Subject.

With regard to *Monarchy*, or Regal-Government, properly so call'd; by which I mean *Absolute-Monarchy*, or a *Government* under the absolute and arbitrary Direction of *one Man*, by whatever Name he may be dignified and distinguished, it is certain that the Subjects of such a *Government* are all **Slaves**; for he that is obliged to act, or not to act, according to the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of a *Monarch* or his *Minister*, is as much a **Slave** as he who is obliged to act, or not to act, according to the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of a *Master* or his *Overseer*. And indeed, I never saw a **Prime Minister**, in any of the unhappy Countries of *Europe*, where such Monsters are to be seen; I say, I never saw such a Monster at his Levee, or in any other Assembly, under his Direction, but it gave me a lively Idea of an *Overseer*, directing a Plantation of *Negroes* in *Barbadoes* or *Jamaica*; the only Difference I know, is, that the **Slaves** of the latter deserve highly to be pitied, the **Slaves** of the former, to be held in the utmost Contempt.

It must therefore be granted, That the Subjects of every *arbitrary* and *absolute Monarchy* are **Slaves**; nor can the Wisdom, the Justice, or the Prudence of the Monarch, any way alter the Condition of his Subjects; for, tho' an *absolute Monarch* may be *wise enough* to make, what are *ridiculously* called, the *standing*

Laws of the Land, the Measure of his Government; yet, as long as he has it absolutely in his Power to alter, or break through, or neglect observing those Laws, they cannot be properly said to be *standing Laws*; nor can the Subjects be called *Free-Men*, no more than the *Slaves* of a prudent and just Master, who prescribes Rules and Regulations for the good Government of his *Negroes*.

As to an *Aristocracy*, or *Noble-Government*, properly so called; by which I mean, a Government lodged intirely in the Hands of the *Nobles*, or *Chief Families* of the Country; without their being any way limited or restrain'd, but by one another, and by such Laws as they are pleas'd to make for themselves: This Sort of Government, with respect to the rest of the People, is as *Slavish* a Government as the other; and the People subject to it, are as much *Slaves* as the *Slaves* purchased by the *African-Company*, or by any other Society or Corporation: But they have this Advantage over *Royal Slaves*, that if one of their Masters happens to be a foolish, unjust, or cruel Man, two others may happen to be more prudent, or better natur'd, by whom the other's Cruelty will be restrain'd, and his Conduct towards the *Slaves* a little regulated; and therefore, tho' such Governments be generally oppressive, they are not so *whimsically* oppressive as absolute Monarchies. However, as the Laws may be altered, broke through, or neglected, by the *Nobles*, they cannot be said to be *established Laws*, with respect to the People; and consequently, the People, being subject to the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of the collective Body of the *Nobles*, must be as truly *Slaves* as those who are the *Slaves* of a Royal-Master.

Lastly, as to *Democracies*, or *Popular Governments*, It is certain, that a *Democracy* may be, and generally is, a *FREE-Government*; but it may be otherwise. I say, it may be otherwise, and is more or less so, according to the Nature of the Power which the People reserve to themselves. Suppose the People should reserve to themselves, only the Power of chusing their own Governour or Governours; but that such Governour or Governours, should by such Choice, become vested with the absolute and sole Power of making, altering, or repealing what Laws they pleas'd; and without being subject to be called to an Account, in a legal Manner, for this Conduct, or turn'd out, or punish'd for Misbehaviour: As such Governours might alter, break through, or neglect observing the Laws, without the Consent of the People; therefore, with respect to the People, those Laws could not be call'd the *established Laws* of the Society; nor could the Governours be legally confin'd or restrain'd by any Power whatsoever; so that during the Continuance of this Government, they would be as absolute and arbitrary as any Monarch; and consequently the People would be as much Slaves as the Slaves of any other Sort of Arbitrary-Government. They would differ from Royal or Noble Slaves, only in this, *That they might perhaps indulge themselves, with the vain Conceit of chusing their own Masters, and*
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the comfortable Advantage of changing one Set of Oppressors for another.

Suppose again, That the People should reserve to themselves the Power of chusing their own Governours; and also the sole Power of making, altering, or repealing their Laws, *but without reserving any legal Power of calling their Governours to an Account, either before or after the Expiration of their Government; or of punishing them for Malversations:* In this Case, we must consider, that the most strict, the most severe Laws that can be made, are nothing but a dead Letter; unless some Method be established for carrying them into Execution, and enforcing the Observance of them, by punishing the Offenders: This, of the People's having the sole Power of making their own Laws, would signify nothing, with respect to their Governours, unless the People should likewise reserve a Power to punish their Governours, if they transgressed them: Without such a compulsory Power, it could not, with respect to the Governours, be said, that the Society had any Laws at all: The Governours could not be directed by any Thing, but their own arbitrary Will and Pleasure, and the People being subject to that arbitrary Will and Pleasure, it would be ridiculous to call that People *a free People*, or to say, that such a Government was *a free Government*.

In the third Place, Let us suppose, that the People have reserved to themselves, not only the Power of chusing their own Governours, and making their own Laws, *but also a legal Power of calling their Governours to an Account; and of punishing them, when legally convicted of any Misbehaviour in their Office:* This we may immediately see, must necessarily constitute a *Free Government*; and must place every one of the Subjects in the most *perfect State of social Liberty*: The Laws of such a Society may be truly and properly called the *established Laws* of that Society; every Member might do or not do, whatever he had a mind, so far as consisted with the Rules of *Virtue* and the *established Laws* of the Society: And if any Man, Governour, or other, offered to inroach upon his Liberty or Property, he would have the Laws of his Country for his Protector, and the united Force of the Society for his Avenger; which is all that human Wisdom can invent, or Society afford.

From what has been said, one may easily discover the principal, and indeed, the only Rule, by which we are to judge whether a Government be a *FREE* or *Stablist* Government. It is not the Society's having a Body of Laws, which are called the *standing Laws of the Land*: It is not their having a wise and a just King or Governour; it is not the People's having the sole Power of making their own Laws, that constitutes them a *Free People*: *But it is the People's having reserved to themselves, not only the sole Power of making Laws, but a Power of enforcing the Observance of those Laws, by a legal and effectual Method of prosecuting and punishing whosoever shall dare to transgress them.*

This Power, as I have said, must be a *legal* and an *effectual* Power : That is, the People must not only have the Power of calling their Governours and Rulers to an Account, and punishing them for their Misdemeanors; but by the Constitution of their Government, some Method must be established, by which the People may exercise this Power in a *regular* and *legal Manner*, so as to make it *effectual* against the *greatest* Offender; for in all Societies, even in the most arbitrary Governments, the Governours are obliged to have some Regard to common Justice, and to those Laws which are called the Laws of the Society; because, as mutual Protection and Self-Preservation, are the chief Causes of Men's submitting to Government; if the Generality of the People should find, that their Governours subverted the Ends of Society, and destroyed those they ought to protect, they would certainly, at last, come to a general Insurrection against their Governours, and in a *mobbish* Way, would do that, which by the ridiculous Form of their Government, they could not do in a *legal*: This is often the Case, at present, in the *Turkish* Government; and has often been the Case in all arbitrary Governments. The People suffer long and grievously; many small Insurrections happen, many Sacrifices are made to the Jealousy, to the Malice, and to the Revenge of the *Tyrants*. At last the Insurrection becomes general, and the *Tyrants* suffer in their Turn; but the Mischiefs is, that many innocent Men are borne down and overwhelm'd in the Torrent; and the Society itself, is generally in danger of a Total Dissolution.

Tho' this *mobbish* Way of calling Governours to an Account, may be some Restraint upon the Exercise of their Power, yet it is very far from constituting any Sort of *social Liberty*; for as it proceeds from that Liberty of Action, with which every Man is by Nature indu'd, it is what the most *abject Slave*, even the most *wretched Negroe* in the *West Indies*, injoys as much as any Subject whatever; and every *Slave* will certainly make use of it, when he sees a Probability of succeeding in any Attempt for relieving himself from a cruel and oppressive Master. *Slaves* are prompted by Despair; and by Fury, by Murder, and general Massacres they seek to relieve themselves from Oppression: But *Free-born* Subjects are prompted by a generous and cool Resentment; they have recourse to the Laws of their Country, and by a *regular Prosecution*, they pour down their Vengeance only upon the Guilty: When this is done, they are pacified; but if in this they should find themselves disappointed, they will from that Moment look upon themselves as *Slaves*; and will certainly, in an *outrageous* Manner, endeavour to relieve themselves the very first Opportunity that offers.

As no Form of Government, then, can be called a *Free-Government*, but that, by which the People have the sole Power of making their own Laws; and also a Power of prosecuting and punishing in a *legal and regular Method*, even their Governours or Rulers, when they transgress those Laws, or commit any sort of Mis-

Misdemeanor in the Execution of their Office : It is therefore necessary, in all Free-Governments, for the People to assemble often together ; but when a Society becomes very numerous, either by the Increase of their own People, or by the Accession of others, it becomes impossible for the whole People to meet together ; and for this Reason, the Custom was introduc'd, of sending *Representatives* : That is, the People divide themselves into certain Districts or Communities, and each District or Community sends two or three of their Number, to represent them at the general Assembly of the Society ; and consequently these *Representatives*, when met together, have the Exercise of that Power which is lodged in the People. This is the Form of all the Governments we know of at present, which hath any Thing of *Freedom* in their Constitutions ; and in such Societies, we must carefully distinguish between the *Power* or *Supremacy* which is lodged in the People, and the *Exercise* of that *Supremacy* which is lodged in the Assembly of the *Representatives* : And we must likewise distinguish between the *Government*, and the *Exercise* of the *Government* ; for, if the People have retained to themselves the Power of chusing all their Magistrates and Officers, the *Government* as well as *Supremacy* is lodged in the People, and the *Exercise* of the Government is lodged in the *Magistrates* and *Officers* they chuse ; but if the People have not retained the Power of chusing any of their Officers or Magistrates, the *Government* is then lodged in the *Chief Magistrate* or *Magistrates*, and the *Exercise* of it is lodged in those deputed by him or them ; for *Chief Magistrates* cannot take much of the Exercise of the Government *personally* upon themselves.

As the *Representatives* of the Society, under a Free-Government, are in their Assemblies, to exercise the Power of the People, for the Good of the People in general, and not for their own private Advantage ; and, as Men are apt to be blinded and misled by their private Advantage ; nay, as there will always be a great Number of Men, in every Society, who will, knowingly, and with their Eyes open, sacrifice the Publick to their private Advantage ; therefore it is absolutely necessary, that in all Questions that come before such Assemblies, *no Member should have any private Advantage or Emolument, to get or lose, by his being for or against either Side of the Question.*

For Example, as in all such Assemblies, the two chief Powers which they are to exercise, are, The making of Laws, and the punishing of High-Criminals : Let us in the first Case, suppose, That a Proposition is made to them by a *private Company*, for a new Law ; which, by a *fresh Example*, in a neighbouring State, appeared to be of the most dangerous Consequence to the Publick, but might be of signal *private* Benefit to every one of the *Representatives* that agreed to it : When this Proposition is attended with the most plausible Pretences of Publick Good, can we imagine, that upon such an Occasion, the Majority of the *Representatives* will see the fatal Consequences attending such a
Law ?

Law? Must not we grant, that a great many of them who do, will, nevertheless, for their own *private* Advantage, agree to it; without taking the least Care to prevent the fatal Consequences that may attend it? Suppose again, That upon some great Combustion of State, the Magistrates should propose Laws, which might perhaps be necessary at that Time; but which, if continued, must intirely divest the People of the Power either of making Laws, or calling any future Magistrate to an Account: If the Magistrates could support such Propositions, with great *private* Advantage to every Man that agreed to them; can we suppose, that the Majority of the Representatives would see the evil Tendency of making such Laws perpetual; or would be so cautious, as to insist upon their being temporary? And the Magistrates being once in Possession of those Laws, tho' the evil Tendency of them should afterwards plainly appear; can we suppose, that the Representatives of the People would ever repeal them, if the Majority of them were to lose a great Part of their yearly Revenue, by voting for such a Repeal? *Upon such Occasions, some real honest Men may be misled; but it is a terrible Thing, for the People to have their Representatives liable to be misled, not only by plausible Pretences, but by private Advantages.*

In the other Case, let us suppose that a *high* and a *notorious* Criminal is accused, or Motions made towards his Accusation, in the Assembly of the *Representatives* of the People; but that the Majority of that Assembly are in Possession or Expectation of great Favours from that high and notorious Criminal, *Favours which he can take away or refuse at his Pleasure.* Must not every Man, in that Case, depend upon being dispossessed or disappointed, if he votes in favour of the Accusation or Motion; and, considering the Nature of Mankind, can we expect that the most heinous Criminal will be condemned, or that his Crimes can ever be brought to light, as long as the Majority of the Representatives are in danger of great *private* Damage by doing *Publick* Justice? No such Thing can be supposed. It is an established Maxim in the Law of Nature, it is an established Maxim in the municipal Law of every particular Society, *That no Man shall sit as Judge in a Cause in which he is interested of either side of the Question;* and shall an interested Man be refused as Judge in a private Cause, and yet admitted as a Judge between his Country and a publick Criminal, a Criminal upon whom he depends perhaps for the greatest Part of his Subsistence? This would be so ridiculous, that I should not have thought it necessary to refute it, if it had not been lately insisted on by some Men of high Rank in this Kingdom.

To constitute therefore a *Free Government*, or to intitle the People of any Society to the glorious Claim of being *Free-born Subjects*, it is absolutely necessary for them to reserve to themselves the Power of making their own Laws, and calling to an account and punishing their Rulers, when they transgress those Laws: To have, by the Constitution of their Government, a *legal* and *effectual* Method of exercising this Power, either by themselves or their

their *Representatives* : And that in the exercise of this Power, the Majority of the People, or the Majority of their *Representatives*, shall not be *blinded* or *tyrannized* by any *private Advantage*, either in Possession or in Expectation.

The Advantages which the People enjoy by being under a *Free Government*, are so conspicuous, that they require no Explanation, but I shall take notice of one Advantage, that even the chief Magistrate or Magistrates enjoy by being at the Head of such a Government. In all *Slavish* Governments the chief Magistrate often loses intirely the Hearts and Affections of the People without being sensible of it, till the Torrent becomes too Strong to be Stemmed; for Discontents in the State, are like Ulcerous Humours in the Body, if they have no natural Vent, or if the natural Vent be stoppt, they fall at last upon the Vitals, and bring Death and Dissolution upon the political Body. This Misfortune often happens even without any fault or real oppression in the chief Magistrate, for Discontents generally take their Rise from the Oppressions of Underlings : Nay they may sometimes arise from a Mistake in the People, or from Artful Insinuations and Misrepresentations; and the People having no way of Undeceiving themselves, or of distinguishing the Innocent from the Guilty, ascribe all the Misfortunes they feel, or believe they feel, to the chief Magistrate, who, for this Reason, often falls at last a Sacrifice to their Resentment. This Inconvenience the great Politician *Machiavel* was so sensible of, that he takes a whole Chapter to shew, *how necessary it is, for the Preservation of a Free State, that any Citizen may be securely accused.*

To this Inconvenience no *Free Government* can be exposed, because the chief Magistrate may always learn the Humour or the Discontents of the People from their Assemblies, or the Assemblies of their Representatives, if in the chusing of such Representatives, the People be left to a *Free Choice*; and no Art made use of to corrupt the Representatives, and the People having a *Regular* and *legal* Method of undeceiving themselves, and of distinguishing between the Innocent and Guilty, false Reports and Misrepresentations, will generally fall upon the Heads of those that contrive them; and even when Oppressions have been committed, the People will seldom carry their Resentment higher than those that are really guilty : If the Course of Publick Justice has met with no Let or Impediment, the chief Magistrate will certainly be excused, because all such are liable to be deceived by those they are obliged to employ.

But as no Human Institution can be without Dangers and Inconveniences, the most perfect *Free Government* must be liable to some, and a pure and simple *Democracy* is liable to a great many. That I call a pure and simple *Democracy*, where the People have reserved intirely to themselves, both the *Supremacy* and the *Government* of the Society. In such a Government the Choice of chief Magistrates often breeds great Disturbances, and not seldom involves the Country in Civil Wars, by which the Constitution of the Government,

ment, and the Liberties of the People, always run a great Risk of being undone; for if a Civil War be once begun, the Victorious Side generally establishes a *Monarchical* or an *Aristocratical Tyranny*.

The same Misfortune often befalls a *Democracy*, from the Ambition of some of their Magistrates, especially if they be such as have got Possession of an immoderate Share of Riches, or such as have from great Services gained the general Esteem of the People. The vulgar and inconsiderate part of Mankind, which is by much the greatest, are outrageous in all their Passions, and so short-sighted, that they seldom perceive Dangers, till they become so great, and approach so near, that it is impossible to prevent or withstand them. They are extravagant in their Love, as well as their Hate, and cannot discover those Designs which are deeply laid, and artfully carried on against their Liberties; and as the People are all upon an equal Footing, as no Families have any particular Privileges or Preheminences, they have all an equal Concern for the Preservation of their Liberties, and *That which is the Concern of all, is too often neglected by all*: This makes it easy for a rich Man, or a Man in great Esteem among the People, to get the Management and Direction of their Assemblies; and if he be an ambitious Man, he may manage and direct them so artfully, as to get the absolute Sovereignty into his Hands, or to be in a Capacity to assume it whenever he pleases, before the People become sensible of the Danger. If this be done by one single Man, the *Democracy* becomes a *Monarchical Tyranny*, if by a confederated Set of Men, it becomes an *Aristocratical Tyranny*.

In all *Democracies* therefore, nay, in all sorts of *Free Governments*, the chief Care of the People ought to be, that no particular Man, nor any confederated Set of Men, obtain the chief Direction of their Assemblies; and for this End, they ought to take special Care, that no particular Man, or Family, get Possession of a very immoderate Share of the Wealth of the Society, or have it in his Power to bestow too many Favours, Rewards or Punishments: Nay, that no particular Man acquire too great a Share of Esteem; for, of all Dangers, this last is the greatest, and the most difficult to be guarded against: It is even dangerous for any Man to attempt to stop the Torrent of Esteem, which naturally flows in upon a deserving Man; for tho' the Attempt may proceed from the most candid and the most unbiassed Love for the publick Good, yet the Multitude will be apt to imagine it proceeds only from Malice and Envy. In short, this Danger of a *Democracy's* sinking into a *Monarchical* or an *Aristocratical Tyranny* is so great, and so unavoidable, that there never was a pure and simple *Democracy* in the World, that continued so for any considerable Time; and I think I could demonstrate, that the Ruin of the *Roman Republick*, which was at first a Government compounded of *Aristocracy* and *Democracy*, was chiefly owing to their introducing afterwards too much of the *Democracy* into their Form of Government.

As all Multitudes, not under the absolute Direction of great and eminent Men, are apt to be too much elated with Success, so they

are apt to take the Pannick, and to become too much dejected upon any Misfortune: To both these Inconveniences, *Democracies* are but too liable; and they are too open and too slow in all their Résolutions, which renders it easy for their Enemies to prevent their Designs, and to do them great Injuries by sudden Invasions. This makes them unable to withstand great and unexpected Dangers, or to bear up under signal Misfortunes. It was the *Nobles*, the *Patricians* of *Rome*, that supported *that Republick* against the *Gauls* in its Infancy, and against the *Carthaginians* in its riper Years; it was the *Dictatorial* Power that often protected and relieved them in the Time of great and imminent Danger; but it was the *Dictatorial* Power that at last overwhelmed their *Republick*.

The last Inconvenience of a *Democratical Government*, which I shall take notice of, is, That the Distribution of Justice and Mercy by great and numerous Assemblies, is seldom either equal or prudent. They are generally either too Rigorous or too Merciful: For if a Man be brought to his Tryal, while the Spirit of Resentment is high among the People, they are apt to mistake Misfortunes for Crimes, and even to behold the latter in the malicious and magnifying Glass, which his private Enemies artfully place before them: On the other hand, if a Criminal can by any Art put off his being brought to a Trial, or give a Turn to the popular Resentment, they are too apt to forget the Injury, and to pardon the most dangerous Offender.

As the Nature of a *Free Government* has of late been wickedly misrepresented, and as no Man can thoroughly know the Excellencies of our Happy Constitution, without knowing the Defects of other sorts of Government, I thought it was necessary for me to premise the foregoing Remarks; and from them I hope I shall be able to give every one of my Readers most substantial Reasons for preferring the *Constitution of our Government* to any other. In so doing, I am sure I shall give a singular Satisfaction to every True Briton; and I hope I shall be able to make every generous Breast glow with an ardent Desire to preserve it in its full Vigour, and true Spirit; and to be as just and honourable to their Posterity, as their Ancestors have been to them.





THE
FATAL CONSEQUENCES
OF
Ministerial Influence, &c.



OUR *Constitution* was originally formed upon the Model of the little Governments which existed among our Ancestors the *Germans* , long before they came over to *this Island*; every one of which consisted of a King or supreme Chief, a Number of inferior Chiefs, and the People in general. In ordinary Affairs the King consulted with the Chiefs, or such of them as he thought fit to call to his Council; but in the great Affairs of State, such as making Laws, consulting about Peace or War, trying of great Causes or Criminals, &c. the whole People of the Society, at the Desire of their Sovereign, assembled together in Arms; the King and the Chiefs consulted and resolved; the People approved or disapproved: They approved by the Clatter of their Arms, they disapproved by a harsh and inarticulate Murmur: In the first Case, the Resolution of the King and his Nobles was carried into Execution; in the last, it was always dropp'd or suspended. From hence proceeds the different Words made use of in our ancient Writs or Summons to Parliament; the Peers are summoned *ad Consulendum*, the Commons *ad Consentiendum*: From hence likewise proceeds the Custom still subsisting of shewing our Dislike by Hissing, and our Approbation by making a Noise with our Feet and Hands.

This was the Form of their Governments; and this appears to have been a *mixt Form of Government*; a Form compounded of *Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy*. The *Supremacy* was lodged in the People, (including King and Chiefs) and the *Exercise* of the *Supremacy* in the *general Assemblies* of the People: The *Government* was principally lodged in the King; and the *Exercise* of the

Government in the King and such of the Chiefs as he was pleased to call to his Council (a). In these Governments the People had the Power of making their own Laws, and the Power of trying and punishing the greatest Offender; and as they had a legal and effectual Method of exercising this Power in their general Assemblies, therefore we must conclude that these were FREE Governments (b).

When our Ancestors conquered this Country, they divided the conquered Lands among themselves: Every Chief got a certain District of Land assigned him, and great Part of this District he again parcelled out among his particular Followers; to some he gave greater Shares than to others, but every Man that had been concerned as a Soldier in the Conquest, got some Share of the Lands conquered. We are not to suppose that, upon this Occasion, all the Natives left the Country, many of them, without doubt, remained, and submitted to be the Farmers and Servants of the Conquerors; but as they were look'd on as Slaves, (*Natif* and *Slave* being synonymous Words in our old Language) they were not allowed the Use of Arms, nor did they ever appear in the Assemblies of the People. *This is the true Reason why none but Freeholders had at first a Right to be in any of our Assemblies*; for it cannot be supposed that there were at first any Cities or Towns in the Country, composed of numerous *Saxon* Inhabitants, especially if we consider, that among them all sorts of mercantile or mechanic Arts were look'd on as beneath a Soldier or Freeman: But when the *Saxon* Race began to increase, and the Distinction between *Natif* and *Saxon* was forgot, Cities began to be formed, and *Citizens and Burgeesses were at last admitted into our Assemblies*.

When the *Saxons* first settled in *England*, it is plain from History, they formed themselves into several distinct Societies; and it is likewise plain, or at least highly probable, that in every one of these Societies they established the same *mix'd Form of Government* they had in their own Country: While these little Societies continued distinct, there was no occasion for *Representatives*; all the *Freeholders* or *Freemen* could, and certainly did, meet together for regulating the chief Affairs of the Society; but when all the *Saxon* Kingdoms came to be united, it became impossible for all the *Freemen* to meet together; then the sending of *Representatives* became necessary, and thus began to be formed what we now call our *Parliament*.

As in these Days the Nation was often engaged in War, and travelling was very dangerous, the assembling of the People, or their *Representatives*, was often interrupted; and during those Intervals, our Kings frequently used to call a Council of their Chiefs, or of such of them as he pleased to name, in order to consult about the ordinary Affairs of State, and even about some Things which could properly come only before the general Assembly of the People. These Councils some of our Historians have, by mistake, called *Parliaments*; and this has led some People into a more ridiculous

diculous Mistake, *That of old our Parliaments consisted only of such Men as the King was pleased to call*: But it is plain, that these Assemblies were only such Assemblies of the Chiefs as it was usual for the Kings in *Germany* to call, in order to consult about the ordinary Affairs of Government: None of these can be called an Assembly, in which the *Exercise* of the *supreme Power* was lodged, it could only be an Assembly in which the *Exercise* of the *Government* was lodged by our *original Constitution*.

It is not necessary for my present Design, to run through all the Variations and Regulations that have happened in the manner of holding this general Assembly, in which the *Exercise* of the *Supremacy* is lodged by our *original Constitution*; but from our whole History, it is plain, that we have always endeavoured, and I hope always will endeavour, to preserve the Spirit of that Form of Government, which we brought with us from *Germany*, and upon which we have made some considerable Improvements. According to the *true Spirit* therefore of our *Constitution*, the *supreme Power* is lodged in the King, Nobles, and People; the *Exercise* of that Power in the King, Lords, and Commons in *Parliament* assembled; the *Government* is partly lodged in the King, and partly in the People; and the *Exercise* of the *Government* chiefly in the King, and such as he shall appoint, but a Part of it too is lodged in *Magistrates chosen* by the *People*. In these last two we have made many Changes, as the Circumstances of our Affairs required; and it is probable we must always be making Changes, as future Incidents may make it necessary. It is therefore evident, that our *Constitution* is a Form of Government compounded of the *Democratical*, the *Aristocratical*, and the *Monarchical*; and as its Excellence consists in such an *equal Mixture* of these *three Powers*, as that no one of them shall be able to *overturn*, or (which is the same thing) *absolutely direct* the other two, our great Business is to preserve this *Equality*. This is not to be done by any Regulations that the greatest human Prudence or Foresight can at once contrive or establish; for as Power is in its own Nature unsteady, and always sinking or rising, and as our *Constitution* is compounded of *three distinct Powers*, there has always been, and while it endures there always will be, a Contest between these three, either for *Superiority* or *Equality*; which Contest is so far from being a Misfortune, that in this the *very Life* and *Spirit* of our Constitution exists; it is *this Contest*, *this mutual Jealousy*, that has disappointed the *Projects* of so many ambitious Kings, and has made many a rapacious Sycophant finish his Life upon a Block, or in a Halter.

This is the reason that there is not any one Period of Time can be assigned, when it may be said our Constitution was in such a Degree of Perfection, as not to want some Amendment, nor is such a Degree of Perfection to be expected in any Time to come. The *true Life* and *Spirit* of our *Constitution* is what every Man ought to study, and to preserve it, ought to be every Man's principal Aim: Every Age, every Generation ought to make it their chief

chief Business to obviate or remove whatever may in their Time seem to threaten the *Destruction* of that *sacred Deposit*, which their *Ancestors* have intrusted in their Hands for the Use of their *Posterity*. And as the *true Life* and *Spirit* of our *Constitution* consists in keeping the *three political Powers*, of which it is composed, always in an *Equilibrium*; it is the Duty of every Man who has a Vote, either in *Parliament*, or at *Elections*, to keep a watchful Eye upon this *political Balance*, and to be diligent in depressing which ever of the *three Powers* seems, in our Days, to have got too much the *Ascendant*. From which must appear the egregious Stupidity, or the more egregious Wickedness of those who now tell us, *That the late happy Revolution established the Liberties of this Nation upon such a firm Basis, that we have no Occasion to be afraid of any future Designs.*

By this *artful*, this *equal* Mixture of the *three* principal Forms of Government, we avoid the Dangers, and enjoy the Advantages of each: By our having a *hereditary* Monarchy, we avoid the fatal Disputes and violent Commotions, about the Choice of a King, or chief Governour or Governours; which often rend in Pieces, and sometimes destroy *Democracies* as well as *elective Monarchies* (a). The Right of the Royal Family, and the Peace of the Kingdom, are secured by that wise and salutary Maxim, *That the King can do no Wrong*; and the *Liberty* and *Property* of the *Subject* are secured by that equally wise and salutary Maxim, *That the King's Express Order shall not excuse a Subject for acting contrary to Law; nor put a Stop to, or prevent the Effects of an Impeachment in Parliament.*

By the *Monarchical* Part of our *Constitution*, we enjoy this other Advantage, That as the executive Part of our Government, especially with regard to Foreign Affairs, is intrusted with the King only; we thereby avoid the Inconveniencies and Dangers which flow from the Openness and Delays incident to popular Councils (b). In all Cases of great and sudden Danger, the King becomes, of Course, invested with a *Dictatorial Power*; the *Supremacy* is on that Occasion lodged solely in the King, and he may by such Ways and Means, as he finds necessary, take care, *ne quid Detrementi Respublica capiat*: And in such Cases, the *Parliament*, as soon as assembled, will certainly approve of what was prudently and necessarily done; even tho' some of the Measures taken, were a little extraordinary, and not consistent with the *strict Rules* of our *Constitution*. But as this is a Power *dangerous* to our Constitution, therefore it is never to be exercised but in Cases of the *utmost Necessity*; and the Exercise of it must never be continued any longer than the Necessity absolutely requires. It is a Power which never ought, and, which indeed *cannot* be granted by *Parliament*; for nothing can excuse the Exercise of it but the *immediate Necessity*; and that Necessity cannot be immediate, which may be foreseen or provided against by *Parliament*. We have formerly had *Parasite-Ministers*; we have even had *Venal-Lawyers*,
who

(a) See Introduction, p. 11.

(b) See ditto, p. 13.

who have told our Kings they might exercise it whenever they had a mind: And if *Parliaments* should once begin, by any Resolution of theirs, to tell our Kings before hand, when they might use it; what happened to *Rome*, might very probably happen to us. *Some future Venal-Parliament, may make a Grant of it for a Term of Years, and then for a Term of Life:* But this we are guarded against by our Constitution, because the *Supremacy* is never lodged in the *Parliament*; and therefore no Grant of theirs can give our King any greater Share of it, than he has by the *original and established Form* of our Government: In Case of Necessity, he becomes absolute and arbitrary; but if he should assume such a Power, without any apparent Necessity, or continue it longer than the Necessity required; *his Ministers would certainly be made to answer for it to future Parliaments; no anterior Grant or Resolution of Parliament, could, upon such an Occasion, be pleaded in their Vindication.*

By the *Aristocratical Part* of our Government, we are secured against the Ambition of our Kings, as well as of private Men; and the Spirits of the People may be supported under the greatest Misfortunes. Our *Nobles*, are by their Birth entitled to great Privileges and Preheminences; therefore (if they have any Thought at all) they are more particularly concerned in the Preservation of our Constitution; and must, upon all Occasions, be extremely jealous of every Step that may tend towards its Overthrow (a). By their Education, they are, or ought to be, taught to search into the Mysteries of State-Affairs, and the hidden Designs of Men; from whence 'tis to be hop'd, they will always discover the Danger before it becomes unavoidable; and they are, upon all such Occasions, in *Honour*, obliged to set themselves up as a *Barrier*, and to venture their *Lives* and their *Fortunes* in *Defence* of the *Constitution* and the *Liberties* of their *Country*.

But of all others, the *Popular Part* of our Constitution is the most beneficial: (b) The Power of the People in making their own Laws, and in calling their Governours, under the King, to an Account, is ingrafted in our Constitution, and established in the most perfect Manner. Our People are not obliged to submit to any Law, without their own Approbation; nor can any Law be altered or repealed without their Consent: Our People, assembled by their *Representatives* in *Parliament*, may call the greatest Subject to an Account, and may punish him for his *Misdemeanours*: This is what gives Life to our Laws, and social Liberty to the meanest Subject. It is this that protects every Man's Life and Estate, and makes him sit securely under his own Fig Tree: it is this that bridles the Violence of the most Rapacious, and makes the Greatest, the most powerful Criminal tremble in the full Possession of his Power: And it is this that gives Glory and Security to our King, Lustre to our Nobles, and Freedom and Happiness to our People. While this Corner of our political triangular Balance preserves its due Weight, we shall continue a happy and a Free-People; but if ever
its

(a) See Introduction, p. 12.

(b) See ditto, p. 11.

its Weight, be, by any Art, transferred to either of the other two, our Government will from that Moment become a *monarchical* or an *aristocratical Tyranny*; we shall all become *Slaves*, and, for one Generation, at least, the most wretched of *Slaves*, by retaining a Sense of the inestimable Blessing we have lost.

I have shewed, that the *Freedom* of a Government chiefly consists in the People's having a Power to call their Governours to an Account, and a legal and effectual Method of exercising that Power (a). The legal Method of exercising this Power, established by our Constitution, is by an *Impeachment*, or some other sort of Proceeding in *Parliament*: This, I say, is the legal Method; this, I hope, will always be an effectual Method for bringing the most powerful Offenders to Justice; and by this Method, we are most prudently guarded against the Fury and Excess of numerous popular Assemblies (b). If an excessive Warmth should, upon any Occasion, appear in the *House of Commons*, it is checked and alleviated, by the Coolness and Wisdom of the *House of Peers*, who, for their own Sakes, as well as for the Sake of Justice, are obliged to take care, that no Man shall suffer by any extravagant or ill-grounded Popular-Fury; and every one of the three Branches of our Legislature, may take care, that a dangerous Criminal shall not meet with unseasonable or undeserved Mercy.

With respect to the People, therefore, the *Democratical* Part of our Constitution is of great Advantage; but even with respect to our King and Governours under him, while they continue just and diligent in the Discharge of their Duty, it is of signal Benefit: For, while the People are *free* and undisturbed in the *Choice* of their *Representatives*; and while the *Members* of both *Houses of Parliament* continue *faithful* to the *Trust* reposed in them, our King and Governours, may in a *legal* and *regular* way, be truly informed how the People stand affected towards their Administration. If any Murmurs or Discontents arise, they may have the Occasions of them *regularly* and *fairly* enquired into; by which the People will be satisfied, if they have been misinformed, and if the Murmurs have been occasioned by the Crimes or the Misdemeanors of the Underlings in Power; those Underlings will be tried and punished in a *legal* and *regular* Manner, by which the People will be pacified, and their Resentment against the King, or any great Officers under him, fully removed: So that neither our King nor his Ministers can ever suffer, if they are innocent; nor can they be exposed to those violent Commotions and Insurrections, which in absolute *Monarchies* and *Aristocracies*, are often fatal to the Innocent, by confounding them with the Guilty (c).

Thus have I shewn the *true Nature*, and some of the *chief Perfections* of our Constitution. I hope I have set them in so clear and distinct a Light, as to make every Man firmly resolve to preserve them, at the utmost Peril of his Life and Fortune.

The

(a) See Introduction, p. 7.

(b) See ditto, p. 13.

(c) See ditto p. 8.

The *Nobles* of this Kingdom (I mean the great and ancient Families, whether they have got Titles or not) have had many hard Conflicts in Defence of our Constitution; and have raised many strong Bulwarks for its Preservation : But those of the present Age, are not to sit down secure, with the Thoughts, that their Ancestors have done, or provided all that was necessary for that Purpose; this I have shewn to be impossible : We may as well imagine, that our Ancestors have secured us against being conquered by foreign Enemies, and that we have therefore no reason to provide Arms for our Defence, or accustom ourselves to the Art and Discipline of War. *Power is, in some Shape or other, perpetually endeavouring to usurp, and therefore Liberty must be perpetually upon its Guard, prompt to reassume whenever it has been dispossessed; and diligent in fortifying wherever an Attack is like to be made.*

Let me again take Notice, because it is of the utmost Importance, That as the *Freedom* and the *Perfection* of our Government, consists in its being compounded of a *Monarchical*, an *Aristocratical*, and a *Democratical* Power, the Preservation of our Constitution, must necessarily depend upon keeping these *three Powers* so *equally poised*, that neither of them shall ever be able to swallow up both, or either of the other two; and as each of the *three* will be forever endeavouring to *usurp* upon the other two, therefore it behoves every Man, who has the least regard to the Happiness of his Country, or to his own Honour, to examine strictly the Circumstances of the Government in the Age in which he lives; and if he find that too much Power has been artfully, or by Accident, thrown into any one of the *three Scales*; he is from that Moment engag'd in Honour, in Conscience, in every Thing that can be dear to a wise and prudent man, to assist in removing some Part of the Weight from that Scale; for if this is not speedily done, the *Scale* that has once got the Turn, will soon mount up the *other two* to the Beam, and the Weights of both will then naturally drop into the *heavy Scale*.

As a prevailing Power will, at all Times, draw many Friends, a Man must, in this laudable Undertaking, expect to meet with great Opposition: Upon the contrary Side, he may probably find many of his Relations, many of his Friends, and some, perhaps, from whom he has received signal Favours: But he ought to remember, *That no Relation, no private Friendship, no Favour received, can oblige him, or ought to induce him to desert the Cause of his Country, or to neglect doing any Thing that may contribute to its Success:* (a) Nay, some particular Cases may happen, where he may be obliged to sacrifice, even his own private Opinion, with respect to a particular Case, to the Success of what he has principally in view; for when a *Conspiracy* is formed *against the Constitution*, there must be a *Confederacy* formed to defeat it; and as the *Conspirators* will, certainly, upon all Occasions, sacrifice their *private Sentiments* to the *Success* of the *Conspiracy*, the *Confederates*

(a) See Introduction, p. 1.

derates must sometimes sacrifice their *private* Sentiments to the *Success* of the *Confederacy*.

In the present Age, I believe no Man will suspect that there is too great a Weight, either in the *aristocratical* or *democratical* Scale of our Constitution; but as for the *monarchical*, there is, in many respects, some Reason to suspect that it is become *too weighty*, and that the *Liberties* we now enjoy, and the *Preservation* of our *Constitution* depend more upon his Majesty's *Wisdom* and *Goodness*, in not making an *improper* Use of that *Weight* of *Power*, which has of late been thrown into the *monarchical* Scale, than upon the Nature of our Government, as it stands at present. This, I say, there is some reason to suspect, in many Respects; but at present, I shall confine myself to the great *Influence*, which the Crown, or, at least, the Ministers of the Crown, might have upon *Elections*, and in *both Houses* of *Parliament*, (if they should ever be so wicked, as to direct the Power they have, to that Purpose) by means of the *many Posts*; *Pensions*; *Translations*, *ecclesiastick*, *civil* or *military*; and *large Sums* of *Money*, now in the *Disposal* of the Crown, and depending upon the absolute and arbitrary Will and Pleasure of the *Ministers for the Time being*.

I have already shewed, That when the Power of the People, either in making Laws, or in calling their Governours to an account, is to be exercised by their *Representatives*; it is absolutely necessary, *That no Member should have any private Advantage or Emolument, to lose or expect, by his being for or against either Side of the Question*; (a) for such is the Nature of Mankind, such has always been the Nature of Mankind, that the Generality of them, may, in most Questions, relating to the *Publick*, be very much blinded by their *private* Advantage; nay, many Men will, upon all Occasions, be ready to sacrifice the *Publick* for a very mean and paltry *present Reward*. I know it has been said, we cannot imagine, that any Man of a tolerable Estate will sacrifice his Honour and the Constitution of his Country, for any Post or Pension the Crown can bestow; because, he will thereby render precarious, not only the Post or Pension he receives, but his own hereditary Estate: But Gentlemen, who argue at this Rate, *if they are serious*, must understand very little of Mankind; for, it is certain, that many, I am afraid, most Men are ready to sacrifice the greater *distant* Good, known, and acknowledged to be so, for the Satisfaction of any *present* Appetite. No Man's *private* Estate can be brought into an *immediate* Danger, by any Vote he can be required to give; and even an honest Man, may be so blinded by his *present* Advantage, that he cannot see the *distant* Danger. This we are convinced of, by the Histories of all Countries which have lost their Liberties; nay, in the History of our own Country, let us but consider the beginning of *Queen Mary's* Reign; we know, that many of the best Families of *England*, were then in Possession of Lands formerly belonging to *Monasteries*, which Lands would certainly have been taken from

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(a) See *Introduction*, p. 8.

them, if the Power of the *Church of Rome* had been fully re-established in this Country; and yet, while she had *Spanish Gold* to give, we find *both Houses of Parliament, Lords as well as Commons*, concurring with her, in all her Measures for re-establishing the Power of the *Church of Rome* in this Kingdom. The Grants of these Lands, in her Father's Reign, prevailed upon his *Parliaments* to join in all his Measures; yet, in her Reign, the *distast* Fears of losing them, could not prevail against the *present* Temptation of very trifling Sums in ready Gold.

If ever the Crown, or rather the Ministers of the Crown, should be able, by the many *Posts and Pensions* at their Disposal, to influence *Elections* of all Kinds, and *both Houses of Parliament*, so as to have always a *Majority* in each House, under the *absolute Direction* of the *Prime Minister* for the Time being, it would be no way necessary for any Minister to desire a *further Sacrifice* of our Constitution; for, by both Houses being under such a Direction, our Constitution would be as effectually destroyed, as if both Houses had joined in an *absolute Surrender* of all the Liberties and Privileges of the People. The outward Form might, and probably would be kept up, but every Man must see, that the Life and Spirit of our Constitution would be lost; our Government would, from that Moment, become an *absolute Monarchy*, and that one of the *worst Kind*: For, if we must chuse, it would be better for us to have an absolute Monarchy, founded upon the Principles of *Passive-Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, and supported by superstitious Priests, ridiculous as they are, than an absolute Monarchy, founded upon Corruption, and supported by mercenary Parliaments: In the first Case, the People would, 'tis true, be *Slaves*, but they might preserve their Religion and their Morality; whereas, in the last Case, the People would, not only be *Slaves*, but the Generality of them, would, of course, become *arrant Knaves*, and a general Depravity would rush in upon us; for all sorts of *Licentiousness* would be encouraged, in order to make way for Corruption: We could never expect to see our Debts paid off, nor to be relieved of any of our Taxes; and if any Part of the old Debt should at any Time be paid off, great Care would be taken to contract some new Debt in its stead; for the Doctrine lately broached would then become a certain and necessary Maxim of State, *Our Debts must be kept standing, and our Taxes continued, because the Dependencies they create, are necessary for the Support of our Government.*

Under such a Government as this, it would be impossible for the People, in a *legal and regular* Method, to bring any Minister to Justice, as long as he continued the Favourite of the Crown: Let him be as rapacious and oppressive as it is possible to imagine; let the Interest of the Nation be sacrificed to Foreigners; let the Murmurings of the People be loud and general; nay, let him be *burnt in Effigie at every Market Town in England*: Yet he would continue to rule over the People, to insult the Nobles, to plunder the

the Nation, and rob the Exchequer; and till the Crown threw him off, he might every Year proudly brag of his Wisdom and Innocence, and defy the Friends of the People to lay any Thing to his Charge. Could we then pretend to be a free People? Could we pretend to a Privilege or Power, of calling our Governours to an account, and punishing them for their Transgressions? No! The Crown might now and then throw a *Prime Minister* out to be torn in Pieces by the *mercenary Mob in Parliament*, at the Command of, and in order to give an Air of Popularity to the next that succeeded; but if no Minister is ever to be called to an account, or punished by our *Parliament*, till he is given up by the Crown, *the People of Turkey have as just a Pretence to Liberty, as the People of England could pretend to.*

This sort of Government, the Royal Family, *when rightly informed*, can never desire to set up: It is against their Interest, it is inconsistent with their Safety; for I have, I think, demonstrated, That in all Governments, it is the Interest of the chief Governor, to have some *legal Method* established, by which the People may testify their Discontents; by which they may call those to an account, who have given them just Cause of Offence: And, as by our Constitution, the King can never be made to answer for any Faults or Oppressions committed by those under him, even, tho' committed by his express Order in Writing; therefore it can never be the Interest of the King, or consistent with the Safety of the Royal Family, to draw upon themselves the popular Resentment, by overturning, or endeavouring to overturn our Constitution.

But, with respect to our Ministers, and all in Power under the King, it is otherwise: They are all answerable, not only for their own Conduct, but in many Cases for the Conduct of those they employ: Nay, they are answerable for the King's Conduct, because they are bound in Duty, to give him good and wholesome Advice; and if he enters into any Measures which are inconsistent with the Interest of the Nation, or if he attempts any Thing against the Constitution, and contrary to the Laws of the Kingdom, they must answer, and will certainly be punished for it, if our Constitution be preserved in its full Vigour. Considering therefore, the Weakness of human Nature, considering how apt Men's Heads are to turn giddy with Power, and considering how ready most Men are to turn the Power and Favour of the Crown, to the Aggrandizing and Enriching their own Families; I believe, without pretending to the Gift of Prophecy, I may foretel, that we shall have, in future Times, as we have had in Times past, many Ministers, whose personal Safety will depend upon preventing any *fair and impartial Enquiry* into the Conduct of their Administration; *and for this Purpose, they will certainly endeavour to overturn our Constitution, by having a Majority in one or both Houses of Parliament intirely under their Direction.*

This Difference between the real Interest and Safety of the *Royal Family*, and the Interest and Safety of the *King's Ministers*,

shews us how necessary it is to distinguish between that Power which is vested in the Crown, by the true and original Nature of our Constitution; and that Power which has since been vested in the Crown, either by Accident, or by the Art of Ministers: The first, I shall call the ROYAL POWER of the Crown, the last, I shall call, what it really is, the Ministerial Power of the Crown. From the ancient Histories and Law Books of this Kingdom, it appears, That the Power of the Crown did not formerly so much consist, in the Naming of all the Officers employed in the Exercise of our Government, as in the commanding and directing them after they were named by the People; and this is certainly most agreeable to the true Spirit of our Constitution, which supposes that the King can do no Wrong, because, if his Orders be contrary to Law, the Officer to whom they are directed ought to inform him, and not only may, but ought to refuse to execute them; and, if in such a Case, he neglects to give the King proper Information, or if he executes any illegal Orders, it is not the King, but the Officer, who, by our Constitution, does the Wrong, and he only is to be punished for it: The Intention of this Regulation, certainly is, that it may not be in the Power of the King to do wrong; that it may not be in his Power to get any illegal Orders executed; and this Intention will probably be effectual, where the Orders are issued by the Crown, and the Officers named by the People: *But when the Officers are named by the Crown, or rather by the Ministers of the Crown, is it not to be presumed, that such men will be named, as may be fit for the Execution of any Ministerial Job?*

Moreover, our Kings are placed in a Situation so high, that they cannot be supposed to have a personal Acquaintance with any of their Subjects, but such as are in the most exalted Stations, and therefore it is impossible they can know who are the most proper Men to be named to any of those inferior Posts or Offices, which are necessary for the Exercise of our Government; in this they must trust entirely to their Ministers, and therefore the Nomination to all such Posts and Offices cannot properly be called *Royal*, but *Ministerial Power*; and the creating or increasing of any such Power, is creating or increasing a Power, which, by the very Nature of it, must be generally employ'd against the Constitution of our Government, and the Liberties of the People. This our Ancestors were highly sensible of, and therefore the Nomination of the *chief Officers only* was left to the King, but the Nomination of all *Officers of an inferior Rank*, was vested generally in the People. This Maxim we'll find was established, with some little Variations, in every Branch of our Government: In the Ecclesiastical Part of our Government, the King named the Archbishops and Bishops, but the inferior Clergy were mostly named and presented to their Livings by the People; that is, by those of the People who had the Advowsons in them: In the Civil Part of our Government, the King named the chief Judges, but the inferior Judges, *viz.* the Sheriffs, who were likewise Military Officers,

cers, the Coroners, and the Conservators of the Peace, were all chosen by the People: And in the Military Part of our Government, the chief Generals of our Armies were named by the King, but most of the inferior Officers were such as had their Commands from the Tenures they possessed, or such as were chosen by their respective Counties: And with respect to the Navy, the King named the Admiral or Admirals, but the Captains of Ships, and all inferior Officers, were certainly named by the People, who, of old, always furnished such Ships of War as were at the Time necessary for the publick Service. As for *Toll-masters* and *Tax-gatherers*, we had neither *Tolls* nor *Taxes*, and therefore were not troubled with such *Vermin*, till the true Nature of our Constitution was forgot, or began to be not thoroughly understood; and therefore when they were introduced, the Nomination of every Man of them was vested in the Crown: In it they continue to this Day, and if no Alteration be made, *we may come to have the Heads of our Prime Ministers more taken up about the Nomination of mean Gaugers and Tide-waiters, in order to make the most of it, with respect to Elections, than about vindicating the Honour, or protecting the Trade of the Nation.*

With respect to Pensions and Gratuities, it is the same. Those which are granted to Men of eminent Rank, may be supposed to be the Effects of ROYAL BENIGNITY, and can never be granted but for eminent publick Services; so that the Considerations for which they are granted must be publickly known, and therefore it would be no Diminution of the *Royal Power* to order them all to be publickly registered under the Pain of High-Treason: But those little hidden Pensions or Gratuities which are paid to Persons of mean Rank, can but seldom be supposed to proceed from ROYAL BENIGNITY, but from **Ministerial Bribery**. Such are seldom granted for publick Services, and they may, very probably, be granted in future Times for securing to the Minister a **Corrupt Majority** in both Houses of Parliament; therefore it is absolutely necessary that all such should be publickly known, and the Considerations for granting them often enquired into; otherwise they may hereafter be granted in such a manner, as to secure not only a **Ministerial Majority** in Parliament, but such a **Ministerial Party** in the Nation, as may make it dangerous, even for the *Crown*, to *dismiss* the *Minister* from his *Employments*.

My Readers will now, I hope, fully understand the Distinction I have made between the *Royal* and the *Ministerial Power* of the Crown: The first is coeval with, and a necessary Part of our Constitution; and, when it is not under **Ministerial Direction**, it cannot be supposed that it will be often turned towards the Overthrow of our Constitution: The last is the Produce of later Ages, and is of late Years grown to such a Height, that if any one Man should hereafter get the Direction both of the *Royal* and *Ministerial Power* of the Crown, and should turn both these Powers towards securing to himself a *Corrupt Slavish Majority* in both Houses

Houses of Parliament, I am afraid the *honest* and *free* Part of the People, tho' united to a Man against him, would find it impossible to exercise their Power in the *legal* and *regular* Manner established by our Constitution, *with respect to the calling of him or any of his Tools to an account, or punishing them for their Blunders or Oppressions.*

There are but two Ways of avoiding this Danger : The one is, to destroy or diminish that *Ministerial Power* which has been lately created : The other is, to prevent its being employ'd in securing to the Minister a *Corrupt Majority* in either House of Parliament. This last Method has been attempted by the several *Laws* lately made against *Bribery* and *Corruption* : But all such *Laws* will be found *ineffectual* ; for, with respect to those who corrupt, it is not necessary for a Minister to tell a Man, in express Terms, what Way he would have him Vote, upon any Occasion : It is not necessary to promise him directly a Post, a Pension, or a Bribe, if he will vote for such a Candidate at an Election, or upon such a Side of any Question in Parliament : Let the *Ministerial Will* but be revealed, and if he has a great many Favours to bestow, and a great deal of Money to give, all the Mercenary, the Covetous, and the Necessitous, will of course go *blindly* to that Side of the Question, *especially if it be publickly known that his Favours or Gratuities are dispensed only to those who, at Elections, or in Parliament, vote staunchly according to the Will which he is pleased to reveal* : By this he will, upon all Occasions, make sure of a great Number of Men ; and he may take such Ways to communicate his Will to the Publick, that it will be impossible to charge him, by any Law that is or can be made, with corrupting the Voters. His Footmen may communicate his Discourse at Table, his other Livery Men, or Ribbon-Men, may, upon all Occasions, give the Signal : Nay, the Pulpit may be wickedly made the Channel for communicating and explaining his Will to the People ; *and the Prelates of our Church may become the Pole-Stars, by whom the mercenary Crew are to steer their Course to Ministerial Grace and Favour.*

Then as to the Corrupted ; it must be granted that many, too many Men are prone to sacrifice the *publick Good* to any little present *Appetite of their own* : This is too much the Nature of Mankind ; and it is impossible to alter their Nature by any Law, or by any Form of Government : All that can be done by the wisest Regulations, is to take care that no Man shall have it in his Power to satisfy any private Appetite by sacrificing the publick Good, without being exposed to great Danger of being immediately discovered and severely punished ; but as it is impossible to discover the Motive of a Man's voting, either at Elections or in Parliament, therefore no Man who sacrifices the *publick Good*, for the Satisfaction of a *private Appetite*, by voting from a *corrupt Motive*, either at Elections or in Parliament, can be under any Apprehensions of being either discovered or punished ; and for this Reason we may depend on it, that this Crime will be

committed, by all selfish and inconsiderate Men, as often as they have an Opportunity to vote according to the *private* Directions or Insinuations they receive from a Minister, who has a great many Favours to bestow, and a great deal of Money to give; by which the Crime may at last become so general, and so frequent, that even the Infamy attending it will lose its Effect: It may, like some other Crimes I could name, become so fashionable, that a Man will be looked on as an enthusiastical Madman, who neglects or refuses being guilty of it upon any Occasion.

From these Considerations it must, I think, appear impossible to prevent the Influence of the **Ministerial Power** of the Crown in Parliament by any Laws made, or that can be made against *Bribery* and *Corruption*: And considering the great Additions lately made to the Civil List Revenue, the great Additions made to our Fleets and Armies, the great Increase of our Colonies in the *West-Indies*, and the many Taxes we have at present, with the Multitude of new Dependencies upon the Ministers of the Crown, that have been thereby created, I think it is also plain, that if the present **Ministerial Power** of the Crown should ever be turned towards procuring a *Corrupt Ministerial Majority* in Parliament, it would be of the most dangerous Consequence to our Constitution: *It is therefore become absolutely necessary to reduce our Government as much as we can to its first Principles, by destroying, or at least diminishing that Ministerial Power of the Crown, which has been lately created, which was far from being known to any of our Ancestors.* This is our *only Road to Salvation*: Every other Method is but *nibbling at the Bait*: If we have a mind to be *absolutely safe*, we must *cut the Line* upon which may hang the *gilded Hooks of Corruption*.

Tho' the Diminution of this **Ministerial Power** be the only effectual Method, and the Method we ought chiefly to aim at, for securing our Constitution against the fatal Effects of *Bribery* and *Corruption*; yet the other is not to be neglected; and therefore when any Discovery or Complaints are made, that this dangerous Crime has been perpetrated, whether by Ministers or by private Men, it certainly ought to be strictly enquired into, and severely punished. I know that by many Gentlemen who have not thoroughly considered our Constitution, and the dangerous Effects of a **Ministerial Influence**, upon the Election of the Sixteen Peers for *Scotland*, the late Complaint from thence is look'd upon with great Indifference. It is look'd on as a Dispute among the Peers of that Kingdom, which no way relates to us; but I must beg such Gentlemen to consider, that while a Minister preserves the Favour of his Master, and engrosses perhaps a great Part of the *Royal*, as well as *Ministerial Power* of the Crown, he will always have many *Honours, Posts, Pensions*; and *Translations, Ecclesiastick, Civil and Military*, to bestow: By these he may (if any Minister should ever apply them that way) secure the Vote of every mercenary mean Soul, who may hereafter, have a Vote for Life in the **House of Peers**; and if such Minister should obtain
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the absolute Direction of all the Elections of Peers for *Scotland*, so as that the Sixteen Peers for that Kingdom should always be such as could obtain or preserve their Seats in that House only by his Favour, must we not expect that every one of them would sacrifice his Honour to the Preservation of that Favour; and as they came there by his Direction, would, upon all Occasions, certainly give their Votes according to his Direction? Is there not then great Reason to apprehend, that Sixteen *Ministerial Peers* from *Scotland*, added to the other *Ministerial Mercenaries* that may hereafter be in that House, would always make a Majority for the Minister for the Time being? And if the Minister for the Time being should be always secure of a Majority in the House of Peers, *how would it be possible for the People to make any legal and effectual Use of that Power, in the Exercise of which I have shewn, that the Freedom of a Government, or the Liberties of the People, can only consist?* The House of Commons might impeach, *but would such a Majority condemn?* The House of Commons might pass Bills of Pains and Penalties, *but would such a Majority concur?* It is not to be presumed: And therefore it is certain, that the Liberties of this Nation would be in the utmost Danger, if ever the Elections of the Sixteen Peers for *Scotland* should come to be absolutely under *Ministerial Direction*.

But suppose it were otherwise: Suppose the Liberties of *England* no way depended on the Fate of any Election in *Scotland*; yet in the last Election of Peers for that Kingdom, we have a particular Concern: We ought to consider, that, at least, *seven* of those who represented the Peerage of *Scotland* in last Parliament, appeared *strenuously* in opposition to a *Scheme*, by which the *Coup de Grace* was to have been given to the Liberties of *England*: We ought to consider, that not one of the *seven* was chosen for this Parliament; and that *three* of the *seven* signed the PETITION presented last Session to the *House of Peers*; from whence we may conclude, that if any undue Methods, or illegal Practices were at last Election set on foot, it was against them they were all directed: *By being strenuous Assertors of the Liberties of England, they have suffered; therefore, in Generosity, in Honour, in Gratitude, we ought to make their Cause our own.*

As we have then a double Concern in the last Election of the Sixteen Peers for *Scotland*, we are under a double Obligation to examine into the Complaint exhibited *last Session* of Parliament against the *undue Methods* and *illegal Practices* made use of at that Election; and if there appears to be any good Grounds to suspect that such Practices were really made use of, we are in Honour, in Duty to our Country, and in Gratitude to our Friends, obliged to have them regularly inquired into, the Guilty severely punished; and some Regulations made for preventing the like in time to come. The Grounds of Suspicion must, in this Case, be founded upon *the Nature of the Thing in general*: Upon the *Character and Credit of the Complainants, or Informants*; Or upon the *Practices*

Practices themselves, and those Proofs and Testimonies of them, which may be had without any legal Inquiry or Compulsion.

But before I proceed to examine the Grounds of Suspicion in the Case now before me, give me leave to suppose a Case, which I am far from thinking to be the Case at present : However, I may suppose, that a Man of mean Birth and Education, may, *in some future Reign*, by vile Arts, and worse Practices, get the entire Management of the Sovereign : That by so doing, he may have ingrossed both the *Royal and Ministerial Power* of the Crown, and the whole and sole Direction of our publick Affairs, both foreign and domestick : That he may be one who has continued in this for many Years, and has diverted or withdrawn the Sovereign's Ear from every Man of Sense in the Kingdom : That he may have made up for himself a motley Faction, a Faction composed of *Whigs, who have betrayed and deserted their Principles of Liberty*; and of *Jacobites, who have betrayed and deserted their Principles of Loyalty*: That he may have put a *Jack* of his own into every Office, a Tool fit for his Purposes, and ready to obey his Commands, and every Man dismissed from the Office who refused or neglected to pay a fawning Submission to this *Ministerial Tool*: That by this Management he may have got into his own Hands the sole Disposal of the Posts and Places, not only of his own particular Office, but of every Office in *England*: That by means of his Ignorance and Incapacity in the conducting of grand Affairs, or perhaps by more wicked Means, the Nation may have become the Scoff and the Ridicule of all its Neighbours : That our Trade may have been interrupted, our Merchants insulted and plundered, and our publick Money misapplied, or squandered away in ridiculous Expeditions, and fruitless Negotiations : That most remarkable Opportunities for doing Justice to our injured Subjects, and for vindicating the Honour, and establishing the Trade of the Nation, may have been neglected, or by ridiculous Measures turned to our Disadvantage : *In short, that we may be at last brought into such a dismal State, that we can neither with Safety or Honour continue in Peace, nor put ourselves into any tolerable Condition for entering into a War.*

The Nation being in such Circumstances, suppose a new Parliament is to be chosen : Would not such a Minister have reason to dread that the People would return such a Set of *Representatives*, as would certainly *impeach* him ? Would not he have some reason to doubt the Success of all the Arts he could use for *corrupting* or *commanding* the Elections of the *Commons* ? And in that Case, in order to prevent the Effect of any *Impeachment*, would not he by all means endeavour to secure a *Majority* in the *House of Lords* ? This he certainly would ; and as we suppose him to have the whole and sole dispensing of the *Royal*, as well as *Ministerial Power* of the Crown, he would certainly make use of both for this Purpose : As the *Nobility of Scotland* have, many of them, the Misfortune to have but small Estates, it is well known that many, I may say most of them, have Posts or Pensions at the Pleasure of

the Crown, upon which Posts and Pensions the chief Part of their Subsistence depends. Must not we then conclude, that such a Minister would be sure to direct his Batteries against this *weak Side* of our *Constitution*, in order to induce or *compel* the *Peers* of *Scotland* to chuse any *Sixteen* he should name? For this Purpose the Disposal of many Posts and Offices, particularly in *Scotland*, would be put off till about the Time of the Elections coming on, in order to have at that critical Juncture the more *Favours*, or rather the more *Bribes*, to bestow: Many Months before the Election, he would take care to make up a List of *Sixteen* Peers to be chosen: Agents and Tools would be dispatched to *Scotland* with Copies of this List, to tell the Peers residing in that Kingdom, *It was the List made up by the King and his Ministers*; and that if they did not vote for it, they must expect the worst Effects of his Majesty's Resentment and Indignation; but if they voted for it, they would talk of them in the most favourable manner to the King, and they might depend upon having whatever Favours they desired from the Crown, either for themselves or their Relations. Those Agents would, without doubt, be likewise provided with Sums of ready Money, wherewithal to bribe the Covetous and Necessitous; and with Power to promise Pensions in Time to come: *Thus would the People's Money be employ'd against the People's Liberties, and that which is given for supporting the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, applied to the Dishonour and the Disgrace of the Nation.*

Such a Case is far from being applicable to the present Times: His Majesty's Wisdom and Prudence makes it impossible for us to apprehend any such Case during his Reign; but, to the Misfortune of his People, he is not immortal, *his natural Life must come to an end, tho' his Fame and his Glory never can*; therefore we do not know what may happen in future Times: And would it not be a terrible Misfortune to this Nation, if such a Minister should have any thing like a Precedent for such Practices? I say, any thing like a Precedent; for if any thing like unto this appears in the Story of the late Election, we must suppose they were all Pretences, forged and set up by a Parcel of low insignificant Men for their own private Ends: We cannot suppose that his Majesty, or any of his chief Ministers, would be concerned in such wicked Practices; but if any such Pretences were actually set up, if any such Practices were really made use of, the Contrivers and Abettors, let them be who they will, ought to be punished in the most rigorous Manner our Laws will permit; *not only for making such a false and traiterous Use of the Name of his Majesty and his Ministers, but for attempting to impose upon the Peerage of Scotland, and endeavouring to introduce among them a mean and venal Spirit, in an Affair in which they ought to be influenced by nothing but Honour and publick Good.*

But now to return to my Subject, and to consider what Grounds we have to suspect, that some *illegal Practices* were made use of at the *last Election of Peers for Scotland*: If we consider these
 Grounds,

Grounds, with respect to the Nature of the Thing in general, it must be granted, that nothing but the Trust we may with Confidence repose in his Majesty's Wisdom and Penetration, and the thorough Knowledge we have of the Innocence of those chiefly employ'd by him, can prevent every Man's having a strong Suspicion that such Practices were made use of at the last Election, that such Practices have been made use of at all Elections in time past, and that such Practices will be made use of at all Elections in time to come. Let any Man make the Case his own: Let him suppose himself a Minister: Would not he give any Place or Pension he had at his Disposal, rather to a Man who votes at any Election for his Friend, than to one that votes against him? Nay, if he could with any Safety, would he not insinuate so much, either by himself, or some of his Agents? I acknowledge, that such Things ought not to be done: *The Favours of the Publick ought never to be made to interfere with Elections; nor ought they to be bestowed in reward of private Services:* But such is the Nature of Mankind: We cannot, at least we seldom do, distinguish between the Publick and the Private: Even the most prudent and upright Minister is apt to imagine, that those who oppose him, especially in Elections, are no Friends to the Publick, and that therefore they deserve none of the Publick Favours: This wrong Judgment it is impossible to prevent; and therefore there are, from the Nature of the Thing in general, most solid Grounds for suspecting that some *illegal Practices* may have been made use of at the last Election.

With respect to the Character and Credit of the Complainants or Informants, every Man who has the Honour to know them, every Man who has heard of them, must agree, that the utmost Regard ought to be had to what they Declare. They are all Persons of as Great and Noble Families as any in *Britain*, they are all known to be Noblemen of Great Honour, and therefore their Veracity is not to be doubted: They have declared, that they know from such Testimonies as they can depend on, that some *Practices* were made use of, which they thought *illegal and dangerous*. What are we then to doubt of? Are we to doubt of their Judgment, by imagining that the Testimonies are such as cannot be depended on; or that they are mistaken in their Opinion about the Practices made use of? Their known good Sense forbids it. They are all Noblemen of Great Abilities: Two of them have had the Honour to serve the Crown in most difficult Negotiations; in Negotiations which required the greatest Capacity, and the most consummate Knowledge of Mankind: One of the Two is known to have as thorough a Knowledge of our Laws, as any Nobleman in the Kingdom, and the other was employed at a Court where the utmost Address is at all times required, and at a Time when the Preservation of our present Happy Establishment depended much upon the managing of that Court: With how much Dexterity, and with what Success he acquitted himself, is well known, and must by the Royal Family, as well as by the Nation, be for ever acknow-

ledged: Can we then doubt of the Force of those Testimonies upon which they depend? Can we doubt of the Illegality or the Danger of those Practices which they represent as such?

I now come to the Practices themselves, and the Proofs or Testimonies of those Practices, which have accidentally fallen into my Hands; and from thence I shall make it appear, I think, as evident as the Sun at Noon-day, that there are very strong Proofs, That at the Time of the last Election, there was a Set of Men, a Set of Traitors I may justly call them, who went about in Scotland defaming his Majesty and his Ministers, by pretending that they had a Power to promise Royal Rewards and Pensions to such Lords as would vote for a List, which they had the Insolence to call *The King's List*: Nay further, that they offered and actually gave Money to some, which was certainly the Money of private Men, but they had the Audacity to call it *The King's Money*. I know that many of the Testimonies the Noble Petitioners had to depend on, are not fallen into my Hands, but such as I have come at, and durst presume to make publick, I have published in the *Appendix*, and shall refer to them as occasion requires.

The particular Instances of illegal Practices, set forth by the Petitioners, in their Answer or Return to the Order of the House of Peers, of the 21st of *February* last, are as follows, *viz.*

I. " That the List of sixteen Peers for *Scotland*, was shewn to Peers, as a List approved of by the Crown, and was called the King's List, of which there was to be no Variation, unless to make Room for one or two particular Peers, on condition they should go along with the Measure.

II. " That Endeavours were used to engage Peers to vote for this List, without the Liberty of making any Alteration, by Promises of Pensions, and Offices, Civil and Military, to themselves and near Relations, and by actual Promises and Offers of Sums of Money.

III. " That Sums of Money were actually given to, or for the Use of some Peers, to engage them to concur in the Voting this List.

IV. " That annual Pensions were promised to be paid to Peers, if they concurred in the Voting this List; some of them to be on a regular Establishment, and others to be paid without any Establishment at all.

V. " That about the Time of this Election, numbers of Pensions, Offices, (of which several are nominal) and Releases of Debts owing to the Crown, were granted to Peers who concurred in voting this List, and to their near Relations.

VI. That on the Day of Election, a Battalion of his Majesty's Forces was drawn up in the *Abbey-Court* at *Edinburgh*, and three Companies of it were marched from *Leith*, a Place at one Mile's Distance, to join the rest of the Battalion; and kept under Arms from Nine in the Morning till Nine at Night, when the Election was ended, contrary to Custom at Elections,

" and

The 2d, 3d, and 4th Articles of the Charge, are only different Circumstances of the same Crime, *viz.* That of promising or giving publick or private Rewards, in order to influence the Votes of the _____ of Scotland at the Election. This Crime is directly, and very expressly proved by the Evidence of the abovementioned _____ of _____ who declares, *That Mr.*

told him, that if he would give his Promise, to concur with the List he had mentioned (the Ministerial List) he was ready to give him 400 l. ready Money, with Assurance of a yearly Pension of 400 l. (a) And it is likewise proved, by the Evidence of the said _____ from the whole Tenor of whose Testimony, it plainly appears, that he was to have had 200 l. a Year added to his Pension, and a Majority of Dragoons, on condition he would vote for the King's, or Ministerial List, as it was called: And, that this was the only Condition, is since become still more evident, because he has got no Addition to his Pension, nor a Majority of Dragoons; tho' the Zeal he testified, at that Time, for the King's Service, and for the Honour of his Country, gave him some Title to the former, and his long and faithful Service in the Army, gives him, not only a Title, but a just Claim to the latter: But so far, it seems, are such Services, from being thought worthy of Royal Favour, by some Men in Scotland, that even, the small Favour of an Ensign's Commission bestowed upon his Son, is said to be *a Favour thrown away (b)*, because he would not vote the Ministerial List; as if the betraying one's Country at Elections, or in Parliament, were the only Services, and the only Merit, by which a Man could expect any Preferment in the Army: Tho' this be not the Case at present, yet it may hereafter happen to be the Case; *and therefore deserves the particular Notice of all Gentlemen, who now have, or may hereafter have Commissions in our Fleets or our Armies.*

The Evidence of these two N---le _____ is confirmed by the Evidence of Mr. _____ who says, *That he having complained to the _____ of _____ that the _____ of _____ had at every Election since 1718, voted the Court List of _____ and on that account had every Time been promised a Pension of 200 l. yet he had never received any Money but one single 100 l. He was answered by the _____ of _____ That Promises of Pensions, formerly had not been performed, but that his present Majesty was slow in Promising, but punctual in Payment; that he had represented the _____ of _____ past Services, and that his Pension was settled, and would be regularly paid (c).* This Complaint and Answer taken together, is a direct Insinuation, that the Pension then, or before promised to the _____ of _____ was on account of his voting the Court List, or what was called the King's or Ministerial List at last Election; and that the _____ of Scotland are wickedly made to believe, that the only Service, by which they can propose to get any Share of the Royal Bounty, is, to vote

(a) See Appendix, No. 1st. L. 14th.

(b) See ditto, No. 2d. L. 242.

(c) See ditto, No. 3d. L. 43.

vote according to Ministerial Directions at all Elections. *Can there be any Thing more injurious to the sacred Character of Majesty? Can there be any Thing more destructive of the Freedom and Independency of Parliament?*

These three Evidences, who all testify, upon their own proper Knowledge, are enforced by the Evidence of two other Names who declare, that what they give an Account of, they had from the very Persons who got Money and Posts by voting for the Ministerial List (a); so that if any Enquiry be made into this Affair, these very Persons might be examined, and certainly would be obliged to give a full Account of the Influence they were under when they voted for that List.

The 5th Article does not require any parole Evidence, because it may be proved by publick Records; and among the Papers I have, there is one which contains a List of no less than *fifteen Scotch* who got Post, Pension, or Release of Debt from the Crown, about the Time of the last Election, as may be proved by the publick Records of one or other of the two united Kingdoms: This List I have examined into, with all possible Care and Industry, and am convinced, not only of the Truth of what is there represented, but that most of the *fifteen* there mentioned, are such as would have voted for some of the unsuccessful Candidates at the last Election, if they had been left to their own *free Choice*; that is to say, I must believe they would have voted for some of the unsuccessful Candidates, if I can judge of a Man's way of voting from Blood Relation, intimate Acquaintance, and great Favours bestow'd, all centering in the Person of one Candidate, in competition with another Candidate, who has not one of these Arguments, who has not so much as a personal Acquaintance to plead in his own Behalf.

The Records of both Kingdoms may be easily come at by either House of Parliament, and, if from them it should appear, that a greater Number of Pensions, Offices, and Releases of Debts, were granted away in the Year of the last Election in *Scotland* than in any two since the preceeding Election, and that few or none of these Favours were granted, but to such as *voted plumb* for what was called the *King's*, or the *Ministerial List*, it will be a strong Presumption against the Freedom of last Election; and that *the dispersing of Royal Favours, at least in Scotland, is in very wicked Hands*. But of all Things, I am surpris'd to hear of Releases of Debts due to the Crown being given for any Consideration, except that of paying the full Sum due: This, the Gentlemen of the House of Commons, are, in a particular Manner, bound to enquire into; because, as the People are obliged to support the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, their Representatives have a Right, and are in Duty bound, to enquire into all Grants made out of the Estate of the Crown; and to prosecute those who shall advise the making of any such Grants without a
just

(a) See Appendix No. 4th, 5th.

just Consideration, more especially those who shall advise making of such Grants, *for a dangerous and wicked Consideration.*

The 6th Article contains a Fact which must have been publicly known; but in a Paper I found among the rest, there are some other Circumstances added. This Paper says, That it could have been proved, that the Soldiers of that Battalion had all their Carteridge-Boxes filled, and Ammunition distributed to them the Night before, as if they had been to go upon Action the next Day: That during the whole Day of Election, there was a Serjeant in Disguise appointed to attend upon some Persons who were at the Election, to receive their Orders, and carry them to the commanding Officer of the Regiment: And, that Drums were placed privately, at proper Distances, between the Place of Election, and the Place where the Battalion was drawn up, to beat an Alarm upon the first Notice from this Serjeant.

I know, that by way of Excuse for all this, it may be pretended, That some *Mob or Riot* was apprehended: But I likewise know, that this *Pretence* of Danger from *Mobs and Riots* has been made use of in all Countries, for overturning the *Liberties and Privileges* of the *People*: Under this Pretence, an *Aristocracy* instead of a *Democracy* has been introduc'd in *Holland*: Under this Pretence, the *Choice* of our *Sheriffs* was taken from the *People*, and placed in the *Crown*; and *I do not know, but some Time or other, this Pretence may be made use of for disposing of the Choice of our Members of Parliament in the same Manner: Indeed, I must say, it would be better to have that Choice placed in the Crown by Law, than to have it placed there by Corruption.* But, if there was really any just Apprehensions of a *Mob*, it is the strongest Argument that can be advanced for a *Parliamentary Inquiry* into that Election; for, there never was a *Mob* in any Country, without a Supposition, at least, of Mal-practices or Oppressions committed, or intended, by the Magistrates or Governors. If the Governors in *Scotland* were guilty of any such, they ought to be punished; and, if they were misrepresented, and the People misled, those who did so ought to be punished; and, if there was no just Apprehensions of a *Mob*, those who gave such Orders to that Regiment ought to be punished; *So that, let us take it what way we will, there must have been illegal Practices at last Election, either of one side or the other.*

I have now gone through the several Articles of Complaint exhibited last Session of Parliament, and have in a short Method applied to each Article, such Proofs and Testimonies as have come to my Hands: But, I must beg of my Readers to consider, how difficult it is, in such Cases, to get any plain and direct Proof: When Men deal in treasonable Practices, they are extremely cautious, both with respect to the Persons they converse with upon such Subjects, and the Manner in which they express themselves: They address every Man, at first, with general Discourses, and with dubious and dark Sentences; they never talk plainly or distinctly, till they imagine they are sure of the Man whose

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Honour or Loyalty they attack ; and after a Man is deeply and thoroughly engaged in the Treason, it is not an easy Matter to get any Information from him. For my Part, I am surpris'd how Men could talk so clearly and so openly, about Matters of such a criminal Nature : It is with me, a convincing Argument, that the Crime is of an old Standing, and that it has been so often committed with Impunity in *Scotland*, that Men are neither ashamed nor afraid to repeat it. I really believe, that Corruption, like Adultery, begins to be thought no dishonourable Action ; for, I am sure, if it were attended with that Reproach it deserves, no Man would be so bare-faced, as to propose openly, *To make the most of his Proxy* (a), or to own publickly, *That for the Good of his Family, he had betrayed, he had sold his Country* (b). But I am still more surpris'd, how they came to talk so freely to the
of or the who, as I

am well informed, are both such as have been always reputed Men of the strictest Honour, and most disinterested Attachment to their King and Country : This I can no otherwise account for, than by imagining, that like abandon'd old Letchers, they have a particular *Gusto* in *debauching* every Person that has the *Character of Virtue*.

My Readers are further to consider, that the NOBLE LORDS PETITIONERS may have had many Proofs, many Testimonies, which I could not come at : They were themselves Candidates at the last Election, and as many of their Relations and most intimate Friends, voted against them, and in favour of other to whom they were no way related, from whom they had never received any Benefit, with whom they had never perhaps conversed ; we may suppose, that many of those *whose Behaviour was so very odd*, gave the Petitioners the true Reason for that Behaviour : This, the Petitioners could give no Account of, without stating themselves as Witnesses ; nay, they were not proper Witnesses ; the only proper Witnesses, were the who had given them the true Reason of their *odd Behaviour* at that Election : And, if either House should enter upon an Enquiry into this Affair, it is to be hoped, every Man who has the Honour or Safety of his Country sincerely at Heart, will give all the Information he can, both as to Facts, and as to the Witnesses proper to be examined ; for, upon this Occasion, let me repeat the Words of that noble Peer, and great Philosopher, the late Earl of Shaftsbury, viz. *I know nothing greater or nobler, than the undertaking and managing some important Accusation ; by which, some high Criminal of State, or some formed Body of Conspirators against the Publick, may be arraign'd and brought to Punishment, through the honest Zeal and publick Affection of a private Man.*

I think, I may now with Assurance, appeal to the Honour, to the Conscience, not only of those who are jealous of their Country's Liberty, but to every Man in the Kingdom, if there are not sufficient Grounds to suspect, that some very illegal and dangerous Practices were made use of at the last Election of for Scot-
F land :

(*) See Appendix, No. 3. L. 124;

(b) See ditto, No. 4.

land: Let him consider the Grounds of Suspicion, with respect to the Nature of the Thing in general: Let him consider the Grounds of Suspicion, with respect to the Character and Credit of the Complainants or Informants: Let him consider the Grounds of Suspicion, with respect, even to those Proofs and Testimonies which I have been able to communicate; and then let him deny upon Honour (if he has any) his being convinced, that there are strong Reasons to suspect, that by some Cabal or other, both his Majesty's Name, and the Name of his Ministers, were made use of, and Promises of Royal Favours and Royal Bounties pretended to be made; nay, the Royal Treasure pretended to be given, in order to *bribe* and *corrupt* the of *Scotland* at the *last Election*: If any such Practices were really made use of, we are most certainly to conclude, that the Persons who had made use of such, had no Authority for so doing, either from his Majesty, or from any of his Chief Ministers. Some who have, at present, great Posts under the Government, may, perhaps, have been concerned in this Cabal, but this can no way make it the Act of the Government; it must be a meer Contrivance of that Cabal, in order to impose, both upon the of *Scotland*, and upon the King: Upon the of *Scotland* they have endeavoured to impose, by attempting to make them believe, that they are the only Dispensers of Royal Favours; in order to prevail with those to chuse such as they should name, for representing the of *Scotland* in the *Parliament of Great Britain*: And they will certainly endeavour next to impose upon the King, by telling him and his *Ministers*, that That *Choice* proceeded intirely from the *great natural Interest* they have among the of *that Kingdom*.

I shall, in the last Place, consider the Consequences of those Practices, first, with regard to the *Honour* and *Safety* of the King and the *Royal Family*; and next, with regard to the *Liberties*, the *Lives*, and the *Properties* of the *Subject*: With regard to the King, with regard to his *present* most sacred Majesty, it is the highest Affront, the greatest Indignity that can be offered, to make use of his Name for such a vile and wicked Purpose, as that of *influencing* any *Election* by *Bribery* and *Corruption*. It is very well known, that his Majesty is, and desires to be the Protector and the Avenger of his People against domestick Foes, as well as foreign Enemies; and he knows he cannot long continue so, without leaving his Subjects to their *free Choice* in *all Elections*: He will protect his Ministers against Faction, but he will never attempt to use any Methods for protecting them against the *just* and *legal* Resentments of the People. Such Attempts can never be made by the Sovereign, they must proceed from the Ministers only; and, whenever any such are made, the Ministers and their Supporters are the only *factionous* Men in the Nation: They are the *Faction*, that unite together against the *Constitution* and the *Laws* of their Country; and his present Majesty's Wisdom and Goodness is such, that we may depend on it, he will never set him-

himself at the Head of any *Ministerial Faction*: Yet this is what those *Dealers in Corruption* endeavoured to instill into the Minds of the *Peers* and People of *Scotland*: They endeavoured to make them believe, that Royal Bounties and Rewards were not to be bestowed for publick Services, nor to be earned by a prudent and an active Zeal for the Honour of the King and the Interest of their Country; but by sacrificing both to the illegal and unjust Commands, of what, in their Sense, must be called a *Ministerial Faction*. Thus did they endeavour, as much as in them lay, to alienate the Minds of the *Peers of Scotland* from his Majesty, by perswading them, that his Majesty was resolved to be the *Father* of his *Ministers*, and the *Master* of his *People*; instead of being what he really is, the *Father* of his *People*, and the *Master* of his *Ministers* or *Servants*.

Is there any Man, in either House of Parliament, who has an *extraordinary* Regard and Esteem for his Majesty? Is there any Man in the Kingdom, who has any *particular* and *personal* Obligations to him? If there is, and surely there are a great many, they are the Men who ought, who are *in Honour* bound to appear *the first*, in vindicating his Majesty's Name from this *vile Aspersiōn*.

As I shall immediately shew that these Practices (tho' now made use of by a Cabal of Private Men) tend directly to the Overthrow of our Constitution, by rendering ineffectual the *legal Method established for the People's calling their Governors to an account, and punishing them for their Misdemeanors*; the Consequences, if not prevented, may prove fatal to the *Royal Family*, and to the *Protestant Religion*, not only in this Kingdom, but in all Parts of *Europe*. I have before shewn, that in all absolute Monarchies, the King and the Royal Family often suffer for the Crimes and Misconduct of their Ministers and Servants. This is a Misfortune can never happen in this Kingdom, while the *True Life and Spirit* of our Constitution is preserved: *No King ever suffered in England, unless he made the Crimes of his Ministers his own, by endeavouring to screen them from the Resentments of the Injured People*: But if any future wicked Minister should get the absolute Dominion of his Sovereign, and prompted by this Precedent, should apply all the Honours, Posts, Pensions and Rewards, now in the sole Disposal of the Crown, towards Securing to himself a *Corrupt Majority* in both Houses of Parliament, he might probably succeed in such a Design, *if the practices now complained of should be overlook'd*; and if he did, our *FREE Government* would become an *absolute Monarchy*, a *Slavish Government*, and not only a Slavish Government, but such a one as must destroy the Religion and Morality, as well as the Liberty of the People: Our People would certainly murmur and complain, those Murmurs and Complaints would be disregarded, would be despised by those that were the Authors of them; they might be smothered for a Time, but the Fire would at last break forth with Fury, and the Sovereign, who was perhaps till then quite ignorant of them, as well as quite in-

nocent of their Causes, would, with his Ministers, be involved and consumed in the Flames.

Let us consider that, *to our Misfortune*, the present Royal Family has a Rival, yea, many Rivals for the Throne, and that all of them are Enemies to the Religion we profess. The Rivals to our present happy Establishment have always endeavoured to support their Claim by the ridiculous Principles of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance, and the more ridiculous Principles of Religion professed by the Papists. The Right of our present Royal Family is founded upon the Divine Principles of Liberty, and the more Divine Principles of Religion professed by the Reformed, especially by those of the Church of *England*. If the Freedom of our Government be, under any Mask or Disguise, destroyed, we remove the chief Corner Stone upon which the Right of the Royal Family is supported: *We may talk of governing according to Law, of doing nothing but by the Advice and with the Approbation of Parliament, but if our Parliaments, by means of a Corrupt Influence, should come to be intirely under Ministerial Direction, the People will soon become sensible of their Loss of Liberty:* Ministerial Tools may amuse themselves, and may endeavour to amuse the World with Names instead of Things, but the People will soon see through the thin Cobweb. This will create a general Discontent; and every Man knows that a *distant* Ill is like a *distant* Good: We look on that which is *near* with the *right* End of the Prospect; but to view that which is at a *Distance* we turn the *other* End: This will of course make the Generality of those *who do not reap the immediate Fruits of Corruption*, turn their Eyes towards the Rivals of our present happy Establishment, and the *present* Ills the People are sensible of will diminish, nay, almost annihilate the Dangers that are from those Rivals *most justly* to be apprehended.

But this is not all the Danger: If a *Slavish* Government should ever be established in this Country, and supported by a *Corrupt Parliament*, as Churchmen are but Men, we may expect that the Generality of them, Presbyterian as well as Episcopal, High-Church as well as Low, Preachers of all Sects and Denominations, will sink into the Depravity of the Times, and become the *Tools of Power, and the Instruments of Corruption*. We shall have our Bishops preaching every Sunday, perhaps writing Pastoral Letters, against the Infidelity and Immorality of the Times, and all the other Days of the Week *sacrificing the Rights of their Country, and haranguing in favour of Corruption*: We shall have the Presbyterian Ministers preaching long-winded Sermons against the Roman Catholics, and with the same Breath, *for the sake of a private Pension*, making fulsome Compliments to the Oppressors of their Country, and *assisting them at all their Elections*: This will give the Generality of the People, especially the Ignorant and Vulgar, who commonly judge of a Religion by the Practice of its Professors, a Dislike, a Distaste to every Religion now publickly professed in *England*. In such Circumstances I should not wonder to see Infidelity prevail among our Gentry; I should not wonder to

see Popery making long Strides towards perverting the Vulgar: *Example will always go further than Precept*, and as Popish Priests can have no Hand in our Government, nor any Concern in our Elections, they would be the only Set of Priests amongst us, who could retain any general Character of Honour, Virtue or Religion. Thus by destroying the Respect our People have for the Reformed Religion, we should remove the other Corner Stone, upon which the Right of the present Royal Family is founded; and by reconciling the Vulgar to the Roman Catholick Religion, we should *remove their Horror at the name of a Pretender*. This might at last produce a fatal Revolution in our Religion, as well as our Government; and if the Papal Power should once be fully re-established in *Britain*, the next age would probably see a Court of Inquisition set up in every Country of *Europe*.

Now with respect to the *Liberties*, the *Lives* and the *Properties* of the *Subject*. It must be allowed that the Practices said to have been lately made use of in *Scotland*, tho' carried on by a Cabal of private Men, evidently tend to debase and corrupt the Minds and the Spirits of the Nobles of that Kingdom, and to render them fit Tools for any future wicked Minister that may attempt to overturn the Liberties of his Country. These Practices will chalk out to him the Method by which he may secure to himself Sixteen sure Votes in the House of Lords upon all occasions; and if these Practices pass unpunished, it will encourage him to repeat them, and to make use of those Means for *Screening* himself from the legal Vengeance of the People, which a Cabal of private Men had before with Success made use for *imposing* upon their Sovereign. If by such Practices the Election of the *Sixteen Peers of Scotland* should at last come to be intirely under *Ministerial Direction*, we may then easily judge that those Qualifications which ought to entitle a Lord of *Scotland* to be one of the Sixteen, will for ever be an absolute Bar to his being Chosen: A Character of Honour and Integrity, a disinterested Love for his Country, a thorough Knowledge of Mankind, and a Capacity fit for conducting the most difficult, the most intricate Affairs of State, as they will always make him despise being the *Slavish Tool* of an *Upstart Over-bearing Minister*, must of course make such a Minister resolve at all Elections to give him the Exclusion: During the Reign of such a Minister, if any Lord of *Scotland* has an Inclination to be one of the Sixteen, he must first take care to forfeit all Regard and Esteem in his Country; he must learn to cringe and bow at the Levees, and to make himself very familiar with the Footmen of the Great Man; or he must make himself the Buffoon of the Court, and the common Butt of the Maids of Honour: By such Noble Qualifications the Minister will be convinced, that he can have nothing but his Favour to depend on for the Continuance of his Seat in the House of Lords, and that therefore he must, upon all occasions, behave in that Seat according to the Directions he receives from him.

Whether such a Set of Peers from *Scotland* could add to the Honour or the Dignity of the House of Peers, I leave

to those who now render their Country happy and secure, by their having Seats in that House, to determine: In this they have a particular Concern; but in this every Subject has likewise a Concern; for it has been the constant Maxim of all those who have over-turned the Liberties of their Country, *To make the Nobles as contemptible as possible*: It was for this Purpose, among others, that *Julius and Augustus Cæsar* made such large Additions to the *Roman Senate*; and it is reported, that *Cardinal Richlieu*, upon a certain Occasion, said, he was resolved to make the Title of *Duke and Peer of France* so contemptible, *That it should be a Scandal to be, and a Scandal not to be, a Duke and Peer of that Kingdom*: By which he meant, That he would raise such Scoundrels to that high Degree of Nobility, as should render it contemptible; and he would set it up so often to Sale, and at so low a Price, that it should be a Sign of great Poverty, in a Man of any Family, not to make the Purchase.

Upon this Occasion, I must again beg, that Gentlemen would consider what a *Weight of Power* is already in the Crown, what a great Addition has of late Years been made to the *Ministerial Power* of the Crown, and what an Influence this may give to any *Prime Minister* (who has a mind to make use of his Power for that wicked Purpose) over a great many even of those who may hereafter have hereditary Seats, or Seats for Life in the House of Peers: By this it is certain a wicked Minister may, in future Times, have the Command of a great Number of Votes in that House; and if to these he can add *Sixteen Tenants at Will*, sixteen sure Votes from *Scotland*, it is more than probable, it may at last come to be in the Power of every Minister to secure to himself a Majority of that House, upon all Occasions, and for the worst of Purposes: For Corruption is one of the most infectious of Crimes: Like the Plague, if it once gets into a House, it soon seizes most of the Family: The more general it is, the less will be every Man's Price, and the oftner a Man commits it, the more abandoned will he be. *The Honour of Men may be compared to the Virtue of Women*. He that first attempts the Virtue of a Woman, must not immediately offer her a *Smithfield Bargain*: He must not say, *I'll give you such a Sum to be a Whore*. No, he must endeavour even to gain her Affections: He must use a great many Allurements, and artfully persuade her there is nothing dishonourable in what he desires. Even the next Man that offers, must be a little upon the Reserve: He must not bluntly offer his Money as a Price for her Virtue. But the third or the fourth may act more plainly, especially if it is in a Place where there are several as good to be had: He may, without Ceremony, ask her Her Price. From that time she begins to look upon her Virtue as a thing proper for sale, and brings it to Market upon every Occasion: Yet still she may be high in her Demands, and disdain to submit to mean or dirty Purchasers; *but at last she makes no Distinction, nor refuses any Price*.

As it is the Duty of a Father to guard the Virtue of his Daughter, and to prevent her being exposed to any Temptation, so it is
the

the Duty of those who are Members of either House of Parliament to guard the Virtue of the People, and prevent their being exposed to the Temptations of Ministers, whose Interest it may be to corrupt them. *Scotland* is now of the same Family with *England*. If one Daughter of a Family be debauched, the other is generally in danger. If the Peers of *Scotland* be taught to know Corruption, it will probably soon after slide in among the Peers of *England*: This would directly put it in the Power of any future wicked Minister to secure a Majority in the House of Peers, which would at once destroy that *legal Method established by our Constitution for calling our Governors and Magistrates to an Account, and punishing them for their Misdemeanors*. What then will signify all those Laws which our Ancestors have with so much Care, and at such an Expence of Blood and Treasure, established, for securing the Lives, the Liberties, and the Properties of the Subject. If no Judge is to answer in Parliament for neglecting or misconstruing those Laws; if no Officer is to be punished for transgressing them, but at the Pleasure of those that appointed him, of what Use or Benefit can they be to the Subject against the Oppressions and Extortions of their Rulers and Governors? Remove but this Check of a Parliamentary Prosecution, and all our Ministers, Magistrates, Judges, and Officers, both Civil and Military, who are appointed by the Crown, may, at the Pleasure of the Crown, set at naught *Magna Charta*, the *Habeas Corpus*, and all those other Fences, which have been set up to guard us against absolute Power and arbitrary Sway: In short, we would be in a much worse Condition than our Ancestors were ever reduced to by the *Court of Star-Chamber*, the *Court of Wards*, the *High Commission Court*, or any of the other Props of Tyranny invented heretofore by Ambition, for the Exercise of Oppression; for the Judges of all these Courts, were under the perpetual Terrors of a Parliamentary-Prosecution, and some of them suffered severely by such: If Parliamentary-Prosecutions, should ever be brought under **Ministerial Direction**, that which was intended for protecting the People, would serve only for riveting their Chains, and increasing the Number of their Oppressors: *The new Ministers might perhaps make use of them for plundering the old, but the People would, without Redress, be plundered by both.*

It signifies nothing to say, we feel none of these Evils; and therefore, why should we dread them, or terrify ourselves with dismal Apprehensions: For, if the Power of putting a Stop to them, when we do feel them, be taken from us, *which Power consists in the Freedom of our Elections, and the Independency of both our Houses of Parliament*, we shall soon come to feel them, and may complain, but to whom shall we complain? To those that make us feel them? To an arbitrary Ministry, and a corrupt dependent Parliament? To such, can we expect to complain with Success? We are as yet in the Infancy of Corruption: We have the Happiness to be under a Prince, who will not give the least Countenance to Oppression: Nay, if there are any Members in either House, who are influenced

enced by the Posts or Pensions they enjoy or expect (which I hope there are not) they must, as yet, be but *Striplings in the Wickedness of Corruption*, they cannot yet be supposed to have become *common Prostitutes*; and therefore, if any very violent Measures, or glaring Oppressions, were brought before them, for their Approbation, their Consciences would probably fly in their Faces, their Country might yet, perhaps, meet with some Regard and Compassion; for this Reason, our present Ministers, if they were inclin'd (which they certainly are not) must yet a while avoid all such Measures, and all such Oppressions. Under *Julius and Augustus Cæsar*, after the first Fury of the Civil Wars was over, *Rome* felt no Oppressions, *Rome* heard of no Violences, nay, *their Senate did not so much as approve of any ridiculous Measures*; but, in the very next Reign, *so close did Tyranny follow at the Heels of Corruption*, *Rome* felt terrible Oppressions, *Rome* heard of Cruelties as well as Violences, and *Rome's Senate not only approved of all, but were villainously instrumental in most.*

If a wicked Minister could once secure a Majority in the House of Lords, that would go along with him in *all* his Measures, he could, in a short Time, secure such another Majority in the House of Commons, *by making himself Master of almost all the Elections in England*; for what would signify all our Laws against false Returns, against Bribery and Corruption, &c. if the Penalties inflicted by those Laws could not be recovered, nor the Persons punished who transgressed them? If in any such Case, our Judges should dare to give Judgment against the Ministerial Tools, that Judgment would, upon a Writ of Error, be reversed in the House of Lords; and the Judges, who shewed themselves so little complaisant to the Minister, would certainly have some Prosecution cook'd up against them for Malversations in Office; and would as certainly have Judgment given against them, either by their Brethren, or upon an Impeachment in Parliament.

As the House of Lords is, and has always hitherto, highly deserved to be the supreme Court of Judicature in the Kingdom; if Corruption should once get within their Walls, no Law, no Privilege could be effectual, no private Estate could be secure against the Ambition, the Avarice, the Malice or the Revenge of a *Prime Minister*, who had got the absolute Direction of that House. Upon this Occasion, I must, in particular, recommend it to the Noble and the Rich Families in *England*, to consider how precarious their Titles are to some of the Estates they now enjoy, *how many Claims the Crown might, from ancient Records, set up against them*, how many plausible Arguments, Counsel learned in the Law, might advance in favour of any Claim that could be set up by the Crown; and *how weighty those Arguments are, which are enforced by the Hopes of getting, or the Fears of losing a good Place or Employment*: Let them consider these Things, and from thence form an Opinion, how secure their Estates would be, against an avaricious or a revengeful Minister, with

with a Court of Chancery to decree, and a House of Lords to affirm, according as he should privately direct.

Nemo fit repente turpissimus, is an old and a just Observation; with respect to Judicatures, with respect to Societies, it holds true, as well as with respect to private Men. If a **Corrupt Ministerial Influence** should once be introduced into Parliament, it might, for some Time, be applied only to *Publick Affairs*, especially if it were in the Hands of a Man not agitated by any very violent Passions; but, if it ever should come into the Hands of a bold, avaricious or revengeful Man, it would soon come to be applied to *private* as well as *Publick Affairs*, and would be made to serve all the wicked Purposes of the Minister; nay, of every one of his Parasites and Tools. Let us read the Histories of the *Romans*, let us examine the fatal Effects of Corruption among that unfortunate People, that People once so famed, so justly famed for Virtue; and we must conclude, *That the most absolute Tyranny, the most whimsical Oppressions, the most horrid Cruelties, are justly to be apprehended from the Effects of Corruption, when ripened into Prostitution.* I have been long suspicious, that this dishonourable, this fatal Crime, has been gaining too much Ground in all Parts of the Kingdom; but the reading of those Papers which are in the *Appendix*, and some other Memorandums, which I could not, *which I was ashamed to publish*, have given me the utmost Alarm: The Facts, as represented, must either be false, or the Spirit of Corruption must be got to a terrible Height in the northern Parts of this Island, and calls loudly upon the Legislature for a speedy, for an effectual Remedy.

What were the Reasons for rejecting the Petition presented last Session to the House of Peers, I shall not pretend to determine; but the chief Reason seems, to me, to have been, *That as Impeachments would probably follow, if the Practices complained of were found to be true, it was not proper for them to act the Part of both Grand-Jury and Judge:* This plainly points out the Method, how the Practices complained of ought to be enquired into. The Commons, in Parliament assembled, are the *Grand-Inquest* of the Nation: Tho' there be no Petition before them, there is a most authentick Report, there is a general Clamour over the whole Nation; and *common Fame* is a good Ground for them to inquire into any Practices that look like an Incroachment upon the Constitution, or an Affront to the King: Therefore I make no doubt but that an Enquiry into this Affair, will be the first Thing moved in that House the next Session of Parliament, and that they will go through with it before they conclude any of the other publick Affairs of the Nation.

This will lead them naturally to consider, what I have called the **Ministerial Power** of the Crown, and which I have shewed to be no Part of our *original Constitution*, but a Power since raised by slow Degrees; and every Man who can impartially consider it, must, in my Opinion, be convinced that it is now arrived at such

a Height, as might be of the most dangerous Consequence, if any future wicked Minister should turn it towards extinguishing the *true Life and Spirit* of our Constitution. The Practices now complained of may, and ought to be punished; but while there is a Power left to corrupt, while that Power is so great as to afford reasonable Hopes of Success by Corruption, the severest Punishment will only serve to make Men more secret in committing that Crime for the future. The only Method for preventing the dangerous Effects of Corruption, is, to dissipate the Power of Corrupting, to disperse it among so many Hands, that no one Man or one set of Men, can build any wicked Schemes upon that Share of it they have in their Hands. This was the ancient State of our Government, and I hope every Gentleman will consider, *That a free Government cannot be preserved, without bringing it often back to its first Principles*, which is an Observation made by a Gentleman of great Penetration in the Nature of Government, and is a most just and most useful Observation; but it is of use only to those who live under a free Government: When the Freedom of a Government is once intirely destroyed, it is out of the Power of the People, *in any peaceable Manner*, to bring their Government back to its first Principles; *and such a benevolent Resignation is rarely to be expected from those who have got an absolute Power into their Hands.*

I hope I have, by this Time, convinced my Readers, that our present Contests are not, as by some most maliciously pretended, about Places or Preferments. I hope I have convinced every Man, that the Contest really is, about *providing for the Safety and future Security of our Constitution*, on one side, and *supporting a Ministerial Power, by which it may probably be destroyed*, on the other. This is to me so plain, that I am convinced no Man, now engaged in the Cause of our Constitution, was brought over by Envy, Disappointment, or Revenge; but if any Man was, such a Man, may perhaps in his own Conscience know, that he acts from such Motives, but no other Man can know it, nor ought he to judge so harshly. The good Actions of Men are often owing to what are accounted bad Passions: Virtue is often indebted to the Pride or Vanity of its Votaries; and even Courage itself is sometimes owing to Cowardice. When a Man acts virtuously from a vicious Motive, his inward Satisfaction cannot be so complete; but the rest of Mankind can have no Knowledge of what passes within, *and therefore they have no Title to withdraw any Part of that Esteem which is due to his outward Behaviour.*

For my own Part, I never dealt so maliciously by any of the Gentlemen engaged upon the other side of the Question: *I have always hitherto had the Charity to make an Excuse for their Honour, at the Expence of their Understanding*: But I have now, at least in my own way of Thinking, set the Nature of a free Government, the true Nature of our Constitution, and the Dangers to which it may be exposed, in so clear a Light, that hereafter I cannot easily suppose a *Mistake* in their *Understanding*; and therefore

fore I shall be under a very great Difficulty how to make an *Excuse* for their Honour. For,

From the foregoing Essay it must, I think, to every Man plainly appear, That a Man of Honour will always prefer the *Interest of his Country* to any *present Advantage for himself or Family*.

That it is the *Interest* of every Country to be under a *Free Government*.

That the *Freedom* of a Government consists not only in the People's having reserved to themselves a Power to make their own Laws, and to punish their Magistrates if they transgress those Laws; but also in their having a *legal and effectual* Method established for exercising that Power.

That the only *legal* Method for that Purpose established by our Constitution, is by a *Prosecution in Parliament*.

That this Method cannot be *effectual*, if the Majority of the House of Lords be under the *Influence and Direction* of the *Magistrate who is to be punished*.

That a great Number of *profitable Posts and Pensions*, at the *sole Disposal* of such a *Magistrate*, may probably procure him such an *Influence*.

That the *most effectual* Method for preventing this Danger, is to *take away or diminish* his Power, with respect to the disposing of such *Posts and Pensions*.


That the *only* other Method for attempting to prevent this Danger, is, to make *effectual* the Laws against *Bribery and Corruption*, by inquiring strictly into such Practices when complained of, and punishing them severely when discovered.

That there are *strong Suspicions*, that some *such Practices* were lately made use of in *Scotland*.

Therefore I must conclude, that *no Man of Honour* will hereafter be *against* inquiring into those Practices, or *against* diminishing that Power which may *probably* give Encouragement to make use of the same Practices in time to come. This is a Conclusion which I must from the Premises necessarily draw; and if the Generality of my Countrymen be of my Opinion, I must beg of Gentlemen who have any Regard to their HONOUR or FAME, (for to such only I address myself) to consider, what the *present Generation*, what *Posterity*, will think of them, if, notwithstanding such a fair Warning, they should *oppose* an Inquiry into the corrupt Practices complained of, or any Propositions that may be made for preventing those fatal Effects of *Ministerial Power*, which may hereafter be apprehended. Now is the only Time, because we have at present a King upon the Throne, who has too much Wisdom to be governed by his Ministers, and too much Goodness to oppose whatever may be thought necessary by Parliament for securing our Constitution in Time to come; but we may hereafter have a King upon the Throne, ambitious of making himself absolute, or governed by a Minister who may deserve to be hanged; and from such a King could we expect the *Royal Assent* to any such Regulations?

I think I have now said enough, for convincing every Man that his Honour is deeply engaged in the present Question; and I hope my Readers will believe me, when I declare, That whatever I have said upon this Subject, proceeds from no *personal* Resentment against any Man concerned in the Administration, nor from a *personal* Attachment to any Man engaged on the other Side of the Question; but from that Principle of Virtue by which every Man is obliged to prefer the Happiness of Mankind, and the Good of his Country, to all other Considerations. This is my Religion. This is my Enthusiasm; and this, I hope, shall always be my Glory and my chief Delight. It was this Principle that gave Occasion to the foregoing Essay, because I am fully convinced, that we are in danger of falling, in some future Reign, under a **Licentious, Corrupt, Knavish Slavery** on one Side, or a **Superstitious, Ignorant, Popish Slavery** on the other; from one or other of which two *dismal Events*, there is nothing can save us, but the VIRTUE, the HONOUR, and the STEADINESS of those who happen in the present Age to be the Representatives of the *Noble, the Ancient, and the Rich Families* of the Kingdom. *It is to them chiefly I have addressed myself upon this Occasion, and it is from them only their Country can expect SALVATION.*





A P P E N D I X.

NUMB. I.

This Paper was indorsed thus :

*A COPY taken from that in the
of own Hand-writing.*

And is intituled,

*COPY of what passed betwixt the
and me, touching the Ministerial List
of Sixteen*

LReceived a Letter from the _____ dated 1
from *Edinburgh* 7th *August*, 1733, desiring me
to meet with him on *Friday* or *Saturday* there-
after, at one or other of the Places mentioned
in his Letter: I waited on him accordingly at 5
South-Queensferry.

At this Meeting, the _____ told me, that in a few
Months there would be a new Parliament, and new Elections,
and that he hoped I would find it my Interest to concur with
such a List of 16 _____ as would be concerted, and offered by 10
the Ministry: I told him I had not yet been spoke to about
any List whatsoever, and that I had not communed with any
Person on that Head.

The _____ told me, *That if I would give my Promise
to concur with the List he had mentioned, he was ready to give 15
400 Pounds Ready Money, with Assurance of a yearly Pension of
400 Pounds*: I refused his Offer; and after some further Dis-
courses on that Subject, we parted.

Some few Days thereafter, the _____ came to my own House
in the Country, where he told me that I had a numerous Fa- 20
mily, and some Debts on my Estate: That it was my Duty to
use Means and Opportunities for the Support of my Family;
that he had, with Pleasure, some Days ago, made me such Of-
fers, as he hoped might contribute to the Benefit of my Fa-
mily; and that he was further to offer me, that I should be 25

one of the 16 in the *Ministerial List*, with proper Allowances for my Charges in Attendance.

I thanked him for his Offer, but told him, that I never entertained any Prospect of bettering my Family, by concurring
 30 in any Means which might endanger the National Constitution and Liberties of Parliament, or Honour of the Peerage: He told me, that this was the Language of the opposing Party, who assumed the Name of Patriots; but that they had no other but personal Views, to get a Ministry turned out, to make way
 35 for themselves: I told him, that perhaps it might be so with some People; but to convince him that my Views were not personal, with respect to Men, but real, with regard to Things, I should propose a Measure to him consequential to what he affirmed, by which he should find, that no such personal Views
 40 were entertained by me, and by which he should command my Vote without Money, Pension, or Office: He desired me to name that Measure: I told him, that if Sir _____ and his Friends would promote a Law for frequent new Parliaments, and for preventing Parliamentary Corruption; and if
 45 my Friends did not concur with such Motions, I would immediately desert them, and would give all the Votes I was capable to give, for continuing Sir _____ and his Friends in their Offices for Life. I desired the _____ to mention this Measure to his Friends, with my humble Opinion,
 50 that such a Measure, offered by him and his Friends, would purchase them the Good Will and Assistance of all true Patriots, and would cut down all the Opposition of false ones. After some Discourse of that Nature, we parted.

Some few Days thereafter, the _____ came a second
 55 Time to my House in the Country, where he told me, that he had reason to believe, that there would be a Compounding betwixt the contending Parties; that he had no further Offer to make me, but desired me to go into *Edinburgh*, and pay a Visit to the _____ of _____ where he doubted not I would
 60 obtain full Satisfaction to my Contentment; but I did not go, neither did I see the _____ until an Hour after I had given my Vote freely at last Elections, 4 June, 1734.

N U M B. II.

*The _____ Evidence copied from
 his own Hand-writing.*

1 I T is to be observed, that Colonel _____ is _____
 the _____ Nephew by the Mother, and first Cousin to
 the Father, and _____ and the _____ of _____ by
 [Two Lines left out here.]

The is married to a Sister of the Colonel's, 5
 and Niece of Lord His is a noted Ad-
 herer to the Earl and told he was
 intrusted and acted under for the Court. He
 has a Pension of 400 *l.* yearly, and is _____

On the 3d of December, 1731, Endeavours were used by the 10
 Courtiers to gain by shewing him some
 Glimpse of Hope that he might succeed to the late of
 as one of the 16 Peers of Scotland, and telling him he
 had been mentioned to the King for that Purpose.

_____ writ an Answer, That he had much ra- 15
 ther be made known to the King in any other Capacity, than
 as one of the 16 for Scotland at the Close of a Parlia-
 ment.

In June, 1733, _____ was willing to be one of
 the 16 in the Ministerial List; yet he then writ to Co- 20
 lonel _____ in Answer to one from the Colonel — I
 was one of the Resolvers against the whole Court List at a
 former Election, and our Confederates Behaviour was such,
 as made me resolve not to tie myself down till the last.

In August, 1733, Sir _____ of _____ writ to 25
 _____ from Edinburgh, that it was taken notice
 of, he had staid a Night with the _____ of _____ at New-
 liston, and had not come to Edinburgh where
 _____ then was.

The 22d of August, 1733, _____ was alone 30
 with the _____ who said he had been obliged to
 him when he was in Disgrace with the Ministry, and thrown
 out of the Parliament, and that he now trusted to his
 _____ as much as to any one of the _____ and that he had
 mentioned him to the King and to Sir _____ who had 35
 a good Opinion of him.

Then _____ pulled out a Pocket-Book, saying to
 I will shew you the List of 16 _____ to be
 chosen at the ensuing Election, as it was given in to the King
 before I left London, and which his Majesty and his Servants 40
 had approved of; he gave it to _____ to read,
 which he did with great Attention.

It consisted of two Columns; the Column upon the left
 Hand contained a List of the 16 _____ of the then (now
 last) Parliament; and those to be dropp'd next time had a 45
 Cross at the End of their Names, and a Dash of a Pen through
 their several Names.

The other upon the right Hand, contained the same List that
 the _____ of _____ and his Friends voted the 4 June, 1734.
 And the Names in that List _____ did, at the same 50
 time, mark in a List of all the Scots _____ printed by Allan
 Ramsay, which _____ happened to have in his
 Pocket; and when _____ gave back the List to
 _____ of _____ the _____ desiring him not to speak of it

55 to any Body, and said that he believed there would be no Alteration made in it, and that if any was made, it would be to make one of the sixteen.

begg'd him not to put his Name in that List, having no Ambition for it, and an Estate too small to support the Dignity, and the Expence of living so much at London.

He also begg'd of _____ [a Line left out here.]

of said he never designed it should put him to any Expence; and since he would not have it, desired to know wherein he could serve him.

thanked him, and said, he had nothing to ask; of answered, You are the strangest Man in the World, you will not let your Friends do for you, and others are never satisfied with all that can be done for them;

70 and then he asked whether had not a Pension of 2 or 300 *l.* yearly, who told him it was 300 *l.* a Year: I'll make it 500 *l.* (said) but immediately (by way of correcting what he had said) cried, But oh! that will not do, the King gives no more to in Scotland but 400 *l.* yearly, so I'll have 100 *l.* added to your Privy-Seal.

75 again said, he was satisfied with what he had; to which the of smiling, answered once more, You are the strangest Man in the World, you will 80 neither ask nor take any thing.

replied, that the last Favour he had asked, was to get leave to pay 400 *l.* for a Pair of Colours to his Son to which he got no Answer.

The of asked how his Sons were employed, and having told him that his Son carried Arms in Brigadier *Hacket's* Scots Regiment in the Dutch Service, and his Son in the of Dragoons.

The of writ down their Names in his 90 Pocket-Book, and said the King would break any Colonel who he knew took Money on such an Account; but he himself would take it upon him to provide for them immediately, because he had acted as Secretary at War in this Country (*Scotland*) since Sir turned ill, and went into the 95 Country.

The next Day, 23 or 24 *August*, 1733.

visited and repeated what had passed betwixt

said and of and said he never heard of speak so much

100 Good of any body, and that might have what he would, and should consider his own and Family's Interest, and therefore join the (*viz.*) who would carry all before them, and the discontented

would

would make nothing of it, but would come in like drooping Geese at last; and that he was only concern'd for good 105

This Discourse often repeated at different Times, to several People; particularly before Mr. of and Mr. Writer to the Signet, who is

Solicitor. 110

On the Saturday following, waited of of to take leave of him before he () went into the Country; but the of took him in his Coach, to visit of at his Country-House, with Mr. the of Brother; and by 115 the Way talk'd only of Buildings and Mathematical Instruments, and Experiments ——— [Three Lines left out.]

Mr. going out of the Coach for a little, the of asked whether he knew that Gentleman? who answered, that he did not; the of 120 said, it is Mr. a Brother of the

of whom I have made a Lord of to bring in his Brother to vote the King's List I serv'd to you of the sixteen for Scotland, at the next Election for a new Parliament. Within these two Years, (said) 125 Mr. would have been thankful for a Post of L. 200 Sterl. about the Exchequer. Don't you think he has made a better Bargain, by having Patience?

told this to many, that Mr. was promoted, in order to gain his Brother the of 130 to vote the Court-List of at next Election.

— — — — [Two Lines left out.] At parting with the of he begg'd would come to the of Election, which declining, because needless, where so 135 many would be; the of urg'd him to it, because it would be obliging to the King, who, he said, takes Notice of every Thing of that Kind; and who appears at Elections.

saw of at his Levee, and at Entertainment, which he gave the 140 Day of his Election: At the Levee, of told him, he had writ to Sir about his Sons, but that nothing could be done for himself till he (of) got to London.

After of Dinner, the of 145 took aside, and said that he, had formerly shewn himself in the Interest of the King and his Servants, and therefore he (of) could not doubt of his going into the Measures of the King and Ministry, at the next Election of sixteen for Scotland, and vote the 150 King's List.

Then he desired to send to him, when at London, a Memorial of his Services in the Army, and what he

he wanted for any other ; which he would lay before the King and his Servants, and give all the Assistance he could.

155 he had any Thing to ask, but not otherwise. said, that he would write to his if

As the Company were parting, of took
by the Hand, and said, My dear I
hope what I have said, will have some Weight with you ; pray
160 let me hear from you when I am at *London*, and you may depend upon my utmost Assistance.

On the 7 *October* 1733, in a Letter
to offer'd of Service to
him, and a Majority of Dragoons ; and urged him to ac-
165 cept of it.

On the 4th of *November* 1733, Lord writ
to an Answer, That he took the Offer
of the Majority to come from the That
he was willing to take the Majority, as due to his long and
170 faithful Services ; and as no Condition is mention'd in the
Letter, that he took it for granted, that he was not ty'd down
to any implicit Faith and blind Obedience, in giving his Vote
at the ensuing Election for sixteen That he
hop'd this would be agreeable to his and the of
175 and prevent Mistakes for the future.

On the 27 *November* 1733, Colonel writ
to that he was surprized at his writing
to he hoped it would not be expected, he
would blindly Vote the Court-List ; that many Months since,
180 he had desired to keep himself uningag'd,
that he Colonel had the Good of his
Family at Heart, that he was grieved and surprized at
his refusing the he earnestly
desires his to do nothing that may give a Handle
185 to those entrusted with the King's Affairs, to suspect that
he will not go alongst with them, even in that they call
Court-List.

He tells how well of had represented his
and begs him frankly to resolve him how far he (
190) would allow him (the Colonel) to answer
for his

That had told him (the Colonel) that he
knew not what to say to the King about
and that the Colonel had been about a Week balancing, whe-
200 ther or no to write that Letter to his

He regretted, if be under Engagement
to of who would endanger himself and his
Friends, and see those drop him whom he least expected it of.
That he was under so great Concern for
205 as might have induced him to write uncautiously for himself,
and begg'd to consider his own, and his
Family's Welfare. That his Son's Name had been mark'd by
the

the for an Ensigny, but feared
 it might be stopp'd. That in the of Situation,
 it was dangerous for him to do, even small Favours, to those 210
 he cannot answer for.

That if his was at *London*, he could (tho' he pre-
 tended not to Secrets) shew him such Game, behind the
 Curtain, as would convince him there was no Hope for the
 Opposers. 215

— — — — [*Three Lines left out.*]

On the 7 *December*, 1733, writ an
 Answer to the Colonel, Thanks for his Kindness.

— — — — [*Four Lines left out.*]

That what he had writ to Lord hoping that 220
 blind Obedience was not to be expected of him, for the Ma-
 jority of Dragoons at the ensuing Elections, he took to be an
 honest way of speaking, when a Majority of Dragoons was
 in the Scale. That he would be both sorry and surprized, if it
 were taken amiss, that he had a great Regard for the of 225

but that his Lordship never desired him to enter
 into particular Engagements with himself or any other Per-
 son. That the of could give no Impression of
 him () to the King, but that he was
 an honest Man, sincerely attach'd to his Majesty's Person, Fa- 230
 mily, and Government ; and that he would always pre-
 serve this Character. That should his Son not be provided
 for, and himself struck out of the Civil-List, nothing would
 prevail with him to vote for any sixteen but those he
 was fully perswaded have the most sacred Regard for the King's 235
 Person, Honour, Safety, and Interest, and a just Regard for
 the Country.

On the 15 *December*, 1733, of Letter
 to bore, That he was afraid

would be against him, but that he had got his Son 240
 made an Ensign, and desir'd to try if that
 Way of Acting would influence him ; and, if it did not, *one*
of the King's Favours was thrown away on the Son of a Man,
 who certainly has Merit, whether he be a Friend of his (Earl
 of or not. 245

— — — — [*Two and twenty Lines left out.*]

In Letter to of
 1 *January* 1733-4, he resumes the former Letter to
 and writ, That he has nothing at Heart, but Ho-
 nour, Honesty, and a sincere Attachment to our present happy 250
 Establishment. That if it be a Crime, not to be ty'd down
 to vote for any sixteen to be handed down to him in a
 List at the next Election, he was, and would be found culpable.
 He thank'd of for the Commission to his Son,
 and hop'd his has not so mean an Opinion of him, 255
 as to imagine it can influence him () at
 the Election of the and that it would give him great
 Pain,

Pain, if he were brought to believe, that the King, or his
could think an Ensigny thrown away, on the Son
260 of a Man who had served twenty seven Years.

writ to 15 Ja-
nuary, 1733-4, and sent to his a Commission, enclo-
fed for his Son to be Ensign in the
and desired to write
265 a suitable Answer to in Return for his Friend-
ship; and begg'd, that tho' he may think his Nephew Colonel
and him () wrong in their
Politicks, that yet he would trust them, till he had a Demon-
stration against them; and that he will, at Meeting, shew to
270 him a long Letter he () had that Day
received from of

on the 17 January, 1733-4, writ an
Answer to the said Letter, That he could trust a great deal to
and the Colonel, but as he was a free Man,
275 he resolv'd to continue so, and not to enter into any parti-
cular Engagements with particular Persons: That he
might believe the Commission was by no
means a disagreeable Thing to him, or to the young Gentle-
man; but that he () was perswaded
280 his and his () other Friends,
had too much good Sense, to think that a poor Pair of Colours
could influence one of his () long Ser-
vice, to go one Step further, than returning his hearty Thanks
for the Thing.

Of the same Date, writ to of
a Letter of Thanks for his Son's Commission, and
mentions not any Thing else.

— — — — [Six Lines left out.]

N U M B. III.

*The Evidence of Mr. Writer, or
Clerk to the Signet.*

Brother, did, in August 1733,
apply to or to his own Cousin
then at *Edinburgh*, for a Pension to
from the King, on Account of his voting for
5 to be the sixteenth for *Scotland*; and be-
cause at former Elections, he had always voted the List, said
to be the Court's or Ministry's: And, on one or other, or
both of these Accounts, or
in his Name, assured the Brother of a yearly Pension to
10 of *L. 200 Sterl.* from the King,
one Year whereof to be paid so soon as the Proxy should be
given,

given, and a Privy-Seal of *England* to be then delivered for future Payments. Of this the Brother immediately acquainted by a Letter, and the Declarant

Mr. in Conversation. 15
Accordingly sent to the Brother
his Proxy, blank, to be delivered to or
and at the same Time wrote to them both, de-
siring to send to himself *L.* 30 of the *L.* 200,
to be presently paid, and to deliver the *L.* 170 to said Mr. 20
for paying some of the most urgent

Debts.

The Brother deliver'd the Letters to both the and
the Proxy to one or other of them, who thereupon desired him
to send said Mr. in a Day or two to receive the 25
Money.

On the 5 of *September* 1733, the Brother introduced said
Mr. to at his Lodgings, who car-
ried them both into a private Room, where opening a Ca-
binet, he took out *L.* 200 in Bank-Notes, saying, it was 30
Pension, due at *Midsummer* last; and gave
L. 170 thereof to said Mr. and *L.* 30 to the
Brother, for the Purposes aforesaid.

Mr. desired also the Privy-Seal, but
said it was not fit to give it, because the Election being so 35
near, the Enemies of the Government would call it a Bribe to
influence the Election; and because it would be expensive to
pass it the Seals, and would be subject to the Tax on the Civil-
List, and to Agency, &c. but that might
depend on receiving it annually from him, 40
free from all Charges and Deductions.

Mr. said he was inform'd by
That at every Election since 1718, (when he came of
Age) he had voted the Court-List of and on that Ac-
count had every Time been promis'd a Pension of 200 *l.* 45
but had never received any but one single 100 *l.* That
would not grudge the Expence of the Pri-
vy-Seal, and of the Deductions. That the Time of Electing
the Sixteen, was not so near as to occasion any Reflection;
and that 200 *l.* given without a Privy-Seal, would rather pass 50
for Bribery.

of answered, That Promises of Pensions,
formerly, had not been perform'd, nor, perhaps, made to be
perform'd; and, that even Privy-Seal Pensions, had not been
paid in the late King's Time, but his present Majesty was slow 55
in Promising, but punctual in Payment. That his
had represented past Services, and
that his Pension was settled, and would be regularly paid.

Mr. still insisted for the Privy-Seal, and said,
That meer Promises were uncertain; and without a Privy- 60
Seal, perhaps would never be paid
but

- but one Year in seven, as an Election came on; and that if a Privy-Seal were granted, he would have a good Claim for every Year, and at an Election, could refuse to vote the
- 65 Court-Lift, if Bygones were not first paid up to him.
 On this, said, The Privy-Seal should be got, if he was a Month at *London*; for it was but to put some other, who would be as well satisfied with a Promise.
- 70 And of this, he desired the Brother to keep him in Remembrance, by writing to when they were at *London*.
 Then carry'd them back to the Company, and gave the Brother a Letter to which he
- 75 said was an Answer to the
 A few Days afterwards, the Brother and Mr. were at a Tavern with where the Discourse was mostly on Voting, and Pension, and
- 80 his Promise, to get Employments for the Brothers; and whereof the desired the Brother to write to him when at *London*.
 When and returned to *Edinburgh*, about the End of *April*, or the Beginning of *May*, 1734,
- 85 the Brother inform'd Mr. that he had waited on or and undertook that would, at the ensuing Election, vote the Court-Lift, if the Promises given last Year were made good; and the Brother sent Mr. to for his Proxy,
- 90 blank; but the inclin'd to vote in Person: Whereupon the Brother went to him in the Country, to persuade him to stay at Home, and send his Proxy. The Brother not returning, so soon as was expected, Mr. Provost (or Mayor) of did, on the 23d of *May*, tell Mr.
- 95 that being uneasy at the Proxy's not yet coming, had sent an Express to the Brother about it; who had answer'd, that declin'd to give one. And Provost further represented, That had got a younger Brother of
- 100 Commission to be Captain of a Man of War. That the Backwardness to give the Proxy, might hurt both his and his Brother; and, that therefore, desired Mr. to speak with him, the said Mr. answered, That he supposed
- 105 Backwardness, proceeded from not procuring the Privy-Seal he had promised: And, tho' he had made his Brother a Captain of a Man of War, yet his Circumstances required something to be done for himself: Provost reply'd, That he believed the Pension promised
- 110 was procur'd, and that would satisfy him about it. Mr. on this, said, That he could not then wait on

on being in an Hour or two to go from Town, to the West Country; but would by Post write to to send his Proxy to his Brother, or to himself; and Mr. accordingly did immediately write to the

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As Mr. was going to his Horfe, Provost came to him, and desired him to go to in the Country, and get his Proxy sent in; which he (Mr.) said he would do in due Time, and when he had dispatched his other Affairs; and would return to *Edinburgh* the 2d or 3d of *June* at furthest.

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Mr. accordingly waited on in the Country, who told him he had sent his Proxy to his Brother at *Edinburgh*, with Directions, to dispose of it to the best Advantage, as said Mr. would direct, who his supposed was at *Edinburgh*; and to whom had wrote a Letter for that Purpose by his Brother; and he therefore intreated Mr. to hasten back to *Edinburgh*, and to assist his Brother in disposing of his Proxy.

130

Mr. arriving at *Edinburgh* the 2d of *June*, found that the Brother had filled up the Blank in the Proxy, and given it to and the Brother gave this Reason for his Conduct, That he found nothing was to be got for it but from the Court-Party; and that he had made no new Bargain at delivering it to because he understood the Court had so great a Majority, as not to need it much, and had not waited for Mr. coming to Town, left by this Delay it might have been slighted, but said that Mr. might go to and try what could be got.

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On the next Day, the 3d of *June*, the Brother and Mr. went to and asked what had been done on the Promises made to answered, That the Pension would certainly be made good, but that it was not proper to speak of it to till the Election was over: That he had accepted the Proxy to serve the Court having too great a Majority to need it; and if Mr. was not satisfied with this, he would give it back to him to be disposed of as he thought best for Advantage, and that he could not have accepted of it, if had known the Backwardness to grant it, but that he ——— [Four and twenty Lines left out.]

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On the 20th of *June*, desired the Brother to bring Mr. to get Payment of Pension; and early upon the 22d in the Morning, the Brother and he waited on at his Lodgings ——— (Two Lines left out.) ——— and coming

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coming into the Room, gave to Mr.
 200 l. *Sterl.* in Bank Notes, as the Pension due to
 at *Midsummer*, 1734. ——— [Seventeen Lines
 left out.]

N U M B. IV.

The Evidence of the concerning the

- 1 **T**HIS was willing to have made Oath,
 that in the Month of *November*, 1733, in a deliberate and
 ferious Conversation, the said to him, that
 being poor, and needing Assistance to provide for his Children,
 he had engaged to Vote for the Ministerial List of the Sixteen
 5 and on that account had received two
 hundred Pounds *Sterling*, ready Money, and a Promise of a
 yearly Pension of two hundred Pounds *Sterling*, and of a Com-
 mission in the Army to his Son and of one in
 the Mint in *Edinburgh* to his other Son
- 10 *N.B.* That these Commissions were accordingly given to his
 Sons, is publickly known, and appears in the Books at the
 respective Offices where such Commissions are register'd.

That the Pension has been paid to the
 appears from a Conversation which his said Son
 15 had in *December*, 1734, with a Gentleman in *Edinburgh* (who
 could make Oath of it) concerning a Bill for about thirty
 Pounds *Sterling* from *London*, which said his
 Father had ordered him to answer out of the first Payment, to
 be made to him the said as Attorney or Factor
 20 for his Father, of the Pension given to his Father about the
 Time of the Election of the the Gentleman having
 objected, that nobody would trust the Honouring of his Bill
 to the Payment of a Court Pension; which, promised with the
 strongest Assurances, was often neglected when the Job was
 25 over. Mr. answered, that there was no fear of
 it in his Father's Case, for the (one of
 the) paid it to
 him on his Father's Account punctually, within
 two or three Days of the several Terms of Payment.

NUMB. V.

The of Evidence
concerning the of

THE of expressly told the 1
of that he was promised either by Sir
or the of that if he
the of would vote for the *Ministerial*
List at the Election of the he himself
should be one of the Number, and should also be made one of 5
the Court of Police, the Salary whereof for a is eight
hundred Pounds *Sterling* yearly, and that he had accordingly
engaged to vote for the said List.

N. B. This Declaration was made by the of
to the said of 10
in the Presence of [*Two Lines left out.*]
[*Four Lines left out.*] That he is made one of the
Court of Police, appears from the Records, and is pub-
lickly known.

F I N I S.



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