Building Alternatives: Community Land Trusts, Neoliberal Governance, and Transforming Housing Relations

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Abstract

This thesis examines the use of community land trusts as a model of affordable housing delivery, and as a potential component of transformative interventions in the capitalist housing market. Drawing on a Marxist political-economic perspective, and concretely analyzing CLT projects in Vermont and Massachusetts, I ask whether these cases show the capacity for the CLT model to facilitate a move away from housing's embeddedness within forms of neoliberal governance. Looking specifically at their institutional and monetary relationships to systems of displaced survival, marketization of governance, and the state's allocation of social surplus, I argue that although both projects have made significant gains in addressing displacement, and have had uneven but notable success in politicizing otherwise depoliticized and marketized governance, they remain ultimately embedded within the capitalist market and the state through its distribution of social surplus. Based on their histories of contesting the allocation of this surplus, however, and the terms of their relationships to state and capitalist actors, I suggest that these cases further highlight the centrality of political contestation in evaluating the potential of these projects.

Acknowledgements and Preface

I would like to acknowledge the contribution of my supervisor, Dr Susanne Soederberg, who has spent a great deal of her time reviewing this work. From the application process, to the design of the project, to the writing and editing, I have been fortunate to have been able to rely on her guidance and feedback throughout. Having begun this during the global pandemic and various lockdowns, it has not exactly been a smooth process, and I am grateful for her support and understanding in revising and restructuring the project based on these conditions. Thank you also to the members of my committee for agreeing to review this thesis and helping to push this project over the finish line.

The thesis below is not the one which was originally planned, nor the one which I began drafting a year ago. The circumstances of the pandemic made it very difficult to secure the interviews around which the original project had been based. As such, the thesis project was restructured to focus mainly on secondary sources and cases which were well-enough represented in such sources to be viable for that research design. I sincerely hope that these changes have not made the resulting work disjointed or compromised its capacity to contribute to the literature.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

HUD – US Department of Housing and Urban Development

CDBG – Community Development Block Grant

AMI – Area Median Income

BCLT – Burlington Community Land Trust

CHT – Champlain Housing Trust

LCHDC – Lake Champlain Housing and Development Corporation

CEDO – Community Economic Development Office (Burlington)

BHTF – Burlington Housing Trust Fund

VHCB – Vermont Housing and Conservation Board

VHFA – Vermont Housing Finance Agency

DSNI – Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative

DNI – Dudley Neighbors Inc

PFD - Public Facilities Department (Boston)

BRA – Boston Redevelopment Authority

JDC – Joint Disposition Committee (Boston)

DND – Department of Neighborhood Development (Boston)

Chapter One: Introduction

The Global North has recently been experiencing what has been termed a 'housing crisis', which has seen rising costs associated with speculation, the associated loss of household savings, and mounting displacements through evictions, homelessness, and debt-burden (Wetzstein 2017; Soederberg 2014). In this environment, alternative housing models have gained increased attention. I examine one such alternative approach. By analyzing the funding and associated institutional relationships of Community Land Trust (CLT) projects, I address a gap in the literature by contributing to research which has begun to assess the ways in which the surrounding political-economic context imposes restrictions which a project must navigate when securing resources, and how their strategies for securing these resources impact their relation to other actors in the community. Applying literature from Marxist debates on the political-economy of housing and land with the literature on community land trusts to two case studies of CLT-anchored projects in Boston and Burlington, I argue that these projects reveal a continued connection to the state that highlights the importance of it as an object of contestation in the socio-spatial processes of capital accumulation.

Overview of the CLT Model

CLTs are a form of land tenure with many different variations. To set out some basic characteristics, I reference John Emmeus Davis, one of the most cited and prolific writers on CLT projects. Davis situates the CLT model in a historical evolution since 1969. Rooted in Georgist theories of land reform, CLTs began in the United States and were associated with segments of the Civil Rights Movement (Davis 2010b). Over time, CLTs have attracted interest in countries like Canada, the UK, and Australia, becoming more closely associated with community organizing and social and economic justice causes (Davis 2010b; Crabtree et al.

2012; Bunce and Barndt 2020; Thompson 2020a). Davis emphasizes the focus on stewardship as the most significant feature of CLTs (Davis 2010b).

In general, the contemporary CLTs can be defined as a form of land ownership in which land is held by a non-governmental organization structured around principles of community control, and which negotiates the usage of the land that it owns with other actors (Crabtree et al. 2012; Meehan 2014). The major innovation of this model is the separation in ownership of the built environment from the underlying land, and the use of the latter to exercise community stewardship over the former (Davis 2010b; 2010a; 2017; Abromowitz 1991b). It is often positioned as a measure to 'remove' land from speculation and market instability (Pastel 1990; Bunce and Aslam 2016). The arrangements stemming from this can take many different forms, including combinations of the following and more: shared equity leases with individual households as a route to affordable homeownership, as in Burlington's Champlain Housing Trust (Davis 1994), the CLT acting as a support structure for co-ops on its land, as in Toronto's Co-operative Housing Land Trusts (Bunce and Barndt 2020), or as a platform for retaining community control and encouraging local business, as in Liverpool's Homebaked Community Land Trust (Thompson 2020a).

There are many variations in the model but the maintenance of land ownership by a non-profit organization able to negotiate its usage is the critical distinguishing feature and is the reason that Davis highlights the potential of the model for stewardship. This often takes the form of a board involving multiple representative blocs, including at its basic level community representatives and leaseholder representatives, but also possibly incorporating representation for governments, technical specialists, and other groups which might be relevant in a given context (Davis 2010b). From the outset, therefore, CLTs at the organizational level are acknowledged

and intended to embody and navigate distinct and often contradictory interests (government officials, residents, and business owners, for example).

Contextualizing the Study

CLTs have gained a measure of recognition in recent decades as a model useful for developing and retaining affordable housing. Although their potential for maintaining affordability over time and providing a platform for community development is well attested (Davis 2017; Crabtree et al. 2012), numerous scholars and practitioners have also identified CLTs as useful components of more transformative projects (as will be discussed further in Chapter Three) (Akuno 2017a; Thompson 2020a; Meehan 2014; Swann 1978). A review of the literature reveals the need for more analysis of how the pressures of securing resources and the wider political context shape the potential of such CLT-anchored projects. This research agenda has been further highlighted by both the emergence of literature which has suggested that CLTs are able to serve anti-capitalist ends, and the development of greater insight into the systems of financialized discipline, control, and exploitation which permeate the land and housing markets and maintain capitalist relations. Together, these developments in the literature put forward an ambitious hypothesis for the potential of CLTs, while also suggesting mechanisms which might limit this potential. The identified need for further research into funding, context, and CLT potential, and the need to connect these two bodies of literature – CLTs, their transformative potential, and Marxist political economy - are the gaps that this thesis is meant to address.

Research Questions

In addressing these needs in the literature, I ask whether the funding strategies and organizational relationships which characterize the CLT projects developing affordable housing represent a continuity or a break from the relationships which characterize capitalist forms of

systemic reproduction in the neoliberal era. The focus is specifically on housing development, and on the forms of neoliberal reproduction which characterize the land and housing sectors. By studying two specific projects, in Burlington, Vermont (VT) and Boston, Massachusetts (MA), my analysis assesses whether these two cases have displayed the potential to move away from the relationships of displaced survival (through unaffordable housing and credit costs and the cyclical displacements of gentrification), marketization (depoliticizing class relationships by mediating them through monetary relations of exchange), and the use of social surplus by capitalist states whose content derives ultimately from capitalist relations of production (the use of public spending to regulate these sectors in the interests of long-term sustainability of accumulation) (Harvey 1989; Soederberg 2014; 2020). These specific projects are the Burlington Community Land Trust, which would become the Champlain Housing Trust in 2006 (BCLT to refer to it in the former stage, CHT in the latter stage, and BCLT/CHT to refer to both together) and Dudley Neighbors Inc, the CLT subsidiary of Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DNI for the former, DSNI for the latter, and DSNI/DNI to refer to both).

Thesis Statement

Both cases show potential to alleviate the conditions of displacement which characterize neoliberal capitalism and DSNI/DNI in particular has displayed capacity to also reframe the terms on which it interacts with private capital and re-politicize the relationships often rendered neutral through marketized exchange. Both projects, however, remain closely tied to the state's allocation of social surplus and cannot fully supplant the role of private capital and marketized governance, due to their reliance on collaboration with different segments of capital. The two CLT projects' development of housing necessitates close supportive relationships with the state and other funders with significant capital to offer. This is especially true in their early formative

phase before their projects have reached a scale at which they have built up their own revenues and assets enough to cover most of their operating costs. Thus, the ability of these projects to serve transformative ends by providing a platform for a transformative movement is severely limited by the financial pressures involved in housing development. My conclusion is not wholly negative, however, as although the cases remain tied to the state and capital, they also show that gains can be made by political projects which contest state power.

Theoretical Framework

My theoretical framework addresses my research question by clarifying the place of land and housing in capitalism, the specific strategies which reproduce capitalist relations within those spheres, and the specific questions which are raised by the situation of CLTs as components of a transformative project within a Marxist analysis. It is by drawing together these bodies of literature and applying them to two specific cases that I aim to address the gap outlined above.

By reviewing some of the prominent features of land and housing markets within capitalist political economy, I characterize these spheres as first, essential to the ongoing systemic reproduction of capitalism, and as integrated with that system's relations of class hierarchy and exploitation of workers' labour[i]. They create the conditions of labour exploitation and capitalist accumulation and are mutually dependent on wage-labour exploitation, and reliant on the smooth functioning of the productive economy, which relies on land and housing relations in turn. Second, that land and housing contain distinct manifestations of class exploitation and hierarchy. They themselves provide opportunities for accumulation, underlying relationships of 'secondary' exploitation by rentiers through rent payments, financial instruments and other claims on future value production, and they are embedded in and reproductive of other

hierarchies, as assets which are relations of power and wealth in themselves and are more accessible to those who already enjoy both. Third, that these sectors, by being integrated with capitalism, and by their being characterized by class contradictions themselves, are zones of class struggle. They represent a terrain in which class actors struggle and advance their interests, including the profit-making strategies of gentrifying big landlords and investors, the erasure and place-making of petty-bourgeois households, the methods of monetized discipline and social power that are used to reproduce working-class precarity, and the struggles against displacement and for neighborhood control by working-class residents. Taken together, these justify the study of transformative projects focused on the housing and land sectors, the pervasiveness of class contradictions within the spaces in which they are operating, and the presence of ongoing class struggle within these spaces in which projects intervene and with which they must contend. This informs my analysis by justifying the focus on the housing and land sectors, highlighting the need to look at the class relationships embedded in them, and confirming that projects in these spaces should be studied as arenas of class struggle, including (among other potentials) for working-class empowerment, ruling-class co-optation, and displacement in the interest of the preservation and continued expansion of accumulation.

To assess the systemic reproduction of capitalism, I look specifically at neoliberalism and the concrete practices of displaced survival, marketization, and the allocation of social surplus by the state, drawing on Soederberg's engagement with other scholars in the field of (particularly Marxist) political economy. In addition to the government's neoliberal retreat from housing and other social services, it also facilitates the introduction of new forms of regulation and discipline, often overseen by private actors and ultimately serving the interests of accumulation. Soederberg shows how mechanisms of displaced survival, marketization, and the use of social surplus by

capitalist states whose content derives ultimately from capitalist relations of production serve to maintain the conditions necessary for credit-led accumulation. These concretely inform my analysis by showing how the general relationships discussed in the previous section manifest in a specific juncture of capitalist development, and the actors and mechanisms involved. The specificity allows the relationship between CLT project and capitalist reproduction to be examined concretely through three processes associated with neoliberal governance.

To situate CLTs within this political-economic perspective, I reference the work put forward by some of those involved with Co-operation Jackson and briefly discuss the work of Matthew Thompson in his analysis of CLT projects in Liverpool. Kali Akuno, Saki Hall, and other CJ participants have laid out a vision of a transformative movement with a CLT playing an important role in anchoring projects of co-operative construction and political organizing. They thus advocate for a transformative vision of the model. Their accumulated experience of attempting to implement that vision has directly raised the issue of CJ's relationship to the state, and has led the organization to conclude that even a sympathetic local government poses a threat of co-option. CJ thus not only theorizes CLTs as part of a revolutionary movement, but also identifies institutional autonomy as being crucial to its ability to fulfill that role. Thompson's theorization of CLTs in transformative change is distinct, in that it focuses on an expanding 'circuit of commons' more than a clear political movement, but it nevertheless reinforces the importance of a focus on autonomy. Both projects seek to address conditions of exploitation and displacement facing working-class people, both seek to address the conditions of marketized governance and social power of private money that has increasingly dominated social relations, including those of housing, and both put forward their models as transformative in part because of their ability to build up a resource base which is not dictated by the state's allocation of social

surplus (even if they do receive some public funding).

The theoretical work outlined above leads to the concrete questions I will attempt to answer in seeking to answer my overall research question. Characterizing the housing and land markets as in a symbiotic relationship with wage labour, as manifesting class relationships, and as being sites of class struggle allow me to justify my focus on them as potential spaces in which transformative projects can intervene. Identifying elements of neoliberal governance associated with the housing and land markets, and with adjacent credit systems provide a clearer look at what the financial reproduction of capitalism in these spaces looks like in practice and at the level of organizational relationships. Costly housing and exploitative debt underwrite displaced survival, the dominance of exchange relationships and private money lie beneath depoliticization and marketized governance, and the role of state power and discipline in structuring these relationships through the use of the social surplus to reinforce private market dominance. These three factors can be analyzed through the CLT projects' organizational relationships to assess their relationships to the reproduction of neoliberal capitalism. Finally, CJ's experience and Thompson's work situate CLTs as potential elements of counter-movements, while also confirming that their potential to act as such depends on an autonomy from those systems of capitalist systemic reproduction described earlier.

Methods

To apply this perspective concretely to the study of CLT projects, I analyze two cases. The first of these is the Burlington Community Land Trust/Champlain Housing Trust in Burlington, Vermont. The second is the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and its subsidiary CLT Dudley Neighbors Inc in Boston, Massachusetts. These two have been chosen based on their scale, accumulated experience operating in the neoliberal era (both began in the 1980s), and

prominence within the wider CLT movement (both were specifically cited by Davis in his examination of the history of CLTs in the United States, and have been discussed by many others since). I briefly review the founding and subsequent history of each, discuss the resources they were able to access, and then discuss the organizational relationships which have accompanied their funding strategies. This includes asking what incentives or dependencies might be produced in these institutional relationships, and how these relationships relate to the neoliberal strategies of reproducing credit-led accumulation. I look specifically at the project's relationship to the credit and rental systems that reproduce displaced survival, the system of depoliticization which reframes class relationships as exchange relationships between equals, and the control over allocation of social surplus. Each of these aspects of neoliberal regulation is constructed in large part by monetary relationships. The capacity of a CLT project to disentangle itself from each of these relates directly to its ability to realize the potential outlined by Kali Akuno and other CJ members, and well as Thompson and others.

My analysis of these is not necessarily comparative, as the basis of the work in secondary research creates some areas of asymmetry in information, but is more an attempt to distill lessons from each. In my conclusion chapter, I will discuss both and what implications they have for the ability of CLT projects in general to meet these conditions of a break from neoliberal reproduction.

Structure of Thesis

In Chapter Two, I review and engage with the literature on CLTs. I discuss the potentials and limitations associated with CLT projects and argue for the need for more research into how funding and political context impact these projects. In Chapter Three, I will review the theoretical perspective I draw on, showing how housing and land markets can be situated within

a Marxist analysis of capitalism, how neoliberal strategies of financial control can be framed in this analysis, and how existing work on CLTs theorizes them as part of transformative movements against the status quo. In Chapters Four and Five, I concretely analyze BCLT/CHT and DSNI/DNI respectively, assessing the resources they access, the organizational relationships associated with this, and what these organizational relationships might reveal about their relationship to neoliberal governance. In Chapter Six, I present my conclusions and argue that CLT potential for transformative change is limited by the reliance of these projects when developing housing on the state's allocation of social surplus and incentives for close relationships with capital that can reinforce depoliticization. I discuss also the potential for political contestation which is revealed by both cases.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to critically review the existing literature on community land trusts (CLTs) and identify gaps in the literature which my own contributions will aim to address. I suggest that the literature could more systematically analyze how the organizational relationships associated with funding strategies influence CLT projects. It is clear from some of the existing works which have dealt with this question that strategies for securing funding have driven CLT members to moderate their discourse, however more could be done to examine the politicized material component of this relationship. As will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Three, financial structures are not neutral, but able to embody class relationships of power, making this a necessary object of analysis when considering CLTs as potentially transformative. Applying Marxist analytical concepts regarding financial forms of discipline and control during the era of neoliberal accumulation, I will study CLT projects through the chief medium which connects them to other institutions, which has been specifically mentioned in the literature as being an important influence on projects, and which is essential for their preservation under capitalism.

This chapter has been organized into three sections. To provide readers will a clearer understanding of CLTs and their decision-making and organization structure, Section One discusses the possibilities and challenges of CLTs which have been identified by scholars, examining each in turn and identifying some of the most commonly cited. Section Two will briefly summarize the above, and clarify a general gap in the literature. Section Three will then directly address this gap by reviewing existing literature which has dealt with it, and what areas still need to be elaborated. It is clear from these that CLT projects are influenced in their ability

to pursue goals by factors including the challenges of securing finance and by the balance of political forces in their local context.

Possibilities and Challenges of the CLT Model

Possibilities

Scholars have written widely on the many potential uses and benefits of CLTs as a model. Some of the major areas of possibility are the ability to ensure long-term affordability through resale controls, subsidy retention and stewardship of public investment, bridging stewardship and investment, household asset building, counter-cyclical stabilization, facilitating community partnerships, racial justice and decolonization, disrupting the hegemony of private property, expanding community organizing and grassroots democracy, and supplanting the capitalist market**.** In the following sub-sections, I explore each of these in turn. In analyzing them, I argue that those more directly associated with transformative change (the latter four listed above) would each benefit from more systematic analysis of how funding strategies and power relationships which they can reproduce, shape and influence CLTs' ability to deliver on these possibilities.

Long-Term Affordability and Efficient Spending

Community ownership of underlying land allows CLT organizations to exercise control over the resale of CLT property. This is the way in which most CLT housing is kept affordable. Davis provides an explanation of some of the key aspects of CLTs which make them well-suited to land stewardship, central among which is the ground lease, which give the CLT a vehicle to control resale and restrict speculation and profit-making in the interest of affordability (Davis 2010b). Resale-restriction and affordability, as mentioned by Davis, are foundational to the model itself, and are therefore mentioned throughout almost all of the other works cited here. The

success of CLTs in this regard is well substantiated in the literature (Kelly 2009a; K. M. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2013; Crabtree et al. 2012; Pastel 1990; Choi, Van Zandt, and Matarrita-Cascante 2018; Angotti and Jagu 2007; Bourassa 2007). For additional empirical demonstration, see the empirical work of other authors in grey and scholarly literature (Gauger 2006; Voith and Wachter 2012; Axel-Lute 2010; Patten 2015).While not mentioning CLTs per se, Ngai Pindell and Josh Ryan-Collins both argue for these same types of resale restrictions and community stewardship mechanisms as a promising method of checking the destruction caused by speculation (Pindell 2005; Ryan-Collins 2021).

Scholars have cited the capacity of CLTs for retaining the value of public spending more efficiently than alternatives, as long-term restrictions on resale allow the initial investment to be preserved between purchases without getting overwhelmed by rapidly rising costs (Cohen 1994; Curtin and Bocarsly 2008). Subsidy retention can be defined against other models of public spending which aim to 'recapture' subsidies by recouping costs. An upfront investment in an asset which can be retained and transferred in the long term without losing the capacity to hold down prices is often more cost effective (Cohen 1994; Davis 2007; Miller 2015). It is this potential for longer term efficiency with public investment that has led more local governments, especially in the United States, to take an increasing interest in CLT projects since the 1980s (Curtin and Bocarsly 2008; Jacobus and Brown 2007). Another alleged benefit is that investments can be retained despite rapid fluctuations in housing markets (Davis 2010a). It is precisely this justification that was used by Chuck Matthei, a significant populariser of the CLT model in the United States in framing his arguments for CLTs as a new "American Land Reform"(Matthei 1992; 1993).

Bridging Stewardship and Investment.

CLTs have also been associated with forms of stewardship, meaning their providing a

mechanism of oversight over land usage, and creating a mechanism to preserve characteristics of the land, such as affordability and environmental integrity. Jessica Grannis in particular has argued that these characteristics make the CLT model useful to ensure environmental sustainability and community resilience (Grannis 2020; 2021). This is also a point made by Roseland, who argues that since the CLT model involves holding land in such a way that both the community and individual users have an ownership stake, they can preserve the natural environment on CLT land (Roseland 1992). Relatedly, the maintenance of long term affordability and stabilization of community space is also positioned as another, similar form of stewardship (Davis 2008; 2017; Bunce and Aslam 2016). One particular draw of the CLT model is that it has been acknowledged to be able to bridge this goal of preservation with those of investment and revitalization, where numerous scholars have argued for its community control combined with ground lease restrictions as being able to facilitate community investment while controlling prices and ensuring local residents benefit (Louie 2016; Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b; Davis 2017; Wernstedt and Hanson 2009).

Household Asset Building

Household asset-building is aided by the emphases on both affordability and ownership within the CLT model. Meehan references this, acknowledging that CLTs are often put forward as a 'rung on the tenure ladder', helping moderate and some lower-income households enter into homeownership (Meehan 2014). Scholars show that CLT homeownership has been able to provide a path to homeownership for low-income renters (Skobba and Carswell 2014; Pastel 1990). Temkin et al, studying programs in the United States, found that homebuyers earned significant returns from CLT projects, which were competitive with investments in stocks or bonds, and that these programs are more sustainable and secure than other investment options (K. M. Temkin, Theodos,

and Price 2013). Kelly concurs, and shows their potential to share some benefits of the equity appreciation occurring within the community with households (Kelly 2009a). CLT homes are usually occupied by similar demographics to those who occupy rental housing, but CLTs provide benefits associated with the market-rate ownership dominated by those of higher income brackets (Schneider, Lennon, and Saegert 2022). These insights are also reflected in research published in grey literature (Jacobus and Davis 2010; K. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010). CLTs are able to expand access to asset-building through shared equity homeownership, overcoming racialized, gendered, and other differentiating barriers (Wang et al. 2019).

Counter-Cyclical Stabilization

CLT potentials can also be situated in the wider political economy of capitalist housing markets as means of counter-cyclical stabilization, both for CLT residents and even for wider communities. Nelson et al have found that clusters of CLTs have a demonstrated ability to stem rapid declines in sales prices in a neighborhood, providing a bulwark against the shock of large-scale foreclosure (Nelson et al. 2020). Due to their perpetual affordability as well as creation of an institutional support structure, CLT housing is widely acknowledged as much more secure against foreclosure than private housing (Crabtree et al. 2012; Crabtree 2008; Davis 2008; Hackett et al. 2019; Miller 2015; K. M. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2013). Some supporting statistics are provided by Emily Thaden in a policy paper (looking again at the United States) which shows in detail how much more stable CLT housing was in terms of foreclosure and delinquency during the 2008-2009 financial crisis (Thaden 2010). Not only are CLT projects able to protect against downturns, but they are also able to stabilize neighborhoods against gentrification (Choi, Van Zandt, and Matarrita-Cascante 2018; Louie 2016; Bunce 2018; Lawrence 2002).

Facilitating Partnerships

Due to the capacity for co-ordination which institutional ownership of underlying land lends to CLTs, scholars such as Meagan Ehlenz and Tom Moore have argued that the ability to facilitate local partnerships is a key potential benefit of the model. Ehlenz posits that CLTs are particularly suited to partnerships with co-operatives, and that this can help to minimize some of the shortcomings of each model (Ehlenz 2018). Moore discusses the mutually beneficial partnerships which have existed between housing associations and the CLT sector, which have allowed both to expand their reach, but also notes the tensions which can exist within these partnerships between conflicting objectives and due to asymmetries of power(T. Moore 2018). Fujii has highlighted their potential when paired with land banks (Fujii 2016). This potential for partnership has also been pointed out regarding community activities like urban agriculture and supporting local businesses (Thompson 2015; Aernouts and Ryckewaert 2018). There is also potential for CLTs to operate in conjunction with other types of land trusts, like conservation trusts (Campbell and Salus 2003).

Racial Justice and Decolonization

CLTs have also been situated in studies of Indigeneity, racism, and colonialism and positioned as potential tools of racial justice and decolonization. In these cases, colonialism and racism are viewed as material systems which occur in urban spaces through forms of dispossession, violence, and marginalization (Bonds and Inwood 2016; Simpson and Bagelman 2018; Danewid 2020). Scholars such as Hayat have highlighted the importance of material development directed by marginalized communities as a key method of addressing marginalities, and Hayat mentions co-operative projects such as Co-operation Jackson specifically (Hayat 2018). Simpson and Bagelman look at the ways in which the engagement with and shaping of urban

political ecologies, particularly by Indigenous groups, can be de-colonial action (Simpson and Bagelman 2018). Safrasky examines how residents, through constructing their own community infrastructure, are able to counteract the forces of capital and the state and "liberate territory", thus showing the importance of land contestation and development to these ends (Safransky 2017). Ramírez applies this point specifically to CLTs (Ramírez 2020). Rose puts forward the idea of the "Indigenous Shadow State" to show how CLTs could be used as means of institutional empowerment for asserting the sovereignty of Indigenous nations (Rose 2011). Discussing Australia, Crabtree argues that CLTs can be particularly useful to Indigenous-led urban housing development strategies by encouraging homeownership in a way which is more stable and respectful of diverse tenure approaches than the promotion of private market tenure (Crabtree 2014). Kali Akuno and other members of Co-operation Jackson have situated CLTs within a transformative revolutionary movement for large-scale decolonial and socialist transformation, in which political organizing and the construction of grassroots power accompanies the construction of a community-controlled democratic economy(Akuno 2017a; 2017c; Nangwaya and Akuno 2017; Akuno 2017b; Cooperation Jackson 2017). These sources show the potential for CLTs to serve material decolonization.

These goals represent, by the acknowledgment of the above authors themselves, a radical shift from a status quo in which white supremacy and colonialism predominate. These colonial relations are concrete and material (Ramírez 2020; Bonds and Inwood 2016; Simpson and Bagelman 2018). Additionally, Kenn has raised concerns about CLTs continuing processes of ghettoization if not paired with other supports (Kenn 1995). As such, to fulfill the possibilities around material decolonization, CLT projects would need to retain the ability to act autonomously from and against the powers of the state and capital (even if engaging with them

tactically at certain times) and be part of broader-based efforts (Akuno 2017a; 2017c). As will be further elaborated in the following sections and sub-sections, their ability to do so is complicated by the realities of securing finance in a capitalist system.

Disrupting the Hegemony of Private Property

John Emmeus Davis suggests that CLTs carry transformative potential in their ability to ideologically challenge the relations of private property and enact small-scale practical alternatives, thereby disrupting the hegemonic ubiquitousness of private property (Davis 2017). Abromowitz argues for this as a significant transformative aspect of CLTs, as they undermine the typical 'bundle of rights' associated with property and separate rights of enjoyment from those of alienation (Abromowitz 1991a). On a more individual level, the stabilizing effect also has personal benefits to residents, altering not only the ideological basis of private property but the way in which it is experienced. Hackett and others show that CLT project can provide more stable and affordable living situations, which significantly alters their experience of daily life by reducing the negative influence of financial insecurity(Hackett et al. 2019). Martin and co-authors suggest that CLTs redefine homeownership by rejecting equity as the primary goal in favour of security and autonomy, allowing residents to escape the discipline of the rental market (Martin et al. 2020). Cahen and co-authors argue that this escape can be a precondition for transformative politics (Cahen, Lilli, and Saegert 2022). Lowe and Thaden argue for the transformative nature of the co-ownership arrangement, since it incorporates residents into mutual dependency and stewardship activities which represent a break from the atomisation of the market (Lowe and Thaden 2016).

Although practices such as creating community-oriented stewardship practices or more equitable and affordable forms of housing tenure do not in themselves challenge the material

domination of capital, these pieces argue that they allow individuals to conceive of material relations beyond their hegemony. Even if acknowledging the genuinely transformative possibility inherent in these engagements with the model, to assess their general applicability it is necessary to examine the influences which shape the ability of CLTs to deliver the services necessary for such outcomes.

Expand Grassroots Democracy and Local Organizing

Scholars have pointed out the potential of CLT projects to expand community control at the grassroots through local organizing and democratic planning. This has been a feature of the movement in the United States since its inception, with these trusts being viewed not only as a means of delivering benefits, but of involving and empowering community members economically. Bob Swann, one of the original promoters of the CLT model in the United States, argued for them as a mechanism for re-asserting community economic planning in the face of the rising power of multinational corporations (Swann 1978). Thompson, in his analyses of Liverpool's CLT movement, shows how collective land ownership can be linked to processes of mobilization and community formation, and how neighborhood-based anti-gentrification struggles have been able to establish and maintain CLTs in the city (Thompson 2020a). Similar points are made by Aernouts and Ryckewaert discussing a project in Brussels (Aernouts and Ryckewaert 2018). Engelsman et al point out how cases in New York and Boston show that established CLTs can serve as focal points for further activism (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2018). Ehlenz shows that the CLT partnerships discussed above are able to foster activism as well as deliver services (Ehlenz 2018). Meehan positions CLT projects as able to develop grassroots democracy, and contribute to wider structural change against the market system (Meehan 2014). Hoover argues that CLTs can help advance a positive and empowering conception of community rights to housing (Hoover

2015), and Kelly positions CLTs as exercising community control in opposition to both the market and state (Kelly 2009b). Gray and Galande show the community-building success that can be achieved by combining organizing with CLT development and stewardship (to materially deliver on and retain the gains of organizing), but also show how this can sometimes become de-emphasized as work progresses (Gray and Galande 2011). Akuno and others involved in Co-operation Jackson put forward a vision of movement-building in which co-operative ownership serves as the underlying foundation to sustain political organizing, all in the service of building structures to contest state power(Akuno 2017a; 2017c; 2017b).

Introducing CLTs as organizing interventions against the prevailing political-economic system raises some points of tension, however. As has been pointed out by numerous scholars (including many who advocate for the transformative possibility of the projects), CLTs' substantial resource needs mean that they are often driven to seek resources from the very power structures against which community organizing would be mobilizing (through government grants for instance, or partnerships with financial institutions). This raises the issue of how structural incentives might influence the ability of CLTs to engage in grassroots organizing, particularly when desires conflict with the interests of governments and capital.

Supplanting the Capitalist Market

Expanding on the radical implications of CLTs as a form of collective ownership over land and economic resources, some scholars put forward the potential of CLT projects to act as more transformative shifts in the relations of production. This tendency has been present from early in the history of the US CLT movement. Meehan's piece, mentioned above, frames CLTs as a means of securing "liberated space" for grassroots community development outside of the dynamics of the capitalist market (Meehan 2014). Thompson makes a similar point, positioning

CLT projects in Liverpool as practical projects incorporating elements of utopian goals, expanding the commons in order to challenge and supplant the hegemony of capital (Thompson 2020a; 2020b). He argues for the creation of a 'bureaucracy from below' involving a sustainable asset base and revenue streams, constructed steadily at the community level through and able to co-ordinate and facilitate resource sharing between CLT projects (Thompson 2020a, 284–85). Thompson references a report by Milburn and Russell which argues for such expanding 'circuits of commons' as a means by which socialist transformation could occur (Milburn and Russell 2019). There are similarities here with the perspective advanced in the *Jackson-Kush Plan*, which seeks to use co-operatives (with some use of a CLT to anchor projects) to build an alternative power structure to challenge capital and white supremacy (Akuno 2017c).

These perspectives, despite their distinctions, coalesce around the notion that CLTs can allow for alternative forms of co-operative economic activity to *replace* the capitalist structures which currently govern with new relations. While authors such as Akuno and Thompson have certainly thought through and acknowledged the pressures and countervailing forces which would face such a constructive project, it would be useful to systematically assess how capitalist forces exert their influence, drawing on recent advances in Marxist scholarship (described in Chapter Three).

Limitations of CLTs

Alongside the many areas of potential, there are some limitations to CLT development mentioned in the literature. These include securing financial sustainability, the co-opting of activist energy (although there are problematizations of this framing), undue influence from the government, local political balance of power, and embeddedness in capitalist structures. Each of these limits is necessarily associated with particular goals and conceptions regarding the purpose

of CLT projects across various geographical contexts. Depending on the goals of a project, some (such as the reliance on the state) might not even be seen as limitations. Nevertheless, I will go over each in turn in order to review the boundaries of CLT potential. I will connect the discussion of each to the areas of possibility listed above to show how the interaction between possibility and limitation reveals the need for further research into funding strategies.

Financial Barriers and Balancing Affordability With Sustainability

First and most obviously, the potential of CLT projects is said to be limited by the monetary costs of starting, maintaining, and developing them. This is especially problematic when trying to provide an expensive service like housing specifically for compensation below market-rates. Davis, in his survey of the CLT movement in the United States, highlights the need for funding as one of the major limiting factors in CLT growth due to the heavy resource needs of CLT projects (Davis 2010b). Temkin at el point out that CLT projects, despite their significant potential, face supply-side constraints when attempting to grow due to the serious costs (including administrative) of land stewardship (K. M. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2013). Curtin and Bocarsly also mention that rising operating and acquisition costs can be challenges to CLT success (Curtin and Bocarsly 2008). Stein has examined CLT projects' acquisition of private mortgage financing, and has showed how these mortgage agreements have often forced CLT projects to compromise significantly on their affordability provisions (Stein 2010).

Crabtree et al, when analyzing the Champlain Housing Trust in Burlington, show that initial start-up funding is crucial to project success and that even an advanced CLT project operating at scale and with a sizable portfolio must rely on extra-ordinary funding for activities beyond covering base costs of housing (Crabtree et al. 2012). Libby also writes, in a study of Vermont's public policy model surrounding CLTs, about the challenges of ensuring financial

self-sustainability over time, and of meeting ongoing costs related to maintenance and environmental sustainability (J. M. Libby Jr 2010). Reviewing cases in England, Bailey points out that even strong projects are only as strong as their capacity to acquire and use land, with high costs making support systems essential (Bailey 2010). In cases of expensive real estate markets, the cost of private land acquisition can be so high that it imposes near-complete reliance on private investors and strict conditions of favourability (Kim and Eisenlohr 2022). The acknowledgement of this limitation has wide-ranging implications, as the ability to secure resources is a necessary condition of a project's survival. The conditions which govern its ability to survive necessarily then govern its scope of action, since jeopardizing its source of funding means jeopardizing its ability to act at all.

Co-option or Restriction of Activism

It has been noted that the needs of CLT projects around resources and collaboration can make it easy for radical activist energy and labour to be used to serve more reformist ends. Engelsman et al argue that CLTs are useful vehicles, able to serve as focal points of community organizing efforts, as well as offering a useful template for a different way of organizing affordable housing (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016a). At the same time, however, the authors note that given the current dominance of capital within the housing system, this potential can easily be co-opted and redirected, and those aspects embodied by CLTs which reinforce desires for self-help and private ownership can easily become dominant (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016a). DeFilippis and various co-authors found that despite some capacity for re-framing land use from its exchange to use-value, transformative practice was often de-emphasized and most participants viewed the project as a form of service delivery rather than of social change (DeFilippis et al. 2019). The authors argue that this attitude is fostered by staff and board members

in order to tailor their projects to desired audiences, such as donors or other potential supporters. In another piece, DeFilippis, Williams, and Stromberg argue that CLT's have moved from a model of community participation to a model of more limited housing delivery, making this case based on the mission statements of the CLTs themselves, statements from participants, increasing scales of projects, increasing number of 'elite-driven' projects, and the representation of projects by advocates and researchers (DeFilippis, Stromberg, and Williams 2018). These conclusions are mainly based on the discourse of the projects examined by the authors. Studying Minnesota, DeFilippis, Williams, and others point out that an actual community identification within the CLT community has proven difficult to foster in practice, and is not inherently encouraged by the model(Kruger et al. 2020). Dawance points out that these types of community empowerment can in fact be complimentary to neo-liberal state disengagement (Dawance 2019).

Problematizing and building on the above critiques are pieces which argue for CLT projects as embodying both reformist and transformative characteristics without fully compromising their activist potential. Bunce argues that East London CLT's case illustrates both the ways in which activist aims are frustrated and in which they are able to achieve limited success (Bunce 2016). Bunce argues against characterizing this case as principally an example of co-optation, since activists were able to create "discursive and material commons" through their partnerships with government and private actors, upon which they relied to make these changes. Similarly, some authors highlights projects which have been successful due to their ability to leverage their multifaceted relationship with local government, thus problematizing a dichotomized view of insurgent activism and the state and examining the conjunction of the two (Cahen, Schneider, and Saegert 2019; Braunholtz-Speight 2015). Engelsman et al also argue that both reformist and more radical tendencies are present within these projects, able to both subvert and

reinforce individualized private land relations(Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2018; 2016a). Although presenting benefits of state involvement in CLT projects, Spicer and co-authors point out the potential negative consequences for community engagement (Spicer, Stephens, and Kramer 2022).

Although these pieces present a more nuanced view than simply identifying limitations, they also highlight some of the tendencies and forces which are co-present with successes, and which influence outcomes. The activism associated with CLT projects exist in dynamic and complex relationships with the state and other institutions. The different theories of how CLT projects' transformative capacity relates to their necessarily close relationship to funders show the value of a more systematic analysis of transformative change.

Government Influence

A closely related point to that of co-optation is the influence of government on the aims and direction of CLT projects. Although this is present within the critiques above around funding and co-optation, Davis and Moore in particular highlight that the increasing interest of government bodies might compromise the ability of CLTs to serve and empower the community due to potentially divergent interests between policymakers and other citizens (Davis 2010b; T. Moore 2018). Davis specifically points out that on the one hand: the need for financial resources has meant that CLTs have both greatly benefited from the availability of public funding and faced significant limitations in its absence; while on the other: many CLT projects are organized *in opposition to* municipal governments and policies (Davis 2010b). It is worth studying how financial pressures might push a project toward such entanglement.

Embeddedness in Capitalist Structures and Political Balance of Power

Lowe and Thaden, in an analysis of six CLT projects in different local contexts within the

US, show that the ability of each to engage in community organizing and advocacy were heavily conditioned by whether there was already a strong grassroots and advocacy infrastructure in place, and on the openness of the local government (Lowe and Thaden 2016). In a piece exploring the potential of the CLT model to serve a radically transformative rights-based housing agenda, Hoover points out that many groups have faced seeming impossibility due to the political forces arrayed against them (Hoover 2015). In a report, Voith and Wachter point out that CLTs will have more success in municipalities which do not feel threatened by their impacts on the wider market (Voith and Wachter 2012). As long as not too many properties are removed from the open market and subjected to price restrictions, and as long as decommodification is not pursued too aggressively or at too large a scale, CLT projects can be accommodated. Thus, the political balance of forces and the degree to which the state and capital are willing or compelled to tolerate the goals of projects, limits the ability of CLT projects to receive support for pursuing their ends.

Authors have cited the embeddedness of any project within the economic structures of capitalism as limitations or at least obstacles to potential for the CLT model. DeFilippis argues that although collective ownership structures for housing are viable and useful, they often necessarily find themselves reliant on outside capital which can undermine their democratic relations (DeFilippis 2004). DeFilippis argues that these projects face obstacles in the form of their lack of oppositional politics, the sources of funding they receive, and the lack of connection to a wider political movement. A group of scholars including DeFilippis have also advanced the argument that the property rights regime itself limits the transformative power of the CLT model, and must be countered by active transformative educational and rhetorical practice (Pierce et al. 2021). Thompson also identifies this as a problem, pointing out that the circuits of capital which

govern the environment in which CLTs operate make it difficult to conceive of them in any revolutionary way, and that the only way to address this is to actively focus on expanding circuits of commons as an alternative (Thompson 2020a). Although they do not argue this directly, Kim and Eisenlohr demonstrate that in situations where private land is required, a CLT project must be desirable to investors (Kim and Eisenlohr 2022). The above pieces contextualize these projects by showing the systemic pressures, both political and economic, with which CLT projects are faced and by which they are influenced. Many of the problems of embeddedness mentioned above relate to the difficulty of accessing resources in a profit-motivated market, as well as the existing strength and organization of community groups (who can pressure funders).

Factors in CLT Success

It is worth touching briefly on what have been identified as 'best practices' for CLT projects, as they reveal the conditions which govern their ability to meet potential. Some oft-cited factors in CLT success include support from local governments (T. Moore 2018; Roseland 1992; Bailey 2010; Thompson 2020a), partnerships with community institutions (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b; Paterson and Dunn 2009; T. Moore 2018; Thompson 2020a), a deep community mobilization (Thompson 2020b; Gray and Galande 2011; Williams 2018; Thompson 2020a; Lowe and Thaden 2016), pooling funding and sharing resources (Thompson 2020a), and clustering holdings(Curtin and Bocarsly 2008; Nelson et al. 2020). Government support is also important to create a favourable tax and regulatory regime (Bagdol 2012). Cahen and others have pointed to the importance of active and engaged CLT workers, and showed how structural pressures can result in the absence of this and the consequent reduction of CLT models to 'bare provision' (Cahen, Lilli, and Saegert 2022). In a report, Bunce highlights the importance of political support, that from legislatures and the community, as well as strong funding sources (Bunce 2013). For those who have advanced a

more radical view of CLT or co-operative projects, the political mobilizatiolibbyn and education has been especially important (Akuno 2017a; 2017b; Hoover 2015; DeFilippis 2004), and some have stressed the proactive creation of new economic and political institutions(Akuno 2017a; Thompson 2020a). Most of the above relate to securing resources (even the mobilizations and partnerships are often to obtain financial support), and to orient CLT projects within a wider political context.

Summing Up Possibilities and Limitations: Resources and Political Power

In this section, I briefly characterize the possibilities and limitations of the CLT model as covered in the literature, focusing specifically on its potential transformative role.

In terms of possibilities, literature which has identified transformative potential suggests this based on the ability of CLT projects to fulfill various regulatory features. For instance to serve as a platform for decommodification (centring use rather than exchange-value in determining cost of housing) (Davis 2017; Meehan 2014), creating an alternative mechanism for regulation and planning (Akuno 2017a; Meehan 2014), and appropriating a share of surplus to reinvest (Thompson 2020a).

When assessing the limitations of CLT projects used for affordable housing, it seems that the commonalities are the difficulty of securing resources, and the political forces arrayed against transformative projects (which often exert their influence through funding). In the first case, the problem of resources essentially sets the boundaries of everything the CLT does, due to the very significant cost of affordable housing delivery. Without access to assistance from the state, capital, or other ‘dose of miracle funding’ (in the words of Davis), it is very difficult for CLT projects to get off the ground (Davis 2010b). For more radical projects, this represents a significant limitation. Financial support will be far more difficult to obtain when projects threaten state or private interests and therefore CLT projects have a powerful incentive to

moderate or step back from such goals and practices. The balance of political forces is important because CLT projects pursuing their goals are confronted by the reality that if those goals are not in the interests of the powerful, they will have a difficult time getting needed support. This is also why mobilization is often emphasized, due to its ability to impact the political scene.

Filling the Gap in the Literature

In order to assess the potential of CLTs in relating to these wider systems, one would need to more clearly study how the scope of action of CLT-anchored projects relates to the 'countervailing' forces in the housing market, such as the systems of financialized reproduction, by which I mean relationships mediated through money and access to resources which serve to perpetuate the capitalist mode of production. Existing literature has highlighted the importance of funding and political context to shaping the potential of CLT projects. More work needs to be done to connect the acknowledgement of these structural pressures and constraints to the suggested role of CLT projects in transformative anti-capitalist initiatives. The following section will discuss this relationship, summarizing articles which have dealt directly with it, and reviewing the areas needing further development. While there are pieces which analyze the connection of CLT projects to their surrounding political-economic context, there is a need for more systematic theorization, based on new understandings of neoliberal governance.

Existing Work and the Gap

A 2019 paper by DeFilippis and others mention the need to assert more transformative politics as part of CLT operations, and the fact that many currently involved in CLT projects do not conceptualize their projects as transformative (DeFilippis et al. 2019). They attribute this to the message of CLT project being tailored to the expectations of funders, and thus becoming less focused on communicating a radical message. In a similar vein, Moore and McKee argue that

there is a need for further research into the relationship between CLT democracy and the wider structures with which their projects interact, and how they are influenced by these structures (T. Moore and McKee 2012). Lowe and Thaden argue that more research should be done into the influence of local environments on CLT projects and vice versa (Lowe and Thaden 2016). Engelsman et al directly acknowledge the complexities of CLT projects' relationships to the state, and call for more research into the scope for radicalism and relation to market forces. (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2018). Spicer and co-authors have suggested that CLTs with significant state control and subsidy represent a distinct form of CLT, better able to secure affordability and sustainability but also potentially reducing community control, and making political control over the state central to the projects' outcomes (Spicer, Stephens, and Kramer 2022). There is also a recognized need for further research into the relationship of smaller-scale transformative interventions to their wider social context and to powerful actors within that context (Mullins and Moore 2018). In a working paper, Lowe and Thaden argue that community engagement, itself essential to CLT success, is significantly influenced by the surrounding socio-political environment (Thaden and Lowe 2014). Stein has looked specifically at the relationship of Fannie Mae to CLT projects' accessing of mortgage financing in the US, and how this has reduced the affordability of mortgages, but greater theoretical and empirical elaboration could be added to this (Stein 2010).

In another vein, there is literature that acknowledges the embeddedness of financial structures in capitalism, but argues that CLT projects are able to build a counter-power to them. While some have discussed the problem of independence from the state (for example, with Thompson's arguments around pragmatic radicalism and forming a 'bureaucracy from below' that overlaps the state, and North et al in their discussion of 'antagonistic economies' that

challenge rather than seek greater inclusion within capitalist structures (Thompson 2020a; North et al. 2020)) they have not done so with an analysis of the specific elements of neoliberal monetized governance. Crucial to these pieces is the notion that the CLT can reach a position of relative independence, in which it is no longer completely reliant on external funders. Palmer writes of a 'sustainability threshold', which is a scale that, upon being reached by a CLT project, enables them to fund their operating expenses out of their own revenues and only rely on external funding for new acquisitions and projects (Palmer 2019). It is unclear, however, how ongoing relationships with the state to cover these projects and acquisitions, and institutional relationships evolving from a projects' early reliance impact the potential of these projects. In order to assess the viability of CLTs to radical ends, it is necessary to look at specific cases and to examine their interaction with neoliberal systems of control by the state and capital. Alongside this identification of potential, more work has been done to clarify how financial reproduction functions in capitalist land and housing markets (this will be discussed in the following chapter), which highlights further the need for a concrete examination.

The question of the relationship of CLTs to transformative change has been posed clearly by the Co-operation Jackson project. Saki Hall. Kali Akuno and other writers associated with CJ have conceptualized CLTs as being useful component parts of a broader liberatory movement based in political organization and the proactive construction of more egalitarian economic and social relationships (Akuno 2017a; 2017c; Nangwaya and Akuno 2017). In their holistic focus on political mobilization, economic construction, and CLT-anchored community control, the members of Co-operation Jackson contribute to the theorization of CLT interconnectedness by stressing the need for transformative CLT projects to act beyond the scope a single project, but seek to comprehensively alter the relations of production and political power. Baiocchi and co-

authors suggest CLTs as possible alternative models able to the market, but acknowledge that they would not be able to succeed without state subsidy, meaning that the focus of organizing should be politically contesting public spending (Baiocchi, Brady, and Carlson 2018). It is worth following up on their point with further empirical study to assess whether this is indeed the case.

Needing Further Elaboration

Thus, there is a clear need for more analysis of how the structural incentives embedded in surrounding capitalist institutions shape and influence CLT projects. There is also a need to study funding strategies specifically, as access to resources is widely acknowledged to be vitally important, but there is not yet sufficient systematic study of such strategies or their impacts. While some papers have suggested best practices for CLT success and co-operative funding sources, they have not connected these to questions of transformative change (by identifying what the requirements of this might be) or to a theory of capitalist reproduction (the dynamic systems of ruling-class reproduction from which a project would need to be able to break). The development of literature, such as that associated with CJ, which theorizes CLTs as anchoring transformative politics necessitates a closer examination of this question. Additionally, addressing this question would help to develop an understanding of how political context shapes projects specifically through funding, contributing to the identified need for more study of political context.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework & Methods

In this chapter, I address the need for more examination of CLT projects and the interaction between their need for funding and the neoliberal modes of governance. In order to distill this into a concrete question I draw on (particularly Marxist) insights in political-economic scholarship to characterize land and housing within neoliberal capitalism, and reference the body of work associated with Co-operation Jackson to situate CLTs as potential components of a transformative political project against the exploitation of the current system. I then describe my specific research methods based on this.

In the first section, I review some of the main features of the historical materialist perspective as the theoretical assumptions which will guide the rest of my work. In the second, I will justify my use of historical materialism by demonstrating that it is particularly suited to addressing the need for a material examination which appreciates the connection between political and economic structures. In the third, I will provide a political-economic theorization of land and housing markets within neoliberal capitalism. I will describe how these sectors serve to create the conditions of capitalist reproduction, how they exist in a state of mutual dependency with wage labour, how they represent a realm of distinct forms of exploitation, how they are embedded in and reproductive of hierarchies, and how they are zones of contestation by class actors.

In the fourth section, I will review some specific aspects of monetized governance which occur within neoliberal land and housing markets. I highlight the importance of forms of monetized governance operating within and around the land and housing sectors, and specifically how private credit and indebtedness help reproduce conditions of displaced survival within the working-class, how forms of marketized regulation by the state and capital work to invisibilize

and depoliticize class relationships, and the deep involvement of the state within these processes through its allocation of social surplus in the form of public spending.

In the fifth section, I will review the theoretical work that has emerged from Co-operation Jackson (CJ), a project pursuing materially transformative politics of national liberation and socialism through the creation of several economic and political institutions including CLTs. I identify independence as being a central principle guiding the project. From the body of work associated with CJ, and to a lesser extend that advanced by Thompson, I situate CLT projects within Marxist political economy as potentially transformative interventions which have been theorized as being able to achieve the conditions outlined in section two. I point out that the relationship of CLT projects to other actors is vital to understanding their ability in this regard.

In the sixth section, I will describe how this theorization of land and housing, and the role of CLTs as being component parts of projects to contest their relations, will be used to inform my concrete analysis of CLT cases in Vermont and Massachusetts. I will assess the ways in which each has accessed resources, the organizational relationships this has fostered, and what these relationships reveal about the ability of each project to act independently of these three aspects of monetized governance.

A Brief Introduction to Historical Materialism

Drawing on Torkil Lauesen's *the Principal Contradiction,* I will outline some of the aspects of the historical materialist perspective[ii]. First, 'materialism' refers to the fact that concrete relationships are seen as the primary point of analysis in this framework, rather than more abstract ideas. Materialism does not just refer to physical objects, but also to relationships between things and people (Lauesen 2020). 'Historical' refers to the methodology of concrete analysis in which the evolution of relationships over time is analyzed to understand the process

that has produced a given situation (Lauesen 2020). In their evolution, relationships change constantly due to their interconnection with surrounding systems.

Although the development of productive forces and the relations which emerge from that development are seen as important to determine the context in which individuals and groups act, the deliberate action of subjects is also seen as playing a role in shaping social relations. This is to say, the evolution of material social relations is not a passive, linear process, but one which is shaped constantly by the push and pull of actors contesting them (Lauesen 2020). This is evident from Marx's political writings, where decision-making and strategy of actors play important roles, in his view, in determining outcomes (Marx 1999; 1871). This is a perspective which does not aim to analyze relationships as neutral, but rather as deeply political (Lauesen 2020). Social relations are viewed according to the material relations of class power which govern them. In acknowledging this, Marxism has traditionally defined itself as a partisan mode of analysis, connected specifically to liberatory projects by and for the working class (Lauesen 2020).

In the discussion which follows, understanding social and political issues as rooted in evolving material class relations and understanding those relations as open to contestation will both be important assumptions guiding the work. I will also adopt the normative position of Marxism in studying these relations from the perspective of a project's capacity to change them by empowering working-class residents.

The Utility of A Marxist Framework

Before presenting my theoretical perspective in greater detail, I will take a moment to justify my focus on Marxist analytical methods. First of all, existing literature has discussed possible connections between projects' needs for both funding and support from local political actors, however it has focused on analyzing the discursive side of this process, looking at

rhetoric and documentary evidence. An approach which examines the specific material relationships which incentivize such a moderation helps to complete the picture. Due to the historical materialist perspective adopting material relations as the basis of analysis (Lauesen 2020), it is evidently suited to this task. However it is not only a focus on materialism which renders the perspective useful, but also its politicization of economic structures. The literature requires more elaboration of both the influence of funding and of political context on projects. Historical materialism provides a medium to examine the interconnection of these, viewing economic structures like state spending and private credit as embodying class relationships of power. While existing literature positions CLT projects as potentially able to play a role in contesting capitalist relations, a theoretical perspective which has an analysis of how everyday monetary systems are themselves products (and productive) of those relations has the capacity to provide a fuller perspective on what forces would limit a transformative project. Thus, a Marxist framework is particularly suited to addressing the gap in the literature due to its grounding in material relations and analysis of material relations as reflecting and embodying class power, both of which are relevant for studying the relationship between funding strategies, political context, and CLT potential.

Theorizing Land and Housing in Contemporary Capitalism

In the following section I will discuss some ways in which land and housing have been situated within contemporary capitalism, as tied to capitalist reproduction (a condition for that reproduction and mutually dependent with it), as manifesting class relationships within its spheres (generating distinct forms of ‘secondary’ exploitation and embodying hierarchies), and as being a site of active class contestation. Taken together, these show the justification for examining transformative interventions within these spheres, the fact that such an intervention

would occur within an environment governed by class relationships, and that this environment is also a zone of strategies of class contestation, both by ruling and working-class actors.

A Condition of Capitalist Reproduction

Land is a multifaceted condition of the systemic reproduction of capitalism. In one sense, shelter is essential to the biological reproduction and survival of the working-class (Aalbers and Christophers 2014). In addition to this, however, the specific arrangements which govern land and housing are essential to the reproduction of the relations of capitalism. Foundationally, the private enclosure of land (labelled 'primitive accumulation' by Marx) is what created the basis for capitalism, in the proliferation of labourers both private and proletarianized (Harvey 2006b; Marx 1990, 876; Federici 2014). Private property continues to fulfill this function throughout the world, severing the majority of people from the means of their subsistence, and forcing them to access goods by selling their labour-power for money (this condition is what defines the proletariat in Marxist theory). Harvey, Federici, Danewid among others also argue that this process is constantly renewed through new dispossessions and displacements (Harvey 2003; Federici 2014; Danewid 2020).

In addition to its foundational role, private ownership of land and housing continues to be critical to its maintenance and survival. It provides ideological legitimacy to private property, the fundamental basis of accumulation by the bourgeoisie (Harvey 2006b; Aalbers and Christophers 2014). It facilitates the co-ordination and spatial and temporal ordering of the economy in the interests of capital, and attempts to establish spatial and temporal 'fixes' to capitalist crises (Christophers 2016; Aalbers and Christophers 2014; Harvey 2006b; Soederberg 2014). Land markets are aspects of the general circulation of interest-bearing capital which plays a crucial role in co-ordination (Harvey 2006b). Furthermore, the displacement which has been vital to the

creation of the proletarian labour force as a whole also produces a ‘reserve army of labour’ (essentially a segment of the workforce surplus to the direct needs of production), which serves as a lever for further accumulation and as part of an ongoing process which continues to maintain workers as displaced, dispossessed, and exploitable (Soederberg 2020; Marx 1990, 782–84). This functions hand in hand with other forms of rentier exploitation, such as consumer credit.

Mutual Dependency With Wage-Labour

Even the particular forms of exploitation which arise from private land ownership are interlinked in a relationship of mutual dependency with wage-labour. To understand this, insights can be drawn from theorizations of credit and ‘fictitious capital’, one way of characterizing the debt relationships associated with the housing market (Harvey 2006b). The appropriation of a share of future value (the defining feature of ‘fictitious capital’) relies upon the successful production of sufficient value to pay the rentiers (Soederberg 2014, 36). Even forms of credit money which do not enter into the value-production process in the way that fictitious capital does themselves rely upon the ability of borrowers to obtain enough compensation to make interest payments (Soederberg 2014, 37–38). Workers need wages to pay their rent, or to pay their mortgages upon which abstract financial products are based (Christophers 2016). This reliance upon a functioning productive economy and the consistent realization of sufficient levels of value is intrinsic to the rentier character of these relationships, in which nothing is produced which can be realized in a market, and payment relies on value realization elsewhere. In Harvey’s words when discussing credit money, regardless of how abstract and mystified a transaction becomes through financial circulation it must eventually ‘return to its place of origin for redemption’ (Harvey 2006a, 246). It also leads to a degree of instability, as the growing rentier sectors, within which a great deal of capital is bound up, face severe disruption when the

productive economy is no longer able to proffer the value needed to fulfill its claims[iii].

Furthermore, in Soederberg's phrase, housing (particularly low-income rental housing) forms one third of an integrated 'commodity-triad of displacement' along with labour-power and credit, which underpins the reproduction of workers as displaced and 'surplus' (Soederberg 2020). Forms of discipline and regulation (including those overseen by states) impact working-class households in ways which reinforce their market dependency (Soederberg 2014; 2020). In order to continue fulfilling its role of maintaining this particular lever of accumulation and condition of capitalist reproduction, the housing and credit systems are tied to wage-labour in their reproduction of the surplus population.

Basis of Exploitation and Accumulation

In addition to enabling exploitation, land and housing also serve as spaces of exploitation in themselves. As an asset, land can enable rent extraction by landlords, who are able to appropriate a share of produced value by the right of their land ownership (Harvey 2006b; Soederberg 2020; Harvey 1989). The collection of this rent can occur from households, who pay from a share of the portion of value created received as wages, sometimes termed 'secondary' exploitation, since it is not occurring at the point of production, but a step removed from it (Soederberg 2020; Aalbers and Christophers 2014)), or from capitalists, who pay a share of value received as profits (Harvey 2006b). This can be extracted from residential or commercial tenants, but in either case the ownership of land allows one to lay claim to a share of the value produced.

Land also serves this function in another way. By serving as the foundation of various financial instruments, sometimes said to represent 'fictitious capital' in Marx's terminology or 'interest-bearing capital' as a title to future value (Christophers 2016; Harvey 2006b). While I will not review the distinction between them here, suffice it to say that each allows for land to be

‘set in motion’ as assets able to be exchanged and from which interest can be collected (Christophers 2016). Private land ownership enables investors to lay claim to future economic surplus in the form of their returns (Harvey 2006b).

At multiple scales and at multiple levels of abstraction ,the relations of capitalist land ownership enable their own forms of accumulation. The case studies I review in the following chapters will address these relations in the forms of unaffordable rental housing, speculative landowners, and investors associated with ‘revitalization’ projects, as the local manifestations of this form of capitalist accumulation which the CLT projects aim to re-shape.

Embedded in and Embodying Hierarchies

Relations of land ownership reflect and reinforce other hierarchies present within the capitalist system. Land appropriation and seizure are foundational to settler-colonialism, the process which lays at the foundation of capitalist economies like those in Canada and the United States (Bonds and Inwood 2016; Simpson and Bagelman 2018). It was land theft which established the oppression of Indigenous nations and the consolidation of settler states. Land relations, including land struggles, therefore reflect these wider systems (Safransky 2017). Land ownership, like that of many other resources, is a relationship of power, is itself foundational to power, and is more accessible to those who already hold power, both manifesting and reproducing social relations of capitalism (Aalbers and Christophers 2014). Housing and labour exploitation have been suggested as being entwined in a reciprocal relationship. Position in the housing market is influenced by labour market position and ownership of the means of production, while housing position (for instance precarity) itself influences and enables labour exploitation (Aalbers and Christophers 2014). Land ownership is one of the ways in which capitalist and colonial inequalities are perpetuated. Rather than standing as either a separate or

completely subordinate sphere to class relationships of wage-labour and other forms of oppression, the realm of housing relates symbiotically to other inequalities, and itself manifests them in a way which is both immanent and determinate (in that they are clearly perceivable within the housing and land sectors themselves, while influencing the other spheres of class relationships). These hierarchies are important to the case studies, in which racial marginalization and class-based disempowerment create the conditions against which working-class movements mobilize.

A Site of Strategic Contestation

Relations of land ownership are not static or simply subject to external influences, but are themselves sites of strategic contestation between actors. This includes strategies by large landowners and investors, by smaller landowners, and by workers and tenants. A useful example for elaborating this point is that of gentrification, which is one of the more noticeable and wide-reaching impacts of class struggles within the housing sector. As will be explained below, gentrification is a class-based strategy which displaces working class residents in the interests of speculative profit-making. land and housing markets are subject to ongoing disruptions in the form of gentrification. Gentrification is the particular form of displacement that many CLT projects have been founded to address, including CJ, BCLT/CHT and DSNI/DNI (North et al. 2020; Akuno 2017a; Torpy 2020; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020).

Neil Smith has theorized gentrification through the concept of a ‘rent gap’ between potential and actual ground rent. Smith argues that when the gap becomes wide enough that land can be purchased at a low enough price and exploited at a high enough one to justify the costs of investing in it, gentrification occurs (N. Smith 1979; 1987). This gap results in a given location based on complex histories of investment and disinvestment. While seeming at first to be an

explanation without much role accorded to actors and strategies, it in fact has many implications for such an analysis. Tom Slater draws out these implications, explaining how a process of protracted disinvestment and depreciation is driven actively by landlords through evictions, harassment, rent hikes, withdrawing services, and other tactics (Slater 2017, 119–20). Thus, rather than being an abstract structural explanation of the phenomenon, Smith's rent gap theory, as interpreted by Slater, is 'fundamentally about class struggle, about the structural violence visited upon so many working class people…'(Slater 2017, 132). In concrete terms, these dynamics of displacement through investment and ground rent increases are present in numerous 'redevelopment' projects, for example in Toronto neighborhoods such as Liberty Village and Regent Park (Catungal, Leslie, and Hii 2009; August 2008; 2014). This struggle does not only involve the actions of the landlords and investors, however. Within gentrification projects there is also the role of the gentrifier households themselves, claiming an outsized role in defining how the community is presented, control over public space, and efforts at surveillance and exclusion of working-class residents (August 2008; 2014; Kipfer and Petrunia 2009)**.** Existing in necessary opposition to these forces of gentrification are the resistance movements of workers and tenants which have emerged within gentrifying neighborhoods, combating their dispossession and the loss of their neighborhood. Slater writes that identifying rent gaps is important to formulating strategies to fight exploitation, and reveals the conflict within the realm of circulation between those facing housing precarity and those profiting from it (Slater 2017).

One other point to mention about contestation within the land and housing sectors, is that the state is often an active participant and facilitator of accumulation strategies. For instance, many 'revitalization' projects which have sought to gentrify disinvested neighborhoods have been spearheaded by local governments. This has been the case in multiple Toronto

neighborhoods, as well as in urban centres around the world from New York to London and Liverpool (Kipfer and Petrunia 2009; Catungal, Leslie, and Hii 2009; Bunce 2020; Angotti and Jagu 2007; Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2018; Thompson 2020b). Governments attempt to facilitate investment by promoting development regimes in the interest of accumulation.

Thus, housing and land markets are zones of contestation by a number of different class actors, and the struggles which arise from the relationships between these actors represent a fundamental fault line within the capitalist system. This shows that CLTs in entering into these sectors (including to combat gentrification) are entering into areas of class struggle, in which they both have the potential to be associated with liberatory working-class projects and face potential pressure from bourgeois structures.

Neoliberal Monetized Governance of Housing and Land

To knit together the features outlined above, I will draw on the analysis of Susanne Soederberg and others to situate land and housing markets within contemporary neoliberal capitalism. Neoliberalism taken broadly represents the dominant governing logic of the current era of capitalism (since roughly the 1980s in the West) which is associated with a high degree of commitment to market deregulation, its replacement with competitive forms of regulation, and individualized, depoliticized, and anti-collectivist forms of governance, among other things (Peck and Tickell 2002). Soederberg argues that low-income rental housing plays an important role in the neoliberal order by contributing to the reproduction of ‘surplus workers’ as such (Marx’s ‘reserve army of labour’). It, along with forms of monetized discipline and labour exploitation maintain poor and under/unemployed workers in a state of ‘displaced survival’, in which they are held in a state of precarity by being driven to secure their own reproduction through systems which continuously displace them (through over-indebtedness, evictions, and

eventually, homelessness) (Soederberg 2020; 2014). This occurs within a larger apparatus of neoliberal 'credit-led accumulation', in which credit money's extension to the working-class has been used to counteract structural problems of over-accumulation (Harvey 1989), while forms of 'monetized governance' have been deployed to depoliticize class power and exploitation.

Within the processes of neoliberalism, the state at multiple scales continues to play a critical role. A lens appreciating the multi-scalar character of capitalism (capitalism as regulated at ordered levels from the local to the national) views the local as integrated into the dynamics of global capitalism, as opposed to analyzing neighborhoods in isolation (Bieler 2018; J. W. Moore 2015; Arrighi 2010; Soederberg 2020). This opens the door to connecting the specificities of each case to the general critique of capitalist political economy, and highlights that the processes described in this theoretical perspective occur differently at different scales and localities. Within the systemic dynamics of capitalism, then, its particular manifestations are not uniform, but are shaped by local patterns of development.

Peck and Tickell provide a general theorization of the state's role in neoliberalism, identifying both destructive and creative aspects of state neoliberalism (characterized as 'roll-back' and 'roll-out' respectively) (Peck and Tickell 2002). The latter of these is characterized by more proactive forms of state intervention to preserve the conditions of private accumulation, although there is regional variation in the actual implementation of these policies. Soederberg, drawing on and synthesizing the work of Harvey, Clarke, Jessop, Brenner and Hirsch, writes that class power is inherent to bourgeois state formations, despite local differences, as each derives their content from the capitalist relations of production (Soederberg 2020, 51–52). The role assumed by states within this system is to negotiate the tensions between immediate accumulation and the long-term conditions of accumulation in order to preserve the latter.

Soederberg connects this to credit-led accumulation and housing, showing how specific strategies are 'rolled out' in these sectors to regulate the contradictions of capitalism, in particular as it reproduces 'surplus' workers (Soederberg 2014; 2020). In order to fulfill this function, capitalist states utilize the distribution of social surplus and deploy other strategies of marketized governance and discipline. In my analysis, I will look specifically at certain aspects of this, including the control over social surplus, marketized depoliticization, and displacement through debt, and assess the cases based on their ability to act against these systems.

Debt and exploitative housing practices reproduce working-class households in a state of displaced survival, with precarity ensuring that they remain part of the 'reserve army of labour' and thus facilitate ongoing and further accumulation (Soederberg 2020; 2014). Simultaneously, cyclical displacement through strategies like gentrification (described above) serve to further dislocate working-class households in the interest of accumulation, and can thus be said to be part of the same system which reproduces them as displaced. Profits are extracted in the process (by accumulation by dispossession or other forms of secondary exploitation) (Harvey 2003; Soederberg 2020).

Forms of marketized governance depoliticize these relationships and thus obscure the class dynamics inherent within. Drawing on Marx, Soederberg shows debt relations (including those associated with housing) as articulated in the realm of exchange, but as composed of power relationships that are obscured by the formal equality of this realm (Soederberg 2014). Strategies of marketized governance and management are attempts by the state to further centre the realm of exchange in mediating these relationships, creating a fetishized equality that serves ultimately to depoliticize what is at root a political relationship and to assert the social power of money, which simultaneously embodies and obscures class relationships.

Control over social surplus is an important over-arching condition which allows the capitalist state to facilitate accumulation and implement specific strategies to regulate the market (Soederberg 2020). Within the housing and land markets of neoliberal capitalism, public money has often been used to discipline and maintain the displaced conditions of the working class, and to keep class relationships in these sectors depoliticized through the realm of exchange. The allocation of social surplus is a key privilege of the state, which is crucial to the fulfilment of its role of reproducing the capitalist system (Soederberg 2020). The state has tied its allocation of this surplus in the neoliberal era to maintaining the social power of capital. Whether by transforming the terms upon which this surplus is allocated, or by maintaining independence from it, transformative projects must break from this system.

Theorizing CLT's in Capitalist Political Economy

I will turn now to a specific discussion of Community Land Trusts within the political-economic framework detailed above. It is worth reviewing in depth the work associated with one particular project, which has theorized its practice by drawing on Marxist and revolutionary New Afrikan traditions[iv]. In the following section, I will review the case of Co-operation Jackson (CJ), briefly describing the theory and experience associated with it. The work in Jackson is useful to orient this discussion because it represents a theorization of CLTs as components of transformative projects within a political-economic framework compatible with that described earlier in this chapter. In attempting to incorporate CLTs and co-operatives into a more general framework and tradition of revolutionary change, CJ provides a thesis about the potential of these projects. It connects the analysis of land and housing markets outlined previously in this chapter to the literature putting forward CLT projects as transformative, and allows one to study this transformative potential according to the conditions analyzed in the first and second sections

in this chapter (housing and land as symbiotic with wage-labour exploitation and capitalist accumulation, as sites of class contradiction and class struggle, and as involving certain strategies of governance and discipline associated with displaced survival, marketized governance, and allocation of the social surplus). In addition to the discussion of CJ, I will very briefly review Matthew Thompson's work on CLTs in Liverpool. Thomson provides an alternate view to that of CJ, which despite this also shows the importance of studying a project's capacity to address the three aspects of neoliberal governance identified above.

Co-operation Jackson was started by members of the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement (MXGM) and New Afrikan People's Organization (NAPO). It is part of a longer-term program of institutional development, which is laid out in detail in the "Jackson-Kush Plan" (Akuno 2017a). The Plan aims at the liberation of the New Afrikan nation currently under the colonial control of the United States government, and at transitioning to an eco-socialist mode of production. In order to do this, it calls for the construction of a participatory grassroots movement involving co-operative development, political organizing, and neighborhood-based planning (Akuno 2017c). The Jackson-Kush Plan and Co-operation Jackson emerge from a tradition of radical Black struggle and the specific political history of the New Afrikan movement. As such, the role of CLTs and co-operative structures within the broader organizing effort are situated within a project of national liberation and working-class struggle. They are intended not just to preserve affordability or make efficient use of public funds, but are also meant to serve political ends of base-building and challenging the power of capital.

The goals of Co-operation Jackson are oriented around this long term liberatory project. The Fannie Lou Hamer CLT is one of the many tools which the organization is using toward these ends. It is intended to maintain both affordable housing and community agriculture on CLT

land, and to serve as a form of collective land ownership helping to provide the material basis for Co-operation Jackson's revolutionary struggle for community ownership (Cooperation Jackson 2017; Rameau 2017). Land is conceptualized as a core object of struggle, and it's control by the New Afrikan nation and working-class as essential to self-determination. By linking the CLT to a surrounding network of co-operatives, participatory "people's assemblies", and militant organizing in workplaces and in neighborhoods, it is meant to serve as one of multiple institutional vehicles by which capitalist material relations can be challenged, supplanted, and overthrown (Akuno 2017a; Rameau 2017; Akuno 2017b).

The Jackson-Kush plan, Jackson Rising, and the wider body of documents associated with Co-operation Jackson represent a comprehensive attempt to theorize the role of co-operative projects in revolutionary movement-building. This includes the role of CLTs within the wider institutional ecosystem. The approach is operating within a theoretical terrain inspired by a rich tradition of radical theory and practice (including Marxism, revolutionary Black nationalism, and anarchism). This is evident in the framing of the project's program as being a movement against capitalist and colonial exploitation, the clear focus on contesting control of the means of production, building the productive forces, democratically transforming the economy, and fighting the conditions which regulate and reproduce a Black 'surplus population' (termed 'Black disposability' and citing Neil Smith directly) (Akuno 2017a, 4–9). Its theoretical perspective thus harmonizes with that outlined above, sharing historical materialism's analysis of exploitation, centering of struggle over control of the means of production and the influence of the development of those means of production over social relations, and the analysis of displacement and surplus populations. Due to this theoretical alignment, CJ's hypothesis about CLTs as helping to anchor projects connects them to the analysis outlined above, suggesting a

role for such projects within Marxist political economy as tools of class struggle. More detailed conclusions regarding CJ itself will have to wait until the project, still in its early stages, has had more time to develop, but this is useful as a theorization.

CJ participants such as Kali Akuno have offered some critical insights which further clarify the research agenda. A component of the Jackson-Kush Plan and the organizing work of Co-operation Jackson has been an engagement with municipal politics, including successfully running Chokwe Lumumba (a prominent member of the New Afrikan Movement) for city councilor and then mayor, and running his son, Chokwe Antar Lumumba, for mayor after the former's sudden death while in office, as well as getting involved in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party (Akuno 2017a; 2017d; Hall 2018). Thus, CJ has enjoyed a close relationship with the city government and with other mainstream political structures. This is, however, a deeply contradictory process which has resulted in serious divisions within the coalition which has overseen the project. Questions of the project's autonomy relative to the state and Democrats, and its feeling that its ability to pursue national and class struggle was being curtailed led to a split in which CJ members decided to disaffiliate from the Lumumba administration, and the MXGM and NAPO (both of which were involved with the government and Democratic structures) (Hall 2018; Akuno 2017d; blackagendareport 2017). Akuno, Hall, and others felt that electoral politics was coming to occupy too much emphasis within the project, and the electoral side of the organizing was coming to take on more and more influence over the organizing and grassroots economic development. The maintenance of independence from structures of the state and capital are held to be vital (Hall 2018; Akuno 2017d).

Thus, the case of CJ highlights a hypothesized potential for these projects to serve transformative anti-capitalist and anti-colonial ends, but also highlights the importance of

institutional autonomy in determining their ability to fulfill this potential. Similar questions are raised by Matthew Thompson in his study of the Granby Four Corners and Homebaked CLTs in Liverpool. Thompson presents a similar but distinct theorization of CLTs and transformative politics, suggesting that the difficulties of disentangling CLTs and co-operatives from the state should be accepted as an inevitability, and that a theory of change that includes them should view state funding and structures as compatible with the creation of common ownership and grassroots power (Thompson 2020a; 2020b). Both of these theorizations share commonalities that justify my approach to the research. For one, both have deliberately positioned their projects against displacement and rendering of populations as surplus. They have also both sought to politicize and empower, shifting the regulation of housing from the realm of market exchange to that of planning (whether CJ's Assemblies or Thompson's 'bureaucracy from below'). Finally, each has justified the transformative potential of the project in part due to their ability to create their own surplus which, even if not necessarily completely separated from the state, is at least controlled by the CLT project(s) involved and not subject to the state's discretion.

Methods

In order to contest relationships of class and national exploitation and oppression, a project must be able to contend with the methods of control that characterize the state and capital's engagement in land and housing. CLT-anchored projects have been suggested as having the potential to do so. By studying two concrete cases of CLT projects which have reached significant scale and success, I hope to contribute to this literature by analyzing how these projects have interacted with these strategies of neoliberal reproduction, particularly through their organizational relationships.

In studying both cases, I will make use of qualitative methods informed by my theoretical

perspective. For each of the two cases, I will examine information including: peer-reviewed research which cites direct interviews with individuals involved with each project, the published reflections of participants in other forms (such as books, magazine articles, or working papers), and some documents directly from the organizations themselves (such as annual reports and tax filings). The purpose of this examination is to be able to trace a narrative of how each project was founded and how it developed over time, to identify some of its most important sources of revenue, to characterize the organizational relationships with the state and capital which developed alongside these funding sources, and to then examine those in light of displaced survival, marketized governance, and the state's allocation of social surplus to characterize the project's relationship to neoliberal governance. These methods are drawn from the historical materialist method outlined above, which provides a basis for viewing CLT projects as potential vehicles of working-class empowerment and situates CLTs within a political-economic critique, which reveals land and housing markets as spaces integrated with the wider relationships of capitalism and defines some of the specific manifestations of neoliberalism within the financial structures associated with land and housing.

Empirically, I examine the following: whether affordable housing has been provided and exploitative credit relationships avoided (as these relate to secondary exploitation and displaced survival); whether there has been politicization of the allocation of resources through planning (addressing the depoliticization present in exchange relationships), and the share of project spending reliant on public subsidy and its control over the allocation of that subsidy. Each of these is worth studying because of each of these three aspects of neoliberal governance is reproduced by material financial relationships which surround land and housing. Displaced survival is reproduced by forms of consumer credit and rents, marketized governance by the

mediation of housing relations through market mechanisms, and the state's role by its allocation of social surplus in the form of public subsidy.

Thus, my argument will proceed in the analysis chapters in the following steps. First, an overview of each case. Second, a specific examination of the funding strategies which each CLT has pursued. Third, an examination of the institutional relationships to the state and capital which follow directly from these funding strategies. Specifically looking at the ability of the CLT project to break from the apparatus of displaced survival (including indebtedness, unaffordable and precarious housing, and displacements associated with class strategies like gentrification), create an alternative to depoliticized marketized governance (including administration of services through mechanisms of exchange and private credit which obscure their class relationships), and to obtain independence from the state's allocation of social surplus (a degree of financial self-sufficiency allowing the project to not be reliant on the state for its continued operation). In the conclusion chapter at the end of this thesis, I briefly examine the implications of the case studies for the theorized potential of CLT projects to engage in transformative interventions within the neoliberal housing and land markets. I focus here on the relationship of each project to the strategies pursued by dominant class actors acting through the machinery of the state and private market. I examine the ruling-class strategies which such a working-class politics would have to face, and how the CLT's relationship to those ruling-class strategies shapes the space in which working-class politics would operate.

The specific cases being analyzed are those of the Burlington CLT / Champlain Housing Trust (referred to as BCLT, CHT, or BCLT/CHT hereafter) in Vermont and the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and its subsidiary CLT Dudley Neighbors Inc (DSNI for the former, DNI for the latter, and DSNI/DNI to refer to both collectively) in Massachusetts. I have selected

these because they share many characteristics but are distinct in ways that inform the research topic. Both organizations were founded in the 1980s, at the beginning of the United States' embrace of neoliberal policies. They have both since grown in scale and can be considered successful projects with significant amounts of accumulated experience. The organizational structures of the two projects are distinct in ways that reflect their respective history (BCLT/CHT attempts to represent local government on its board, for instance, and DNI is subordinate to DSNI, which focuses on diverse community representation). The similarities help to establish a common context, against which the different relationships to the state can be analyzed. Additionally, the similar age of both and the relative scale and success each has achieved makes them useful for understanding the implications of successful funding strategies within capitalist land and housing markets. I will not necessarily be comparing these two cases, as differences in available secondary information might make it difficult to properly isolate variables to contrast, but will review the lessons of each for my research question and discuss general conclusions drawn from the analysis of both. I have selected two cases in the United States since the literature on its CLT movement is well-developed, but would benefit greatly from the perspective I have outlined previously (connecting the existing literature to a more systematic political-economic analysis).

Conclusion

Having described the framework I will be making use of, including the focus on class and capitalism as characterizing land and housing markets, identifying three characteristics of neoliberal governance, and situating CLTs within this terrain of class struggle, I will now apply it to my first case study, that of the BCLT/CHT in Burlington.

Chapter Four: Burlington Case Study

Introduction

This chapter will study the history of the Champlain Housing Trust (CHT), originally known before 2006 as the Burlington Community Land Trust (BCLT), tracing the evolution of the CLT, its initiatives, and its relationship with other actors in the community. I apply a historical materialist theoretical framework (developed in the previous chapter) to analyze how its emergence and funding strategies condition its relationship to the state and capital.

I have organized this chapter into three sections. In the first, I will utilize a historical materialist review the history of the CLT project, describing the context of the federal Reagan administration and dawning of the neoliberal era, the mayoral administration of Bernie Sanders, the foundation of the BCLT, the support given to the BCLT, its work, and its relationship to other institutions. I will describe its 2006 transformation into the CHT and trace the continuity and further development and expansion of the CHT's work to the present day. In the second section, I will describe the funding strategies pursued by the BCLT/CHT, focusing on how it has accessed state resources at various scales, how it has formed partnerships with financial institutions and developers, how it has made use of its own project revenues, and its use of donations.

In the third, I return to the central issue of situating CLTs in class struggle. I argue that the history of the BCLT/CHT shows that it has pursued funding strategies which have relied on various kinds of support from municipal and state-level governments and access to federal government resources, and that this reliance initially depended on and continues to necessitate a close alignment with both the state and capital. The CLT project was created with and received

the ongoing support of the public sector, principally at the municipal and state-level scales, and these links have remained essential to the organization's success. BCLT/CHT has had genuine success in alleviating the conditions of displaced survival and gentrification, creating affordable housing, other community services, and a stewardship framework to maintain them in the long-term. When considering marketization, it is unclear that the BCLT/CHT has made as much progress, as it remains both closely tied to the wider housing market, operating principally through the realm of exchange, and engaged in co-operative relationships with local capital, despite also showing the potential to restrict the market and engage in some democratic decision-making. The engagement of BCLT/CHT with the state's allocation of social surplus has resulted in the CLT project attaining some degree of self-sufficiency in its own revenue, since its scale has allowed it to cover the bulk of its regular operating costs, but it remains reliant on the state's support for new projects and significant acquisitions. Furthermore, its particular development and the level of investment by governments has resulted in CHT's organizational structure not only granting a significant share of internal power to representatives of local government, but also its close relationship to the state in its work on projects. Thus, I argue that BCLT/CHT has not itself proven able to obtain control over a share of the social surplus, due to its continued reliance on the allocation from the state. Combined, these factors show that BCLT/CHT, while improving the lives of its residents and undermining one aspect of capitalist reproduction, is limited in its capacity to challenge the power of capital.

Overview of the BCLT and CHT

Election of Ronald Reagan and Neoliberal Turn

At the beginning of the 1980s (in fact, the very same year in which the Progressives[v] came to power in Burlington), Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States (Davis

1994; Torpy 2020). Reagan took the Presidency with a mandate to significantly roll back the role of the government in regulation and service provision, and to open the doors for expansion of the private market. These two aspects of rolling back the state's involvement in social welfare and rolling out forms of market-oriented discipline and regulation are both part of the neoliberalizing process (Peck and Tickell 2002). This approach extended to the housing sector. The 1980s saw the federal government abandon much of its affordable housing funding, reducing 75% of its program funding by the end of the decade and reducing the number of new federally subsidized rental units from 200,000 to 25,000, which was especially pronounced due to the expiration of many affordable housing provisions (Davis 2010c; Soifer 1990). The policy of government retreat put municipalities in a difficult position, forcing them to adapt to a much more restricted funding environment (Davis 1994).

Housing Crisis and Displacement

At the same time, however, the housing market in Vermont was becoming less affordable. The 1980s saw the rapid rise of housing prices while the vast majority of people saw stagnating incomes, with early years of the decade saw an increase in housing prices and rents about twice that of incomes, with double-digit mortgage rates (Davis 1994, 2; Torpy 2020). This was associated with a rise in speculative pressures, including an increase in migration and in the student population (Davis 1994, 2). Displacement increasingly became a feature of Vermont's housing landscape. As City Hall often favoured commercial and for-profit housing development they allowed working-class neighborhoods to be ravaged (Torpy 2020; Davis 1994). As low-cost housing was lost and replaced by more expensive market -rate housing, tenants found themselves without much recourse due to the lack of government regulation and scarcity of low-cost housing (Torpy 2020; Davis 1994). The 1970s saw a significant tenants movement which

repeatedly called for more protections (Davis 1994, 6).

Bernie Sanders and CEDO

The immediate story of the BCLT begins with the election of Bernie Sanders as mayor of Burlington in 1981. Sanders ran a left-wing independent campaign, challenging a five-term incumbent Democratic mayor, and managed to win narrowly by only ten votes (Davis 1994, 1–3). Sanders' political project was meant to represent an opening of city government to greater popular participation and Sanders, a declared socialist, had a mandate to implement a progressive social program (Torpy 2020; Soifer 1990). The new mayor initially faced a hostile city council, and it was not until after winning his first re-election campaign in 1983 that Sanders had a consolidated political base and had gotten enough fellow Progressives elected to council to begin seriously implementing his project (Davis 1994, 6).

Many members of the local tenant's movement supported Sanders' campaign, and his administration remained closely tied to them (Davis 1994). As such, tenant protections and housing market regulations were an immediate priority for the mayor's office. Many of the attempts at stronger government interventions were defeated by the city council, the Vermont legislature, or by popular referenda (Davis 1994, 6). Although these initiatives failed, there was also a strong commitment from Sanders' office to dedicate a large share of its public funds to housing, including allocating half of its annual federal Community Development Block Grants to spend on affordable housing (Davis 1994, 14). The new government succeeding in making some positive changes, including the revitalization of the Burlington Housing Authority (BHA) (Davis 1994, 21; 1994, 7). Sanders began therefore with a political coalition associated with working-class political objectives, but a municipal structure and constituency unwilling to implement many of them.

One of the major institutional developments of the Sanders years (1981-1989) was the creation of the Community and Economic Development Office (CEDO) in 1983 (Torpy 2020). Early in his tenure, Sanders succeeded in convincing the city council to support the creation of CEDO as a new municipal agency tasked with overseeing local development, obtaining and distributing federal funds, preserving affordable housing and protecting the vulnerable, and searching for affordable housing alternatives able to survive in the new neoliberal funding and economic environment of federal government withdrawing social surplus from the housing sector (Soifer 1990, 241; Davis 1994, 4). From the outset, CEDO displayed an interest in innovate projects and experiments with co-operative ownership and decommodification (meaning attempts to detach land values from purely speculative and exchange-based pressures) (Soifer 1990, 241; Davis 1994, 5). Sanders was able to utilize CEDO to overcome the opposition within the city government by assigning it (an organization directly accountable to the mayor) responsibility to allocate federal CDBG funds (Davis 1994). CEDO thus became an activist institution able to serve a political role as part of the municipal Progressive movement (Davis 1994, 25). It would be CEDO that spearheaded the creation of BCLT.

CEDO's creation was part of a general strategy by the Progressives of creating an institutional apparatus alongside established government channels to manage affordable housing. CEDO's own staff argued in favour of this in part to protect the new housing projects against changes in administration (Davis 1994, 11; Torpy 2020). Initiatives which might have begun with the government had their administration shifted to a growing non-profit infrastructure which, although working closely with the city, maintained its formal independence (Torpy 2020). There was a desire to build a constituency to support affordable housing in local politics and to independently mobilize for it (Torpy 2020). Additionally, there was an economic

motivation, as private non-profits are eligible for sources of project funding that governments are not, and organizations with a 501(c)(3) designation are exempt from federal income tax (Torpy 2020). The BCLT would be key part of this new infrastructure.

Foundation of BCLT

After CEDO's founding, it sent some employees to a national CLT meeting organized by the Institute for Community Economics (ICE), an influential organization focused on propagating the CLT model (Torpy 2020). Soon after, an adviser on ICE's staff, John Emmeus Davis (cited throughout this thesis), came to Burlington to help found a CLT. Due to federal funding cuts and the simultaneous housing crisis, a smaller pool of resources had to address a more severe need while also avoiding further stimulation of an overheated market (Davis 1994, 9–11). Furthermore, the political opposition to government regulation and failure of the Sanders administration's early moves in this direction meant that there was little room for direct restriction of the market (Davis 1994, 9–10). For both political and fiscal reasons, these were problems that a CLT model seemed uniquely suited to addressing. For one, the expansion of homeownership for which the CLT model is suited proved very popular, and it was difficult for the establishment to oppose a policy so in line with supposed American ideals of homeownership and private property rights (Torpy 2020; Davis 1994, 10). Additionally, the CLT model's particular success at ensuring that the benefits of public subsidies are retained in the long term aligned well with the scarcity of federal resources and need to make each dollar count, while long-term stewardship was thought to be better served by a specialized and independent staff (Torpy 2020). Thus, the principles of 'third sector' housing (run by non-profits rather than the state or market actors) and 'permanent affordability' (utilizing resale controls to maintain the low costs of housing, rather than subsidizing market-rate purchases) came to influence more of

CEDO's approach (Davis 1994; Soifer 1990). These seemed to fit the particular conditions faced by the Progressive government in Burlington.

In 1983, 50 community members representing many different groups from tenants to bankers to members of religious communities met for the BCLT's first meeting (Soifer 1990, 241). The Old North End was initially chosen as the BCLT's main (but not exclusive) priority area (Torpy 2020). It had been facing decline since the 1950s, when the area's textile mills had closed, and was impoverished and blighted by the 1980s (Gauger 2006, 13). The creation of the CLT was possible because of the support it received not only from the labour of CEDO staff and other volunteers, but also by the support of the city government in raising funds. In 1983, city council decided to appropriate $200,000 out of the city's recently discovered $1.9 million budget surplus in order to fund the BCLT (Davis 1994, 12; Soifer 1990, 241–42). In 1987, the BCLT received $150,000 from the city's available CDBG money, and also received a $1 million line of credit from the Burlington Employees Retirement System (BERS) when the government instructed city funds to divest from South Africa and reinvest locally (Soifer 1990, 242). BERS would approve another $1 million investment in the BCLT in 1992 (Davis 1994, 16). In 1988, it also received a $3 million line of credit over a three year period (Soifer 1990, 247). With these and other investments, the BCLT was able to acquire properties, which it could then leverage to draw on additional resources (Soifer 1990; Davis 1994; Torpy 2020). In 1989, voters would approve a property tax increase of one cent on every one hundred dollars of valuation in order to capitalize the Burlington Housing Trust Fund (BHTF), which was meant to provide further support for perpetual affordability (Davis 1994, 17). The city therefore tapped into the social surplus from different revenue streams to support the project. Throughout this period, support by CEDO remained strong, with the bulk of its housing development money going into BCLT or

other organizations in the new extra-governmental non-profit apparatus (Davis 1994, 11). The BCLT would receive ongoing regular funding through federal funds (such as CDBGs) that were distributed by the municipality, and the local funds managed by the BHTF (Torpy 2020).

The BCLT's governance was shaped by its membership structure, with the most important decisions, particularly those regarding overall organizational direction, made at annual meetings open to the whole membership (Soifer 1990, 245–46). This membership also elected a 13-person board of trustees who were drawn from leaseholders, CLT members, community leaders, businesspeople, and others (Soifer 1990, 246).

The goals of the BCLT were to create a stock of 'permanently affordable' housing, to revitalize blighted communities in ways that did not displace working-class residents, and to expand access to homeownership. In other words, to address the conditions of displaced survival outlined in my second chapter. Permanently affordable housing can best be understood in this case as housing accessible to those whose income is below the Area Median Income (AMI), and which includes certain provisions that maintain its accessibility even after multiple resales and many years (Davis 2010c). This concept gained currency within CEDO and was successfully integrated into affordable housing funding strategies at the state and municipal levels (Palmer 2019, 19; Davis 1994; Torpy 2020; Libby 1990; Gauger 2006, 15). This also represents the attempt to remove units of housing from speculative pressures by suppressing their exchange value (Soifer 1990, 242). The BCLT was founded to deal with the problems of gentrification and displacement, as well as a lack of affordability, and as such preventing displacement while encouraging community re-vitalization became a priority of the organization (Torpy 2020). Staff involved with the BCLT have also expressed its goal of expanding homeownership and serving to help low and moderate-income households enter homeownership, which is viewed in this case

as a right (Gauger 2006, 13; Soifer 1990, 242).

It pursued these goals mainly through the mechanisms of its ground lease agreements, ongoing educational programs among residents and community members, oversight of affordable rental and co-operative housing, and investment in non-residential activities. The BCLT specifically provided perpetually renewable leases for properties occupied by lessees and used as their principal residence (Bourassa 2007, 341). The contracts limited the amount that a CLT homeowner could pocket in appreciation upon sale, and included provisions against speculation and allowing the CLT to intervene to prevent foreclosures, restricting residents to a modest but reliable profit and enabling the CLT to re-acquire and re-sell the property for an affordable below-market price (Torpy 2020). To accomplish this, it retained the option to purchase any properties being resold and would assume responsibility for finding a new buyer and arranging the resale (Jacobus and Davis 2010, 20; Gauger 2006, 15), a process which allowed the BCLT to maintain affordability and ensure that available properties were allocated to residents below the target percentage of the AMI (Soifer 1990, 243). The involvement of the BCLT in resales also allowed it to ensure that new homeowners participated in the CLT's education programs and were able to access any government subsidies for which they might be eligible (Torpy 2020). The education programs were essential to the BCLT's operations, allowing the organization to educate new homeowners on the mortgage process and other aspects of ownership (Gauger 2006, 15), and is credited as being responsible for the CLT's comparative low rate of foreclosures (Gauger 2006, 16; Lowe and Thaden 2016, 21).

In addition to the single-family residences organized as more-or-less private homes on CLT land, the BCLT also found itself taking possession of rental housing in larger multi-unit buildings. While its initial intention was to convert this housing into Limited Equity Co-ops

(LECs) on CLT land, it quickly became clear that this was not a viable option in most cases (Torpy 2020). As such, the BCLT often assumed the role of affordable housing landlord (or partner to affordable housing landlords, depending on the specific property). In terms of tenure, its rental units operated similarly to market rental housing, except for the fact that the land and/or housing units were owned by an organization governed through member-democracy, and providing generally better service according to tenants (Soifer 1990). Since residents were also able to participate as members, this created a form of democratic control. The BCLT took an interest in developing commercial and community properties as well, focusing on supporting businesses within targeted areas to stimulate the local economy, and building up community spaces (Gauger 2006, 13).

As mentioned previously, the geographical focus of the early BCLT projects was Burlington's Old North End, a working-class neighborhood subjected to displacement through neglect and the threat of gentrifications (fluctuations along the lines of those described by Smith and Slater). Within this neighborhood, it did not just engage in affordable housing preservation and development, but also acquired and developed commercial properties to support a more comprehensive revitalization program (Gauger 2006, 13–14; Torpy 2020). Its initial investments were risky and barely yielded enough to cover the costs of financing and managing the properties, but the CLT was well-served by its long-term vision of revitalization (Gauger 2006, 14). Its involvement in this neighborhood would eventually lead to a dense concentration of CLT housing, alongside its commercial properties and community spaces (such as a community centre and legal aid office) (Champlain Housing Trust 2019). This focus was not exclusive, however, and from its early history the BCLT worked to expand its holdings into other, more expensive areas of the city (Gauger 2006, 13).

BCLT Until 2006

The BCLT, despite its formal independence from the government, was closely integrated with the municipal Progressive movement. There was significant overlap in personnel between progressive activism, the BCLT, and the Sanders administration. This network came to form the Progressive Party, which would dominate Burlington's municipal politics for the following decades (Torpy 2020). Bernie Sanders left office in 1989, but his political project was continued by Peter Clavelle. Clavelle, a Progressive and the former director of CEDO, won the race to succeed Sanders as mayor (Davis 1994, 1). Over the tenure of both Sanders and Clavelle, lasting over a decade, the new imperative of permanent affordability was entrenched in the structures of local government (Davis 1994, 12). At the time Sanders left office, the BCLT had a total of 85 housing units on 37 parcels of land, and by the end of 1992, nearly 800 units had been either created or made perpetually affordable across CEDO's various partnerships (Soifer 1990, 243; Davis 1994, 9).

The Progressives did not go unchallenged, however. Clavelle was defeated in 1993 by Peter Brownell. Brownell took over the mayoralty with a plan to further reduce to role of city government and adopt a more conservative approach (Davis 1994, 30). When the new mayor attempted to redirect community development funding away from affordable housing, members and others associated with the BCLT and the non-profit infrastructure led a local movement to resist the actions of his office (Torpy 2020). They wound up successful, with council voting against Brownell's proposal and the mayor himself serving only a single term before being defeated by a Progressive candidate in the next election (Torpy 2020). Thus, the new focus on permanent affordability and the new infrastructure proved themselves durable enough to last.

In the era after Sanders left office, the BCLT continued to expand both its geographic

service area and its scope of work. It had first expanded in 1987 to the rest of Chittenden County, then by 2001 covered the three North-West counties of Vermont (Torpy 2020). Other town governments in the area requested the CLT's help in operating and rehabilitating rental and owner-occupied housing (Torpy 2020). It also increasingly developed non-residential properties to fulfill its goals around broader-based community development (Crabtree et al. 2012; Soifer 1990; Torpy 2020). During this period, it also continued to benefit from its strong relationship with the city of Burlington and the state of Vermont (Gauger 2006, 12).

Merger with LCHDC and Formation of CHT

In 2005, staff from the BCLT met with their counterparts from the LCHDC (also founded in 1984) to discussing merging the two organizations. Despite the successes that had been achieved, the cumulative impact of decades of US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and other social welfare funding cuts made it difficult even for Burlington's strong non-profit housing sector to achieve any long-term security (Torpy 2020). In such an environment, it made more sense to combine and coordinate resources rather than competing for scarce sources of social surplus (Torpy 2020). In 2006, the two organizations were formally combined and the Champlain Housing Trust was founded (K. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010, 1). At this point, the BCLT had about 755 housing units, including 375 rental units and 380 single-family homes (Bourassa 2007, 342). LCHDC had about 1,200 rental apartments (Torpy 2020). Since its programs, funding sources, and membership base were broader and more diverse, the BCLT's organizational structure survived and retained continuity despite the change, although the new board structure was amended to reflect the LCHDC's strong connections to municipal governments (Torpy 2020).

The CHT After 2006

Vermont did not experience a real estate price crash in 2008, but found itself badly impacted by the effects of the general economic crisis, including facing a rise in homelessness that went far beyond what the public infrastructure could manage (Torpy 2020). In this and subsequent crises, such as a 2011 tropical storm, the CHT has seen its role grow as its assistance was sought by governments facing problems beyond their capacity to address (Torpy 2020; Champlain Housing Trust 2019). Throughout these crises and in the years after the merger, CHT has taken a leadership position within the community on providing services to un-housed people, providing other community services such as child and senior care and legal aid, and has continued to grow and expand its housing portfolio (K. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010; Champlain Housing Trust 2019; Torpy 2020). Its partnerships with municipalities have only grown closer, not only at the board and staff levels, but at the grassroots level as well (for instance, Burlington's parks and recreation department is a tenant which uses CHT space for its programming) (Torpy 2020). As of 2021, the CHT's holdings include 642 permanently affordable homes, 2,489 permanently affordable apartments, with 1,054 enrolled in the CHT's education and counseling programs. (Champlain Housing Trust 2021, 13–14). It's total assets are valued at $196,200,705 and its total liabilities at $100,943,281 (Champlain Housing Trust 2021, 17–18).

The BCLT and the CHT have succeeded at creating, maintaining, and stewarding affordable housing. Furthermore, this has been done in a novel way which encourages community engagement. It has reduced displacement in its local housing market and expanded access to homeownership (K. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010; Torpy 2020; Crabtree et al. 2012). It has in the process been forced to compromise on many of the demands of its initial

working-class orientation, and to step back from some of its ambitious efforts around co-operatives (Soifer 1990; Davis 1994). Its programs' most notable successes have been in stabilizing the local low-end of the housing market, for instance in helping households build wealth, enter homeownership, and creating a solid base of affordable housing (K. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010; Jacobus and Davis 2010).

Funding Strategies Pursued by BCLT/CHT

The funding strategies of the BCLT/CHT can be divided into a few broad areas. Accessing public (municipal, state, and federal) resources (or in other words, shares of social surplus allocated at different scales), forging partnerships with local representatives of private capital, and building up independent revenue streams through the CLT's own project and by soliciting donations. I review each of these in turn, and summarize them, arguing that the BCLT/CHT's access to resources from various levels of government and its partnerships with capital have remained essential.

Social Surplus: Accessing Municipal Resources

Even from the time preceding its founding, strategies for acquiring municipal resources have played a decisive role in funding the BCLT/CHT. A good deal of the preparation and the early co-ordination labour was done by CEDO staff, which can be seen as a form of material support. The initial $200,000 which allowed the BCLT to purchase its first properties was a grant drawn from the city government's budget surplus (Soifer 1990; Davis 1994). The BHTF was similarly first capitalized through the levy of a property tax by the municipal government, and would go on to co-ordinate local funds to support organizations like the BCLT/CHT (Torpy 2020). Beyond these initial subsidies, these material partnerships have remained significant through the history of the project (Crabtree et al. 2012; Torpy 2020).

Social Surplus: Accessing State-Level Resources

Resources from the state of Vermont were also important to the history of the BCLT/CHT. CEDO was instrumental in spurring the creation of the Vermont Housing and Conservation Board (VHCB), which was formed by the Vermont state legislature in 1987 to support permanently affordable housing and conservation efforts (Bourassa 2007, 342). The VHCB has since been a crucial medium by which the CLT project has been able to develop its partnership with the state of Vermont and it has continued to deliver financial support, as funding CLTs is the central means by which it fulfills its mandate (Torpy 2020). For example, the VHCB has historically provided subsidies of up to $40,000 for limited equity homes (Bourassa 2007, 342–43). Permanent affordability and close institutional support for CLTs has been embedded not only in municipal but in state-level government. Davis writes that the most successful projects undertaken by the BCLT/CHT and other housing non-profits would not have been possible without support from the VHCB, as well as the Vermont Housing Finance Agency (VHFA) and Housing Vermont (Davis 1994, 33).

Social Surplus: Accessing Federal Resources

The Sanders government's policies were a counter-movement to neoliberal trends in federal politics, and were specifically designed to survive in a context of federal retreat from the housing sector (Soifer 1990; Davis 1994). Federal funds which did find their way to the BCLT/CHT often did so due to the decision-making of the local government body distributing them, for instance the allocation of CDBGs by the city to the BCLT/CHT. Another way in which the BCLT/CHT has utilized federal resources has been in its connection of residents to tax credits and other federal benefits for which households might be eligible. In recent years, the CHT has been involved in efforts at forging a national network able, among other things, to

lobby the federal government of behalf of the CLT movement (Champlain Housing Trust 2019).

Donations

As many non-profits do, the BCLT/CHT works to maintain a regular inflow of charitable donations. Strategies for obtaining donations were considered at the outset, with one of the original reasons for CEDO adopting the non-profit approach being to entice donors (Torpy 2020). As it is a 501(c)(3) organization (both before and after the merger), it incentivizes such gifts. Individual donors can deduct donations from taxes, and it is eligible to apply for private philanthropic grants and government programs (Torpy 2020; K. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010). The CHT has accumulated a capital endowment of $2 million from donations, which it uses to help fund its projects and by which it generates regular returns (Torpy 2020). Donations, although a much smaller share of the project's income than rents and fees, are still substantial, equal to $439,169 in 2021 (Champlain Housing Trust 2021).

Access to Private Capital

The VHFA, established by the state-level government to provide mortgages to first-time homebuyers, advocated for the BCLT with participating banks by encouraging them to work with the CLT provided that a rider was added to the ground lease allowing banks to take both built property and underlying land in the event of a default not cured in time (Torpy 2020). Eventually, the BCLT's record at generating stable returns and its particular capability in avoiding foreclosure despite the low income of its residents endeared it to the banks, and the underlying land no longer needed to be put up as collateral (Davis 1994; Torpy 2020). CEDO also took action to connect private investors to community organizations by sponsoring the creation of the Community Banking Council in 1989, which continued to meet for the following for years, and the creation of the Vermont Community Reinvestment Association, which raised

created local pressure for more private investment in Burlington (Davis 1994, 16–17). These relationships helped the project overcome the initial skepticism (and even open opposition) from some quarters and develop partnerships with lenders (Soifer 1990; Davis 1994). The BCLT/CHT has also made use of relationships with private developers to benefit from inclusionary zoning requirements and other opportunities for joint projects, although it remains selective in applying criteria of quality and compatibility to these partnerships (Champlain Housing Trust 2019; Gauger 2006, 14–15). Thus, access to resources from private capital have also been essential to the BCLT/CHT's housing projects.

Project Revenues

The BCLT/CHT has developed its own revenue streams. It has been able to leverage the substantial value of its assets to significantly increase its spending capacity (Davis 1994; Champlain Housing Trust 2019; Soifer 1990). Aside from borrowing against them, it profits substantially off its land ownership by charging multiple fees, including ground lease fees for the homeowner, developer fees, resale fees, and transaction fees (Palmer 2019, 27). Alongside rents for its rental housing units, these fees compose the better part of its revenue (Champlain Housing Trust 2021). The BCLT/CHT has adopted an approach embracing diversification, targeting households beyond its typical income level, including those earning up to 100% of AMI (Gauger 2006, 14–15). This approach has allowed it to enter more expensive markets and cover costs through offering comparatively more expensive housing. It has reached a stage of its development where the homeownership program is able to run a surplus and the organization as a whole is financially robust (Crabtree et al. 2012; Champlain Housing Trust 2021). That being said, it still relies on the substantial external support mentioned above, particularly for new acquisitions and for its non-housing programs (Crabtree et al. 2012). It has come far in

developing its own revenue streams and building up its assets, but it would not have been possible to achieve the necessary scale, to continue expanding, or to maintain its other projects without subsidy.

Summary Of Funding Sources

After having examined the project's sources of funding, it seems clear that access to public resources was decisive in determining the success of the project, including its eventual ability to cultivate other sources of funding. It has since built up more of its own asset base and revenues, but without receiving initial and ongoing support it would not have been able to acquire the assets it later leveraged, or to make new acquisitions beyond what its fees and rental income could cover. In delivering on its goals of permanent affordability to create housing which does not displace working-class residents and neighborhoods, BCLT/CHT has relied on the state's allocation of social surplus, particularly in its earlier stages but also in its ongoing projects. I now turn my attention to the projects' relationship to neoliberal governance.

Relationship to Neoliberal Governance

I will review in turn how funding strategies shape the relationship of the BCLT/CHT to the state at various scales. In the following section, I argue that despite the real successes it has had in alleviating some of the displacements of the capitalist land and housing system, and introducing some moves away from complete marketization, the BCLT/CHT's funding strategies and consequent relationships to the state and capital have created a certain reliance on their support, and the accommodation of the BCLT/CHT with their strategies of long-term capitalist reproduction and monetized governance.

Relationship to State Institutions: Integration and Support

As is highlighted above, the BCLT/CHT's funding strategies depend on a level of support

from the state at various levels. In order to get started, it received a direct grant, lines of credit, and other support either directly from or facilitated by the city. It has continued throughout its history to receive money distributed by the city and by the state of Vermont. Both at its founding and since, as described above, this funding has been essential to the BCLT/CHT's successful survival and expansion. The BCLT emerged from an initiative of the city government and CEDO, and this close intertwining of CLT project and municipality has continued ever since, consistently reinforced by the reliance of the organization on municipal funding (which underwrites its ongoing projects). Alongside the direct support of the city and state-level governments, BCLT/CHT has been able to access private and other resources through the facilitation of the states.

City resources were put behind the CLT project due to the early commitment from the municipal government to devote resources to innovative forms of affordable housing, and the close relationship between the Sanders and Clavelle administrations and the newly founded organizations, which doubtless created a level of political investment for the project's success (and therefore willingness to spend money and political capital) that would not necessarily be present for another project (Palmer 2019; Davis 1994). State-level support was possible because of the combination of housing crisis and federal austerity, which forced the state government to step in to continue fulfilling the role of facilitating the long-term reproduction of capitalist relations. The successful organizing and advocacy efforts of the early BCLT and other housing advocates managed to entrench perpetual affordability in Vermont's public funding priorities, shaping the state's distribution of surplus in line with the CLTs own principles and shoring up the government's support (J. M. Jr. Libby 1989). The relationship of the BCLT/CHT to the federal government is very different from its relationship with the other two levels of

government. Whereas it was relationships of partnership, coalition, and political compatibility with those governments that allowed the CLT projects to access municipal and state-level resources, these relationships did not exist at the same level at the federal scale, especially not initially. The relationship to federal funding was characterized more by the need to strategize to access a dwindling pool of available public money, as is evident in the decision making during the merger and formation of CHT.

There has been close collaboration between the CHT and governments at many junctures over the last few years, from its regular consulting with municipalities, to its assistance supporting the unhoused, to its role in the COVID pandemic. Organizationally, the CHT's current bylaws guarantee that a third of its board members be 'public representatives', all but one of which must be municipal officials from the cities or towns in the service area, with each being the highest ranking executive officer in that municipality or someone appointed to act on their behalf (Champlain Housing Trust 2022, 9–10). Aside from its board structure, the CHT continues to work closely with various municipal and state-level organizations including VHCB who provide ongoing funding and support. The organization's intention to expand its advocacy network at the federal level shows a willingness to continue to expand these relationships to a higher scale. Thus, the BCLT/CHT is tied closely to governments in its operations and has depended on their support to reach the level of development it currently enjoys.

Its relationship with the state was established and has been entrenched through the Progressives' political coalition-building. Over the course of its development, the BCLT/CHT has faced opposition, but has succeeded in putting forward a broad appeal and building a diverse political constituency. After it's foundation, the BCLT faced the opposition of a group called Homeowners Against the Land Trust (HALT), composed of homeowners concerned about

devaluation of their properties by the CLT. This forced the BCLT into a compromise, in which it reduced the scale of its planned project to obtain the support of a sufficient number of councilors (Soifer 1990, 247–48). It faced another reversal when Peter Clavelle was defeated in 1993 by a conservative mayoral candidate, Peter Brownell, determined to reduce the city's allocation of funds to affordable housing. A broad movement coalesced around the BCLT and other non-profits to defeat the new effort and return Clavelle to city hall in 1995 (Torpy 2020). The Progressive Party held onto the mayoralty of Burlington until 2012.

This history reveals the strength of the coalition which coalesced around the BCLT. While Bourassa argues that Burlington's 'leftist political climate' in part enabled the creation of the CLT project, he also acknowledges that the CLT model is able to appeal to conservate political figures due to its utility in conserving public subsidies (Bourassa 2007, 341). A similar point was made by Torpy and Davis in pointing out the popularity of private property rights in Vermont and widespread homeownership aspirations allowing a seemingly radical model to gain widespread political acceptance (Torpy 2020; Davis 1994). Davis argues that the non-profit infrastructure helped broaden the base of popular support for affordable housing and build a constituency which became influential in local politics (Davis 1994, 23). Soifer argued in 1990 that the BCLT's small scale had meant that it does not threaten real estate interests enough to provoke a vigorous response, and that in fact the expansion of homeownership to lower-income households can be seen as more positive than negative for more typically pro-market actors like bankers (Soifer 1990, 248). Thus, BCLT/CHT's access to the social surplus and state support more generally has not been a static condition, but something which was maintained by the political coalition built by the organization and the wider Progressive organizations. This coalition has faced some pushback, but has tried to build a broad class alliance which addresses

some of the immediate interests of working-class residents without threatening capital, and utilizes its partnerships with the state to this end.

To conclude, BCLT/CHT has been historically reliant on the state's willingness to allocate a share of the social surplus to its project, and to a lesser but still notable extent has remained so. In its early years, the project was reliant on state subsidy to get started and fund its early projects. Although it has reached a scale which has enabled it to fund its operating costs from its revenues, it still depends on support from the state for other costs and new projects, retains a close integration with the state in terms of governance, both due to the power of the state within the CLTs organizational structure and because of the ongoing collaboration between the state and the CLT that has resulted in part from the organization's constitution through the allocation of public money.

Relationship to Capital and Marketization

From the outset and despite initial difficulties, the BCLT/CHT has sought to forge pragmatic working relationships with local capitalist actors in order to fund its projects. It has worked to gain acceptance from lenders, including by using forums such as the Community Banking Council and institutions like the VHFA to build connections and establish its credibility as a partner. The willingness of private lenders to lend to CLT residents has been essential for the functioning of the model, particularly for its homeownership program. The BCLT/CHT has also sought private institutional donations. This means that for the organization to keep functioning as it has, private actors must continue to work with the CLT. As it stands, the BCLT/CHT has successfully found an alignment of interests, in which the Land Trust's projects are largely non-threatening (despite some handwringing from local conservatives) and even beneficial to private institutions. Despite some of the radical implications of the BCLT/CHT's tenure model and its

focus on decommodification, retaining the ability to work with local lenders and developers has been a feature of the organization's approach. The single-family ownership tenure model required institutions willing to lend to the CLT homebuyers. This was challenging at first, due to the unfamiliar and radical-sounding ownership structure put forward by the BCLT. Davis writes that banks came to support and work with the BCLT because of the success of their operations, because their investment in low income housing credits made CLT housing a more attractive investment than it otherwise would be, and because the city indicated that institutions with a demonstrated history of community investment would be trusted with the city's own accounts (Davis 1994, 17).

The CLT has been said to function as a 'rung on a tenure ladder', allowing households with lower incomes to enter homeownership in a stable environment in which they are supported against foreclosure. Temkin et al estimate that as of 2009, 91.8% of the BCLT/CHT's first-time homebuyers were still homeowners five years after the initial purchase, and the majority of people moving out of CLT homes transitioned into market-rate owner-occupied homes (K. Temkin, Theodos, and Price 2010, 21–24). This particular case shows the CLT's program not as a radical disruption of the housing market, but more as a gentler entry point into it, stabilizing its margins and even establishing households as market subjects. Most of the the CLT's projects occur through the medium of exchange, which residents enter into as buyers or renters of housing, even if the particularities of their relationship to the CLT as housing provider are better than they would be in the private market. It has successfully been able to provide entry points for households to the private housing market, allowing them upon the eventual sale of their CLT home to purchase a non-CLT home. Thus, not only do the specific arrangements around CLT home acquisition align with the depoliticized forms of marketized governance typical to

neoliberalism, they also retain a close connection to the private market with entry into that market as market subjects held as an objective

Although BCLT/CHT shows capacity to restrict market transactions through its ground leases, and to exercise community planning by leveraging its underlying ownership and making decisions through its trust structure, these potentials do not seem to be overly emphasized in accounts of the project. Most of the CLT's projects are mediated through processes of exchange, which residents enter into as buyers or renters of housing, even if the particularities of their relationship to the CLT as housing provider are better than they would be in the private market. It has successfully been able to provide entry points for households to the private housing market, allowing them upon the eventual sale of their CLT home to purchase a non-CLT home. Not only do the specific arrangements around CLT home acquisition align with the depoliticized forms of marketized governance typical to neoliberalism, they also retain a close connection to the private market in which entry into that market as market subjects is held as an objective.

Representing Working-Class Residents

The BCLT/CHT's internal relationships are characterized by the same approach to building relationships between community groups, private actors, and the state which characterizes its relationships with other organizations. Indeed, this is one of the stated purposes of the classic CLT tripartite board (Davis 2010c; Crabtree et al. 2012), which is reflected in the CHT's board structure which guarantees equal representation to local government representatives, general members (at least one of whom must be from the private sector) , and resident members (at least one must be a shareholder, one a co-op member, and one a renter) (Champlain Housing Trust 2022). This structure is meant to ensure a balance of different interests across sectors and tenure-types. The open membership could also be seen as a means for

synthesizing diverse community interests. While there has been some conflict between and among the board and staff, mainly over specific projects (Soifer 1990, 246), there does not seem to be much evidence of any public conflicts among the membership or over the relationship to the state or capitalism in the CHT era. In their analysis of the discourse surrounding CLT projects, DeFilippis et al argue that framings of permanent affordability (central to the BCLT/CHT project) can depoliticize the policies of CLTs (DeFilippis, Stromberg, and Williams 2018, 763–64). Despite the observations of individuals such as Tim McKenzie and John Emmeus Davis of the radical implications of decommodification, there is little radical or disruptive planning observable in the plans and goals of the Trust itself, which mainly argues for affordability, expansion of homeownership, and other issues of accessibility. This aligns logically with the focus on compromise and coalition-building.

Summary: Facilitating Compromise

Thus, BCLT/CHT has had demonstrable success in stabilizing the fluctuations of the housing market, and alleviating conditions of displacement and gentrification through affordability and stewardship. In building up neighborhoods such as the Old North End in ways which resisted the displacement of working-class residents, and in creating perpetually affordable housing of various types throughout its area, BCLT/CHT has addressed some aspects of the neoliberal displacement process. Despite its ability to restrict the market through its ground lease agreements and its creation of an institution able to engage in community planning, it has remained in some sense tied to marketization due to its continued integration with the private market. It has also relied on the state's allocation of social surplus throughout its history, which is reflected in its ongoing institutional relationships to the state. The project's representative structures and internal governance are characterized by attempts to create

relationships of compromise between working-class residents, state representatives, and some private capitalist actors. It has addressed some aspects of neoliberal governance, but has remained tied to the state which reproduces them.

Conclusion

I have described the BCLT/CHT's funding strategies which are predicated on the ability of the organization to obtain a share of the social surplus allocated by the state and the CLT's ability to capture some benefits from the operation of private capital. The BCLT/CHT's institutional relationships which are characterized by close relationships with the state at multiple scales, maintaining partnerships and legitimacy with private capital, and coalition-building across class categories

These areas highlights the BCLT/CHT as an actor whose institutional relationships are characterized by a reconciling interests and a limit to its ability to risk alienating the state or capital. The BCLT/CHT relies on funding gained through its close relationships to the state at different scales, and as such is closely institutionally intertwined with these governments with a strong interest in maintaining those relationships. It also relies on its partnership with private capital, and similarly must avoid alienating those able to lend and invest. Its internal governance processes and relationships seek to represent a broad cross-section of the community and to create a synthesis of interests within the organization, not to mention that its institutional guarantee of government and private sector representation ensure that these partners will always have a seat at the CHT table. Its political history shows that although it initially faced opposition from homeowners and developers threatened by its novel ownership structure, it succeeded in forging a broad coalition by ensuring moderation and pragmatism in its program and building close institutional partnerships.

Chapter Five: Boston Case Study

Introduction

This chapter will study the history of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), a community organization engaged in CLT-anchored housing and community development in Boston, Massachusetts, as well as its subsidiary CLT Dudley Neighbors Incorporated (DNI). As in the previous case study, I will first provide a brief overview of DSNI and DNI's history and projects, will then review the major sources of funding it has relied on and how it secured them, will then discuss the institutional relationships which these funding strategies have helped to establish and necessitate, and will close with a discussion of how these relationships condition the project's connection to the state and capital.

As with the BCLT, DSNI has its origins in the Reagan era of neoliberal policy. It was developed through a process of political engagement, with its specific development projects emerging from municipal politics. DSNI emerged through a process of community organizing facilitated by private grant money which sought to challenge and pressure the city. I will discuss many of the details of DSNI's founding and early development, and will briefly touch on its subsequent history. I will then discuss the different sources of resources which have been essential to its success, arguing that it has relied in particular on access to early resources from charitable foundations and the state, as well as ongoing financial and in-kind contributions from these and other sources. I argue that DSNI reveals the potential for such projects to assist in working-class empowerment, including to address and alter the system of displaced survival, but its success is also predicated on a certain level of access and support from local elites, which means that this potential exists as long as points of unity can be found with the state (particularly at the local scale) and other large funders (such as charitable foundations).

Overview of DSNI/DNI

Dudley Neighborhood: A History of Displacement and Neglect

Since the postwar era, the history of Roxbury (the neighborhood in which DSNI is situated) has reflected the broader program of white supremacist redlining, blockbusting, and segregation that was implemented in many urban centres of the United States. Initially a working-class and predominantly white neighborhood in the 1950s, a combination of redlining, racial discrimination in housing markets, and deliberate blockbusting incentivized the flight of many white residents to the suburbs, the demographic transformation of the area, and the massive disinvestment from the community by state and private capital (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b, 4; 2016a, 603; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 14–18). This was not a passive process, but one which was actively driven by state and private actors, (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 24–27; Sklar 2008).

This history set the neighborhood up for both public and private disinvestment. By the 1970s, many of the residences, shops, and community spaces had become vacant lots (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 14–15). By 1984, about one third of land in the Dudley Triangle (an area of the neighborhood and central focus of DSNI's later development) was composed of 1,300 vacant lots, and the neighborhood was facing large-scale housing abandonment (Gauger 2006, 10; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 30; Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016a, 604). The vacancy produced a toxic matrix of depreciation and potential for speculative gain which resulted in endemic arson (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 30–31). In addition to the burning of properties, the neighborhood faced a problem of constant illegal dumping in vacant lots (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 32). The problem of disinvestment from the area was compounded by the increasing loss of manufacturing jobs and the 'roll-back' neoliberal (Peck and Tickell 2002) retreat from

public support for affordable housing (through wages and public spending) (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 20–21). The majority of neighborhood households found themselves cost burdened (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). Thus, disinvestment (as an active process of retreat and displacement) combined with the legacy of racial segregation to leave Dudley impoverished and severely blighted. As an aspect of these processes, Roxbury was marginalized from the planning and economic development pursued by the city of Boston and Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 18–20; 1994, 50). When a small number of Dudley residents attempted to appeal to the city, they were shut out by the city government (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 33–35)**.**

Founding DSNI

The particular group which would grow into the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative began with the connection between the Riley Foundation and La Alianza Hispana (a local nonprofit agency). Riley was a charitable foundation with a focus on long-term improvements in low-income multi-racial neighborhoods, with grants totaling $1.5 million per year (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 39–43). After a tour of the neighborhood in which they experienced its devastation firsthand, Riley's board decided that they would set the Dudley neighborhood itself as their priority, intending to provide large-scale support to community groups (Louie 2016, 7; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). Riley convened a group of community agencies to put together projects for Riley to fund (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 43–44). This advisory group voted unanimously in 1984 to establish a new organization, which officially took the name Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative in January of 1985 (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 46; 1994, 50). Riley's commitment of resources brought many different agencies to the table, and its active work in convening meetings and maintaining balance between groups helped retain members (Medoff

and Sklar 1994, 44–46).

In February 1985, the group held an open meeting to establish the new organization through public participation. Many of the residents who attended initially met the proposals of the group with skepticism, and even open hostility (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 53). The meeting facilitators and members of the advisory group made clear their willingness to restructure the project (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 55–57)**.** This openness led a number of attendees, even some who expressed criticisms, to get involved with DSNI (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 56–57). Even if they retained some skepticism, many at least figured that there was room for them to shape the effort.

It was at this stage that DSNI (in its form as a community-controlled organizing, planning, and development organization) can be said to have been born. A number of changes were made to make DSNI's bylaws more representative. The first board was elected in April after a weeks-long round of intensive organizing work (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 58–59). The new board included not only those from the initial agencies, but also residents who got involved with the project after the contentious first meeting (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 60–65). DSNI established a series of committees to handle nominations, land use, planning, and communications, and received a $70,000 grant from Riley to support its first six months of operations (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 61–62).

Another important early juncture was the hiring of DSNI's first staff-person. Peter Medoff was eventually selected by DSNI's board based on his tenant and community organizing background, and his vision of DSNI as a vehicle for community empowerment (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 62). Medoff's vision was that should DSNI aim to create an institution able to serve as the means by which working-class residents themselves can participate in and exert influence

over their neighborhood's development. The organization first undertook extensive doorknocking and surveying of residents and businesses in the area, and the launching based on these responses of a campaign against illegal dumping (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). Over the following years, this campaign prompted the city to close illegal trash transfer stations and clean up many lots (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). The goal underlying this was in part to begin creating a long-term vision and mobilization process to sustain the work while also beginning with clear, winnable issues to empower residents (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 67–69). From the outset, organizing, empowerment, and participation were held to be central to DSNI.

Dudley Neighbors Inc, Participatory Planning, and Winning Eminent Domain

DSNI members saw their efforts as part of a strategy of 'development without displacement', similar to that advocated by BCLT/CHT. This involved attempts to rejuvenate the neighborhood through investment, produce new housing and commercial spaces, and introduce more economic opportunity while maintaining affordability for current residents and ensuring that they retain control over the process (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b, 7; Meehan 2014, 128). According to this analysis, local democratic control is not merely one benefit among many but is the overriding condition that allows development to serve the interests of current residents. This is in direct response to those conditions of contemporary capitalist housing markets described in Chapter Three which reproduce displaced survival.

Leaders within DSNI realized that there was a need to not only attempt to control the effects of cyclical speculation and disinvestment, but to actively seek to break that cycle (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). They decided to embark on a participatory planning process, intended to go hand-in-hand with community organizing and extensive bottom-up participation (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 89). The city had recently released its own revitalization plan for the

neighborhood, which had sparked renewed fears of displacement from yet another top-down initiative (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 50–51). Thus, DSNI's plan developed in opposition to the city's plan. The planning process was carried out with assistance from Riley and hired consultants, and involved extensive consultation with institutions as well as ordinary residents (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 96–98; 1994, 100–101). It was ratified in September 1987 at a meeting of about 120 residents (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 107). The 'Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative Revitalization Plan' described a $135 million process occurring over two five year periods in the core of Dudley, involving low-density single-family and low-rise housing targeted to households with incomes of $10,000 to $20,000 (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 107–9; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020).

After drafting the plan DSNI succeeded in mobilizing enough community power to force the city to abandon its official master plan and adopt DSNI's plan as its own (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). Mayor Flynn and others at the city had come to recognize DSNI as a legitimate representative of the people in Dudley, and as such accepted the plan based on DSNI's strong local rootedness and backing from residents, adopting it as the city's own (Meehan 2014, 127; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 112). As concrete details were filled in, the specifics of DSNI's plan would be revised and updated (including a significant reduction in the number of housing units), however the principles of participatory community control, holistic 'urban village' style development, affordability, and fighting displacement would continue to inform the efforts at each stage (Meehan 2014, 129; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 109–10).

Essential to the implementation of the plan was DSNI taking over parcels of vacant land in Dudley upon which to develop housing. At this time, Boston's new mayor, Ray Flynn, was both attempting to dispose of city-owned land and build connections with Black constituencies

(Louie 2016, 8; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 91). These conditions presented an opportunity for DSNI's appeal to the city. Even before the ratification of DSNI's plan, it had been talking to the city's Public Facilities Department (PFD) about acquiring public land (about 1/3 of the 1,300 vacant lots in the area were owned by public institutions), and had managed to persuade PFD to delay the sale of the land until after DSNI's plan was completed (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 90–91; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Meehan 2014, 127–28). DSNI realized quickly that the land they would receive from the city was broken up by privately-owned vacant plots, such that there was not enough contiguous space to develop (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). Although much of the private land was tax delinquent, foreclosure would be too time-consuming, and many private owners would not sell voluntarily as they were anticipating speculative gains (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 117–18; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). DSNI decided to request that it be granted the power of eminent domain[vi], an option under Massachusetts law available to organizations developing affordable housing (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 118–19). DSNI thus embarked on a new campaign to lobby BRA to grant it this status, adopting the slogan: 'Take a Stand: Own the Land'.

In order to apply for eminent domain, and to hold the land it would acquire, DSNI decided to establish a subsidiary CLT, to be called Dudley Neighbors Incorporated (DNI). DNI was formed in August 1988 with advice from the Institute of Community Economics (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 126–27). The CLT was meant to provide an ownership structure able to protect against speculation while allowing development, and to retain ownership beyond the initial planning period in the interest of future generations (Meehan 2014, 128; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). It provided for local self-sufficiency by tying land ownership to the trusts' structure of community control and subordinating it to DSNI's planning oversight (H. Smith and

Hernandez 2020).

The campaign to win Chapter121A status involved both community organizing and a particular strategy of lobbying the municipal government. DSNI was supported by prominent members of the city government including BRA director Stephen Coyle and PFD director Lisa Chapnick and eventually the Mayor himself (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 122–25; 1994, 130). This assistance was due to the acknowledgment even by figures within the city that attempts at revitalization had been historically a failure and that the 'sincerity', community credibility, and the specifics of their plan would perhaps position DSNI to succeed where the city could not (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 124–25). In the mayor's case, he stated that DSNI's determination, organizing approach, technical capacity, and bottom up momentum made it preferable for the city to stand with rather than against DSNI (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 130–31). In effect, Flynn was forced to recognize the political strength and capacity of DSNI, and thus accept its legitimacy. After a process of mobilization, negotiation, and re-negotiation, the BRA board finally voted to approve DNI's application, and DNI (and by extension DSNI) became the first community-based organization in the US with the power of eminent domain (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b, 8; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Medoff and Sklar 1994; Gauger 2006, 10). This power wars renewed in 1992, with the BRA remaining supportive (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 154).

Realizing Community-Controlled Development

DNI is structured similarly to other CLT projects, with the major distinction being its subsidiary relationship to DSNI and to the latter organization's planning process. Its board is controlled by a majority of members appointed by DSNI, with others appointed by various public institutions (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Medoff and Sklar 1994; Gauger 2006, 10–

11). It has utilized long-term (99-year) ground leases aiming to control appreciation and maintain perpetual affordability, with the specific goal of ensuring that appreciation lags inflation and that resale is directed to low and moderate-income buyers (Meehan 2014, 120; Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016a, 605; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Sklar 2008). The use of the CLT to maintain the long-term integrity of affordability provisions also applies to other tenure types than owner-occupancy, including the co-operatives on DNI land (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016a, 605). DSNI seeks to fulfill its goal of affordability by ensuring that CLT housing is mixed income with majority of units priced for those with low and moderate-income, identified as such based on their income as percentage of AMI (the majority of houses are targeted to households making between 30% and 60% of AMI) (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 159–60). Based on the desires of residents, quality of housing is seen as an equally important objective to affordability itself, and most development has been of lower-density housing (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 159–60). In providing for higher-quality housing affordable to low income people, the project sought to address the systems which render workers surplus.

A Joint Disposition Committee (JDC) was formed with equal representation from DSNI and PFD to oversee the disposition of 30 acres of land, 15 owned by the city and 15 to be acquired through eminent domain (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 138). Despite some tensions over the pace of public land acquisition and the unwillingness of some private landowners to sell, the acquisition process was a success (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 156). DSNI also benefitted from a $2 million commitment from the Ford Foundation (closed on in 1992 at 1% interest) which allowed them to purchase the private land (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 147–48; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). DSNI received this support due to the foundation’s

respect for DSNI's access to high levels of city government, partnership with established institutions, and the participatory buy-in, comprehensiveness, and innovativeness of DSNI's model (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 147–50). DSNI partnered with both for-profit and non-profit developers to implement the plan (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 153).

DSNI to the Present Day

DNI currently has 227 units of affordable housing on its land, including 97 permanently affordable owner-occupied units, 77 co-op units, and 53 rental units, and provides services to assist homeowners and prospective homeowners (Dudley Neighbors Inc n.d.; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Louie 2016; Crabtree et al. 2012). DSNI's vision for Roxbury, articulated by residents, is that of a generally healthy and thriving community. This includes not only perpetually affordable housing, but a growth in local businesses, community spaces, and a more equitable, less exploitative lending environment. As such, DSNI has not only developed housing, but has developed these types of projects as well, in line with its holistic view of development and 'urban village' aspirations. This includes the development of urban agriculture and employment programs for youth (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b, 10; H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Crabtree et al. 2012, 27; Lowe and Thaden 2016, 620). Alongside development has been DSNI's goal of non-displacement, which it seems to have been able to achieve by helping spur improvement without destroying affordability (Louie 2016, 13–15). The higher value of land in the neighborhood in recent years might suggest that if not for the stewardship of DNI, private developers would displace residents by buying and selling at market rates (Dwyer 2015, 57).

Since its founding, DSNI has retained its focus on community planning, control, and organizing. It has since been involved in working-class empowerment like supporting tenant

organizing (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 161) and has kept community oversight over projects through its committees and engagement (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Crabtree et al. 2012, 26–27). Residents have been involved in pivotal decisions regarding projects and the direction of DSNI, including the depth of subsidies received from the city during a downturn, or the question of whether to expand projects outside of the original service area (Meehan 2014, 129; Palmer 2019, 20). It has also maintained its close political connections with the city and its efforts to build political will through changes of administration, still receiving material support and jointly working on projects with the government (Palmer 2019, 15–17). This balancing act is not without risks, however, and the potential for displacement lingers with the recent appreciation (Crabtree et al. 2012, 27; Louie 2016, 16; Thaden and Pickett 2021, 9).

Funding Strategies Pursued by DSNI/DNI

Social Surplus: Accessing Municipal Resources

As with BCLT/CHT, municipal support, including access to the social surplus (described in Chapter Three) has been crucial to the success of DSNI, particularly in its founding but also during its operations since then. It received early financial support from the Flynn administration, transfers of city-owned land at almost no cost, and has received ongoing support for a number of projects. For instance DSNI received an $1 million loan for its initial round of building after its acquisition of the vacant land (Quinones 1993, 757). When the city transferred publicly-owned land to DSNI, it did so at a fee of $1, a form of subsidy in itself (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 147). Since DSNI's first stage of building, it has continued to receive municipal support. Ro Whittington, who would become a staff person for DSNI in the 1990s, remarked that city financial support was especially important to the project due to the lack of bank financing (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 252). A source of funding for DSNI's development came through

Massachusetts ‘Town Commons’ program, which the city supplemented with a $500,000 investment (Medoff and Sklar 1994; Quinones 1993). It has even provided grants to DSNI and other organizations in the community to be used for community organizing (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 161). For a more recent example, the city government supported DNI’s 2017 acquisition of a former bank building in Upham’s Corner, near to DSNI’s core area of focus (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). Thus, the City of Boston has provided significant support from the social surplus and other resources, including at the vital early stage of DSNI’s development.

Social Surplus: Accessing State-Level Resources

There has been support from the government of Massachusetts as well, even despite the general environment of austerity which began to characterize the state’s approach by the 1990s. AS mentioned above, the state government agreed to award DSNI a sum as part of their ‘City and Town Commons’ program to create and preserve common spaces (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 128). Although initially $1 million, the award wound up only being $700,000 (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 153–54). This grant, although reduced, was still remarkable as it occurred during a time of austerity when the new state government was significantly paring down its housing and other subsidies, making DSNI the only such project being funded (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 153–54). The state of Massachusetts is one of the actors providing subsidies to help lower the costs of housing in Dudley (Louie 2016, 12). Thus, the state has provided support to the project, even if it has been less involved and less impactful than the city.

Social Surplus: Accessing Federal Resources

DSNI began during a time of federal retreat from the housing and other sectors which impacted not only the funds available for DSNI but also devastated the social and public services available in the wider community (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 281–83). Through HUD, the federal

government provided support of $2.3 million awarded as a grant through the Nehemiah Program on October 1990 to provide $15,000 second mortgages at no-interest for low and moderate-income first-time homebuyers (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 153). DSNI also received a $2.5 million investment from HUD for construction of low-income housing (Quinones 1993, 757–58). Federal funding remains one of the group of funding sources drawn upon for more piecemeal subsidies, tax credits, grants and support (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 153).

Donations and Role of Foundations

Perhaps the most decisive support, and that which in some ways distinguishes the early history of DSNI, is that of the charitable foundations. Riley provided the first grant to DSNI, giving $70,000 to cover the first six months of its operation (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 61–62). While DSNI drafted its initial plan, Riley contributed $100,000 to pay for consultants (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 96). While Riley's support went beyond this, these grants came when DSNI was still new and were essential to laying the foundations of its planning and organizing, from which it was able to bring in additional funding. Another foundation with a significant impact is the Ford Foundation, which provided a $2 million loan at 1% interest to use over two five-year periods in DSNI's initial acquisition and development work (Quinones 1993, 757–58; Gauger 2006, 11). There was involvement from other foundations such as the Boston and Hyams foundations (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 273)[vii]. In addition to the foundations, there was initial support from Consumer United Insurance Corporation who committed to a $1 million line of credit, however they wound up backing out of this arrangement due to their own financial difficulties (Quinones 1993, 757; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 100). Although the money itself did not materialize, the commitment contributed to DSNI's momentum and legitimacy. There was also support from organized labour, as Local 26 of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union

contributed $15 million for DSNI to develop low-income housing (Quinones 1993, 758). To co-ordinate other donations, Gus Newport (one-time staff member of DSNI and mayor of Berkely) founded 'Friends of DSNI' in 1992 (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 185). DSNI has continued to rely on diverse streams of charitable and other funding (Palmer 2019, 28). In addition to monetary support, DSNI has benefited tremendously from various in-kind contributions, for instance by law firms providing legal services for free, and Riley's early facilitation work (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 116; 1994, 275). From these examples, it is clear how important a role foundations, community organizations, and other contributors (which will each be approaching the project with their own agendas) have played in shaping DSNI's success.

Accessing Private Capital

While DSNI has worked with private developers and lenders, this relationship has often involved a great deal of contestation, however DSNI seems to have had some success in encouraging community reinvestment. In 1989, DSNI created the Community investment Coalition with other groups, which was intended to co-ordinate with banks in ending discriminatory practices and undoing the effects of redlining (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 164; Quinones 1993). A 10 year plan was announced, which included opening new branches, financing affordable housing, and other support, which would go toward DSNI's first developments and increase the availability of investment in the community, however the banks were initially slow in implementing it and systemic inequalities remained (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 164–65; Quinones 1993, 758). In 1992, the coalition was renamed Community Investment and Economic Development Coalition, and a new organizing effort was launched to hold the banks accountable (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 167). It seems that over time, DSNI's efforts at building functional partnerships with the banks has been more successful, with Tony Hernandez

(director of DNI) stating in an interview published in 2019 that DSNI had had success getting banks to create mortgage packages specifically for CLT homeowners by educating bankers about the model (Palmer 2019, 29). While the control of community members over market and other forces is evidently important to DSNI, the project does not aim to completely supplant them but rather to harness them for the community's own democratically defined priorities, such as developing single-family affordable housing.

Project Revenues

DNI collects revenue from its fees and rental income. It has pursued a strategy focused on putting the human and material assets already present in the community (including potential workers, land to be developed, etc) into motion through its planning (Medoff and Sklar 1994). According to Palmer's loose quantification of a sustainability threshold (point at which the project can cover its ongoing costs and put subsidies and grants to new acquisition), DNI has reached the scale which usually allows CLT projects to keep their ongoing operations relatively self-sufficient (Palmer 2019). Based on its tax filings, a regular share of DSNI's revenue is composed of its program revenues, with contributions and grants forming a fluctuating share of the income, sometimes being a small share, sometimes being up to 60% of the total (Internal Revenue Service 2020a). It seems unlikely that the organization would have been able to run a significant surplus is most recent years without donations and grants (although would still run a small surplus is most years), and would have faced far more significant losses than it already has during and since the fiscal year ending in June 2018 (Internal Revenue Service 2020a). Thus, although it shows the ability to reliably meet at least most of its operating expenses with revenue from its own projects and investments, it is unlikely that it would be sustainable with these alone, as it would be difficult to put together funds for new projects or weather crises.

The scale of the project is far smaller than that of CHT, which holds almost $200,000,000 in assets, relative to the approximately $5,500,000 of DNI (Internal Revenue Service 2020b; Champlain Housing Trust 2021). This reflects the more focused geographical concentration of DSNI's development (the Roxbuy neighborhood, as opposed to all of Burlington and much of the surrounding area).

Summary Of Funding Sources

The most important factors in funding DSNI's development projects have been the support of charitable foundations such as Riley and the Ford Foundation providing capital and credibility, support from city hall providing access to significant shares of social surplus, and the ability of DSNI to secure its credibility and have some state functions delegated to it. Not only did these institutions provide crucial financial backing to DSNI, including in its infancy, but they also significantly contributed to its ability to access resources beyond their own direct funding. For one, the early support of Riley in particular allowed DSNI to actually embark on the process of organizing and planning that would lead to its eventual successes. The support from the city, including DSNI winning the power of eminent domain, allowed them to acquire the land which was the essential precondition of its future projects, and the support of the government and established institutions allowed DSNI to access other funding and support (Riley and city support was vital to securing the Ford Foundation loan, for instance). While various partnerships with private developers and lenders have been part of DSNI's projects, this has involved a significant amount of work from DSNI to achieve arrangements in line with their values (and it has been a particular challenge to redress the structural consequences of segregation, including the lack of bank branches and available capital in Roxbury).

Relationships to Neoliberal Governance

Relationship to State Institutions and Social Surplus

As was established in the previous section, DSNI/DNI has relied on support from the state, in the form of allocation of social surplus and in other forms of material support (such as transferring public land). Although it has grown less reliant on direct external funding as it has grown and developed its revenues, DSNI remains close to the state and receives support from it for individual projects. Based on this alone, it is clear that DSNI/DNI have not separated themselves from being tied to the broader framework through which the state makes use of social surplus (due to their continued connection to public money), however it is worth examining the dynamics of this. Specifically, the degree to which DSNI is able to control the terms by which the surplus is allocated.

DSNI was founded at a time when city hall was particularly open to creating partnerships, as it was being forced to grapple with its history of racialized displacement. In the years leading up to DSNI's formation, the state's relationship with neighborhood residents was one of pronounced neglect. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the city of Boston had a history of facilitating segregationist policies. It allowed the neighborhood to decline, and shut working-class residents out of its planning and decision-making. Ray Flynn defeated Mel King in the city's 1983 mayoral election, in which the former campaigned on an economically populist program, while the latter also focused on redressing the ongoing segregation and marginalization faced by racialized residents. Flynn won, but received very little of the collective vote share of Black residents and faced a movement which advocated the secession of Greater Roxbury from Boston and other militant organizing from Boston's Black communities (Louie 2016, 8).Flynn was thus open to finding partnerships with neighborhood organizations, both to make inroads

with residents and to help carry out his program (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b; Louie 2016). Early gestures from the Flynn administration, such as awarding DSNI a Fair Housing Award before it had even begun developing housing, were interpreted by some members of DSNI as an attempt to create these relationships (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 64). Thus, the city's openness to DSNI at the time was due in part to the specific juncture of class and racial politics.

DSNI never took the goodwill of the city government for granted, however, instead placing its primary emphasis on organizing in order to create bargaining power (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 277–80). Although it later had success in its lobbying efforts, and city officials came to express their support for the project's innovative approach and capacity, the credibility upon which these were built came through its grassroots organizing and ability to include and mobilize ordinary residents (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016a, 605). Even through its later developments, Medoff and Sklar argue that the organization maintained a certain distance from the city, never believing that the government shared its values, or that it would act without being pushed by DSNI (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 280).

Alongside organizing, however, DSNI's activities have involved a significant amount of advocacy and relationship building with city officials. Its strategy has hinged on creating political will to support its projects by targeting people in leadership positions (rather than going up through more typical bureaucratic channels) and attempting to turn them into advocates of DSNI. To do this, it was able to make use of individual relationships (Medoff's connections in the Flynn administration, Riley members' relationships in the municipal bureaucracy, for instance) and position itself as an institution capable of delivering where the state could not (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 122–25; 1994, 262–64). Perhaps the most pronounced sign of its success in this regard is the fact that Flynn himself became an active champion of the project

within the city government (playing a decisive role in helping DSNI win eminent domain), and this relationship between DSNI and individual mayors seems to have continued after his tenure (Palmer 2019, 17; Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b; Medoff and Sklar 1994). Other city officials who helped move the project forward at that stage include Stephen Coyle, then director of BRA, and Lisa Chapnick, then PFD director. It has maintained a close working relationship with the city through numerous projects since, such as the 2017 acquisition in Upham's Corner (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). Into the tenure of Mayor Tom Menino, and after his leaving office in 2014, members of DSNI and DNI kept up their advocacy efforts to build political will and, during the tenure of Martin Walsh, the executive director of DSNI served as Boston's Chief of Economic Development (Thaden and Pickett 2021, 9). The support from these local political elites was pivotal in DSNI obtaining support for its initial land acquisition and development. It has remained an ongoing part of the organization's work since.

Supporters of DSNI argue that these relationships of co-operation represent, rather than co-option and dependency, forms of equitable collaboration in which DSNI retains its autonomy and capacity to set the terms of the relationship (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 90). According to some involved with the project, DSNI is able to achieve this balance due to its organizing focus, from which it draws its political strength, and its bottom-up structure and strong board which prevent the capture of its leadership and staff by the city (Palmer 2019, 15–17; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 278–80). One example which supports this view is the interaction between DSNI and the city over the official plan. When BRA, with its history of exclusion and displacement (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 19–20), released its revitalization strategy, DSNI responded to the fears of the community about displacements by undergoing its own in-depth participatory planning process and pushing the city to adopt the new plan as its own (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020). Not all

leverage remains with DSNI, however. As Medoff and Sklar wrote within a decade of development starting, the constant presence of support from the city has created more potential for co-option, as many of DSNI's projects require that support, and as an established organization serving hundreds of residents directly, DSNI has more to lose if that funding is withdrawn than it did in the days of its early campaigns (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 279–80).

From BRA approval onward, DSNI seems to have more-or-less enjoyed ongoing municipal support (despite Hernandez describing a 'rocky' early relationship (Palmer 2019, 15)). According to DND's onetime Senior Development Officer, the city views DNI as a tool which creates strong communities and produces the many benefits associated with them (Spencer 2007, 51). She goes on to mention the positive relationships between local politicians and DNI, the work done by DND in helping to market DNI's housing units, and the fact that DND views the CLT project as an ally in its own priorities around affordable housing. Taken in conjunction with the other examples mentioned previously, it seems that whatever conflicts the organizing of DSNI might have raised regarding neglect and discrimination, its appropriation of development responsibility has seemed to align relatively well with the city's own priorities. While this has relied on organizing success, its results have not been oppositional to the city's own interests in these cases.

The city has not only been an ally to DSNI in their own joint projects, but has also assisted DSNI in its dealings with other scales of government and funders. PFD officials helped DSNI draft its proposal to Massachusetts' 'City and Town Commons Program' and assisted the project in receiving its funding (as well as contributing $700,000 to it) (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 128; Quinones 1993). DND helps find buyers for DSNI homes, and the credibility established by DSNI's municipal partnerships allowed it to secure other sources of funding, for instance playing

a role in securing the Ford Foundation loan.

It is worth emphasizing that when discussing DSNI's relationship to the state, most of this discussion has centred on the city government. As should be evident from the overview section, the city government has been decisive in shaping DSNI's history, which has not been the case for state and federal governments. Even the support which has come from the state of Massachusetts has been facilitated by the city government. Thus, these strategies of dealing with the state to obtain social surplus have been oriented toward the state at its most local scale.

The question of control over social surplus is a nuanced and contradictory one. Like BCLT/CHT, DSNI has also relied on being able to obtain a share of the social surplus however has had more autonomy in defining the terms of this arrangement. Much of the funding it has received has been for projects which its membership and leadership have themselves defined, rather than being spearheaded by the state. Through its early campaigns, planning process, and development, DSNI seems to have established itself as a legitimate representative of the community, with the capacity to carry out some of the delegated functions of a state. As such, it has been able to deliver on local priorities and empower the community beyond what a project that did not enjoy its leverage, autonomy, or legitimacy would. At times, it has been able to act against policies driven by the state or capital that local residents objected to (for instance, in creating its alternative plan). In achieving this, DSNI has made remarkable progress in reducing the conditions of displacement which are essential to the reproduction of the reserve army of labour under capitalism (for instance, in its use of land ownership to prevent foreclosure and prevent exploitative lending) and has laid claim to a certain amount of control over allocating social surplus and regulating private capital.

The caveat is that this approach succeeded not only because of DSNI's organizing

strength, but its ability to use its elite relationships to leverage that organizing strength to achieve concessions from the state. This is the essence of its strategy of creating political will, in which it combines grassroots engagement with targeting of key officials within the government to become champions of its projects. This relies not only on the effective organizing which gives it something to leverage, but on the receptiveness of state officials to its message. Furthermore, its ability to make these connections has also relied on its relationships with other highly-placed individuals (Riley's board, well-regarded lawyers). Thus, although there is room for contestation and class struggle, the goals of the project cannot deviate from what the state is able to accept, due to its continued reliance on access to state institutions to continue accessing social surplus. The struggle is effectively over terms of collaboration.

DSNI/DNI, Private Capital, and Marketization

DSNI's relationship to private capital has been characterized by the organization's attempts to use its organizing and development role to reduce exploitation by private capital and subordinate marketized relationships to local planning. When DNI properties have faced foreclosure and banks threatened to sell the properties on the market without resale restrictions, DNI responded by threatening to raise the ground lease fee from $49 a month to $649 a month in order to force the banks to keep the resale restrictions (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b, 10). DSNI has also leveraged its position to enforce quality standards on its private development partners, refusing proposals which do not meet standards (for instance, bedroom size), and invoking DNI's power of consent to mortgage to prevent the closing of predatory deals on their land (Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b, 15; Smith and Hernandez 2020). One of its directors has characterized DSNI as 'gatekeeper' of development in its service area, able to exercise some control over the projects that are allowed to go forward (Engelsman, Rowe, and

Southern 2016b, 10). Within the wider community, it has attempted to work towards redressing Boston's legacy of segregation (which has resulted in the only credit available to local people being unstable and unfavourable) by encouraging access to credit and community reinvestment, creating an institutional infrastructure to encourage reinvestment and directly encouraging banks to develop mortgage packages specifically for the CLT model (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 164–67; Palmer 2019, 29). While some of the approaches listed here have involved forms of contestation, and there have been cases where capital has resisted or been unsupportive of DSNI (lagging in implementing reinvestment, resistance from the Minority Developers Association to the eminent domain campaign), they have also been characterized by a certain degree of co-operation. The recalcitrant developers eventually got behind the project, and DSNI did have later success in encouraging banks to develop CLT mortgage products. It has also built relationships with both lenders and households in order to facilitate less exploitative lending (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020).

A distinctive feature of the DSNI-city relationship has been that DSNI and DNI have not merely advocated for or organized around calls for the city to take certain actions, but have pushed for the empowerment of the organization. DSNI has not only sought to tap into the social surplus, but to take on some of the state's regulatory functions. One example is the planning process discussed above, in which DSNI laid claim to the role of development planning on behalf of the neighborhood. Not only did it manage to supplant the official plan, but DSNI also jointly convenes community land use and housing design meetings with the city's Department of Neighborhood Development (DND) (Louie 2016, 12). DNI also retains a veto power within its designated neighborhood (Crabtree et al. 2012, 25). Related to this, it has also sought to establish itself as the legitimate representative of residents on such issues (often positioning itself as more

legitimate than the state due to its local and participatory focus). In one of its most notable initiatives, it received the right to utilize eminent domain, a legal power almost exclusively exercised by governments. Far from being in all cases an antagonistic appropriation of state power, some city officials have seen this as a positive (Chapnick, for instance, took the organization's desire for serious development responsibility as a selling point) (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 278), and have been supportive of delegating government functions to an organization closer to the local community.

To address private capital's role in reproducing displaced survival, DSNI has leveraged its power to prevent predatory and speculative lending and redress the histories of displacement within the neighborhood. It has retained the right to intervene to refuse predatory mortgages on its land and has worked to overcome unequal and racialized credit relationships within its community through its planning. It has reduced the displacement which is wrought by unaffordable rates in the unfettered market. Regarding marketized forms of neoliberal governance, the planning and mobilization pursued by DSNI has politicized the relations of land and housing by putting working-class empowerment at the centre of its projects. By attempting to subject the market transactions to a democratic planning process and community control, DSNI has moved away from the depoliticized, marketized way that housing is delivered by the neoliberal state, and instead made participation and mobilization central. While this seems a clear step away from mediating housing relations only through a depoliticized realm of exchange, it still relies on there being scope for co-operation with the developers, lender, and other capitalist actors themselves as well as other charitable or state supporters. It also relies on being able to leverage the support of the state in order to obtain the authority to oversee development.

Relationship to Foundations, Nonprofits, and Private Contributors

Foundations such as Riley and Ford have been crucial supporters of DSNI from the beginning. It was Riley's board which put together the early advisory group, and Riley's funding which enabled the first months of DSNI's operations (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 61–62). Riley even provided most of the funding to pay for consultants during DSNI's pivotal planning process (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 96). The Ford Foundation's $2 million investment at 1% interest in 1992 helped provide DSNI and DNI the means to acquire the land from private owners (Gauger 2006, 11; Quinones 1993, 757–58). DSNI's relationship with Riley was characterized by collaboration and trust, and despite the foundation's role in bankrolling DSNI's projects, the autonomy of the later seems to have been respected and taken seriously (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 62). This approach is perhaps evident in that Riley did not push back in the first community meeting when residents took over and significantly democratized the project. Riley's involvement from the beginning and initiative in helping start the project made it a committed supporting of DSNI, willing to take risks to support the project (it also already had an established reputation as risk-taking and innovative). The relationship with Ford was facilitated at first by Medoff's personal connections at the foundation, which provided an opening for DSNI's pitch (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 147–48). When considering DSNI's application, Ford was motivated in part by the organization's connections to city hall (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 148). Funding and other support from foundations (including the Boston and Hyams Foundations) has remained important to DSNI's operations, allowing for greater durability and ambition in planning (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 273; Palmer 2019, 28).

In addition to foundations, DSNI benefited from donations by other organizations, both for and not-for profit. I will review a few of the most significant examples. Despite some

differences which would arise between them over their relationship and the balance between confrontation and collaboration, Local 26 of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union provided large-scale early support (Quinones 1993, 758; Medoff and Sklar 1994, 76–78). Resources also came from in-kind contributions, including the pro-bono legal services of Rackemann, Sawyer, & Brewster, an old and prestigious law firm in the city, with its contributions equal to at least hundreds of thousands of dollars (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 116). DSNI had earned their respect through its organizing and planning, and through its close relationship to Riley. Highlighting the mutually-reinforcing nature of these relationships, support from the firm provided DSNI with more credibility when dealing with other organizations, including the city (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 117). DSNI's ability to access these resources has relied on its continued supportive relationships with these institutions and use of existing relationships to build new ones.

In addition to its reliance on forms of negotiated co-operation with the state to access a share of the social surplus, DSNI has therefore also relied on support from charitable organizations, and private organizations willing to contribute. It is worth considering whether these relationships impacted the disposition of the organization to the state and capital. These relationships aided it in obtaining social surplus from the state, in addition to the funding they themselves provided. They thus demonstrated another way for the project to access social surplus and other private funding. This depended, of course, on its acceptability to donors, and their openness to providing significant support to the project. In particular, it has depended on the willingness of the Riley foundation to invest significant time and money, and has relied on the alignment of DSNI with the priorities of the foundations. Thus, donor support has provided an entry point for DSNI to the other institutions and has enabled DSNI's early work, but was itself based on contingencies including Riley's willingness to focus so heavily on one neighborhood.

Additionally, since Riley was the institution most responsible for founding DSNI in the first place, it has had the potential to shape the direction taken by the organization. In this case, it seems to have done so according to its goals of making DSNI genuinely representative and open to residents, however the significant agenda-setting capacity it enjoyed during this process suggests that under different circumstances an organization in Riley's role could influence the project a different way.

Internal Practices and Representation of Working-Class Residents

In representing the working-class residents of the Dudley area, DSNI centres participatory development planning, and community organizing. One aspect of DNI that is distinct from other CLT projects is that it exists as a subsidiary of DSNI, which is the organization responsible for most of the planning, organizing, and other decision-making. This relationship not only enables access to more diverse funding streams than an organization which focused exclusively on CLT housing development, but also allows DSNI to retain its focus on organizing and keep that focus central (organizationally subordinating development to organizing and planning) (H. Smith and Hernandez 2020; Crabtree et al. 2012, 25; Palmer 2019, 23). The centrality of organizing remains the guiding principle of the organization (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 261; Engelsman, Rowe, and Southern 2016b, 10). It continues to involve community members in the development process through its committees and participatory decision making (for instance with the Dudley Village development) (Crabtree et al. 2012, 26–27). It has also supported tenant organizing campaigns, using public money to do so (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 161). At a less tangible level, DSNI, at least in its early campaigns, seems to have been characterized by a high degree of internal solidarity and close camaraderie, built over the course of its campaigns and initiatives (Medoff and Sklar 1994, 250–51). Thus, in ways which are both

embedded in its structure and in its culture and objectives, the CLT itself and its development and stewardship projects are conceptualized as part of a wider organizing and community-building process, rather than the other way around.

In line with the above relationship, the majority of DNI's board is appointed by DSNI (6 out of 8 voting members), with the board also including representation from the local city councilor and mayor, and non-voting members present on behalf of the state representative and state senator (Crabtree et al. 2012, 25; Dudley Neighbors Inc n.d.). DSNI's board includes several provisions to ensure community representation. It includes reservations of four seats each for each of the neighborhood's major ethnic groups (Black, Latino, Cape Verdean, White), reserves seats for youth, requires a majority of board members to be residents, and provides seats for non-profits, businesses, religious organizations, and CDCs (Gauger 2006, 11–12; Crabtree et al. 2012, 25; Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative n.d.). Significantly, the board structure, although retaining positions in DNI for political representatives, does not grant city or other government officials any significant share of formal voting power. Rather, it is designed around DSNI's understanding of equitable community representation.

DSNI, despite some involvement outside of its designated service area around the Dudley Triangle (such as the recent acquisition of the former bank building in Upham's Corner), has for the most part kept its projects concentrated within its specific neighborhood. This focus is in line with its goals of neighborhood revitalization and control, and it goes hand-in-hand with its principles of deep community participation. The geographic concentration of DSNI's projects does not mean its scope of ambition is limited. DSNI is also involved in attempts to work within the wider community in Boston to support similar projects and propagate its model. This approach was derived from a deliberate decision of its membership, which voted against

distributing developments over a larger space and instead advocated for DSNI facilitating the launch of new CLT projects in other neighborhoods (Palmer 2019, 20).

Thus, DSNI's and DNI's internal governance procedures have been developed through community participation, and with the goal of preserving community representation and control. The organization has made of point of continuing to support organizing among working-class and racialized residents and has created a governance structure weighted more heavily in favour of residents than that of BCLT/CHT. It has developed around a specific neighborhood and has kept its local focus which has enabled a deeper participatory process than would likely be possible operating over a more dispersed service area with more residents.

Summary: Contesting the Terms of Collaboration

Thus, DSNI has approached the state and capital with the same combination of contestation and co-operation. When dealing with the municipal government, DSNI began with organizing. It negotiated with the city officials and the mayor on its own terns, pushing them to adopt its own plan and practices, but retaining a collaborative approach in building relationships and implementing it. It helped that this plan was in line with some of the city's own priorities. The relationship with local capital involved a bit more weight on the contestation side, due perhaps to the more threatening politics of the eminent domain campaign and deep-rooted racial inequalities, but nevertheless retained space for co-operation. DSNI's hand was strengthened in this by its relationship with the state and the latter's delegation of authority to DSNI. DSNI's aim of revitalizing its neighborhood without displacement and with community control did not exclude accumulation completely, but attempted instead to orient it around local working-class residents' needs. Particularly important in its ability to create working relationships (and indeed, to DSNI's own viability as a project) have been its relationships with foundations, with Riley's

early role in initiating the project giving DSNI a level of credibility, resources, and access that it would not otherwise have enjoyed. Unlike BCLT/CHT, DSNI seems determined to relate to the city and the private developers and lenders as principally external actors, granting them only small shares of the board seats of the two organizations. It has been able to achieve this balance through its organizing efforts, and some of the contextual factors which enabled the success of its organizing. Its ability to secure legitimacy (in terms of its having suffient capacity and popularity to represent its community) has been crucial.

Conclusion: Contesting Terms of Collaboration

I have described DSNI and DNI's funding strategies and organizational relationships to the state and capital. Although DSNI's community organizing-centred approach has certainly been crucial to its success, and its ability to engage and act with the community has been an essential source of legitimacy, it is not the only condition of DSNI's success. It has also relied on supportive local elites, particularly those operating within the city government. In order to obtain this support, DSNI relied on a certain level of access and material support which came particularly from the Riley Foundation's early involvement and from other aspects of its collaborative approach. In order to obtain this support (including from Riley) there would need to be a certain harmony between DSNI and the city, the foundations, and any other partners it worked with. Thus, DSNI shows the potential for adopting an approach centred on empowerment and contestation for addressing the conditions of displaced survival and marketized governance and that the simultaneous need for co-operation has set some parameters in which contestation must operate (as it must be able to find an eventual alignment of interests), since DSNI still relies on the support of these elites to be able to distribute its share of the social surplus.

The combination of the above factors highlights that DSNI serves as a vehicle for some working-class control of development but that the conditions which allow that control are embedded in social structures (a history of segregation, the political-economic environment, the coalition-building priorities of politicians, etc) and in contingencies (such as the availability of long-term grant funding). The earlier history of community efforts in Roxbury being shut out by city hall suggests that the willingness of the city to listen to DSNI was based at least in part on its own disposition and priorities at the time, rather than solely on the project's organizing capacity. DSNI shows itself able to develop affordable housing that is able to move at least some distance away from the commodity nexus which produces displaced survival, as well as to provide a structure for housing provision which is not solely market based. Through its political mobilization, DSNI has succeeded in obtaining a certain share of social surplus, but its ability to do this (and to preserve its access) depends on its successful mobilization as well as factors like the favorability of the wider political-economic context, the disposition of state officials, and other local specificities like availability of capital and land.

In this chapter, I have established that DSNI/DNI has succeeded not only in alleviating the conditions of working-class displacement, it has been able to take on some of the planning functions of the local state and setting the terms within which it deals with other actors, and also that DSNI/DNI nevertheless has still relied on alignment with the interests of the state and support from charitable lenders in order to develop its projects. In the next chapter, I will conclude this thesis by tying this case study together with my study of Burlington, my theoretical perspective, and the identified gap in the literature to arrive at my final reflections on the role of funding strategies, neoliberal governance, and CLT potential.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

In the chapters preceding this one, I have established the gap in the literature, which requires more elaboration of the ways in which material relations interact with and limit the potential of CLT-anchored projects developing affordable housing. I justified my use of a historical materialist framework drawing on an analysis of housing and land markets in neoliberal capitalism, and used that framing to shape my methodology, in which I analyzed the funding of both cases and to what extent the organizational relationships associated with their funding broke from those associated with neoliberal governance. In this chapter, I summarize my conclusions from my analyses of the cases and discuss some general conclusions regarding the influence of funding on the ability of CLT projects to act autonomously from neoliberal governance. I will first review each of the projects' relationship to each of the aspects of neoliberal governance and will review the conclusions of the case study chapters. I will then discuss the takeaways from examining both cases together.

CLT Projects and Neoliberal Governance

Displaced Survival

In both cases, the CLT projects succeeded in creating and preserving affordable housing and avoiding exploitative debt relationships and foreclosures.

Burlington's BCLT/CHT has developed a large quantity of permanently affordable housing, ranging from rates affordable to those below median income to market-rate housing with resale restrictions. It has addressed the displacement of working-class neighborhoods, for instance that of the Old North End, through gentrification. In addition to the affordability of its mortgage and rental rates, it has addressed displaced survival by encouraging ownership by its

residents, through private ownership and limited-equity co-operatives, and by having a stake in the trust itself.

Boston's DSNI/DNI project has also developed a significant amount of affordable housing (although fewer units than BCLT/CHT). This housing has been kept accessible for those making less than AMI and has been 'locked in' to perpetual affordability through similar resale restrictions to those in Burlington. Not only has it lowered the costs of housing, but DSNI has used its land ownership to check the power of private capital in the realm of credit. It has strengthened community control and solidarity within its service area, thereby acting against displacement.

Marketization

In addressing marketization, some distinctions are apparent between the projects, as well as some similarities. Much of the delivery of housing within BCLT/CHT was done through market mechanisms and in integration with the private market. By contrast, DSNI/DNI supplanted these to some degree through its participatory planning process, showing a capacity to move away from conditions of marketization. While this was not wholly absent from the former, it is a strong characteristic of the latter.

BCLT/CHT, through its resale restrictions and the individual covenants of its ground leases, does restrict market decision-making in the housing sector, in the sense that it does not allow housing to be exchanged entirely through market decision-making, controlling the amount that it can appreciate, giving the CLT the right of first refusal of sales, and allowing the trust to exercise some control over the activities occurring on the land. That being said, much of the specific allocation of housing remains characterized by market relations, with households not only entering into CLT housing as purchasers, but also often being integrated into the non-CLT

housing market through CLT housing. Thus, although it has displayed the ability to exert an influence on the exchange of housing through market transactions, its break from these has been far from complete, and much of the structure by which it allocates housing has remained essentially within the realm of exchange, and subject to the same depoliticizations which this system exerts in private markets.

DSNI/DNI has moved farther from marketization, as it has developed practices around planning and community organizing which have attempted to centre participatory democracy rather than market exchange in steering housing development. The co-operation between DSNI and other actors in Boston such as the municipal government and private developers has largely occurred within the framework of this planning, the product of the meetings DSNI has facilitated with community members. Although this process has not necessarily been antagonistic to private capital, it has been oriented around working-class residents and nonprofit institutions in the neighborhood. This more developed planning process is in addition to the resale restrictions enabled by the ground lease arrangement itself. It is aided in this by its particular local focus, which helps DSNI engage in deeper organizing and create more of a sense of community. Nonetheless, it still depends to some degree on continued co-operation with capital. Thus, DSNI/DNI have displayed the ability to address marketization to some extent through planning, which offers the means by which the relations of land and housing can be politicized.

Social Surplus

Despite the potential of the two projects to address aspects of displaced survival and marketization, both reveal a close interconnection and initial dependency on the state's allocation of social surplus, although this occurs within dynamics of contradiction and contestation. While the particular dynamics of this differ between the cases, both reflect an ongoing support from the

state. They also reveal, based on the important role that the social surplus has played in each, the importance of examining the political dynamics by which this surplus is distributed.

BCLT was founded by CEDO, and it was supported heavily during its early years by public institutions. It built connections at both the state level and local level with governments. When it went through its merger and became CHT in 2006, these connections were perhaps even strengthened due to LCHDC's own closeness to governments. CHT's current governance structure reflects this, with at least a third of its board seats being reserved for various government representatives. In some sense, this integration makes BCLT/CHT part of the state's wider framework of allocating social surplus, since its own decision-making is subject in some ways to the state. Many of BCLT/CHT's projects and acquisitions have relied on state subsidy, requiring a share of social surplus to deliver on them, and particularly in its earlier years it relied on public resources to cover operating costs as well. In addition to its close relationship to the city government, it also receives a great deal of support from the state of Vermont. This relationship arose during the federal retreat from social housing provision, and resulted in part from the necessity of the state-level government stepping up to manage the contradictions of the housing sector. Thus, BCLT/CHT has been intertwined within the state's framework for allocating social surplus, as it still relies on some financial support for the success of its projects and because its decision-making lends a great deal of weight to the representatives of the state.

DSNI/DNI was not founded by Boston's municipal government but began its development projects after obtaining the support of this government. This came in the form of financial subsidy, but also in the form of the state granting powers like those of planning and eminent domain to DSNI and DNI. Its process of support has therefore included direct allocation of social surplus and control over the conditions in which that surplus is spent. As with

BCLT/CHT, this relationship was particularly vital in the early stages of the project but carried on even as the size and revenues of it expanded, with ongoing co-operation including allocation of social surplus and collaboration with the city on specific projects. DSNI has been able to set the parameters in which this assistance is given, however it still relies to some extent on its ability to continue accessing social surplus.

CLT Projects and Transformative Change

Having reviewed the ways in which the two cases have interacted with these three aspects of neoliberal governance, I will now connect these back to the rest of the research question. As is summarized in the section before this one, the projects studied here have showed significant potential to address certain aspects of neoliberal governance, including to address the conditions of displaced survival and of marketized depoliticization. Although they have demonstrated the ability to grow and develop their own resources, both cases also show that ongoing connection with the state and its allocation of social surplus remains crucial. They also reveal the incentives which such projects face to co-operate with private capital in order to develop and provide housing. Based on the cases studied here, these projects were not able to break from their connection to social surplus, both due to their continued reliance on public funding and based on the ongoing organizational relationships which their initial connections to the state established. Due to this continued connection, both cases' ability to access resources has been a product of their relationship to the state, highlighting the importance of active contestation of state power and resources by these projects.

The Difficulties of Separation

The two projects I have studied, even as they have developed their own revenues and assets, have remained closely tied to the state. One aspect of this is the important role that social

surplus has played in both, which demonstrates that active subsidization is vitally important to being able to provide affordable housing in land and housing markets dominated by capitalist speculation. Both projects were able to achieve successes in part because of their successfully winning commitments of public money from governments at the municipal and state-levels.

Another aspect in these case studies, however, is the importance of other state actions (convening meetings, delegating functions such as the power of eminent domain or planning) to empower CLT projects to drive local development. The granting of these powers to a CLT project, as can be seen in the case of DSNI/DNI, can greatly expand the capacity of the project (for instance, its subsidy would not have gone very far if it could not quickly and affordably acquire enough vacant lots in its core area, which it could not do without eminent domain and transfer of public land from the city). Functions like planning were shown to be important for the CLT projects.

The importance of contestation

The ongoing connection of both projects to allocation of the social surplus has revealed the importance of both projects shaping the terms of state support through political engagement. In these cases, BCLT/CHT's and DSNI/DNI's engagement with the state enabled both the projects to obtain a share of social surplus and to obtain other public resources and capacities for their projects. In BCLT/CHT's case, the CLT project was admittedly created by CEDO and the city government, but this came about as a result of the municipal Progressive movement's successful electoral campaign in support of Bernie Sanders and its subsequent attempt to entrench a 'third sector' infrastructure in Burlington. Thus, the BCLT/CHT's access to a share of social surplus and its very founding were predicated on the takeover of the city government by a movement committed to its success and willing to invest in it. For DSNI/DNI, the project began

outside of the state, but focused immediately on organizing for community power in order to pressure the state into supporting it and delegating certain powers, like those of eminent domain and planning. Through this strategy, it arrived at a collaborative relationship with the city of Boston, within which DSNI was able to deliver on its goals of development without displacement and community empowerment. In the view of many within the organization's leadership (at least those whose statements were reviewed in this thesis), this relationship has developed on terms set by DSNI, and thus represents a victory for working-class residents and not a case of co-option by the state. Thus, DSNI's own relationship with the state within which it accessed public funding was established through its organizing efforts in which the organization dealt with the city government as the representative of a community.

A Note on Scale

Each project's political engagement was oriented principally toward the state at its most local scale. It has not been exclusively municipal (for instance, CHT's attempts to support the construction of a federal-level CLT advocacy infrastructure and its engagement with the state of Vermont), but this has been the most important scale. It has not only provided the most significant initial subsidy for each project, but support from municipal governments has enabled both projects to secure their relationships with the state at other scales. Municipal governments in both Boston and Burlington (as well as surrounding municipalities in the latter case) played leading roles in obtaining social surplus allocated at other scales, as well as in negotiating with other local actors.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have addressed the need for more study of how funding and relations of political power influence the ability of CLT projects to serve transformative ends by drawing on

a political-economic lens informed by Marxist analyses of land and housing and neoliberal governance. I have situated CLTs within this as potential tools serving working-class or other liberatory empowerment. Their potential in this regard is conditioned by their ability to maintain independence from the pressures of co-option which surround them when engaging in affordable housing development. I looked in particular at how they have secured resources, and viewed these relationships through three aspects of neoliberal governance: displaced survival, marketization, and the distribution of social surplus. Based on these analyses, I show that the CLT projects have the potential to address the conditions of displacement and unaffordability which render working-class populations surplus, that they have potential of addressing marketized depoliticization by establishing structures for planning and organizing, but that they remain closely tied to the state's allocation of social surplus. As such, the ability of these projects to fulfill their potential depends on their engagement with the state able to allocate that surplus. This engagement has focused primarily on the local scales of municipal governments.

The difficulty of disentangling projects from the social surplus in developing affordable housing has some important implications for understanding the transformative potential of the CLT model. It shows that these projects are unable to serve the ends of working-class empowerment in isolation from the state but shows rather that these relations must be actively contested. If projects wish to create non-capitalist relations and build alternatives to the market, my study of these cases suggests that they should focus on contesting state power in order to control the allocation of social surplus. More research must still be done into this topic, and more practice developed, particularly on the political relationships associated with the struggle for public resources. No doubt, further work emerging from Co-operation Jackson will help to drive this forward.

Notes

[i] In line with the Marxist framing of the project, I understand labour exploitation as the extraction of surplus value from workers through the wage-labour system.
[ii] I have selected Lauesen's work because it is a comprehensive contemporary effort to tie together the writings on this subject from prominent theorists operating within this tradition, and one with a particular focus on its connection to political praxis.
[iii] The potential for a gap between privately created credit money and the productive activities which are necessary to maintain the value of that privately created money open the potential for the value of money in general to be threatened. This occurs if the gap becomes pronounced, necessitating a balance between fictitious capital and other forms of credit and the productive economy (Harvey 2006a; Soederberg 2014).
[iv] The New Afrikan movement is a revolutionary Black nationalist tradition identifying Black people in the United States as a distinct New Afrikan nation being oppressed by the US government and deserving of material sovereignty, political independence, and the right to separate from the US
[v] I will use the word Progressive as a proper noun to refer to the movement which elected Sanders and remained prominent within Burlington's politics. I use this to refer to the movement both before and after the Progressive Party proper's founding.
[vi] Eminent domain allows a (usually government) institution to force private property owners to sell their land at 'fair market rates'. In this case, it allowed DSNI to buy vacant lots owned by private individuals without having to go through a prolonged negotiation process with the owners or be halted holdouts refusing to sell.
[vii] These foundations are focused on community-centred nonprofit development projects, and take a particular interest in racial and economic justice (The Boston Foundation n.d.; The Hyams Foundation n.d.; Mabel Louise Riley Foundation n.d.).

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Appendix A: Map of Burlington in 2010s



(City of Burlington, Vermont 2016)

Appendix B: Map of Roxbury and Dudley Triangle in Early 1990s



(Medoff and Sklar 1994)