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
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Coffee House No. 12
GREAT BRITAIN

In the approaching CONGRESS
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F.B.

In a LETTER from
A Newly Elected MEMBER
TO A
Devenish
Noble MINISTER of STATE. *Cour*



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
WESTERN

GREAT BRITAIN

IN A LETTER FROM

A MEMBER OF THE

PARLIAMENT



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THE
INTEREST
OF
GREAT BRITAIN, &c

MY LORD,

A SENSIBLE mind can scarcely reflect, without concern, upon your Lordship's situation. Your master not contented with your having been the instrument of his happiness, has made you the Minister of his glory. He has degraded you into the first Post of state he could bestow, after your having the pleasing satisfaction of forming his mind to whatever is great or amiable;

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nor did he think it sufficient that he himself should enjoy the benefit of your Lordship's abilities, unless his people should share in them likewise. This, my Lord, is a severe proof of Royal Esteem; and the more so, as your Lordship becomes a Minister at the most critical period of any that *Great Britain* has seen for a century past. A period perhaps that, politically speaking, is as critical as any she ever saw. In another country this would not be a discouraging circumstance, because, in other countries, the Sovereign's favour can protect a Minister, in this it has often undone him; and sometimes, not so much through his demerit as the caprice of the people.

I, my Lord, as well as you, am entering upon a new scene of life. The good opinion of my country has given me a seat amongst her representatives; and, if your Lordship will pardon the familiarity of the idea, I cannot help looking upon myself as one of the audience at that great political drama, in which your Lordship is a capital actor. But, my Lord, spectators are the judges as well as the hearers of a drama; they form the bench as well as the pit, and however despicable they may be

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be as individuals, they are powerful as a body.

It is, my Lord, as an individual that I now address myself to your Lordship; nor can I give a better proof of the sincere esteem I have for your person and character, than by imparting to the public the ideas I have formed to myself of the part which a *British Ministry* ought to act in the approaching Congress for Peace. A part to which the abilities of few are equal; and I address myself to your Lordship upon this head, the rather because the Plenipotentiaries, notwithstanding their full powers, must take their directions from a Secretary's office here; and the blame, in case of a miscarriage, will fall, not upon them, but, upon those who direct them. The Earl of *Strafford*, and the Bishop of *London* escaped uncensured for the Treaty of *Utrecht*, while the Earl of *Oxford* was tried for his life, and Lord *Bolingbroke* was proscribed, for the directions they gave in measures which the others executed. If other nations pay perhaps too finical a regard to the study of politics; if they carry it into even ridiculous refinements, that is no reason why it should be so totally neglected as it has been in *Great Britain* for a century

past. It is with some concern that I must observe, without excepting even Sir *William Temple*, we have not, since the Restoration, had an able negotiator. The many Treaties we have concluded, instead of being systematic, have been no more than expedients for stopping the wounds of the day, which were no sooner closed, than they broke out with more mortal symptoms.

Notwithstanding this, nothing is more evident than that there is a certain system of interest which *Great Britain* ought to pursue with relation to every power in *Europe*, and that system, it is to be hoped, will take place at the approaching Congress. Were I to speak my mind freely to your Lordship, I should most solemnly declare, that all the evils which *Great Britain* now feels, arise from the ill-judg'd Treaties her Ministers have concluded. Experience tells us, that she cannot make war upon the continent without incurring triple the expence that continental powers are at. The *French* are sensible of this; and their policy has ever been to patch up a Peace at any rate, till they could lick themselves whole, and then begin afresh. The Treaties of *Nimeguen*, *Utrecht* and *Aix-la-Chapelle* are

are glaring instances of this melancholy observation; and, another treaty of expedients, the moment that *France* recovers her breath, will bring us into the highway of perdition.

As the system which I have the honour to propose to your Lordship may appear to be somewhat extraordinary, I shall beg leave to premise a very few observations in answer to the general prejudices which Ministers are apt to have, and which I know they have, against novelties of this kind. One of their most common topics is; “none but a conquered people will submit to such and such terms”. My answer is; if the *French* are not conquer’d, we ought to fight till they are; if they are conquered, they must accept the law from us; but to treat with them under, even, the shadow of an equality, will be certain ruin to *Great Britain*, unless all the elements have altered their qualities; for I will defy any man to bring a single instance from history of the *French* ever observing a Treaty with *Great Britain*, when she was in a capacity to break it. It may again be said; “At this rate, there must be perpetual warfare between *Great Britain* and *France*.” My answer is; “better an open war, than another
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another insidious Peace, which must inevitably plunge us into expences greater than all we have yet undergone, immense and incredible as they are. In short, my Lord, I can form no idea of a Peace that will leave *France* the ability of renewing war; because that would be to her, a decisive advantage. But it may again be urg'd; "May not *France* break even the stipulations we ourselves shall impose, as well as those which may be concluded upon the footing of an equality?" I think not; and I will give your Lordship my reasons for so thinking.

Great Britain, as a power subsisting by commerce, has nothing to fear but for commerce. The *French* know that, and all the desperate passes they have made against us have been aim'd at our commerce. We have indeed parry'd them, but how? merely by our superiority at sea. Had the *French* been superior at sea, those attacks must have been mortal to us, and, the moment they are superior, they will prove so; let us bind them down as firm as parchment, seals and oaths can admit of. Considering the state of the belligerent powers at the conclusion of the Treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle*, that Treaty was far from being either
disgraceful

disgraceful or disadvantageous to *Great Britain*. But can any man of common sense imagine that *France*, when she concluded that Treaty, ever meant to keep it? No; she agreed to it, as I have already hinted, that she might take breath. She had formed in her councils a system of commercial rivalship. When she threw her eye upon this happy island, and reflected that its prosperity was owing to commerce; when she saw the poverty and distress of her own inhabitants, populous, plentiful and pleasureable by nature as her country is; when she reflected that a superiority in commerce would place her as far above *Great Britain* as *Great Britain* is above the meanest state in *Europe*; she then dropt all considerations but that of improving and employing her marine. Twenty millions of livres a year, and if that was not sufficient, double, nay triple the sum were deducted from the land establishment, and set apart for the sea service; and so promising an aspect did this new system bear, when carried into execution, that she thought herself a match for the *British* marine.

But thanks to heaven, to use a vulgar expression, she halloo'd before she was out

out of the wood. Her expectations were too sanguine for her strength, tho' her policy most undoubtedly imposed upon the *British* Ministry, notwithstanding all the repeated experience that this nation has had of her perfidy. Sensible as she was that the nerves of our commerce lay upon the continent of *America*, she negotiated with one hand and armed with the other. She knew the *British* nation would not suffer their rights to their *American* possessions to come under a discussion; she invented a chicane about what those possessions were, and our court most inadvertently fell into the snare. We appointed commissaries—of their abilities I shall be silent.—The scene of negotiation was laid at *Paris*. They treated over maps and plans about fixing the very limits which the *French* were invading with ships and troops. Happily for this nation the vigilance of some of our *American* planters spread an alarm of our danger, which reached the throne, and the subsequent acts of hostility at last opened our eyes. What followed is too well known for me to recapitulate it here. I shall therefore, in very few words, sum up what I have to say on this head.

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This I cannot do better than by supposing the year 1761 to be the year 1748, and that our present plenipotentiaries, instead of *Augsburg*, are to meet at *Aix-la-Chapelle*, but fraughted with all the experience of the *French* perfidy and policy, which they have tried in the intermediate time between 1748 and 1761.

Were this the case, give me leave most humbly to submit to your Lordship whether we should make such a Peace as we did at the Congress of *Aix-la-Chapelle*; would not a *British* Ministry say, "There is no faith to be put in your professions, none in your oaths, none in your seals, none in your signatures. We must have more substantial securities than pen and ink can give us." This language would undoubtedly appear extravagant, were we treating with any other people than the *French*. It must appear extravagant even in treating with them, were it not for the many recent proofs we have had of their disingenuity and wicked designs. Were we to carry the supposition I have mentioned forty-eight years back, is it to be imagined that had *Queen Anne's* Ministry had the same experience of the *French* designs, as the Ministers of *King George the Third* have, or ought to have, they would have trusted to pen, ink and paper for the demolition of *Dunkirk*, or to

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map-security and to charts for ascertaining the boundaries of *Nova Scotia*, which has cost this nation above thirty millions sterling in settling; because, in that point, all the beams of this widely disseminated war are collected.

It has, I know, been urged, and perhaps your Lordship knows it better than I do, "What stronger security can you have than a solemn Treaty and the public faith of nations; or to what purpose is a Congress appointed, if we are to insist upon what is extravagant and impracticable?" My Lord, what would seem extravagant in one situation becomes reasonable in another: what, in one case, would appear like mean distrust, in another becomes a fair precaution.—Therefore, my Lord, to be extremely plain with your Lordship, I cannot entertain the smallest notion of a Peace that shall leave *France* at liberty to recruit her marine, and perhaps in a few years to dispute with us the empire of the seas, and strike into hazard all that ought to be dear and valuable to *Britons*. If she is left at that liberty, no man can be simple enough to doubt that she will avail herself of it; and if she does avail herself of it, it will not be thought presumptuous in me to say, that all the blood and treasure we have spent in this war have been thrown away, and that we have

have our work to begin anew, with a debt of an hundred millions upon our shoulders. That being the case, as undoubtedly it will be, have we not reason to make use of every precaution to prevent it ?

Having said thus much, I cannot help owning to your Lordship that I am puzzled as to the application. Was any one to demand from me an instance where a people not absolutely reduced, were compelled to limit (for I shall not say to abolish) their marine, I must go back to the *Punic*, the *Athenian*, and the *Sicilian* wars, and to the days of Queen *Elizabeth*, or I must bring precedents founded in injustice, and established by tyranny. It is sufficient if I have pointed out the necessity of such a measure, for, if it is necessary, it *must* be practicable.

I am, upon this head, sorry to observe that other causes besides the native perfidy of *France* concur in enforcing the absolute necessity of limiting her marine in any future Treaty we shall conclude with her. It is but too certain and too melancholy a truth that she appears to have got an absolute ascendant in the councils of the *Dutch*; that this ascendancy has enabled her to support this war, and in a great measure to recover from that state of bankruptcy into which she was plunged twelve or fourteen months ago; while *England*, without a friend in

the world that can assist her with a single ship, is tied down, and has indeed tied herself down, to the most rigorous observance of Treaties, made at a time when the existence of such a system of power as now takes place in *Europe* could not be suppos'd. Give me leave therefore, my Lord, as a member of our great national council, to say, that we cannot be too jealous in this respect; nor ought we to comfort ourselves with the thoughts that the marine of *France* is now so much reduc'd that it will require many years before it can be repair'd. Were the *Dutch* out of the question, how many hungry northern powers are there, who for the sake of money, can, within the space of twelve months, replenish the harbours of *France* with a marine more formidable than any she has had these fifty years. But, in fact, the naval power of *France* is not perhaps so much ruin'd as is generally imagined. Twenty seven ships of the line, and many of them capital ships, is no despicable stock for a young beginner to set up with, and that *France* still retains those, besides the ships she is daily building, is I am afraid too certain. Let us suppose, what is by no means either absurd or improbable, that the Czarina, from the immense useless navy she keeps up, shall either out of friendship, or for interest, spare to *France* twenty
sail

fail of the line, which she is in no condition to man, and which must otherwise rot in her harbours. Let us suppose what is equally probable; that the *Swedes*, who at present are, by their own confession, in a state of famine for money, should, for a valuable consideration, spare to the *French* ten of their line of battle ships. I shall forbear to extend those suppositions to all the lengths they may admit of. I therefore shall but just mention the connections which the *French* give out, falsely I hope, that they have with *Spain*, whose marine is admitted to be at present in a flourishing, if not a respectable, condition. I shall likewise but just hint at the uncertainty we are under with regard to his *Danish* majesty's sentiments as to the present war; nor shall I insist upon the evident partiality which the *Dutch* every day discover for our enemies.

As these pages, my Lord, professedly treat of the interest of *Great Britain* at the approaching Congress, I cannot form a conception that it can be well conducted without a stipulation that shall bind up other powers from furnishing *France* with shipping. If there is not such a stipulation, I would not insure the continuance of the Peace for eighteen months; nor dares any man answer for the consequences of a war renew'd, as such a war must be under circumstances

circumstances so deplorable and so disadvantageous to *Great Britain*. But, my Lord, even that precaution must be unavailing unless we extend it to *France* itself. Should I be ask'd, "With what face can you make such a demand?" I would bid the enquirer take pen and ink in his hand, and calculate what *Great Britain* has gained by expending above forty millions of money. Will the revenue of *Canada*, of *Guadaloupe*, *Senegal*, and I shall throw *Bellisle* into the bargain, produce a clear revenue of two millions of money in a year? Which, taking one circumstance with another, is short of the interest of that capital which we have expended in the prosecution of the present war.

It becomes not me, my Lord, to prescribe the limitations to which, perhaps, it may be proper and necessary to fix our demands. In that respect, all I can say in general is, that number, metal and burthen are to be considered, and that a limitation of each must be fixed, if we intend to have a peace that is durable, and if it is not durable, we must certainly be in a better situation without one. But still, the *Effronterie* (to make use of a *French* expression) of such a demand is objected. Examples that appear every day in common life will remove that objection. A man who borrows money,
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and faithfully repays it, may do it upon his word and his bond, without any other security. A man who borrows money, and does not repay it punctually, when he applies again to the party he borrowed from, must give a mortgage of his lands if he has any. But what shall we say to a man who mortgages those lands to several other people? Is that man to be treated with that complacency, with that decency that an honest man of untainted reputation and experienced ability has a right to expect from those he deals with. Notwithstanding that, there is a way of treating with such a man, by making him give you a pawn of value equal to the sum which he borrows.

Pawnbroking, my Lord, may be said to be an ugly term amongst polite people; but in the case I now treat of, and indeed in all cases of the same nature, it is the only security that a people, so often bubbled and baffled as *Great Britain* has been by *France*, can have. It is a security which the greatest states in the world have deign'd both to give and receive; and if I am not mistaken more than one belligerent power in *Europe* at present deals in such a security. But I mention this only by way of illustration, for strictly speaking, *Great Britain*, at the approaching Congress, can demand of *France* nothing in the nature of a deposit, nor indeed

deed has she any to give that can be of any security to us, after her multiplied breaches of faith. The limitation of her marine would be an effectual security, because we should then have it always in our own power to enforce the observance. The marine of *France* may ruin *Great Britain* should it get to a certain pitch of strength. The marine of *Great Britain* never can hurt *France* in her most interesting concerns, because, being a continental power, they are not liable to be affected by what passes upon the ocean. That it may not be thought I advance any thing at random, I shall just put your Lordship in mind, that before the restoration of *Charles* the Second the *English* had a most formidable marine, when the *French* had next to none; and yet there is no man who reads history with candour, who will not acknowledge that *France* was then greater, richer, and more powerful than she has been since. But it is to be considered at the same time that she has been since incomparably more formidable to *Great Britain* because of her marine.

From what I have said, I am far from insinuating that it ever will be in the power of *France* to be so formidable upon the continent as she was during one part of the reign of *Lewis* the Fourteenth. The case

is now altered. *France* was then powerful, chiefly through the weakness of the other princes upon the continent. *Prussia* was at that time scarcely mentioned as an *European* power, and *Russia* was seldom spoke of but with contempt, for the barbarity of its inhabitants, and as being too distant from the great scenes of action in *Europe*. *Spain* was generally under princes eaten up with religion and indolence, and the house of *Austria* was weak thro' the divisions which prevailed amongst the other *German* princes, which *France* never failed to improve to her own purposes, under pretext of her being the guarantee of the Treaty of *Westphalia*. Even *Great Britain* did not then know her own strength: and if she sent six or eight thousand men at times to the continent, it was looked upon to be a most extraordinary effort, and exclaimed against as an unnecessary expence of blood and treasure. There is, therefore, with regard to the rest of *Europe* at present, no manner of danger that *France* will be able to give law to the continent, unless she becomes mistress at sea, which she cannot be without a marine too powerful for that of *Great Britain*; in which case, she will undoubtedly impose upon us the same terms that, I hope, it is in our power to impose upon her. When such a delicious morsel as a superiority at sea is within her view, it

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would be the worst of scepticism to doubt that she would say to *Great Britain*, "I will give you peace if you will reduce your navy to such a number of ships, and such a quantity of metal, and all who shall be found to exceed either in number or quantity, shall, wherever they are found, be treated as pirates."

Such is the language that *France* would hold towards us, was she in our situation and we in hers; even without having received the smallest provocation from breaches of faith and violations of treaties. She would, perhaps, even go farther, and prescribe to us the limits and quality of our commerce; and some may think that we ought to do the same by her. But that would be carrying matters too far. We have nothing to apprehend from the extension of her commerce, but from the means she has of protecting it. During the administration of cardinal *Fleury* her trade was immense; but not being protected, upon the first spurt of hostilities, it fell a prey to us. He trusted to our tameness, but, happily for us, he was deceived. The same vain presumption had the *French* before the commencement of this war, to cover the ocean with their trading ships, before they were in a condition to protect them by their marine, to which we owe the having 25000 of their best hands now in the prisons of *England*.

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But what, my Lord, must have been the consequence had their power been equal to their injustice by land? And what must the consequence be should it ever become so? And where is the man that dares pronounce that it will not become so, if effectual care is not taken at the approaching Congress to prevent it, should the negotiations arrive at the maturity of a formal Treaty?

I have been, my Lord, the more diffuse upon this point, as I think it to be the capital concern, and the principal point of view that *Great Britain* ought to have in any negotiation that is set on foot. The houses of *Brandenburg* and *Austria* will naturally terminate their disputes by mutual indemnifications. *Russia* seems to take part in the war thro' resentment, and for hire. When the subsidies she has are withdrawn, she must be disabled from giving any trouble to the repose of *Europe*. *Sweden*, as usual, has been drawn in to take share in this war by the arts of *France*; and has neither the means nor the inclination to continue it. The elector of *Saxony*, in like manner, became a party by the sollicitation and address of the house of *Austria*; and as his *Prussian* majesty has no demands upon him, he must comply with whatever is concluded upon by the other powers. So that in the main I think there can be little doubt

that the interests of all the states in *Europe*, upon the continent, may be brought, at the approaching Congress, to a happy conclusion.

But the differences between *Great Britain* and *France* lie much deeper, and their interests are not so easily reconcilable. His Majesty, as elector of *Hanover*, has great demands upon the *French* for the ravages and cruelties they committed in his electoral dominions during the life-time of his Royal Grandfather. I shall, however, set aside that consideration, and take it for granted that each must sit down with his own loss, for the sake of public Peace. The demands which *Great Britain* has upon *France* are not to be so satisfied. Whether the Allied, or the *French*, army have the upper hand in *Germany*, is a consideration entirely independent of our *American* differences. Our troops there fight as the auxiliaries of *Prussia*, and the protectors of *Hanover*, which was most unjustly attack'd and desolated upon our account. Tho' the *French* connected *Hanover* with *America*, we never did. And in negotiating, we are to proceed upon the same principles, as if we had not a man upon the continent of *Europe*. I shall therefore, my Lord, lay aside all manner of consideration about the settlements and stipulations that may concern other powers, and confine myself

self entirely to the immediate interests of *Great Britain*.

The nature of a Congress admits that certain points between the contesting powers may be settled by an amicable compromise, and that each must yield somewhat to the other. This must undoubtedly, as I have already observ'd, be the case with all the continental powers. But where is the point in which *Great Britain* can recede in her demands upon *France*? Supposing we were to gain by treaty as much again as we have conquered by arms, must we not still be vastly out of pocket? Supposing *Britany* or *Normandy*, or both together, to be ceded to us, we must still be losers. And yet such is the nature of a Congress, that by agreeing to it, we in a manner agree to yield up somewhat, and, what that ought to be, is the next consideration. For my own part, I would agree that nothing should be given up that we can keep without prejudice to ourselves.

In war nothing is more common than to distress an enemy, without any advantage arising to the party but what results from that distress. I cannot help being of opinion that our conquest of *Canada* was an acquisition of that kind. It was glorious for the arms of *Great Britain*: It wounded the *French* in a most sensible part, and disabled them from continuing the war upon the
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the *American* continent. In this, and no other, light that conquest was of benefit to *Great Britain*. The conquest of *Guadaloupe*, on the other hand, though of less eclat and less detrimental to *France*, was of more solid benefit to *Great Britain*. But such is the force of sounds, that the one has been under-rated, and the other over-valued, merely from a presumption that when Peace shall take place, one or other must be given back to the enemy.

I shall, in compliance with an opinion so universally receiv'd, suppose that such an alternative may fall under the deliberation of our ministry; and I cannot help saying, they will in that case have great difficulties to encounter. On the one hand all the *British* subjects in *America* are, to a man, for our keeping possession of *Canada*; and their interest in their mother-country is now so great, that it may be dangerous for a minister to withstand it. On the other hand, an honest *British* Minister will regard only the interests of *Great Britain*, and, if he sees them incompatible with that of her colonists and planters, he will drop the one and pursue the other. If the interest of *Great Britain* is consulted, that of our *American* brethren never can be hurt; but it is extremely possible to hurt the mother-country by too great an attention to the interest
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of her colonies. Such a complacency therefore can only be called weakness, and is somewhat like the partial doting of a parent for his youngest child, in prejudice of the elder who never offended him.

The arguments, however, for our retaining *Canada* are pompous and plausible. The security of our colonies upon the continent of *America* has been strongly urged; but I apprehend from mistaken principles. Were the *French* at this instant disposed to cede *Canada* to us, we must be at a greater expence in maintaining it, than if it was in their hands, unless we were barbarous enough to butcher every *Frenchman* there. Is it to be supposed that the *Canadians*, let their mother-country make what cessions she pleases, can ever be reconciled to our religion and government? Can we imagine that they ever will look upon themselves as *English* subjects, and that they will not take every opportunity which our indulgence or security shall present them with to shake off our yoke? Can we forget that *Canada* itself was originally peopled by *French* jesuits and missionaries, who still preserve their influence over the minds of the inhabitants. To that influence we owed all the misfortunes we met with upon the continent of *America* during the course of this war.

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The *Indians* themselves are no other than their pupils, and are taught that it is meritorious to betray and butcher *Englishmen*. If we look into the descriptions which the *French* writers themselves have given of this country, we cannot hesitate a moment in concluding that our conquest of it is far more glorious than solid or advantageous; and that *France* itself was out of pocket in keeping it, and that she never looked upon it in any other light than its being a nursery for her soldiers and her sailors. It is true, the country is improvable; but, to *Old France*, farther than for the purposes I have mentioned, it was not only useless, but, often, burthensome. It was the consideration of this that made the *French* government put in practice that insidious iniquitous scheme of securing to themselves the back settlements upon the *Ohio*, and of perverting the native *Americans* from their allegiance and friendship towards *Great Britain*. Had that scheme indeed taken place, *Canada* might justly have been stiled a *French* empire. But thanks to providence it is now defeated, and *Great Britain* is possessed of all those advantageous situations that the *French* had so insidiously projected for themselves.

The *English* government, my Lord, never would have had the smallest jealousy of *France* upon account of *Canada*; nor would they ever have thought it an object worthy of their arms, even in time of war, had it not been for the encroachments I have taken notice of. These became matters of serious consideration to us. We effectually dispossess'd them of all the forts and settlements they had made along the *O-bio*; and then we conquer'd *Canada*. But that conquest was not our primary object, and is valuable chiefly because it disables the *French* from giving us any interruption in securing to *Great Britain*, those advantages which they had so unjustly pointed out to themselves. We have had sufficient time, either to do that (and I hope it has been done) or to render every thing that had been done by the *French* irreparable. We have had leisure sufficient to profit by all their schemes; and if we have made good use of our time, it will be out of their power ever to renew them, and therefore it can be of no manner of prejudice to *Great Britain*, if this tract of wild, uncultivated country, should revert to its former possessors.

But, my Lord, reasons of a more cogent nature than any I have mentioned makes it highly prudent in us, if we are

reduced to the alternative I have already mentioned, to render back *Canada* rather than *Guadaloupe*. To begin with the weakest. Nothing is more impolitic than for a nation to possess a greater extent of territory than her inhabitants or subjects can cultivate. This was the failure of the *Roman* policy. They conquer'd tracts which they neither could people, nor cultivate. This obliged them as, for, instance, in *Britain*, to keep immense armies upon the frontiers of those whom they called *Barbarians*. It is a mistake to think that the *Romans* conquered one half even of the then known World. But their rage for extended conquest, however, completed their ruin. Their force, which was immense, and formidable when collected and compact, was feeble when dissipated and remote. Ambitious men among themselves assumed the title and reins of empire before the mother country, or the reigning emperor could reduce them. Deluges of blood were shed, till old *Rome* became at last so weakened, that her government and constitution expired almost without a struggle, under the swords of those very barbarians whom her civil dissentions had disciplined.

Remote, my Lord, as the application of this remark may seem, it is far from being improbable, that the same one day

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or other may be the case of the *British* government in *America*, should our frenzy of conquering wastes and wilds continue. However we may flatter ourselves, yet the compleat conquest of *Canada*, or even of all the *French* settlements in *America* would be far from putting us in possession of the sixth part of that immense continent. Nations upon nations, independent of us of the *French* and *Spaniards*, would remain to be guarded against, and require a perpetual standing force to keep in awe. The consequence of this must be, that the commander of every petty fort being too remote from the seat of government to be controuled, will become a tyrant, or, if apprehensive of punishment, he will take shelter with our enemies, or with those barbarians where it will be found impracticable to pursue him, or to bring him to justice. That this has not often been the case already with the *British* government in *America*, is entirely owing to its being so compact as it is; we possess no more territory than what we can cultivate, and therefore it would have been easy for the government of *Great Britain* to have brought to justice any military or other subject who had presumed to abuse his power.

And yet, my Lord, compact and con-

tiguous as our *America* possessions were, all the misfortunes we have suffered in this war there, were owing to their being less so than could have been wished. Any one who casts his eye upon a common map of *America* will easily see that those scenes of action in which we suffered most, lay the most remote from our seats of government there. This rendered it impracticable to give that quick assistance to our troops and garisons, which their situations and danger required. It would be to recapitulate the history of the war in *America* to mention the various Instances of this truth; and the facts are too recent to demand such a review, which would be foreign to the subject of these pages.

But, my Lord, if such was the case when our forts and settlements were contiguous, what must be the consequence, if instead of four or five hundred miles we shall have at least 2000 to guard, and every station not within 1000 miles from any seat of government to which our officers is accountable, or from which they can be relieved, if attacked; and yet it is plain, that if we mean to keep possession of *Canada*, we must have such bridles upon the barbarians; if we have not, we cannot be said to have possession. It may be said,
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that such precautions are useless, because we have nothing to apprehend from the natives if we make them our friends. But — *sic notus Ulysses?* have we so little experience of the arts and intrigues of jesuits and missionaries, as to imagine they will not put in practice all their infernal machinations, which have been already but too successful in rendering those barbarians our enemies.

The mention of this, my Lord, leads to a consideration which, is by no means, foreign to my subject, and that is, that in whatever shape our *American* differences with the *French* may terminate, it will be to highly expedient, if not absolutely necessary, for this government, to make some more effectual provision, than it has hitherto done, for counteracting the religions practices of our enemies upon that continent. To that neglect we owe the loss of the friendship of those *Indians* which has been so fatal to our fellow subjects during the course of this war. The more barbarous a people is, the more liable are their minds to religious impressions, and the more apt to swallow the grossest delusions. The *French* sensible of this have been indefatigable in setting apart a number of their ecclesiastics for such missions, and in giving them a proper education for the same.

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They have found their account in it, and we may be now sensible of the fatal consequences.

Sorry I am to say it, that this matter seems never to have entered into the heads of any of our ministers of whatever party or profession they were. If there is a profligate who has got the smallest tincture of erudition, whose vices have rendered him disgraceful in the community and burthensome to his friends, he is sure to get into orders, and to be provided for in *America*. Thither he goes, has a comfortable settlement; being a good companion either to tell a merry story, or to sing a good song, he is carressed by the most eminent planters; he lives well, gallops over the bare exercises of his function, and thinks of nothing else, because there is no power in that part of the globe, that can compel him to do more. The travelling for the conversion of the native *Indians*, the taking pains to instruct them in the duties of religion, or in conciliating them to the friendship or intercourse of the *English*, are to him the most unintelligible of all mysteries. The *French*, on the other hand, like the *Pharisees* of old, compass sea and land to make proselytes. Hence it is, that if those barbarians accept of our civilities, and even presents, it is
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with a design to employ them against ourselves; and even their interest, tho' the most barbarous among them dearly love it, is not so prevalent with them as their attachment to the doctrines and persons of those missionaries.

How easy, my Lord, will it be for our government, by a proper attention, to counterwork this poison which has operated so fatally against the *British* planters in *America*. A proper regulation, or rather institution, of ecclesiastical government on that continent, might do great things. But the choice of proper agents here would do much greater, and perhaps at the approaching congress it may not be improper for the *British* Plenipotentiaries to insist upon treating every *French* missionary as a felon, if he is found without the boundary that shall be assigned to him. Unless some expedient of that kind is fallen upon, it will be in vain for us to negotiate, let us do it ever so successfully. Whether we give up, or retain, *Canada*, we shall have the *Indians* for our perpetual enemies, and we shall be at the eternal growing expence of maintaining a large military force to keep them in awe, and that too; perhaps, without being able to do it, on account of the distance of our garrisons from support and relief.

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Having thus, my Lord, explained my weakest reasons why we ought to give up *Canada* rather than *Guadaloupe*, I shall but just add that our colonies in *America*, as they stand at present, require no accession of territory for their security; provided we keep possession of the forts erected by the *French* upon our back settlements. If we can improve and cultivate the lands we already have there, it is as much as possibly we can do. It will require many years before we can effectually do even that. But when we can do it effectually, by adding population to improvement, all the arts of *Spain*, *Rome* and *France* never can prevail against us.

I have, my Lord, made use of the word population, because it leads me to another important consideration, connected with my subject. *England*, itself though infinitely more populous, is less in extent than our *American* colonies is but imperfectly peopled, and consequently improved, when compared to *Holland*. The improvement or cultivation therefore of *British-America*, which I mention, is only to be understood comparatively with the *French* or *Spanish America*; which falls far short of ours in both those respects, because neither of them is, proportionably, so well peopled. It is no paradox to say, that had we double
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the number of inhabitants there, that we have now, we should be doubly richer there, and not a single individual the poorer. It would perhaps be no easy matter to convince a *British American* planter of this proposition; but nothing is more certain than that 1000 acres of land well cultivated, and substantially improved in the hands of twenty proprietors, is of more real advantage to this country, than 20000 acres could be in the hands of five proprietors. The private riches of those five proprietors is no consideration to *Great Britain*, or, if it is, it turns to her prejudice, because it implies a monopoly of that which ought to be for her advantage. For let those five Proprietors be possessors of the mines of *Peru*, they cannot be of benefit to their native country, unless they have hands to consume our manufactures and commodities. There is therefore, from this principle, a clear deduction, that the greater number of hands employed in improving and cultivating *British America*, the more beneficial it must prove to the mother-country.

Though this truth is incontestible to an inhabitant of *Great Britain*, yet it is unintelligible to a planter in *America*, who values his property, not according to its improvement, but its extent, and, like certain

noxious vegetables, thrives by sucking the substance of all the growth under or about him. Our government here, to do it justice, has been long sensible of this defect in the constitution of the *British America*, and have endeavoured to remedy it, and that too, with some success; but that success is far from being answerable to the evils complained of: for it is evident that the culture of the *British America* would employ ten times the number of hands that is employed upon it at present. It is certain that the mother-country is at present, and probably ever will be incapable to spare those hands, and the government has very properly supplied them with foreigners. But, my Lord, I am afraid sufficient attention has not been given to the means of forming those foreigners and *American Britons* into one people? and till that is done, the ends of population, with regard to *Great Britain* (for she still ought to be our object) never can be answered. A proper opportunity seems now to present itself; an alteration in the *Germanic* system, if peace should take place, appears to be inevitable, and whatever that alteration may be, is extremely immaterial to *Great Britain*. It must however produce a change of masters to the inhabitants, who may thereby be more inclined to settle under the

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the mild government of *Great Britain* in *America*, than to live under their new masters. It would therefore, my Lord, be equally for the honour of the *British* ministry, as well as the advantage of the nation, if, in the approaching treaty, we could obtain some stipulation that might facilitate, and at the same time encourage, the population of our colonies from *Germany*, be it either by Protestants or Papists. But at the same time, my Lord, it will be absolutely necessary for us to form at home such a system of coalition between our own subjects and foreigners, as to take from both, all ideas of their having separate interests.

While I am upon this subject, my Lord, I cannot help expressing some degree of surprize, that our government has not availed itself more, than it has done, of the present miseries of *Germany*. By this expression, I am far from meaning that we ought to improve our own interest at the expence of *Germans*, be their religion and party what they will. But when I read that *Holland* is filled with wandering exiles, rendered so by the fate of war, to such a degree, as to make it necessary for the *Dutch* government to expel them their country, and to drive them back to their own, I cannot help wishing that some

means were found to let those unhappy wanderers know that there is a land of promise to which they may repair, and where they may live unmolested by the ambition of Princes, or the caprice of superiors, in the full enjoyment of all that can be dear to mankind. I cannot think that it is even yet too late for thinking of such an expedient, especially considering the prodigious number of transports in the government's service that daily return empty from those parts, and may be loaded with the most valuable commodity that this nation knows.

I now, my Lord, proceed to a more important consideration, than even that of which I have taken my leave. It is well known that the *British* empire upon the continent of *America*, is, at present, of three times the value that it was of, when the present illustrious Royal family came to the crown of *Great Britain*. This is a fact that can be easily proved from the books of the public revenue. But it is equally certain, that the richer our *American* planters grew, they proved the more restive against the government of their mother-country; and that they did not treat either the royal instructions, or the persons of the governors sent them from *England* with common decency. This disregard of the
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royal authority, began to appear about the year 1730, and got to such a height, as threatened the ruin of the *British* interest in *America*. Every one knows, with what disrespect the strongest instructions that came from hence met with, though warranted by the fundamental constitutions of the country. Even after his Majesty, and the parliament, here, had come to the generous resolution of supporting them with troops against the common enemy, their conduct was such as to make it doubtful, at least, whether they would not chuse to be ruined by the *French*, rather than saved by the *English*. If by the influence of some better intentioned gentlemen amongst them, any public spirited measures were resolved upon, they were sure to be defeated in the execution. To this was owing the defeat of *Braddock*, the loss of *Oswego*, and all the disgraces, and calamities we suffered in *America*, during the course of this war.

The man must have an extraordinary assurance, who will pretend that those disgraces and calamities were owing to any cause but the backwardness of our *Americans* in the service of their country, their disagreement with the *British* regulars, in the mean jealousy of every thing that came from *England*, let it be calculated ever so much for their advantage, and their
reluctance

reluctance to co-operate with any measure that was prescribed here, or even to give a native *Briton* the smallest shew either of honour or profit in the execution. Can it be pleaded that they were too weak for the *French*? nothing is more certain, than that, though *England* had not sent a single company of soldiers to their relief or assistance, had they been well affectioned to the service, they might have done all that *Great Britain* has done, at the most monstrous expence any nation ever underwent. The fact is indisputable and well known, that at the commencement of this war, the *British* colonies in *America* were capable of sending to the field 100,000 fighting men, and that had but the fourth part of that force exerted itself properly, twenty millions of money, and above 20,000 lives would have been saved to this nation.

But far from such an exertion, their assemblies never met but to wrangle with, or to affront their governors, or to dispute the royal mandates. They seem to have considered every advantage that could be gained under a *British* direction, as an acquisition detrimental to themselves. They every day saw the *British* troops butchered, and the *French* making wide strides towards a total conquest of our colonies, and that without the least emotion, without apparently

rently taking the smallest step that could be effectual against the common enemy. The disputes between their lawful governors and them, grew every day stronger, till *Great Britain*, at last, was obliged to take upon herself the intollerable burthen of the whole war in *America*; which she has since so advantageously finished.

If it be said, that our *Americans* exerted themselves proportionably to what the government here did, I should be glad that any of their friends would point out in what manner. It is true when they found that they must either work or drown, they fell a pumping; when they saw that the progress of the *French* was become too formidable, and that their own properties were in real danger, they raised as many men, and acted with just as much resolution as gained them a respite, till succours and supplies could arrive from *Great Britain*. At last they did arrive. By them the progress of the *French* was checked, and an offensive war was undertaken, but all at the expence of the mother-country. But what share had our *Americans* in the conquest of *Quebec* and our after successes? I say none. All was purchased at the expence of *British* blood and *British* treasure.

Let me now, my Lord, from the consideration of what I have premised, make a supposition,

supposition, so fair, that it must follow in reality; that those dutiful *Americans*, who, in all their public transactions, could proceed in open defiance of the Government of *Great Britain*, are left without the terror of an enemy hanging over them, and that they had nothing to fear but from their mother-country. Had that been the case six years ago, can any man, who looks into the public proceedings of their councils and Assemblies, and their disputes with their Governors, imagine, that, had our Government continued to assert its just rights, they would not, long before this time, have held their mother-country at open defiance? It is true they did, at last, bestir themselves, but not till the *French* were at their gates, and till they saw themselves upon the verge of ruin. They did not, however, throw off their sullenness, time enough to prevent the amazing expences their mother-country was put to, both by sea and land, and doing what they themselves might have done with a very inconsiderable assistance from *Great Britain*.

I am extremely sensible, my Lord, how ready most people are to ridicule all insinuations, as if a time might come, when our Colonies on the continent of *America* might declare themselves independent upon their mother-country. I shall not therefore,

fore, make use of that unfashionable term ; but I will be bold enough to say, that, if peace was restored, and we to retain possession of *Canada*, while our Colonies are to reap the chief benefit from that possession, it will be extremely difficult for his Majesty's Governors, with all the eloquence they can employ, to persuade them to comply with the just demands of the Crown. What must be the consequence of this, should they continue refractory ? Or what means has our Government in its hands to reduce them to reason ? We may, indeed, deprive them of their trade ; but is not that hurting and punishing ourselves, as well as them ? Do we not thereby lose all the advantages we can propose to ourselves from our Colonies, and all the fruits of the prodigious expence we have been put to, in rearing and defending them ? But, in fact, though the *British Americans*, by being abridged of their trade with their mother-country, would lose many of the luxuries of life ; yet it is well known, that they have, within themselves, all the necessaries, nay all the conveniences of it ; and there is nothing to prevent them, in a few years, of having most of its luxuries likewise.

But, might we not reduce them by force of arms ? I am afraid that would be impracticable ; or if practicable, it must be

done at such an expence on our part, as must exceed all the advantages we can propose to ourselves by it. It would, for instance, be absolutely necessary for us to keep up a perpetual standing army (and a numerous one too) upon that continent. This army must be paid either by *Great Britain*, or her Colonies: if by *Great Britain*, the charge would be insupportable; if by her Colonies, they are unable to furnish it, without checking their industry, and in a short time bringing them to ruin. Such an army must likewise be recruited from *Great Britain*, and occasion such a drain of men as would be impossible for her to supply. But, in fact, though the consideration of expences of all kinds were entirely laid out of the question, all experience tells us, that it is impossible for Industry to subsist without Liberty and Independency, both which would be fettered, and, in a short time, destroyed, by a standing army kept up for overawing the subjects. It was the gentleness, mildness, and humanity of the *British* Government, that rendered our Colonies powerful and populous, and our Planters rich; should we be forced upon other measures, the country must return to its original barbarity.

I know it will be said, that by giving back *Canada*, we do nothing to prevent
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the disagreeable consequence I have mentioned here. Give me leave, my Lord, to say, that all mankind are naturally fond of Freedom and Independency. Were the *French Canadians* to-morrow, by a formal treaty, to become subjects of *Great Britain*; can we imagine, that, if they had the bait of Independency thrown out to them, and the example set by our other Colonies, that they would not greedily join in the common cause; nay, would not they be the first to embrace it?

Are we then (it may be said) to restore *Canada* to the *French*, and thereby keep a rod perpetually hanging over our own Colonies, and give our enemies fresh opportunities of renewing their massacres and usurpations? This apprehension, my Lord, is a chimera far more ridiculous, than that of our Colonies declaring themselves independent upon their mother-country. We have, at present, the ball at our foot, nor can we suppose that our Negotiators will be either so weak or wicked, as to part with one inch of territory, that is the property of *Great Britain*, or her Allies. While the *French* are shut up within those limits of *Canada*, which we have always insisted they should be confined to, we have nothing to apprehend from their power in *America*. It was by their exceeding those limits, gradually

and clandestinely, that they became formidable to our Colonies. It was the inexcusable indolence of our fellow subjects, and their unreasonable aversion for coming to extremities with *France*, that gave her the opportunity of silently and slyly adding fort to fort, and encroachment upon encroachment, till our Planters found themselves surrounded by all the horrors of a power that threatened to push them into the sea, or to drive them to uncultivated wilds. But we can now profit by experience ; we can even avail ourselves of the forts raised by our enemies, and fight them from behind their own walls. Unless, therefore, we are the most infatuated people in the world, no peace can ever be made with *France* that will leave them a possibility of renewing their encroachments. Add to those considerations, that our seamen are now so well acquainted with the navigation of the river *St. Laurence*, that while we keep our superiority by sea, *France* will find it impracticable to send to *Canada* the prodigious supplies of troops, arms, and ammunition of all kinds, that assisted and supported them in their injustice.

For my own part, my Lord, I own, that my chief apprehension is, lest the *French* Court should think that *Canada* is of so little importance in itself, as not to be worth
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while to take back upon the terms that are necessary for our safety and security. It is most certain, that the country itself could but barely maintain its own inhabitants; and that the Crown of *France* never would have found its account in supporting it as it did, but in hopes of being indemnified at our expence. But, notwithstanding that disappointment, there are many reasons to induce *France*, to wish to have *Canada* again ceded to her. The country is improvable; and by introducing new modes of living and thinking amongst the inhabitants, it may be rendered extremely serviceable to Old *France*, without given the smallest alarm us. To conclude, my, Lord, what I have to say upon this subject, should the *French* insist upon the rendition of *Canada*, should they refuse to make peace upon any other terms, then that either *Canada* or *Guadaloupe* should be given up, we ought not to hesitate one moment in determining to part with the former, after bringing *France* to assent to a fair and equitable settlement of boundaries.

Ever since the notion of a peace has taken possession of the Public, I have observed, for three or four weeks, in the Public Papers, a most pompous display of the vast quantity of Manufactures and Provisions sent from this country to *Canada*; and this is evidently

evidently calculated to impress the Public with an high idea of that conquest. I shall not take upon me to dispute the reality of those exports, or that they are actually shipped for *Canada*: But I cannot help having great doubts that they are not sent on the account, or for the consumption of our new fellow-subjects there; and upon a careful consideration of particulars, I cannot think that the quantities exceed the consumption of our own troops, by sea and land, who would find it otherwise impossible to subsist in a country, where, according to all accounts, the native inhabitants were upon the point of starving, at the time they submitted to our arms. Add to this, that, according to the best descriptions we have of *Canada*, even from the *French* writers, the inhabitants, in their most flourishing state, though extremely gay and showy, were so miserably poor, that the wealthiest of them seldom had by them, money to the amount of a week's wages of a common *English* labourer.

It is therefore, extremely unlikely, that, in the present distressed condition of the *French* there, those exports, if real, can be for their use. The inserting them, therefore, in so pompous a manner, in our common News Papers, must be owing to those, whose interest it is, that we should, at all events,

events, give up *Guadaloupe* and keep possession of *Canada*. But the practice is unfair, and prejudicial to the Public; nor would a rational, justifiable, cause stand in need of such an expedient to support it.

This now brings me to some considerations about the importance of *Guadaloupe*, and the utility it may be of to this country. In the first place, our keeping it, is void of all the inconveniences that I have mentioned to attend the keeping of *Canada*. It can be done at little expence, either of men or money; and that little will be defrayed by itself, to the vast emolument of *Great Britain*. In the next place, it is now certainly known, that the prodigious advantages which the *French*, in the last, and the beginning of the present, war, drew from their Sugar trade, arose from *Guadaloupe* chiefly, though all went under the name of *Martinico*. This is a truth that is not contested by the *French* themselves, and is ascertained by the daily experience which we have of that island's fertility. This consideration, to a trading people, is of more importance than their possessing millions of uncultivated acres, and barren wilds. The great commodity of *Guadaloupe* is undoubtedly Sugar, which is so universally used all over the world, that it may be said to have now become a necessary of life. If
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we are to depend upon the best accounts, it produces 150,000 hogsheds, a quantity almost double to the product of all the *British* Sugar islands, put together: If it be said that this quantity, when added to the product of our Sugar islands, which is 89,450 hogsheds a year, will over-stock our markets let me appeal to the universality of the commodity; there not being a family, in all the cultivated parts of *Europe* and *America*, that does not consume it, more or less. This objection therefore is founded upon either the gross, or affected, ignorance of a fact, which is obvious to every man who has his seeing and tasting. But though our Sugar islands may furnish ourselves with that commodity, with somewhat to spare to our neighbours, yet how long will they continue to do it. Is it not well known, that *Barbadoes*, which, at a medium furnishes 12,000 hogsheds a year, is almost worn out. *Antigua*, and several of our other Sugar islands, must soon be in the same condition; so that we shall be reduced, in time, to depend upon *Jamaica* alone, which at present is said to furnish us with 40,000 hogsheds annually. Now it is immaterial to my argument, whether the Proprietors of the islands in *Jamaica*, cannot; or will not, cultivate more land: if they cannot, the argument is strong, why we ought to keep

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Guadaloupe; if they can, what are we to think of those who impose upon their mother-country a severe tax, by keeping up the price of a necessary of life, merely for their own emolument?

But, my Lord, I suspect the case to lie partly in want of ability, and partly in want of inclination. Though it is allowed that the third part of *Jamaica* is not cultivated for Sugar, yet it is admitted by those who know best, that the inland parts of that Island are so mountainous, that it would be impracticable, tho' they were cultivated, to bring sugar down to the sea-side; at least the expence attending the carriage would eat up all the profit. On the other hand, it has been clearly proved in one of the most august assemblies in this kingdom, that great part of *Jamaica* that might be easily cultivated, and the product conveniently shipped, is now uncultivated; an omission that calls aloud for redress; it being contrary to the tenor of the original grants from the crown to the proprietors. *Great Britain* conquered, and has ever preserved, *Jamaica*, and she has therefore a right to expect every advantage she can draw from it. If *Jamaica* can produce 100,000 hogheads of sugar a year, the price of the commodity in *Great Britain* must be reduced, and her inhabitants from

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the higheft to the very loweft would then be eafed of a tax much greater than that which they pay to the government. Every man who has been a houfe-keeper for twenty years, has reafon to remember that within that time, the price of fugar has rifen above 30 *per Cent*, and we now pay nine pence a pound or at leaft eight pence half-penny for the fugar, that twenty years ago we bought for fix pence a pound. This is a tax that falls heavier upon the poor than it does upon the rich, becaufe the proportion of confumption for fugar in a poor and a rich man's family, greatly exceeds the proportion that is between their eftates. A man whose income is but 100l. a year, lays perhaps four of them, if not five, out upon fugar. A man whose income is 10,000 l. a year, does not perhaps lay out 40l. on the fame commodity.

This, my Lord, being moft undoubtedly the cafe, had the natives of *Great Britain* been to have formed a wifh for fome temporal acquisition, they could have formed none fo wife or fo proper as that of a fugar ifland like *Guadaloupe*, which relieves them from the neceffity of fubmitting to a moft intolerable tax impofed upon them, not by the government, but by their fellow fubjects. A confideration fo ftriking as this is muft intereft every inhabitant of *Great Britain*

Britain, in giving the preference of *Guadaloupe* to *Canada*, where it is very problematical and doubtful, whether the fur trade, the only considerable trade the inhabitants there deal in, ever will fall into the channel of *Great Britain*, so as to be of any service to her inhabitants.

But, my Lord, the case is very different with regard to the sugar trade. It is a commodity we never can be overstocked with ; and if we keep *Guadaloupe*, it is a trade in which we can, for many years, at least, have no rival. We will then have over the rest of *Europe* the same advantage, which the proprietors of our sugar lands in the *West-Indies* have over the inhabitants of *Great Britain*. Knowing that they can have no other market to go to, we can impose our own price upon the commodity, and serve them with it in what proportions we please. They who know what trade is, know the advantage of the sugar trade to be beyond all others. The returns, supposing the sugar of *Guadaloupe* to be manufactured in *Great Britain* and carried to foreign markets, must be at least two millions sterling a year ; supposing every hoghead to be worth 141. This is a consideration, that to a people which has incurred upwards of 100 millions of debt by their wars with *France*, that ought to be decisive.

five. But how much more important is it, when it is added, that in proportion as our sugar trade flourishes, our shipping must encrease, and our marine both commercial and military must flourish. Even this last consideration, independent of the vast revenue the sugar trade must bring in, is preferable to all the advantages we can propose by retaining *Canada*. For where the fur trade employs one ship, the sugar trade employs fifty.

I have hitherto, my Lord, mentioned *Guadaloupe* only as producing sugar. But the short experience we have had since we became masters of it, convinces us, that it produces in great abundance, cocoa, ginger, indigo, cotton, coffee, and even cinnamon as good as any we have from the *Dutch*. This last, though a very extraordinary circumstance, is not unparalleled. The *Chinese* thought that their sovereign root *Gen-seng*, which is their *Panacea*, and held by them to cure all distempers, in so much that it is monopolized by the Emperor himself, grew only in their dominions. One of their late Emperors sent a present of a piece of it to Sir *Hans Sloan*; and he communicating it to some of our *American* or *West Indian* planters, they immediately recollected that such a root grew amongst themselves, and we actually at present drive

drive on a considerable trade, by exporting it for *China* and other Eastern countries. Why may not the culture of cinnamon therefore be so improved in our *West Indies*, as to render it unnecessary for us to apply for it to the *Dutch*, and to pay the immense sums we do at present?

The most strenuous advocate for the importance of our settlements upon the continent of *America*, furnish the strongest arguments for our retaining *Guadaloupe*. If as they say, and very justly, the prosperity of our *American* colonies ought to be a capital object of *Great Britain's* attention, then all imaginable care is to be taken, to render their dependence upon *Great Britain* as easy and comfortable to them as we possibly can. The question, therefore, is, whether this end can be best answered, by keeping possession of *Canada* or of *Guadaloupe*. From our possessing *Canada*, they can, for many years, at least, draw no manner of advantage, but security. I have in the preceding part of this pamphlet proved undeniably, I think, the bad policy of our abandoning our own compacted settlements, that bid so fair, to bring strength and wealth to their native country, for the sake of forming a straggling dominion, that may undo it. I have shewn, that if our negotiators have common sense, it will be easy to form such a treaty of peace as shall prevent the

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French, tho' left in possession of *Canada*, from again molesting us, in the manner they have done; and that their remaining in the possession of *Canada* is the best security which we can possibly have against the turbulence of our colonists, and against the itch of independency upon their mother country, which they may one day or other contract. Now, my Lord, every argument that is urged for the aggrandisement of the *British-America*, operates strongly for *Great Britain*, making herself strong and powerful in the *West-Indies*. The advocates for retaining *Canada* have very properly shewed the prodigious encrease of population, which every day gains ground upon that continent. The greater that population is, the greater will be their demands for the luxuries, conveniences, and necessaries of life. If we cannot supply them with sugar, rum, coffee, cotton and the like commodities, they must, as usual, go to other markets, and, in fact, every shilling they lay out with the *French* is so much lost to this country. Our possessing *Guadaloupe* remedies that and all other inconveniences of the same nature. The trade between *North-America* and the *West-Indies* is now known and frequented, and the *British Americans*, for their own sakes, will repair thither for whatever they want, whether it is in
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the hands of the *French* or the *English*. If in the hands of the former, the chief advantages that *Great Britain* proposes to herself from the aggrandizement of her *American* colonies, will result to *France*; if in those of the latter, to *Great Britain*.

There is, my lord, an argument independent of all I have yet mentioned, that I think must have great influence with a truly *British* minister in the present question, and that is, that the more we do for our sugar colonies, the more money their proprietors expend in this country. They look upon their own islands, only as so many shops, in which they are obliged to labour till they can get as much money as may enable them to live at home: for so they call this island, and all they acquire, sooner or later, is laid out here. I do not mention this circumstance in the way of reflecting upon the *British Americans*; for their situation and manner of life confines them to their own plantations. They must be their own overseers. Their estates are wide and extended; and one part or other of them requires hourly inspection; in short, they have a home as well as an *Englishman* has; and they visit *England* as *Englishmen* do *France* and *Italy*, for curiosity or for pleasure. In this they are far from being blameable; but still, I say, that
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the advantages derived from them by their mother country are far inferior to those she receives from her *West Indies*. This is an observation so generally known to be true, that it would be losing time to attempt to prove it.

Your Lordship may perceive that in what I have said upon this subject I have kept myself entirely clear of all consideration of the war now raging in *Europe*; because I think notwithstanding the *French* most unjustly connected them together, they are considerations that ought to be entirely distinct in the eyes of a *British* minister. The sole object of his attention ought to be whether *Great Britain* every day evidently decaying in population, and yet every day rising in her demands for people, ought to embrace a system, that, supposing it to be practicable and successful, which is extremely doubtful, will require a whole century before it can be brought to bear, or whether she ought to embrace a measure, in which the prospect of success and advantage is certain and immediate; and instead of depopulating her, becomes instantly the means of encreasing her trade and marine. Nothing is more certain than that she already knows the benefit of the sugar trade, not only by her own experience, but by the infinite accessions
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of wealth and commerce, which it has added to her enemy. For where *France* employed one ship to, or received one in return from, *Canada*, she employed fifty to and from her sugar islands. We must however except the ships that she sent to the river *St. Lawrence* with troops, arms and provisions, which brought her no returns.

I should not have insisted so long upon a matter so extremely clear as that we ought to give the preference to *Guadaloupe*, instead of *Canada*, had it not been for the extraordinary pains that has been employed by men of the greatest interest and fortune, in this kingdom, to impress the public with different notions. They have, on their side, a copious field of declamation, and they have availed themselves of it to the utmost. A conquest of such extent, attended with such difficulty and glory as that of *Canada* was, is a consideration pleasing to an *Englishman*, who looks no farther than into news-papers and party declamation. But when matters are represented in their true light, all the false glare, which interest and sophistry throws upon them must vanish, and I make no doubt but our ministry will regard the cool approbation of their country far above the noisy suggestions of passion and interest.

pular measures, prejudicial to the public interest, have, before this time, been pursued and concluded by an *English* ministry, for the sake of a little immediate applause, which the authors had soon reason to repent of. But it happens my Lord, in the present case, that it is hard to say which is the most popular side of the question, for heat, noise and petulance are not always proofs of *popularity* tho' they are of *faction*.

I now proceed, my Lord, to some other considerations of importance to the interest of *Great Britain*, I can by no means think that the Neutral Islands, as they are called, should continue in their present state of neutrality; at least in that state which they were meant to be left in by the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*. I hope the spirit of our people and government there, has already taken possession of them, and if they are not in our possession, that the first orders that go from this to *America* shall make them so; a service the most important of any next to the conquest of *Martinico*, that could be performed there. This measure being effected, which by no means will hurt either the pride or the interest of *France*, the trade between the whole of our colonies in *America*, both upon the continent and in those islands, ought to be put upon
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the same footing, as the trade between *England* and the *Spanish* settlements in *America* are put upon by the treaty of 1670. Let an absolute exclusive right of trade take place, each to its own colonies between the two nations and from one colony to another, and that under the pain of the transgressing party being treated as interlopers, and, in some cases, even as pirates. But let the wording of such a stipulation or articles be much more clear and precise than they are in the treaty of 1670, or 1667, between us and *Spain*. Let there be no room to confound the two regulations of trade, that in *Europe* and that in *America* together, and let not the expressions of the treaty, as in that of 1670 with *Spain*, and 1674 with *Holland*, destroy its purpose.

Should great difficulties arise about restoring what we have taken from the *French* upon the coast of *Africa*, I should by no manner of means be of opinion, that we ought to be inexorable upon the head. I cannot perceive, that this nation has hitherto reap'd the prodigious advantages which we promised ourselves from the conquest of them. But tho' we had, nothing, I think, at this time, especially, ought to be so precious as the lives of *Britons*; and perhaps *England* never made a conquest so fatal in that respect as that of *Senegal* is. When I

have said this, my Lord, I mean not to detract from the merit of the conquest, which, undoubtedly, was planned with wisdom and executed with impidity.

It may be expected that I am now to proceed to the *East Indies*; but I am free enough to own, my Lord, that I do not consider the *English* interest there, as being a natural interest. I do not look upon it to be the concern of a ministry, so much as of merchants. Such men are seldom mistaken in their own interests; and if we are to continue that trade, a *British* minister will always be justified in following the lights, which those who are concerned in it, hold forth.

I shall therefore return to *Europe*, where in fact, our smallest concern in the issue of this war lies. And here, my Lord, I have somewhat more to propose on this head, which is so connected with the interest of *England*, that it becomes a matter of the most serious consideration to a *British* ministry, wise and well meaning.

The public expects, that the negotiations we are now to enter upon, for peace, will be lasting, as well as definitive, and that they will bring about a treaty that shall not leave it in the power of *France*, upon every spurt of ambition or interest, to teize this nation, and put her to extravagant

vagant expence ; and yet, my Lord; that always will be the case while we have a patriot King upon the throne. I do not mean, that expression in my Lord *Bolingbroke's* sense, but in a sense more noble and exalted. The people of *Hanover*, while our King is their sovereign, demand his cares, his tenderness, and his protection, as much as the people of *Great Britain*. His present majesty being born a *Briton*, is, in this respect of no importance, as he is born with sentiments of humanity, and has been educated in principles of virtue. Such a prince, my Lord, would disdain to rule a people about whom he is indifferent. And yet, — I cannot — I dare not — perhaps I should not, express my sentiments. But I will endeavour. — They are, my Lord, that unless we have a King upon the throne, who is indifferent about that electorate, we never can have a solid, a permanent, peace with *France*. To exemplify the many evidences of this truth, which have happened since the accession of the present illustrious family to the throne, would be to recapitulate the principal events of the two last reigns. Events which planted thorns under the pillow of his Majesty's royal grandfather, which rendered this nation a scene of civil distraction, which opened the flood gates of disrespect,

I had almost said of disloyalty to the best of princes, and which reared the ruinous fabric of our present national debt. But declamation apart.

It may be asked, how it is possible to prevent the same effects, if the same cause subsists? — *Aye, that is the question.* — My Lord, I fairly confess I think it is impossible; but I do not think it impossible to remove the cause. The two most stubborn obstacles are the constitutions of the *Germanic* empire, and the prejudice arising to his majesty.

As to the first, those constitutions are far from being like the laws of the *Medes* and *Persians*. We have known them violated; we have known them altered. The authority by which they were enacted still exists, and that authority has an undoubted right to cancel them, wherever they appear to be prejudicial to the peace of *Europe*; or, let me even say, the safety of the empire itself. A power that can secularize bishopricks, can alter modes of succession, provided the principal party is satisfied. By this time, my meaning may be easily understood, which is neither more nor less than that the approaching congress is the proper place to discuss a question of that infinite importance to *Great Britain*. It is, at least, natural to think, that
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if such a measure was to take place, the electorate ought to be given to a prince of the family. But what must be the consequence? Will not the connection with such a prince of *Great Britain* make the *French* still consider it as annexed to our crown? I am of opinion in the negative.

I think that *Hanover* governed by a prince residing there, will be able to defend herself. The reason why she has not been able is because, contrary to the common ridiculous opinion prevailing in *England*, she has been ruined by her elector becoming our sovereign. A prince residing there, cultivating the arts of peace, improving manufactures, living frugally, and ruling wisely, as the ancestors of his present Majesty did, would soon recover to *Hanover*, and his Majesty's electoral dominions, all the importance they had, during the last century, and at the beginning of this. Such a prince could be no object of *French* ambition. He could interest *Great Britain* no more in the affairs of the continent, than any other protestant power in *Germany*. Such a prince would have his hands unfettered in pursuing whatever his interest dictated to him as elector of *Hanover*. That perhaps, my Lord, has not always been the case. His interest never could be separate from that of *Great Britain*, and that of protestantism.

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And here, my Lord, it is necessary to look both backward and forward. What prodigious things did the treaty of *Westphalia*, by which many innovations were introduced in the fundamental constitutions of the *Germanic* body, effect for the liberties and independency of *Europe*. I admit that *France* being declared its guarantee has given her frequent pretexts for invading the peace of the empire. But, my Lord, every man of sense knows the *Germanic* body had as much to fear from the ambition of *Austria*, as from that of *France*; and the treaty of *Westphalia*, like the principle of gravitation, kept the liberty of *Germany* in a poize between the two opposing bodies. That principle is now broken; instead of opposing each other, they have coalesced, and another system has taken place. But, my Lord, let us not deceive ourselves by imagining the present protestant system can last. The valuable person of the king of *Prussia* is not immortal, his dominions are not inexhaustible, nor is our pocket fathomless. On the other hand, the unnatural conjunction between the house of *Austria* and *Bourbon* can be as little permanent; interest must soon divide them, and then religion, as formerly, will be out of the question. In that case, a prince of the house of *Hanover* independent in power, con-

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ned in interest and agreeing in principle with a *British* sovereign, will make the same figure as the great duke of *Zell* or *George* the first did, when he was only elector

Tho' I could with pleasure pursue this pleasing idea, yet the bounds I have allotted to myself in this performance, will not suffer me to carry it as far as the argument would admit of; I therefore must proceed to consider the other obstacle I have stated, which is the prejudice arising to his Majesty by such a cession.

I acknowledge, my Lord, that if his Majesty is to be indemnified in point of property, that I am unequal to the task of pointing out from whence that indemnification can arise upon the continent; and yet I think some sort of an equivalent may be contrived, could we but peep into the state of the *Austrian* finances, and balance the account, profit, and loss arising from their possession of so fine a country as the *Austrian* Netherlands, and a country lying so convenient for the crown of *Great Britain*. But in the case I hint at, would not the *French* have the same object to attack as they had in *Hanover*? I apprehend not. Or if they had, the case is widely different. *Hanover* can be considered in its present state, only as an open country, and without

a great army to defend it, as it now has; the labour of conquering it lies only in the fatigue of marching; nor can *Great Britain* afford it the smallest relief, without a vast expence both of men and money.

Perhaps, my Lord, before I proceed in an argument, which to some may appear so extravagant, I ought to premise somewhat to make it appear less so, and plead the authority of the greatest and wisest princes and states-men *England* ever was blessed with, who always had their eye upon such a measure, and often attempted to carry it into execution. But my Lord, I am singular enough to think, that no precedent in past times, ought to be a rule to the present. Circumstances may alter and render a measure which is extremely proper at one juncture, highly absurd at another. The question, therefore is, whether at this juncture, such a measure would be improper, or is absurd.

To resolve that question, my Lord, let us consider, what has happened, and what must happen, as soon as the interests of *Europe* shall, as they certainly must do, return to their natural system. During this and the preceding century, I will take upon me to say and to prove, that *Great Britain* spent as much money in defending the barrier of the *Austrian-Netherlands*, as she

she would have laid out, had they been her own property. This, my Lord, happened in times when the friendship of the *Dutch* towards us was not doubtful, and I am sorry to say, it is at present more than doubtful. If so, *Great Britain* has a stronger reason than she has had ever since she so shamefully quitted possession of *Dunkirk*, to have some pledge, some security, some possession opposite to her own coasts. That the empress *Queen* does not draw one shilling from them, more than maintains the troops and fortifications she has there, and keeps up the idle parade of a court and regency is most certain; and the little value she has for her *Low Countries* is evident from her ceding to *France* possession of the principal port that is in them; I mean *Ostend*.

When I said that the natural system of *Europe* must some time or other take place, I did not mean that it might not again be deranged. But my Lord, I think the measure, I have hinted at, would, as far as human affairs can admit of, certainly prevent it. It never can be the interest of *Great Britain*, to disturb the peace of the continent, she naturally is the guarantee of its tranquility. An honest and a wise *British* government, therefore, never could employ

ſuch an acquisition to the public prejudice, either at home or abroad.

Having ſaid thus much of the propriety of ſuch a meaſure, I now come to conſider in what manner the execution of it would indemnify his majeſty for the diſmemberment of *Hanover*, from the crown of *Great Britain*. This conſideration, my Lord, requires no great reaſoning. For that indemnification muſt ariſe from the people of *Great Britain*, who by the advantages that ſuch a meaſure would bring them, would be amply repaid, ſhould they add to his Majeſty's civil liſt, a revenue adequate to what his late Majeſty, at an average, annually received from *Hanover*, and making it as perpetual a revenue as that of the exciſe, which was granted in lieu of a revenue as hereditary to the Kings of *England*, as that electorate is to the head of the *Hanover* family. Were this done, when we conſider the diſpoſition of his preſent Majeſty for a comprehension of all parties, we cannot a moment hesitate that there muſt then be an end of every difference amongſt us; we could then enter into no quarrel, that was not ſtrictly and properly *British*; we could have no advantage, by which *Great Britain* would not be immediately bettered.

It is eaſy to be foreſeen that *France* would ſtrenuouſly oppoſe any ſuch meaſure; ſo
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she undoubtedly will whatever tends to our interest or to preserve the tranquility of *Europe*. But, in fact, the thing never could be a prejudice to *France*, because we have nothing to expect, we have nothing to demand, we have nothing to take, from her. And here, my Lord, I must again differ from the vulgar opinion, as if *France* thought the barrier of the *Netherlands*, an object of infinite concern to her. That she does not, is, I think, evident from her conduct at the peace of *Aix la Chapelle*, and during the preceding war. But supposing, what I am by no means apprehensive of, that *France* should make a violent resistance to such a proposition, supposing she should go even so far as to threaten to break off all negotiations unless it is given up; can we imagine, that if the other powers are satisfied, *France* will be able to keep her deposit in her hands, and overthrow the salutary work of peace. She must, in that case, stand single and unsupported; the most fortunate event that could, at this time, happen to *Great Britain* and her allies. Let it not, however be thought, that I am an advocate for having every concession made to us without giving any thing up to our opponents. No: let us relax so far as to give up even the capital point of the entire demolition of *Dunkirk*, which we have a right to demand by the

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most solemn treaties. But this is a concession that our own Safety cannot admit of, without such an equivalent, as I have mentioned, being made to us, either in whole or in part; for I should be extremely indifferent about any extension of territory, could we be possessed of security. Let any man throw his eyes upon our newspapers, a few years ago, till the last blow that was struck by Sir *Edward Hawke* against the *French* fleet, and let him consider the marches and countermarches to and from *Dunkirk*, which they are filled with. Let him reflect upon the immense expences, and the dreadful alarms to public credit, which every intelligence of that kind, however groundless, occasioned, and he will easily see with what justice we ought to insist upon the entire demolition of that port and harbour. Were we to make a peace to-morrow my Lord, with *France*, will it not still be in her power to renew the same alarms upon every trifling occasion, and without putting herself to one shilling of expence, will they not be attended with the same ruinous effects, with regard to us?

Whoever has read the papers published by the partizans of *France*, since the commencement of this war, may easily perceive how much they comfort themselves with the thoughts, that they will be able to obtain

tain from *Great Britain* a most valuable consideration out of her conquests by the rendition of *Port Mabon*. They are encouraged in this by the public outcries which reached the throne from all quarters, by the sacrifice that was made to national justice, and by the general consternation that ensued, upon the loss of that place. But, my Lord, all these are so many proofs, that there may be such a thing as popular prepossession; as the loss of that place has saved to this nation, at least, a couple of millions of money, which it would have cost us, had we kept it, without being better'd by it one Shilling. As we are in no likelihood of having any war with *Spain*, I should be extremely sorry if our Ministry should accept of *Port Mabon*, though tendered to them *gratis*, if we were obliged to maintain it at the expence we did while it was in our possession. There is no country in the world, where sufferers, of every denomination are so apt to complain as they are in *England*; because there is no country where they are so well heard, or where they can complain with so much safety. But since the commencement of this war, I have neither read nor heard a single complaint of any disadvantage of trade our navy has been under, by the loss of *Minorca*. On the contrary, every one reflects with satisfaction, that the *French*, by
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keeping it, are put to a great, but fruitless: expence of men and money; and we, by losing it, have the use of 3000 of our best regular troops, besides saving the immense sums consumed on the fortifications, and the useless military establishment there.

Minorca, my Lord, being, therefore, laid out of the question, what have the *French* to offer us, even in part of an equivalent, for the immense expence of blood and treasure, which their injustice has cost us? I make no doubt if we depart from the present possession, if we trust to stationary ware, wax, pen, ink, and paper, they will yield us all we can demand; nay, I believe they would offer us more than we ought to demand: But, my Lord, experience tells us, that that would be giving and offering — just nothing at all.

I shall now, my Lord, take the liberty to proceed to consider the interest of *Great Britain* at the future Congress, independent of her quarrel with *France*. We have, it is true, no national war with the Empress-queen, or her consort, but we have a great many points to settle with them, as his Majesty is confessedly at the head of the Protestant interest in *Europe*. The pride, ambition, and avarice of the Imperial Court, during this war, have been seen in many instances. They had the insolence to pro-
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scribe, not only the King of *Prussia*, with whom they were at war, but his *Britannic* Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, who, in a manner gave them the Empire, and ventured his royal person, and that of his son, at the head of his armies, fighting in their cause. Those proscriptions were founded upon arbitrary acts of power; they are inconsistent with the fundamental laws of the Empire, and the rights of its Electors, and other Princes.

Those acts of injustice may be repeated again upon the first umbrage the Court of *Vienna* shall take at Protestants, even supposing peace to be re-established. In that case, in whatever hands *Hanover* is, *Great-Britain* must become a party in the quarrel, unless she deviates from every sentiment of true honour, and from every maxim of sound policy. No general peace, therefore, my Lord, ought to take place, without having some further security provided for the Protestant interest in *Germany*, and unless the power and authority of the Emperor, which is the same thing, the Aulic Council, in putting Electors and other Princes to the Ban of the Empire, is clearly pointed out; and, if already too exorbitant, circumscribed; and the whole *Germanic* body ought to be the guarantees of the regulations. In the present low state of the

Protestant religion in the Empire, such regulations are absolutely necessary. It is extremely plain, from the conduct of many Protestant Princes there, who have lent their troops to fight against the Protestant interest, that they either tremble under the *Austrian* rod, or that religion, with them, is a mere matter of accident or indifference, to be taken up, or laid down, according to conveniency. This being the case, there seems to be an absolute necessity of something farther being done in favour of Protestantism; and that too, secured by the strictest guarantee that can be devised. It is true, my Lord, guarantees are little regarded amongst great powers; but small powers sometimes have about them principles of honour and justice, that may have weight with great powers. Add to this, I have a much better opinion of the *German* Princes in general, than I have either of the houses of *Bourbon* or *Austria*. If such regulations, however, should take place, it were to be wished that a fundamental law were enacted, that no alterations should be made in them without a concurrence of two thirds of the members in the Dyet of the Empire.

This is the best expedient that can be devised, to preserve them; for we have known, in certain countries even the *Pacta*
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Conventa of their constitutions set aside by a determined majority.

I am far from thinking, that there are not other points, besides those I have mentioned, which *Great Britain* ought to insist upon, at the approaching Congress, if ever it should sit. But as they are matters that do not so immediately affect her, I shall omit them in this place. One thing, however, is certain, that the smallest objects ought not to be indifferent to her, if they regard the least Protestant power in the Empire. What to her may be a matter of the slightest moment, may be to them of capital importance; a nation never appears so great as when she vindicates the right of her meanest ally. In such cases her honour becomes her interest.

While I am upon this subject, give me leave, my Lord, just to mention the concerns of his *Polish* Majesty as Elector of *Saxony*: This was an object, which, it is well known, his late Majesty had greatly at heart; and he was often heard to regret that the conduct of the *Saxon* Court laid his nephew under the necessity of treating that Electorate as he did. Upon this head, the interest of *Great Britain* and *Prussia* seems somewhat to clash. The former certainly is entirely unconnected with the quarrel between the two Electors; and, in the affairs of Ger-

many ought to have nothing so much in view, as the ballancing the power of the house of *Austria*, and preserving every Prince of the Empire, Papists as well as Protestants, in their just rights and possessions. Though the Elector is Popish, yet the Electorate may be considered as Protestant; and every suffering it is laid under, is an injury done to that ballance among the *Germanic* Princes, that *Great Britain* ought always to maintain. This may be the more easily effected, as his *Prussian* Majesty declared, that he originally seized *Saxony* only by way of deposite for his own security.

Upon the whole therefore, my Lord, I cannot think that the interest of any *German* Prince ought to be indifferent to us; for the more independent they are upon the House of *Austria*, the fewer occasions *Great Britain* will have to concern herself with the affairs of the Continent. I should now, my Lord, proceed to take notice of many other points of interest which *Great Britain* has at present to settle, with *Holland*, in particular; but as I perceive the Ambassadors only of the belligerent Powers are to be admitted to the Congress, those matters, properly speaking, are foreign to the subject of this Letter.

Before I conclude, my Lord, I must mention the case of the ships taken from
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the *French* before the formal declaration of war. I call it the formal declaration, because it, in fact, was no more than a formality, the *French* having made the real declaration, when, taking advantage of the mist of negociations, they forcibly invaded our possessions in *America*. If we were warrantable in point of public justice, in taking those ships, we must have taken them either by way of reprisal, or deposite. If they were taken as reprisals, they ought to answer for our expences, and the damages we have sustained, both before and since the declaration of war. If they were taken by way of deposite, it must be to make good some claim, and to answer for it as a security. But, my Lord, I am afraid, the mortgage is, by this time, fore-closed, and that the money that has arisen from the sale of those prizes will not pay six months interest of the sum that the war has cost us. I shall but just mention, that tho' it would be unreasonable that so public a good, as a general peace, should be obstructed on account of private persons; yet if there is a private case wherein all the laws of evidence, and of that right and equity that should prevail amongst nations, have been violated, to the prejudice of private people, and in favour of the *French*, the sufferers ought to be indemnified out of the enemy's pro-

property. Such was and is the case of the
the Capture of the *Antigallican* Privateer.
I shall now, my Lord, subscribe myself, with
the most profound respect,

My Lord,

your Lordship's most faithful,

most obedient, humble Servant

